• For his supporters, Khamenei was not merely an Iranian leader. He was a pillar of regional resistance politics and a religious authority. He transformed political Islam into a force capable of confronting what he framed as global hegemony and modern forms of colonial domination.

   

• Through the formation of the so-called “axis of resistance” and his consistent call for Islamic opposition to the United States and Israel, he became a leading figure for Shiite movements and segments of Sunni political Islam.

   

• Sunni groups such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood were not created by Iran. Yet they voluntarily aligned themselves with Tehran’s resistance framework, forming close strategic ties.

   

• Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, and the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 as a result of Iranian-backed resistance, significantly elevated Khamenei’s standing among many Muslims. This reinforced the perception that resistance could produce tangible results.

   

• For Shiites, his legacy carries additional weight. His support for Shiite communities living in Sunni-ruled states – many of whom had experienced long periods of marginalisation – was seen as a historic political shift.

   

• For many Shiite communities in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and beyond, Khameinei’s leadership symbolised political empowerment, the building of political and military institutions, and the creation of a new balance of power.

   

• As guardian of the Islamic Republic, his ability to steer the regime through sanctions, protests, war and internal crises – while expanding Iran’s regional influence – also earned him domestic support.

   

• Some Iranians viewed him as a stabilising, patriotic figure. After eight years of war with Iraq shattered the country, he rebuilt the political, economic and military systems. He also shaped Iran’s doctrine of defiance against pressure from Israel and the West.

   

• On the other hand, Khamenei’s rule was marked by severe restrictions on political freedoms inside Iran and support for dictators such as Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. This cost him popularity among other Sunni Muslims in the Arab world.

   

• The central tension of his legacy remains clear: the same system that empowered certain communities beyond Iran’s borders simultaneously constrained political freedoms at home.

   

• Reactions to his death mirror the deeper fault lines within the Muslim world between secularism and religiosity, sovereignty and global integration, resistance and reform.

   

• History will remember him as a defining figure whose impact reshaped the region – for better or worse.<!-- Below is The Conversation's page counter tag. Please DO NOT REMOVE. --><!-- End of code. If you don't see any code above, please get new code from the Advanced tab after you click the republish button. The page counter does not collect any personal data. More info: https://theconversation.com/republishing-guidelines -->

   

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• The U.S. has already been at war with Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. In 1987-88, the U.S. Navy actively sided with Saddam Hussein in his war with Iran, by escorting tankers carrying Iraqi oil, attacking Iranian boats and oil rigs, and “accidentally” shooting down an Iranian civilian jetliner. This war with Iran is a continuation of a long-simmering conflict.

   

• Yet in four decades of conflict, Iran has never sponsored an attack within the U.S., even as the U.S. has attacked its allies in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and directly attacked its own forces in the Gulf. Only Sunni terrorists (also opposed by Iran) have attacked targets in the U.S.

   

• But there is one scenario that I fear could lead to boots on the ground in Iran. Watch for the U.S. and Israel again stoking ethnic divisions in the diverse country, where ethnic minorities form more than 40 percent of the population, such as Azeris and Kurds in the northwest, Baluchis in the southeast, and Ahwazi Arabs in the southwest, who have been oppressed by both the Shah and Ayatollahs. The most dangerous sign would be encouraging a rebellion in the province of Khuzestan, called “Al Ahwaz” by its Arab inhabitants.

   

• Netanyahu today exclaimed, “The time has come for all segments of the Iranian people – the Persians, the Kurds, the Azeris, the Baluchis, and the Ahwazis – to throw off the yoke of tyranny and bring about a free and peaceful Iran.” Yet at the same time, Israel backs the Shah’s son Reza Pahlavi as a future ruler, who would not be welcome by the ethnic minorities that his father severely repressed, nor by most Persians living in Iran.

   

• Even if ethnic minority grievances against Persian rule are legitimate, the timing of western interest in their grievances coincides too neatly with the larger desire to pressure and isolate Iran. Washington has a long history of championing the rights of ethnic minorities against its enemies (such as in Montagnards in Vietnam, Hmong in Laos, Miskitus in Nicaragua, and most recently Kurds in Syria), then abandoning or selling out the minority when it is no longer strategically useful. We love ‘em, we use ‘em, and then we dump ‘em.

   

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• Het nu geëscaleerde conflict gaat over AI-gebruik voor massasurveillance op Amerikaans grondgebied en AI-gebruik voor volledig autonome wapensystemen. Anthropic wil dat expliciet uitsluiten voor zijn AI-technologie en dat specifiek opnemen in het contract met Defensie. Het ministerie wil dat niet op die manier vastleggen.

