Rachel Spenia's List: Physician Assisted Suicide

• It has always been a crime to assist a suicide in the State of Washington. The State's present law makes "[p]romoting a suicide attempt" a felony, and provides: "A person is guilty of [that crime] when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide." Respondents, four Washington physicians who occasionally treat terminally ill, suffering patients, declare that they would assist these patients in ending their lives if not for the State's assisted suicide ban. They, along with three gravely ill plaintiffs who have since died and a nonprofit organization that counsels people considering physician-assisted suicide, filed this suit against petitioners, the State and its Attorney General, seeking a declaration that the ban is, on its face, unconstitutional. They assert a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause which extends to a personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician-assisted suicide.
• Relying primarily on Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, and Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, the Federal District Court agreed, concluding that Washington's assisted suicide ban is unconstitutional because it places an undue burden on the exercise of that constitutionally protected liberty interest. The en banc Ninth Circuit affirmed.
• (a) An examination of our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices demonstrates that Anglo-American common law has punished or otherwise disapproved of assisting suicide for over 700 years; that rendering such assistance is still a crime in almost every State; that such prohibitions have never contained exceptions for those who were near death; that the prohibitions have in recent years been reexamined, and, for the most part, reaffirmed in a number of States; and that the President recently signed the Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, which prohibits the use of federal funds in support of physician-assisted suicide. Pp. 5-15.
• (b) In light of that history, this Court's decisions lead to the conclusion that respondents' asserted "right" to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The Court's established method of substantive due process analysis has two primary features: First, the Court has regularly observed that the Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. E.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (plurality opinion). Second, the Court has required a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. E.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302. The Ninth Circuit's and respondents' various descriptions of the interest here at stake--e.g., a right to "determin[e] the time and manner of one's death," the "right to die," a "liberty to choose how to die," a right to "control of one's final days," "the right to choose a humane, dignified death," and "the liberty to shape death"--run counter to that second requirement. Since the Washington statute prohibits "aid[ing] another person to attempt suicide," the question before the Court is more properly characterized as whether the "liberty" specially protected by the Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so. This asserted right has no place in our Nation's traditions, given the country's consistent, almost universal, and continuing rejection of the right, even for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. To hold for respondents, the Court would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every State. Respondents' contention that the asserted interest IS consistent with this Court's substantive due process cases, if not with this Nation's history and practice, is unpersuasive. The constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition that was discussed in Cruzan, supra, at 279, was not simply deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy, but was instead grounded in the Nation's history and traditions, given the common law rule that forced medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment. And although Casey recognized that many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy, 505 U.S., at 852, it does not follow that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected, see San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34. Casey did not suggest otherwise. Pp. 15-24.
• (c) The constitutional requirement that Washington's assisted suicide ban be rationally related to legitimate government interests, see e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-320, is unquestionably met here. These interests include prohibiting intentional killing and preserving human life; preventing the serious public health problem of suicide, especially among the young, the elderly, and those suffering from untreated pain or from depression or other mental disorders; protecting the medical profession's integrity and ethics and maintaining physicians' role as their patients' healers; protecting the poor, the elderly, disabled persons, the terminally ill, and persons in other vulnerable groups from indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a possible slide towards voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia. The relative strengths of these various interests need not be weighed exactingly, since they are unquestionably important and legitimate, and the law at issue is at least reasonably related to their promotion and protection. Pp. 24-31.
  
• Unknown. "WASHINGTON v. GLUCKSBERG." n.pag. SIRS Government Reporter. Web. 11 Feb 2011.

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• Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997),^[1] was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously held that a right to assistance in committing suicide was not protected by the Due Process Clause.

• Dr. Harold Glucksberg, a physician—along with four other physicians, three terminally ill patients, and the non-profit organization, Compassion in Dying, counseling those considering assisted-suicide—challenged Washington state's ban against assisted suicide in the Natural Death Act of 1979. They claimed that assisted suicide was a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

   

  The District Court ruled in favor of Glucksberg and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. The case was argued before the United States Supreme Court on January 8, 1997. The question presented was whether the protection of the Due Process Clause included a right to commit suicide, and therefore commit suicide with another's assistance.

