• The Internet once presented a promise of abundant, unfiltered information that posed a challenge to the monopoly of conventional methods of communication and forms of information dissemination and control.
• Internet as a publishing platform, a personal communications medium and as an economic vehicle.
• Bloggers, citizen journalists and independent media are viable competitors to traditional corporate and state–owned media. In the economic realm, Voice–Over–Internet–Protocol (VoIP) [1] is threatening to traditional telecommunications companies while offshore gambling and banking sites challenge existing laws and regulations. File–sharing services have significantly impacted the area of copyright and intellectual property. And, from the security perspective, spam, child pornography, identity theft, computer break–ins and terrorism — both cyberterrorism and the use of the Internet for recruitment — present significant challenges for governments worldwide.
• there are locations at the intersection of regulatory and technological controls through which an information control policy is imposed on the Internet.
• Filtering is the technical mechanism through which such controls are operationalized.
• Much like geographical boundaries, states are seeking to assert information sovereignty over the Internet
• Internet content filtering at the national level is imposed on entire populations, often with little accountability

• The motivations for state–directed Internet filtering include those with:

    
  • a specific emphasis on e–commerce: tax, copyright, VoIP
   
  • a specific emphasis on children: child pornography, violence
   
  • a specific emphasis on content
   
  • cultural: pornography and gambling
   
  • political: dissidents and independent media
   
  • security: (cyber)terrorism and hacking, circumvention
• information security has now become a paramount concern
• Filtering is used as a means to control external content,
• Filtering has two inherent flaws: over–blocking and under–blocking.
• Filtering technology cannot keep pace with categorizing and blocking existing content, let alone all the newly created content on the Internet. Thus there will always be content available that is similar to blocked content.
• Filtering systems can be easily circumvented by those actively seeking filtered content.
• There are significant transparency and accountability issues raised by the deployment of filtering technology
• The process through which content is selected and blocked is most often conducted in secrecy. There is little accountability in the selection process and no mechanism for review or redress for incorrect blocking.
• the selection process is often vague and arbitrary and rarely is justification provided as to why a specific site is blocked. This problem is exacerbated when countries add their own block lists to existing commercial filtering technology. The block lists used by commercial filtering technology and kept private as they are the intellectual property of the manufacturer.
• In effect, the manufacturers of filtering software are determining what Internet content citizens of entire countries have access to. Not only do these companies often make mistakes, but their selection process is not open to peer review and scrutiny.
• Filtering effectiveness is not rooted entirely in technology; the technical implementation of filtering forms the basis of new social norms in which users conform to accepted patterns of behavior and do not seek to access content known to be filtered
• Citizens subjected to Internet filtering and surveillance grow to fear potential penalties for publishing or accessing content that may (or may not) be considered sensitive thereby limiting free communication and dialog.
• filtering technology is now being widely deployed at the institutional and national level.
• rely on list–based blocking, often in conjunction with blocking techniques that use keyword matching, to dynamically block Internet content.
• hen users attempt to access a Web page the filtering software checks its list database and blocks access if the page is on that list. If keyword blocking is enabled, the software will check each Web page (the domain, URL path and/or body content of the requested page) and dynamically block access to the page if any of the banned keywords are present.
• When deployed at the national level, many states implement robust enterprise level filtering technology at Internet Service Providers (ISP) or near international gateway connections so that the filtering affects the entire country.
• China deploys Internet filtering technology at the Internet backbone level, near international gateway points.
• Although cyber–cafés and ISPs may implement an additional layer of filtering, at the national level all users are subject to essentially uniform filtering
• Iran delegates filtering responsibility to ISPs.
• variations in blocked content
• ISP level, focus on the “block list” approach where access to listed locations are blocked.
• Domain Name Service (DNS) filtering
• IP filtering
• URL filtering
• it easy to circumvent (by accessing an IP address for instance, or using a different DNS server) it is not something that network administrators normally do. DNS servers are used to translate domain names into IP addresses and are updated frequently.

