This link has been bookmarked by 17 people . It was first bookmarked on 29 Jul 2006, by sdesaille.
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15 Mar 12
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Feminist epistemology and philosophy of science studies the ways in which gender does and ought to influence our conceptions of knowledge, the knowing subject, and practices of inquiry and justification
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08 Jan 12
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To claim objectivity for a representation is to claim that “the world made me represent things this way.”
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To claim relativism is to claim that “my identity (my situation) made me represent things this way (and my identity/situation is not inferior to yours).”
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In asserting the equality of all perspectives, it claims immunity from the critiques of differently positioned others, and complacency in one's own position.
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Negotiating the bewildering array of situated knowledges therefore involves two types of epistemic practice. One is acceptance of responsibility, which involves acknowledging the choices of situation that entered into the construction of one's representations
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Both transform situated knowing into a critical and responsible practice.
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Feminist inquiry begins as a critique of accepted disciplinary methods, assumptions, and canons. As it matures, it develops constructive projects of its own.
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how feminist epistemology negotiates the tension between the two poles in the paradox of bias that lies at the core of the feminist empiricist project.
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Advocates of feminist science develop this theme in seeking to practice science in light of and in the service of feminist aims and values. They thereby represent feminist biases as epistemic resources.
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Another core project of feminist science criticism is demonstrating that the evidence assembled on behalf of the theories under study does not compel assent to the theories. The theories go well beyond the data that support them, with the gap being filled by sexist and androcentric assumptions.
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Thus, Haraway (1989) uses the tools of literary theory to demonstrate how hypotheses in primatology and evolutionary theory depend on narrative conventions
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for example, casting the transition from ape to hominid as a heroic drama) and tropes (for example, casting primates as mirrors of human nature)
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Beyond this negative critique, feminist science critics are interested in uncovering and defending the viability, and in some cases, the superiority, of alternative nonsexist and feminist theories of the phenomena in question.
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scientific inquiries informed by feminist values are based on legitimate, generative limiting biases.
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They argue not that feminist sciences should exclude other ways of doing science, but that feminist sciences should be included as among the legitimate choices available to investigators.
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Its methods should encompass intuition, emotional engagement, and other cognitive styles associated with a feminine sensibility
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rgue that only qualitative methods that accept women's reports of their experiences in their own terms, refusing to generalize, can uphold feminist values of respecting differences among women and avoiding the replication of power differences between researchers and research subjects.
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Feminists are interested in uncovering the causes of women's oppression, revealing the dynamics of gender in society, and producing knowledge that women can use to overcome the disadvantages to which they are subject. Forms of knowledge that simply valorize the “feminine” may not be helpful to women who would be better off not having norms of femininity imposed on them. In any event, feminist pluralists argue that advocates of “feminine” science have not shown that feminine cognitive styles and ontologies are, as a general matter, better able to track the truth (
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Feminists are interested in epistemic practices that reveal the operations of gender in the world, and opportunities for women to resist and transform these operations.
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This gives feminists an interest in the value of “ontological heterogeneity”
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using categories that permit the observation of within-group variation and that resist the representation of difference from the group mean as a form of deviance.
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Gender bias also reinforces sexism through single-factor causal models that attribute seemingly intrinsic powers to men by neglecting their wider context.
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Other feminist cognitive values involve the accessibility of knowledge:
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feminist favor knowledge that “diffuses power”
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None of these feminist cognitive values displace or compete with the search for truth, because doing science as a feminist, like doing science with any other interest in mind (for example, medical or military interests) involves commitment to the cognitive value of producing empirically adequate theories.
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Representations of the world reflect the interests, positions, and biases of observers, and could hardly do otherwise, given that scientific theories always go beyond the evidence offered for them. Biases are necessary to get theorizing off the ground. Therefore, our proper project should not be to give up on presuppositions or biases, but to empirically study which biases are fruitful and which mislead, and reform scientific practice accordingly, as naturalized epistemology would recommend (Antony 1993).
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Feminists argue, on the basis of historical and sociological investigations of the history and current practice of science, that this insistence on the value-neutrality of scientists is self-deceptive and unrealistic (Potter 1993, 2001; Longino 1990, 2001; Harding 1991, 1998; Wylie 1996). Indeed, it is self-defeating: when scientists represent themselves as neutral, this blocks their recognition of the ways their values have shaped their inquiry, and thereby prevents the exposure of these values to critical scrutiny
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17 Sep 09
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Auto mechanics are generally in a better position than auto consumers to know what is wrong with their cars. Practical experience in fulfilling the social role of the mechanic grounds the mechanic's epistemic privilege, which lays a claim to greater reliability than the judgments of auto consumers.