• The decision reversed a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that a ban on physician assisted suicide embodied in Washington's Natural Death Act of 1979 was a violation of the 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court asserted that because assisted-suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest, it was therefore not protected under the 14th Amendment. As previously decided in Moore v. East Cleveland, liberty interests not "deeply rooted in the nation's history" do not qualify as being a protected liberty interest. Assisted-suicide had been frowned upon for centuries and majority of the States had similar bans on assisted suicide. Rehnquist found the English common-law penalties associated with assisted suicide particularly significant. For example, at early common law, the state confiscated the property of a person who committed suicide. Like Blackmun in Roe v. Wade, Rehnquist used English common law to exemplify American "tradition" and therefore determine what rights were "deeply rooted in the nation's history." Indeed, Rehnquist frequently cited Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey in the opinion. In addition, the Court felt that the ban was rational in that it furthered various compelling state interests, such as the preservation of human life and protecting the mentally ill and disabled from medical malpractice and coercion. It also prevented those from ending their lives simply due to financial or psychological complications. The Court also felt that if the Court declared physician-assisted suicide a constitutionally protected right, they would start down the path to voluntary and perhaps involuntary euthanasia.

   

  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion for the court. Justice O'Connor concurred. Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens all wrote opinions concurring in the judgment of the court.

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• The Boston Globe, in an editorial: "The Supreme Court acted wisely (Tuesday) to let Oregon continue its experiment with physician-assisted suicide. The justices ruled 6-3 against a Bush administration move to strip the licenses of doctors who help terminally ill patients end their lives. ... The ruling is a reminder of the common sense that retiring Justice Sandra Day O'Connor brought to the bench. In a 1997 ruling, the court said there is no constitutional right to assisted suicide and upheld two state laws banning the practice. But the court said states have the right to pass laws like Oregon's, with O'Connor mentioning the 'laboratory of democracy' role of states to try out different approaches to difficult issues."
• Chicago Tribune, in an editorial: "Let's hope the people of any state considering such a law argue long and hard about it. In the end, the decision rightfully rests with them."
• The (Baltimore) Sun, in an editorial: "The high court has been pitching from side to side on ... how far medicine should go to relieve the suffering of terminally ill patients. In 1990, the court ruled patients may refuse treatment that would otherwise keep them alive, but it declared in 1997 that people have no constitutional right to die. This is one of those intensely private matters that doctors, patients and family members should ideally be able to resolve without government interference. Dying patients must be protected ... and provided whatever miracles of medicine they seek that are available to them, but neither patients nor states need self-righteous public officials presuming to make such personal decisions for them. The high court was wise to recognize that."
• The Oregonian, Portland, in an editorial: "Oregon had hope for John Roberts, the newly confirmed chief justice. ... During Senate confirmation hearings last year, Roberts seemed open to upholding Oregon's assisted-suicide law. He also appeared to possess a less moralistic, less arbitrary view of federal power than Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, the court's two conservative judicial activists. Roberts let Oregon down this week. ... Roberts joined Scalia's peevish dissent. While this vote doesn't define Roberts, it's a troubling indicator of the chief justice's mind-set -- and of the court's creeping direction."
• Brian Dickerson, columnist in the Detroit Free Press: "One can't help but be struck by the difference between the way the ... court blundered into the abortion controversy and its gingerly approach to the comparably complex assisted suicide debate. ... The democratic debate over physician-assisted suicide continues. Tuesday's ruling serves notice that neither mavericks like (Jack) Kevorkian nor reactionaries like (John) Ashcroft will be permitted to hijack it."

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• Yesterday we told you about the controversy surrounding physician-assisted suicide. Today, the Senate Judiciary Committee took executive action on one of those bills.
  
  Senate Bill 167 would set up rules and protections for physicians who honor their terminally ill patients end of life decisions.
  
  The bill was tabled by lawmakers today. It failed by a vote of seven to five, with the motion to table the bill passing seven to five.
  