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  Blocking by IP is effective
• as the scale of filtering increases, countries begin to adopt the use of commercial technology designed specifically for Internet filtering, most of which is capable of URL filtering.
• Countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Tunisia, Yemen and Sudan all use commercial filtering products developed by U.S. corporations [9]. Despite the ability to filter by specific URL, most countries do not make significant use of the technology [10]. Instead most simply block entire domains if any offending content is located.
• The deployment of commercial filtering technology at the national level is generally restricted to developing countries whose Internet infrastructure can be intentionally designed or adapted to accommodate filtering technology.
• The implementation of a filtering strategy is particular to the unique legal, political and technical conditions within a country.
• Some are quite transparent about filtering practices, from both a policy and technology standpoint, while others remain closed and secretive.
• The way in which the decision to filter is taken is as significant as the technology used. It sets the tone, from the start, as to the amount of transparency and openness there will be in the process and whether or not respect for freedom of speech and expression will factor into the filtering regime
• Governments can legislate the use of filtering technology and order specific content to be blocked. This has been the case in the U.S. when the State of Pennsylvania passed legislation requiring ISPs to block access to sites designated as child pornography.
• most filtering regimes are implemented as a result of vague laws which are open to arbitrary interpretation, ministerial decrees, or obscure “national security” channels.
• Iran does not have explicit laws regulating Internet content or requiring the implementation of filtering technology. Rather, Iran uses the country’s Press Law to target specific content. The implementation of filtering is mandated, not by law, but by the Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI), which is run by the Ministry for Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
• In Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, Internet content is regulated through the “2000 Web Regulations” which prohibits publishing content “detrimental” to state interests
• India’s Internet filtering regime appears to operate by decree. In September 2003, ISPs in India received a faxed notice from the Ministry of Communications & Information Technology order a specific URL to be blocked. The Mumbai Police Commissioner’s Office also ordered ISPs in India to block a specific Web site [15]. There appears to be jurisdictional and legal uncertainty concerning the implementation of filtering in India.
• South Korea’s Internet filtering came as a result of order by the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC). ISPs in South Korea were instructed to block access to Web sites designated as North Korean propaganda. The filtering action was taken under a Security Law, passed in 1948, to counter the threat of communist influence and infiltration [16]. There appear to be no explicit laws requiring the use of filtering.
• China, the government has established a complex web of regulations for both Internet Service Providers (ISP) and Internet Content Providers (ICP). These regulations manage the delivery of Internet access as well as content within China and define the enforcement policies and mechanisms through which compliance with the regulations is achieved. Although the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) is responsible for the Internet infrastructure, the Ministry of Public Security and the State Secrets Bureau are also involved in the filtering process [17]
• Most countries that filter are unable to publicly answer the following questions: What are the blocking criteria? Is there a review process? What is the policy on collateral blocking? Is there a grievance mechanism? How can designations be changed if there is mis–categorization? How are Internet users informed that they are attempting to access prohibited content?
• Iran and United Arab Emirates clearly inform users that the content they have requested is blocked.
• Saudi Arabia users are presented with a blockpage which states that the requested Web site has been blocked but it also contains a link to a Web form through which users can petition to have the site unblocked [18]. In these cases users are at least aware of the fact that their requested content has been deliberately blocked, and in some cases, are given instructions on how to seek to have content unblocked. The acknowledgment of blocked content allows users to petition to have sites unblocked if there has been a mis–categorization [19]. It also requires governments to justify why a specific site is blocked.