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12 Sep 09
Megan SpencerGood description of standpoint feminism. It gives a lot of details on different viewpoints and ideas.
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To serve their critical aim, social theories must (a) represent the social world in relation to the interests of the oppressed—i.e., those who are the subjects of study; (b) supply an account of that world which is accessible to the subjects of study, which enables them to understand their problems; and (c) supply an account of the world which is usable by the subjects to study to improve their condition.
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To serve their critical aim, social theories must (a) represent the social world in relation to the interests of the oppressed—i.e., those who are the subjects of study; (b) supply an account of that world which is accessible to the subjects of study, which enables them to understand their problems; and (c) supply an account of the world which is usable by the subjects to study to improve their condition.
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To serve their critical aim, social theories must (a) represent the social world in relation to the interests of the oppressed—i.e., those who are the subjects of study; (b) supply an account of that world which is accessible to the subjects of study, which enables them to understand their problems; and (c) supply an account of the world which is usable by the subjects to study to improve their condition.
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To serve their critical aim, social theories must (a) represent the social world in relation to the interests of the oppressed—i.e., those who are the subjects of study; (b) supply an account of that world which is accessible to the subjects of study, which enables them to understand their problems; and (c) supply an account of the world which is usable by the subjects to study to improve their condition
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To serve their critical aim, social theories must (a) represent the social world in relation to the interests of the oppressed—i.e., those who are the subjects of study; (b) supply an account of that world which is accessible to the subjects of study, which enables them to understand their problems; and (c) supply an account of the world which is usable by the subjects to study to improve their condition.
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To serve their critical aim, social theories must (a) represent the social world in relation to the interests of the oppressed—i.e., those who are the subjects of study; (b) supply an account of that world which is accessible to the subjects of study, which enables them to understand their problems; and (c) supply an account of the world which is usable by the subjects to study to improve their condition.
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To serve their critical aim, social theories must (a) represent the social world in relation to the interests of the oppressed—i.e., those who are the subjects of study; (b) supply an account of that world which is accessible to the subjects of study, which enables them to understand their problems; and (c) supply an account of the world which is usable by the subjects to study to improve their condition.
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To serve their critical aim, social theories must (a) represent the social world in relation to the interests of the oppressed—i.e., those who are the subjects of study; (b) supply an account of that world which is accessible to the subjects of study, which enables them to understand their problems; and (c) supply an account of the world which is usable by the subjects to study to improve their condition.
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To serve their critical aim, social theories must (a) represent the social world in relation to the interests of the oppressed—i.e., those who are the subjects of study; (b) supply an account of that world which is accessible to the subjects of study, which enables them to understand their problems; and (c) supply an account of the world which is usable by the subjects to study to improve their condition.
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16 Feb 09
Peter HanleyThe central concept of feminist epistemology is that of a situated knower, and hence of situated knowledge: knowledge that reflects the particular perspectives of the subject. Feminist philosophers are interested in how gender situates knowing subjects. T
postmodernism philosophy mla-general gender feminism mla-pomo
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20 May 08
Dr. Sorin Adam MateiFeminist epistemology conceives of knowers as situated in particular relations to what is known and to other knowers. What is known, and the way that it is known, thereby reflects the situation or perspective of the knower. Here we are concerned with claims to know, temporarily bracketing the question of which claims are true or warranted.
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12 Mar 08
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23 May 07
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The central concept of feminist epistemology is that of a situated knower, and hence of situated knowledge: knowledge that reflects the particular perspectives of the subject.
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Here we are concerned with claims to know, temporarily bracketing the question of which claims are true or warranted.
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The scope of the claimed privilege includes the character, causes, and consequences of the social inequalities that define the groups in question.
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First, it claims to offer deep over surface knowledge of society: the standpoint of the disadvantaged reveals the fundamental regularities that drive the phenomena in question, whereas the standpoint of the privileged captures only surface regularities.
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Second, in virtue of this, it claims to offer superior knowledge of the modality of surface regularities, and thus superior knowledge of human potentialities. Where the standpoint of the privileged tends to represent existing social inequalities as natural and necessary, the standpoint of the disadvantaged correctly represents them as socially contingent, and shows how they could be overcome. Third, it claims to offer a representation of the social world in relation to universal human interests.
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that the world does not dictate the categories we use to describe it, that innumerable incompatible ways of classifying the world are available to us, and therefore that the selection of any one theory is a choice that cannot be justified by appeal to “objective” truth or reality. Even the ways we draw our distinctions between mind and body, ideas and objects, discourse and reality, are contestable.