  In the ruling of the case of Baxter vs. Montana, the treasure state became the third to legalize physician assisted suicide but doctors say they still have fears that they could be prosecuted.
  
  “The sky is not going to fall when we tell doctors that you have immunity from honoring what Montana citizens with terminal illnesses, want them to do. I just don't think this Legislative body needs to get into the business of telling these folks who are on their last limb, enduring incredible suffering how much is enough,” voiced Senator Anders Blewett (D - District 11), bill sponsor.
  
  “There's inadequate protection in this bill from the powerless, it's our obligation to protect the powerless,” shared Senator Jeff Essman (R – District 28).

• A new Harris/BBC World News America poll finds that large majorities of Americans now favor physician assisted suicide and euthanasia for terminally ill patients in great pain who wish to end their lives, according to a release.

• Key findings in this new poll include: 

   

   -Most people (56 percent of all adults) know someone, living or dead, who has created written directives or documented instructions, often called living wills, that express their wishes for the type of care they would like to receive at the end stages of their lives; 

   

   -While only about a quarter (28 percent) of adults have written directives themselves, this increases with age. Almost two-thirds (63 percent) of adults over 65 have executed written directives; 

   

   -More than two-thirds (70 percent) of all adults agree that people who are terminally ill, in great pain and who have no chance of recovery should have the right to choose to end their lives. This includes a majority, but a smaller percentage (62 percent), of people over 65. Only 17 percent of the public disagree; 

   

   -Two-thirds of all adults (67 percent) think that doctors should be allowed to advise terminally ill patients who request the information on alternatives to medical treatment and/or ways to end their lives. However only 27 percent think doctors should be able to do this in all cases, while 40 percent think this should happen only in "certain cases," that were not defined in this survey; and, 

   

   -A 58 percent to 20 percent majority, with 22 percent not sure, think that "the law should allow doctors to comply with the wishes of a dying patient in severe distress who asks to have his or her life ended." In other words, a majority of adults say they support physician-assisted suicide for such patients. 
• This new poll confirms that substantial majorities of the public now favor physician-assisted suicide, and the right of some terminally ill patients to commit suicide. However, in reviewing these measurements of public opinion it is worth noting that that the real world is often more nuanced and complicated than these blanket hypothetical scenarios. How certain is one that the patient really is terminally ill? How much distress or pain is required to justify suicide or assisted suicide?
• his BBC World News America/ Harris Poll was conducted online within the United States between August 19 and 23, among 2,340 adults (aged 18 and over). Figures for age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, region and household income were weighted where necessary to bring them into line with their actual proportions in the population. Propensity score weighting was also used to adjust for respondents' propensity to be online.
• Respondents for this survey were selected from among those who have agreed to participate in Harris Interactive surveys. The data have been weighted to reflect the composition of the adult population. Because the sample is based on those who agreed to participate in the Harris Interactive panel, no estimates of theoretical sampling error can be calculated.

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• Decision:  The Court found no constitutional right to die with the help of a physician and upheld state bans on assisted suicide.
   
• At Issue:  Whether assisted suicide is protected by the Constitution, and whether criminal penalties for those who aid in assisted suicide violate the 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause.

• Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States regarding the right to die. It ruled that a New York ban on physician-assisted suicide was constitutional, and preventing doctors from assisting their patients, even those terminally ill and/or in great pain, was a legitimate state interest that was well within the authority of the state to regulate. In brief, this decision established that, as a matter of law, there was no constitutional guarantee of a "right to die."

• The State of New York had enacted a prohibition against physician-assisted suicide, making it a crime for a physician to administer lethal medication or to otherwise knowingly and intentionally end the life of a patient, even a consenting, mentally competent, and terminally ill patient.

   

  A number of physicians (here the respondents) filed suit against New York's Attorney General, in United States District Court, challenging the law on constitutional grounds. The respondents argued that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, noting that a patient, while still enjoying the right to refuse treatment when terminally ill, did not enjoy the right to authorize a doctor to end their life. In effect, the respondents argued that refusing treatment and requesting that their doctor assist them in ending their life were "the same thing."