• In tegenstelling tot Anthropic lijkt OpenAI erop te vertrouwen dat Defensie zich houdt aan de wet en dat dit gelijkstaat aan moreel of ethisch juist handelen. Altman kwam maandag nog wel met aanvullingen op de al gesloten overeenkomst, die naar zijn zeggen te haastig is gesloten. De ceo van OpenAI zegt nu met het ministerie te werken aan veranderingen. Het is de vraag of en hoe ver het ministerie daarin meegaat, nu het kennelijk de gewenste AI-deal heeft met een grote aanbieder.

   

• De haastig gesloten overeenkomst van OpenAI en het schijnbare vertrouwen van ceo Altman in de Amerikaanse overheid werpt vragen op over ethisch gedrag. Anthropic lijkt in deze kwestie dus de ethische partij te zijn, die oog heeft voor mogelijk militair AI-misbruik. Ceo Dario Amodei deed vorige week nog ferme uitspraken dat het eindbod van het Pentagon 'onacceptabel' was. Toch valt er wel wat aan te merken op de aanpak van de Amerikaanse AI-aanbieder.

   

• Zo deed Anthropic recent al water bij de wijn. De concurrent van OpenAI schrapte een belangrijke veiligheidsbelofte uit zijn beleid voor het ontwikkelen van AI-systemen. Topmensen van Anthropic onthulden vorige maand dat ze de centrale veiligheidsbelofte van het bedrijf loslaten. Het gaat om de belofte van 2023 dat de AI-aanbieder nooit een AI-systeem zou trainen als het niet vooraf kon garanderen dat de veiligheidsmaatregelen van het bedrijf adequaat zijn. Deze belofte is de kern van de responsible scaling policy (rsp) van het bedrijf, maar die kern is dus losgelaten.

• Eerder gebruikte Defensie al Claude in de ontvoering van de Venezolaanse president Nicolás Maduro. Dat zou de oorzaak zijn geweest voor het conflict tussen het ministerie en Anthropic. Bij de aanval op Iran zou de Amerikaanse legerleiding de AI-technologie van Anthropic gebruiken voor verschillende doeleinden. Dit omvat volgens The Wall Street Journal het vergaren van inlichtingen, het uitvoeren van slagveldsimulaties en het bepalen van doelwitten.

• De vechtscheiding tussen Anthropic en het Amerikaanse ministerie van Defensie betekent weliswaar verlies van een grote klant en is dus erg voor het AI-bedrijf. Maar er speelt meer. Niet alleen Defensie verbreekt de banden met Anthropic. Alle Amerikaanse overheidsinstanties krijgen het bevel om te breken met die AI-aanbieder.

• President Donald Trump kondigde dit vrijdag aan, vlak voor de start van de militaire operatie tegen Iran. Hij noemt de dwarsliggende AI-aanbieder 'een radicaal-links, woke bedrijf' dat eropuit is om te bepalen hoe het Amerikaanse leger moet vechten en hoe het oorlogen moet winnen. Trump uit verdere klassieke MAGA-kritiek op Anthropic en kondigt aan het bedrijf in de ban te doen voor overheidsgebruik in brede zin.

   

• Defensieminister Hegseth beschuldigt Anthropic van 'arrogantie en verraad'. Hij stelt dat zijn ministerie volledige, onbeperkte toegang moet hebben tot de AI-modellen van Anthropic. Daarbij benadrukt hij dat dit voor 'wettelijke doeleinden' is ter verdediging van de Verenigde Staten. Woordvoerders van de Amerikaanse overheid omschrijven de aanval op Iran als een defensieve maatregel, vanwege de verwachte wraak van Iran op Amerikaanse doelwitten in reactie op een aankomende aanval op Iran door Israël.

• Zelfs ceo Altman van OpenAI maakt zich zorgen. Hij spreekt van 'een angstwekkend precedent' voor wat nu gebeurt met zijn concurrent. Ondertussen speculeren experts over een dreigende nationalisering van de Amerikaanse AI-industrie, spreken werknemers bij techbedrijven zich uit tegen de ban op Anthropic en dreigt de toch al precaire situatie in het Midden-Oosten te escaleren, met AI opgenomen in het wapenarsenaal.

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• • Mining companies are now required to process and refine minerals locally to add value before export, aligning with broader African trends.
     
• • Major Chinese companies have heavily invested in Zimbabwe’s lithium mining, making the country a key supplier for Chinese refineries.
     
         
                                                                                         
   
              
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• Following investments totaling billions of dollars by companies such as Sinomine Resource Group, Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt Co., and Chengxin Lithium Group for mine construction, Zimbabwe rapidly emerged as a key source of lithium concentrate for Chinese refineries, as reported by Bloomberg. 