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ideologies that claim that observed differences between men and women are natural and necessary, or that women have an essence that explains and justifies their subordination. The oft-cited claim that gender is socially or discursively constructed—that it is an effect of social practices and systems of meaning that can be disrupted
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The theories of universal gender identity under attack are ones in which the authors, all white middle class heterosexual women, could see themselves.
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Both positions disclaim the active participation of the knower in constructing her representations.
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One is acceptance of responsibility, which involves acknowledging the choices of situation that entered into the construction of one's representations (Haraway 1991), and considering how one's situation affects the content of one's representations (Harding 1993)
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A wholesale opposition to large-scale generalizations about women seems to arbitrarily preclude a critical analysis of large-scale social forces that critically affect women (Benhabib 1995). That women in different social positions may experience sexism differently does not entail that they have nothing in common—they still suffer from sexism (MacKinnon 2000)
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feminist postmodernism dissolves all groups, thereby reproducing the individualism of the Enlightenment epistemology it claims to repudiate.
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only now in the guise of “the view from everywhere” rather than “the view from nowhere” (Bordo 1990)
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Empiricism is the view that experience provides the sole, or at least the primary, justification for all knowledge.
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Most also advocate a socialized epistemology, in which inquiry is treated as a fundamentally social process and the basic subjects of knowledge may even be communities or networks of individuals.
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First, much feminist science criticism consists in exposing the androcentric and sexist biases in scientific research, especially in theories about women, sexuality, and gender differences. The force of this criticism seems to rest on a prior empiricist commitment to the view that bias is epistemically bad—that it leads to false theories. Yet, advocates of feminist science urge that feminist values inform scientific inquiry. This amounts to a recommendation that science incorporate certain biases into its operations.
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No single theory captures the whole structure of reality, since different ways of classifying phenomena will reveal different patterns useful to different practical interests (Longino 2001)
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is the epistemic community, not the individual
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Hundleby
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Feminist inquiry begins as a critique of accepted disciplinary methods, assumptions, and canons. As it matures, it develops constructive projects of its own. The history of feminism and science follows this pattern. In the empirical sciences, the pattern helps us see how feminist epistemology negotiates the tension between the two poles in the paradox of bias that lies at the core of the feminist empiricist project. Feminist science critics focus on identifying androcentric and sexist biases in the actual practice of science. This practice began by representing bias as a source of error. But as philosophers and historians of science joined the practice of feminist science criticism, they developed a more sophisticated way of understanding some biases as epistemic resources. Advocates of feminist science develop this theme in seeking to practice science in light of and in the service of feminist aims and values. They thereby represent feminist biases as epistemic resources.
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Exemplary works of feminist science criticism by philosophers and historians of science include Haraway (1989), Harding (1986, 1991, 1993, 1998), Lloyd (2006), Longino & Doell (1983), Schiebinger (1989), and Wylie (1996). Although some of this work is devoted to exposing errors caused by sexist and androcentric bias, some of it is devoted rather to showing how the interests in technological control that underlie the modern practice of science limit its scope and what it takes to be significant knowledge (Lacey 1999, Merchant 1980, Tiles 1987).
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Exemplary normative (methodological) works generated by feminist science criticism include Altmann (1974) and Eichler (1988).
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Bias in a research program is shown to be limiting or partial, but not necessarily erroneous, to the extent that avoids clear error and generates (1) a limited range of concepts and/or (2) uses a limited range of methods, (3) has some empirical successes, while (4) rival theories, depending on different concepts and/or methods, can also claim to avoid clear error and to possess some empirical successes or other epistemic virtues not possessed by the research program in question. Such biases are legitimate: it is rationally acceptable to conduct scientific inquiry under the influence of such biases. Indeed, empirical investigations into the workings of the human mind strongly suggest that we have no choice but to think in accordance with some biases.
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They argue not that feminist sciences should exclude other ways of doing science, but that feminist sciences should be included as among the legitimate choices available to investigators.
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Different communities have interests in different aspects of reality, so leaving them free to follow their interests will reveal different patterns and structures in the world (Harding 1998; Longino 2001).
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Doing biology, primatology, anthropology, archaeology, psychology, economics, history or any other special science as a feminist—that is, with the aim of answering feminist questions—has resulted in many and various local methodological innovations, discoveries of new sources of evidence, and developments of alternative theories (see, for example, Bell, Caplan and Karim 1993; Haraway 1989; Hays-Gilpin and Whitley 1998; Nielsen 1990). These are then made available to inquirers asking other, nonfeminist questions. Thus, there is no presumption that certain methods, evidence, etc. are uniquely available to serve feminist cognitive interests.
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17 Dec 05
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