• China, for example, the filtering mechanism in place at the Internet backbone level generates an error when prohibited content is requested. When a “block” occurs, the Internet connection of the user is disrupted. The connection between the user and the requested site is terminated [20]. This creates a situation where connections between the two computers are disrupted for a period of time, often up to twenty minutes. This is what is generally referred to as being “banned” or being in the “penalty box.”
• Tunisia uses this blockpage functionality to deliver a false error indication to users.
• Saudi Arabia, for example, blocks little political content and focuses on pornography and gambling sites.
• Saudi Arabia is quite open about filtering. On the other hand, Tunisia is quite closed about what type of content is filtered.
• In Uzbekistan, some ISPs provide a blockpage to users indicating that the requested content has been blocked because it is pornographic. However, some political Web sites are blocked in this way even though they do not contain any pornography.
• Many countries implement filtering in order to block pornographic content. Most countries use commercial filtering lists to target this content and have achieved reasonable levels of success. Saudi Arabia, UAE and Iran blocked 100 percent of all pornographic sites tested by the OpenNet Initiative.
• While China has been cracking down on domestically produced pornography, China blocked pornography at a rate of only 39 percent. Of all the topics tested by the OpenNet Initiative, pornography is blocked with the highest overall percentage rates. Pornography is not language–specific and thus commercial enterprises create targeted lists that are used by countries worldwide.
• Most countries that filter the Internet target content that is specific to the country itself and is in the local language.
• The focus is on “high impact” Web sites or keywords that contain content that governments consider to be sensitive or taboo. These Web sites generally include domestic human rights organizations, independent media, opposition groups or political parties, and religious conversion or spiritual groups. Sites that contain content opposed to or dissenting from the views of the current government are most often the targets of filtering. The control over information begins to move from filtering into overt political censorship.
• China blocks access to Web sites containing content related to Taiwanese and Tibetan independence, Falun Gong, the Dalai Lama, Tiananmen Square, and opposition political movements. The filtering regime in China operates with a lack of transparency. China rarely admits to filtering the Internet. There is no public list of banned sites and no mechanism for citizens to petition to have a site unblocked
• Iran blocks access to Web sites of banned political parties, the monarchy [24], independent media and blogs. Iran also uses commercial filtering software to block access to pornography. While Iran has publicly acknowledged filtering the Internet and uses blockpages to inform users that content is blocked, the list of blocked sites and the specific criteria used to determine which sites to block are not public. There is also no mechanism for citizens to petition to have a site unblocked
• Uzbekistan blocks access to the Web sites of banned Islamic movements, independent media, NGOs and Web sites critical of the government’s human rights record, and UzSciNet blocks access to pornography. Political content is blocked deceptively and there is no mechanism for citizens to petition to have a site unblocked
• Filtering systems suffer two inherent flaws: over–blocking and under–blocking
• Not only do filtering technologies often block access to content that is unrelated to banned topics, they often do not block access to all content intended to be blocked. In effect, there are two types of lists used for filtering: government lists and commercial lists.
• his inherent flaw is exacerbated when entire countries rely on such commercial filtering programs. For example, Saudi Arabia was condemned by human rights organizations for blocking access to non–pornographic gay and lesbian sites. After learning about the blocked sites, the Saudi authorities promptly removed the blocking [29]. Saudi Arabia never intended to block access to these sites. These sites were likely misclassified by the commercial filtering product, SmartFilter, that Saudi Arabia implemented at the national level. In effect, U.S. corporations are in a position to determine what millions of citizens can and cannot view on the Internet. Even the countries implementing filtering products do not know for certain what is in fact being blocked.
• Government lists generally consist of sites that highlight corruption or oppose the regime in power, report on human rights abuses, or publish the writings of independent journalists.