   

  The District Court ruled in favor of the New York statute. In its decision, the court stated that the State of New York had a rational, legitimate interest in preserving life and protecting vulnerable persons; as such, the law was not unconstitutional. The District Court said that this was a matter of legislation, and, if the ban were to be repealed, it would take an act of New York's legislature (or a binding referendum by the voters) to do so.

   

  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment. The Appeals Court reasoned that, even though the law itself applied as a general rule to all persons, a fact that the District Court noted in determining its constitutionality, it did not treat all competent patients equally when they were near death and wished to end their lives. To this effect, the Appeals Court said that, for example, a patient attached to a life support device was allowed to require its removal, while a person under identical circumstances could not demand that a doctor administer drugs to ensure the patient's death. It agreed with the contention that removing life support devices was identical to requesting physician-assisted euthanasia, and thereby reversed the lower court's finding.

   

  The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari, hearing arguments on January 8, 1997.

• On June 26, 1997, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous (9-0) decision. The majority opinion was authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and was joined by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion, joined in part by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer filed separate concurring opinions. Interestingly, this means that even with majority support for one opinion, there were still six opinions total that were finally submitted.

   

  The Court began its opinion by stating that the New York law did not infringe upon a fundamental right. In this line of reasoning, the Court referenced San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1 (1973) which said, in relevant part, that the judiciary must look to the Constitution, rather than to the stated "importance" of a right, when determining whether that right was, indeed, fundamental. Because New York's ban did not infringe upon a fundamental right, and because respondents were not claiming that the "right to die" was fundamental, the Court reiterated its policy of according such laws a great deal of leeway. In the Court's own words, from Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) laws such as those enacted by New York were entitled to a "strong presumption of validity."

   

  After addressing the matter of fundamental rights, the Court delineated the rationale behind its decision. It first turned to the long-standing legal tradition of looking to a person's intent as a way of distinguishing between two acts with identical physical consequences. For example, a person who accidentally kills a pedestrian while blinded by the sun might only face punishment for vehicular manslaughter, while a person who intentionally and purposefully kills another with his car could be punished for murder. While these two acts give the same results, they are distinguished by the intent of the actors.

   

  The Court applied the standard of intent to the matter at hand, finding that a doctor who withdraws life support at the request of his patient intends only to respect his patient's wishes. This, the Court said, is a sharp contrast to the doctor who honors a patient's request to end their life, which necessarily requires more than an intent to respect their wishes; namely, it requires the intent to kill the patient. A major difference, the Court determined, in the two scenarios is that the former may cause the patient to die from underlying causes, while the latter will cause the patient to die by the hands of the physician. To this effect the Court quoted a House Judiciary Committee hearing, stating that a physician performing an assisted suicide, "must, necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily that the patient be made dead." Furthermore, in another repudiation of the respondents' argument, the Court noted that a patient removing life support might not actually intend to die, and that death without such a device may not be a certainty.

   

  Looking to New York's intent behind the ban, the Court noted that the law plainly recognized the difference between "killing" and "letting die." It also recognized that the State of New York had, as a matter of policy, a compelling interest in forbidding assisted suicide, while allowing a patient to refuse life support was simply an act of protecting a common-law right. This right was not, contrary to the Court of Appeals' view, the "right to hasten death"; rather, the Court declared that it was the right to retain bodily integrity and to preserve individual autonomy. The prevention of "unwanted touching" was, the Court said, a very legitimate right to protect.

   

  In closing, the Court said that it fully rejected the respondents' argument that the statutory difference between assisted suicide and refusing lifesaving treatment was "arbitrary" and "irrational." It did concede that there were probably incidents where the two were likely to have the same result, but also said that such an argument was beside the point. The Court declared that New York "obviously" had a number of legitimate, compelling, and rational interests in enacting this ban. However, regardless of these reasons, it determined simply that the law permitted everyone to refuse treatment and prohibited everyone from assisting suicide; as such, the law did not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause and the state had the constitutional authority to put such a law into place.