         

                          

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• The mines minister further revealed that the export prohibition encompasses lithium concentrates, in addition to any raw or unbeneficiated minerals that have not undergone value addition. 

         

                          

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• The plan was for a quick and lively campaign and a speedy takeover of a country the Russian president thought shouldn’t exist.

• Four years on, Russia has not found itself among fellow great powers willing to divide up the globe.

    

• A middle power despite its great power cravings, Russia has instead been forced into a growing dependence on China while having to deal with a multitude of hostile middle powers, which often thwart its ambitions.

    

• A greater failure is hard to imagine.

• In recent days, Russia had to watch on helplessly as the US and Israel – following Russia’s playbook – ignored international law and attacked Iran, a close Russian ally.

    

• When Iran’s foreign minister asked his Russian counterpart for help, Sergei Lavrov sounded more like a European politician than an advocate for a new world order.

    

• He condemned the “unprovoked act of armed aggression […] in direct violation of the fundamental principles and norms of international law”. He called for a “peaceful solution based in international law, mutual respect and a balanced consideration of interests”.

    

• As The Guardian put it, Russia has found out a

    

   

  rejection of the old rules of geopolitics have not necessarily played into its favour.

• Russia underestimated the extent to which the old order gave it room to manoeuvre. Then, as long as others played by the rules, breaking them could give Russia a tactical advantage.

    

  But once others also opted for raw power, the limits of Russia’s abilities became obvious.

• But Ukraine’s government retained control of 80% of its territory. It also held onto its use of the Black Sea, a vital link to world markets.

    

• All Russia’s efforts are complicated by the emerging multipolar world order it had so desperately hoped to conjure into being.

    

• Russia has discovered the hard way that its geopolitical fantasy of being a great power in this new multipolar world order comes with one tiny problem: it can’t afford it.

    

• Its population is both declining and ageing. Its GDP (adjusted to purchasing power) is in the same ballpark as that of Japan or Germany (rather than the much larger India, to say nothing of the US or China).

    

• And its economy is dominated by hydrocarbon exports destined for a bleak future in a quickly decarbonising world.

    

• But the results were opposite to intentions.

    

• Unable to subdue Ukraine, Russia’s power projection suffered elsewhere. Its once-close relationship with Israel is on the rocks. It lost its foothold in Syria and has proved unable to support its allies in Iran and Venezuela.

    

• In a lawless international order, it is too inconsequential to dictate the play.

    

• While US President Donald Trump at times treats Putin as an equal, nobody else does.

    

• But it neither took clear sides in Russia’s Ukraine war, nor sent weapons. Instead, Beijing used Russia’s isolation to cement a relationship in which it clearly has the upper hand.

    

• India increased its purchase of Russian oil (now at a steep discount) and continued to buy Russian weapons, but as part of a multi-vector geopolitical strategy.

    

• Rather than a fellow great power, India saw Russia as an opportunity to be exploited in its ongoing quest for an autonomous foreign policy.

    

• According to the latest data, the nearly US$75 billion (A$105 billion) in military aid the US has provided since the start of the war has amounted to only 30% of the total tally.

    

• The remaining 70%, and all ongoing military support in the past 12 months, came from middle and smaller powers, led by Germany (20%), the United Kingdom (9%), Norway (8%) and Sweden (7%).

    

• Thus, Russia’s war on Ukraine did hasten the emergence of a multipolar world.

    

• It just wasn’t the one Russia had in mind.

   

         

   

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• Even for skilled developers, it's at minimum an hour of setup. For non-developers, it's effectively impossible.

  Claude collapses all of that into a single conversation. You describe what you want, and within seconds you have a working prototype you can actually use — and share with anyone who has the link.

• The most direct approach: tell Claude you want to build an AI-powered app, then describe the persona or purpose. Try something like: "Build me a chatbot that acts like a skeptical editor reviewing my writing" or "Create an AI assistant that only speaks in the style of a 1920s detective." Let your imagination go wild and Claude will handle the rest — writing the code, embedding the API calls and rendering the finished app in the side panel.

• My guess is it won't stay exclusive forever. But for now, if you've ever wanted a custom AI assistant tailored to exactly your needs without touching a line of code, Claude is the place to build it. Give it a try and let me know what you think in the comments.