• When an IP address is blocked, there is a significant chance that many unrelated Web sites will be blocked in the process.

    

  For example, South Korea has an advanced Internet infrastructure. Yet when implementing Internet filtering, South Korean ISPs have chosen to block by IP address. As a result, while trying to block 31 Web sites, they actually blocked 3,167 unrelated domain names hosted on the same servers as the sites they intended to block [31].

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  Morocco recently introduced Internet filtering and blocked the IP addresses of the following Web sites that promote independence for Western Sahara: http://www.arso.org/, http://cahiersdusahara.com/, http://wsahara.net/ and http://www.spsrasd.info/ [33]. The site http://www.afapredesa.org/ is also blocked. In blocking these five sites Morocco is actually blocking at least 2,287 domains [34].
• A major ISP in Canada, Telus, ran into similar trouble when attempting to block a site set–up by workers during a strike action with the Telecommunications Workers Union. Telus blocked the Union site’s IP address, causing more than 600 other, non–related Web sites to be blocked for all Telus subscribers in the process [35].
• n 2004, Thailand began the process of implementing Internet filtering. Unlike many countries, the process was largely transparent.
• Malaysia has approved recommendations to restrict access to pornography. Schools and libraries are now required to install filtering software.
• Once a national filtering system is in place, governments may be tempted to use it as a tool of political censorship or as a technological “quick fix” to problems that stem from larger social and political issues.
• Filtering is primarily restricted to Web–based communications and largely ignores alternative means of communications such as e–mail, instant messaging, peer–to–peer technologies, and VoIP.
• In Egypt the Web site http://www.ikhwanonline.com, the official Web site of the Muslim Brotherhood, is blocked.
• There are numerous circumvention technologies, also known as anonymizers, available that allow users to access filtering content.
• Despite the Internet’s decentralized architecture, states have implemented both legal and technical mechanisms to control their citizens’ access to and publication of information on the Internet. Combining low–tech and high–tech solutions, states have created a complex regulatory framework that is combined with Internet filtering and monitoring. Controls are placed at multiple levels of access including educational facilities and cyber–cafés as well as at the national level. Filtering is implemented at locations such as ISPs and at the Internet backbone and international gateways.
• filtering is most often imposed through interpretations of vague laws and regulations, by ministerial decree, or through unaccountable national security channels. There is little transparency regarding the selection of sites to block and citizens rarely have any recourse to petition to have a site unblocked. While some states are open about the fact that filtering has been implemented — by showing users a blockpage when attempting to access filtered content — some deceive their citizens by masquerading filtering as a generic network error or by redirecting users to innocuous content. Often, these deceptive practices are used to target political content such as human rights groups and independent media.
• Filtering technology cannot block all content that governments intend to block and it often blocks content that was never intended to be blocked.
• National filtering is implemented to impose information control on populations within a given geographic space. There are significant transparency and accountability concerns regarding the decision to implement Internet filtering and the selection of targeted content. Often, those implementing filtering are unaware of the consequences that the mechanism of filtering can have. While easily circumvented, Internet filtering inflicts “collateral damage” that represents a significant threat to transparent and democratic practices.

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• Today, anyone in China can send a sensitive message if they are minimally savvy, and that fact is transforming the political discourse. True, technology has not led to the overthrow of the Communist Party, as some had predicted — the party has even harnessed the Internet for its own purposes.

• Libertarian software engineers, enterprising students, banned religious groups, and regular for-profit companies compete with one another to launch new downloadable tools that outfox the censors. They exploit proxy servers, deploy encryption technology, and ferret out holes in the wall. I have spent many afternoons in the Internet cafés of Beijing's Haidian University district, learning from the students who live in this world. For a dollar an hour, they will help anyone hack the system: set up secure SSH and VPN connections, use a circumvention tool called UltraSurf developed by the banned Falun Gong group, access unregulated Chinese peer-to-peer networks.
• Beijing's propaganda department updates a list of banned stories. Available to senior journalists at government-controlled news outlets, the list includes scandals, protests, and sackings across the country. Newspapers are not allowed to report on them, but some journalists post the lists online, telling you all you need to know.

• The Golden Shield — the latest addition to what is widely referred to as the Great Firewall of China — was supposed to monitor, filter, and block sensitive online content.
• Traffic generated by China's 162 million Internet users is routed through the shield, which checks all requested URLs against a blacklist of tens of thousands of Internet addresses