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• Physician-assisted suicide in the United States is legal in the states of Oregon, Montana and Washington.

   

  The process is set forth in law, including the requirements that the patient must be of sound mind when requesting assisted suicide, as confirmed by a doctor and other witnesses; and the patient must be diagnosed with a terminal illness.
• The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, and the Washington statute modeled after it, set certain requirements and safeguards before a person may commit suicide with a doctor's assistance. The patient must be of sound mind when they request a prescription for a lethal dose of medication. Two doctors must confirm a diagnosis of terminal illness with no more than six months to live. Two witnesses, one non-doctor unrelated to the patient, must confirm the patient's request, and the patient must make a second request after 15 days.

• Assisted suicide movement of 1906

   

  The first significant drive to legalize assisted suicide in the United States arose as part of the eugenics movement in the early years of the twentieth century. In a 2004 article in the Bulletin of the History of Medicine, Brown University historian Jacob M. Appel documented extensive political debate over legislation to legalize physician-assisted suicide in both Iowa and Ohio in 1906. In Ohio, the legislation was inspired by the campaign of heiress Anna S. Hall, whose mother had died a painful death from cancer.^[1] Despite Hall’s efforts, the bill was rejected by the Ohio legislature by a vote of 79 to 23.^[1][2]

• Dr. Kevorkian

   

  Aid in dying in the United States was brought to public attention in the 1990s with the highly publicized case of Dr. Jack Kevorkian. Dr. Kevorkian assisted over 40 people in committing suicide in Michigan.^[3] His first public assisted suicide was Janet Adkins, an elderly female diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease in 1989. He was charged with murder, but charges were dropped on December 13, 1990 because there were no Michigan laws outlawing suicide or the medical assistance of it so he was not in violation of a law.^[4]

   

  Years later, Kevorkian crossed the line from assisting the patient to actively killing the patient himself. Kevorkian videotaped himself giving a man a lethal injection and aired the tape on 60 Minutes. He was found guilty of second-degree murder and served eight years of a 10-25 year sentence. He was released in 2007.^[5]

• California's Proposition 161

   

  In 1992, the group Californians against Human Suffering proposed Proposition 161 to allow patients with less than 6 months to live the right to receive assistance from physicians in dying. This proposition offered more safeguards against abuse by physicians than Washington’s Initiative 119, such as special protections for patients in nursing facilities. This measure also did not pass with only 46 percent of the vote.^[6]

• New York Cases

   

  In 1994, a suit was filed in New York claiming that the anti-assisted suicide statute was a violation of equal protection and liberty guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. This claim was rejected by the District Court on the basis that there is no right to assisted suicide given by the U.S. Constitution. In 1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals overturned this ruling with the reasoning that the criminalization of assisted suicide violates the Equal Protection Cause. This ruling led to the overturn of laws in Washington as well and affected states such as Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Connecticut, and Vermont. This case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.^[7]

• Oregon ballot measures

   

  The Hemlock Society introduced Ballot Measure 16 in Oregon in 1994. It asked if terminally ill patients with less than 6 months to live should be able to receive a prescription for lethal drugs and included many provisions to protect against misuse, such as two oral requests and a written request from the patient. The patient must also be referred to counseling if a mental illness is suspected. This ballot measure passed by a narrow margin with 51.3 percent of the vote. This was seen as a victory for supporters of assisted suicide. The passage of this measure became very controversial. Many feared that people would flock to Oregon to take advantage of this law.^[8]

   

  Ballot Measure 16 provided for enactment of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act. That law requires that patients of sound mind may request a prescription for a lethal dose of medication. Two doctors must confirm a diagnosis of terminal illness with no more than six months to live. Two witnesses, one non-doctor unrelated to the patient, must confirm the patient's request, and the patient must make a second request after 15 days. The 2008 Washington law is closely modeled on the Oregon law.