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• As we predicted a week ago, and in light of the Iranian regime’s continued intransigence—its refusal to commit to ending uranium enrichment and to negotiate limits on its ballistic missile programme—it faced “the risk of a military strike that could create a situation threatening the entire regime, and which might ultimately lead to Khamenei’s removal from power in one way or another.” We concluded that the impending US strike was “planned to target Ali Khamenei specifically, along with the heads of the hardliners in the Iranian regime, in the hope that their removal would pave the way for Tehran’s submission to Washington’s desiderata.” (“A Game of Chicken Between Washington and Tehran?” [in Arabic], Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 24 February 2026).

• We also explained how Donald Trump’s approach to Iran falls within the framework of the strategy he successfully implemented in Venezuela, which focuses on “changing the regime’s behaviour” rather than “changing the regime” itself, as the George W. Bush administration sought to do by invading Iraq in 2003 (see “US: an old-new imperial doctrine”, Le Monde diplomatique, February 2026). A significant difference between Venezuela and Iran, however, is that Washington had connections with key figures within the Venezuelan regime and believed they would comply with its demands once subjected to intense pressure and after the removal of their president, Nicolás Maduro, through his abduction. In Iran, by contrast, the regime exercises far tighter control and oversight over its leading figures, making the risk of any of them reaching a behind-the-scenes accommodation with Washington far lower. Moreover, kidnapping the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran was not a feasible option, and eliminating him alone would in any case have been insufficient to alter the regime’s trajectory.

• For this reason, the American operation against Iran is far larger and more complex than the one that targeted Venezuela. What, then, is the Trump administration’s objective in Iran? It bears repeating that it is not “regime change,” despite the insistence of those who fail to grasp the vast difference between that policy—as exemplified by the occupation of Iraq—and large-scale military operations. The current onslaught is not accompanied by any intention to occupy Iran (even assuming such an occupation were possible, given that it would require a military effort more akin to the Korean and Vietnam Wars than to the occupation of a much-weakened Iraq in 2003—something the US administration is neither politically capable of nor willing to undertake). Everything Trump has done thus far appears consistent with the approach described above, even to the point of reassuring the backbone of the Iranian regime—the Revolutionary Guard Corps—that he guarantees them “total immunity” if they halt the war and submit to Washington’s will.

• This suggests that Washington’s wager in Iran rests on hope rather than certainty, unlike its calculations in Venezuela. The Trump administration is betting that overwhelming military pressure, combined with the elimination of several leaders—including the head of state—will tip the balance in favour of pragmatic, non-ideological “moderates”. These are figures who believe that preserving the mullahs’ regime now requires abandoning the posture of “resistance” and “steadfastness”, relinquishing regional expansionist ambitions, and pursuing political and economic openness toward the United States. Such a shift, they believe, would return Iran to a path of economic development for which it possesses considerable potential. It would also prolong the regime’s lifespan and diminish popular opposition, especially if accompanied by a significant easing of the repression that weighs on daily life, particularly for women. The noose has tightened around the mullahs’ regime to the point that it can no longer continue along its previous course—unless the hardliners opt to transform the country into an absolute, isolated, and impoverished dictatorship akin to North Korea. That scenario cannot be ruled out, of course, although the Iranian people have shown themselves far less susceptible to indoctrination and submission than the population of that unfortunate country.

• Here lies the fundamental difference between the Trump administration’s objectives in Iran and those of the Zionist government—indeed of the Zionist state. Netanyahu has repeatedly called on the Iranian people to overthrow the regime and has openly expressed his desire for the restoration of the Pahlavi dynasty, which was overthrown by the 1979 Iranian Revolution, as represented by Reza Pahlavi, son of the deposed Shah. Washington, however, has not backed the Shah’s son, just as it did not support the Venezuelan opposition leader, judging both incapable of governing their respective countries. Its primary objective is for the Iranian regime, with its core structures intact, to cooperate with the United States along the lines of Washington’s other regional allies. It fears the regime’s collapse, recognizing that such an outcome would likely lead to armed chaos and fragmentation, producing extreme instability in the Gulf region—an outcome entirely contrary to Washington’s interests, and even to Trump’s personal and familial interests (not to mention those of the Kushner and Witkoff families).

• By contrast, the Zionist government favours such a collapse, which aligns with the longstanding Zionist plan to fragment the entire Middle East (see “Reviving the Zionist Project to Fragment the Arab East”, 22 July 2025) and would reinforce the image of the State of Israel as “a villa in the jungle”, as former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak once described it—echoing the founder of modern Zionism, Theodor Herzl, who promised that the “State of the Jews” he envisioned would be “an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism”, borrowing from the colonial lexicon. Meanwhile, the Zionist state has surpassed all other regional states in barbarity through the genocidal war it has waged—and continues to wage—in Gaza.

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