Senior at Chatham University---Interested in studying foreign policy, languages, human rights, law, conflict mediation---Interested in general in books, rock climbing, color guard, drum corps, winter guard, music, dance, and conversations with no point.

Member since Nov 03, 2009, follows 2 people, 0 public groups, 35 public bookmarks (35 total).

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  • FindLaw | Cases and Codes on 2010-04-12
    • And the only "conspiracy" crimes that have been recognized by international war crimes tribunals (whose jurisdiction often extends beyond war crimes proper to crimes against humanity and crimes against the peace) are conspiracy to commit genocide and common plan to wage aggressive war, which is a crime against the peace and requires for its commission actual participation in a "concrete plan to wage war."
    • The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, over the prosecution's objections, pointedly refused to recognize as a violation of the law of war conspiracy to commit war crimes, see, e.g., 22 id., at 469,39 and convicted only Hitler's most senior associates of conspiracy to wage aggressive war, see S. Pomorski, Conspiracy and Criminal Organization, in the Nuremberg Trial and International Law 213, 233-235 (G. Ginsburgs & V. Kudriavtsev eds. 1990).
    • Hamdan is charged not with an overt act for which he was caught redhanded in a theater of war and which military efficiency demands be tried expeditiously, but with an agreement the inception of which long predated the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the AUMF. That may well be a crime,41 but it is not an offense that "by the law of war may be tried by military commissio[n]." 10 U. S. C. §821.
  • Uniform Code of Military Justice - UCMJ on 2010-04-12
    • 821. ART. 21. JURISDICTION OF COURTS-MARTIAL NOT EXCLUSIVE
        
      The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts- martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.
  • The Psychological Asymmetry of Islamist Warfare :: Middle East Quarterly on 2010-04-08
    • But Israel's technological edge does not mean that it enjoys every advantage in its battles with terror groups: While Israel subscribes to traditional restrictions on its battlefield conduct, its Islamist and jihadi adversaries, who eschew international humanitarian law, enjoy an asymmetric advantage born of psychological impunity.
    • The Israeli military faces a serious dilemma because it adheres to a specific moral code. Despite Arab propaganda to the contrary, Israeli military planners respect human life.
    • Comparative prisoner treatment also highlights the discrepancy: The Israeli government provides access to and information about captured terrorists, opening itself to criticism of their treatment,[14] whereas neither Hamas nor Hezbollah even acknowledge whether captured Israelis are alive, let alone allow international monitors access to them.

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  • A NATION CHALLENGED - CAPTIVES - A NATION CHALLENGED - CAPTIVES - IN SHIFT, BUSH SAYS GENEVA RULES FIT TALIBAN CAPTIVES - NYTimes.com on 2010-04-08
    • After pressure from European allies angered by the administration's original stance, he wanted to send a signal to the world that the United States respects the convention and expects its own captured soldiers to be accorded its protections. But critics argue that the president's action makes a mockery of the convention and may or may not protect American soldiers.
    • It also does not limit American ability to interrogate the captives, though it was not known whether that issue influenced the decision.
    • Prisoners of war can be tried only on charges of war crimes, but unlawful combatants -- as the United States is calling the captives even though the term does not officially appear in the convention -- can be tried for acts before the conflict in Afghanistan, like conspiring to attack the World Trade Center.

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  • C.I.A. Had Plan to Assassinate Qaeda Leaders - NYTimes.com on 2010-04-06
    • the Bush administration sought an alternative to killing terror suspects with missiles fired from drone aircraft or seizing them overseas and imprisoning them in secret C.I.A. jails.
    • The program was designed in the frantic weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks when President George W. Bush signed a secret order authorizing the C.I.A. to capture or kill operatives of Al Qaeda around the world.
  • 58. White House Press Secretary announcement of President Bush's determination re legal status of Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees (February 7, 2002) on 2010-03-29
    • Q What about the U.S. special forces? They don't -- they often do not wear uniforms. They often do not carry their weapons outwardly. If they are captured, they wouldn't be prisoners of war?

       

      MR. FLEISCHER: The terms of the Geneva Convention apply to all, and those terms speak for themselves.

  • International Humanitarian Law - Additional Protocol I 1977 on 2010-03-04
    • 2. While all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, violations of these rules shall not deprive a combatant of his right to be a combatant or, if he falls into the power of an adverse Party, of his right to be a prisoner of war, except as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4.

    •  3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he
       carries his arms openly:
       
       (a) during each military engagement, and
       (b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate.
       
       Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1 (c).
    • 4. A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while failing to meet the requirements set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3 shall forfeit his right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention and by this Protocol. This protection includes protections equivalent to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention in the case where such a person is tried and punished for any offences he has committed
  • Richard Falk: Appraising the War Against Afghanistan on 2010-03-01
    • On September 11 the Taliban government was recognized by only three countries in the world and had been refused the right to represent Afghanistan in the United Nations. Indeed, Afghanistan itself was treated as an outlaw state, a status confirmed by a Special Rapporteur appointed by the UN Human Rights Commission, who reported annually on the severe human rights abuses and crimes against humanity that were routinely taking place in the country. As well, Afghanistan was the recipient of universal censure, including from Islamic governments, for its insistence on removing any taint of non-Islamic religious devotion by the deliberate destruction of the huge world renowned statues of The Buddha at Budiman just months earlier.
    • Against such a background it was generally credible that Afghanistan would be treated as an enemy state held responsible for the attacks of September 11.
    • President Bush in his September 20 address to a joint session of Congress articulated some non-negotiable demands directed at the Taliban regime that seemed to focus exclusively on al Qaida - seeking custody of Osama bin Laden and the al Qaida leadership, as well as terminating their presence within the country.

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  • (Page 8 of 23) - The Law of Armed Conflict and Irregular Warfare: Real and Perceived Normative Challenges authored by Svarc, Dominika. on 2010-03-01
    •  the  AP  II  is  itself  an  unreliable  source  of  humanitarian  protections  in  non-
       
      international armed conflicts, since its application depends on the nature of the non-state armed 
       
      group (responsible command and the ability to implement AP II), on the exercise of a minimum 
       
      control  of  territory  thereby  (exercise  of  de  facto  control  over  a  part  of  a  national  territory, 
       
      sufficient to allow military operations of a sustained and concerted character to be carried out) 
       
      and on intensity of military operations.
       
      24
       
       The underlying difficulty in the context of terrorism is 
       
      that  much  of  the  terrorist  violence  is  perpetrated  by  loosely  organized  groups  or  networks,  or 
       
      individuals  that,  at  best,  share  a  common  ideology,  but  could  hardly  be  characterised  as  a  well 
       
      organized insurgency, qualifying as a ‘party’ to a conflict within the traditional meaning of AP II.
  • (Page 7 of 23) - The Law of Armed Conflict and Irregular Warfare: Real and Perceived Normative Challenges authored by Svarc, Dominika. on 2010-03-01
    •  According to Cassese, ‘an armed conflict which 
       
      takes place between an Occupying Power and rebel or insurgent groups – whether or not they 
       
      are  terrorist  in  character  –  in  an  occupied  territory,  [likewise]  amounts  to  an  international 
       
      armed conflict’
    • since  contemporary  trans-national  terrorist  groups  increasingly  operate 
       
      independently  from  any  State  and  often  do  not  fit  the  definition  of  a  national  liberation 
       
      movement in the sense of AP I, eventual hostilities between them and a State or group of States 
       
      might have more the character of a non-international rather then international armed conflict. 
       
      This covers scenarios in which a State is fighting terrorist groups either in its own territory or in 
       
      a foreign territory, when the host State is not involved in hostilities.

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