   

  In 1997, the Oregon Legislative Assembly sent a ballot measure to the voters, Measure 51, which sought to repeal the Death with Dignity Act. The measure was introduced because of the controversy surrounding the passage of Ballot Measure 16 and the slow implementation of it. Measure 51 was defeated by 60 percent of the vote.^[9]

• Washington

   

  In 1994, the Washington state chapter of the Hemlock Society (now called Compassion & Choices) introduced Initiative 119 as an amendment to Washington’s 1979 Natural Death Act. The ballot question asked if terminally ill adults should be allowed to receive physician aid-in-dying. This initiative was very controversial. Supporters of the initiative advertised cancer patient’s statements of wanting a dignified death. Opponents invoked fear in the public by saying the initiative would allow doctors to kill patients. The initiative failed, only receiving 46 percent of the vote.^[6]

   

  However, Washington Initiative 1000 was approved on the November 4, 2008 election by 57.82% of Washington state voters. The provision allows an adult Washington resident who has a six month predicted survival to self-administer lethal medication prescribed by a physician.

• Florida: Krischer v. McIver

   

  This case was brought to the Florida Supreme Court in 1997 by the Florida chapter of the Hemlock Society in an attempt to overturn the state’s anti-assisted suicide law. The question was if AIDS patient Charles Hall had the right to end his life with the help of Dr. Charles McIver. The Circuit Judge ruled that Hall did have this right, and the case was appealed to the Florida Supreme Court. This court upheld the constitutionality of Florida’s law against assisted suicide.^[10]

• Alaska: Sampson and Doe v. State of Alaska

   

  In 1999, two terminally ill patients, Kevin Sampson and Jane Doe, sued for an order to exempt their physicians from being charged with manslaughter for assisting them in committing suicide. The superior court ruled against them, and they appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. This court upheld the previous ruling with the reasoning that the Alaska Constitution’s right to privacy and liberty does not allow terminally ill patients to be assisted by physicians in committing suicide.^[11]

• Montana

   

  Assisted suicide was made legal in Montana through a trial court ruling on December 6, 2008 in the case of Baxter v. Montana. The Attorney General of the state of Montana sought an appeal from the Montana Supreme Court, but the court, by a decision of five to two, affirmed the lower court's ruling on the state law. The Court did, however, limit the scope of the decision by not determining if the state's constitution protected the right.^[12]

• State power to allow and regulate

   

  States have the power to allow and regulate assisted suicide, or to prohibit it.

• 1997 Supreme Court cases

   

  In 1997, in the cases of Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously that there is no Constitutional right to assisted suicide, and that states therefore have the right to prohibit it. Advocates of assisted suicide saw this as opening the door for debate on the issue at the state level.^[13]

• Gonzales v. Oregon

   

  Gonzales v. Oregon was brought to the United States Supreme Court in 2006. The Supreme Court ruled that the United States Attorney General could not enforce the Controlled Substances Act against physicians prescribing drugs to assist terminally ill patients in committing suicide because it would be in conflict with the law established by Oregon’s Ballot Measure 16.^[14] The Controlled Substances Act would have allowed the Attorney General to control or stop the distribution of fatal drugs to terminally ill patients.^[15]

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• Thanks to the educational efforts of the right-to-die movement regarding the plight of patients like these, national polls continue to show that growing numbers of Americans support regulated physician-assisted death for qualified terminally ill patients. The latest Gallup poll reveals that 75 percent of adult Americans favor aid in dying. This figure compares to 53 percent in a 1982 Harris poll and to 65 percent in 1988. The movement's extraordinary educational strides were also reflected in the passage of Oregon's Measure 16 and the narrow loss of Initiative 119 in Washington State (both would legalize physician-assisted suicide). But in spite of these high levels of public support, elected officials nationwide remain opposed to this form of aid for the terminally ill.

• A 2005 HCD Research nationwide poll of 677 physicians found that 59% supported physician-assisted suicide, while 41% opposed it. A March 2007 e-mail survey of 502 Washington State Medical Assn. physician members showed that 50% supported an Oregon-like law, while 42% opposed it. The survey respondents did not represent a random sample of WSMA membership, according to Elway Research, which conducted the poll for the medical society.