Redundancies, overlaps, misrepresentations of military operations:
“According to the [HTS' own] website, the [Civil Affairs] CA staff is responsible for “developing, coordinating, and executing plans to positively influence target populations to support the commanders’ objectives, and to minimize the negative impact of military operations on civilian populations and interference by civilians during combat operations.” officers “provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance on FN/HN [foreign nation/host nation] social and cultural matters.” This doctrinal description almost directly mirrors the claimed capabilities of an HTS human terrain team” (61).
“According to the 15 July 2008 HTS briefing, the HTT is staffed by at least two officers or enlisted soldiers with FAO [Foreign Area Officers], CA, [Civil Affairs] Special Forces, or intelligence backgrounds. The team is led by an experienced combat arms officer. Why is it necessary to create a separate program, costing (at a minimum) tens of millions of dollars, to assign these personnel to the very staffs at which they were trained to serve? What do the Human Terrain Team FAO and officer bring to the table that organic and CA officers do not? If HTS can find these qualified officers, why can’t the U.S. military services?” (61).
“As early as 2004, the First Marine Division held regular tribal councils and established a ‘graybeard’ board of disgruntled former Iraqi general officers. Provincial reconstruction teams and infantry battalions often attend and support loya jurga meetings in Afghanistan. Without input from the Human Terrain System reachback cells, FAOs, CAofficers, and PSYOPS officers have been actively engaging with local leadership and proposing culturally savvy solutions since the onset of the war” (62).
“One quote published on the HTS ‘impact’ webpage stands out. Rreferring to the local populace, an Army brigade operations officer states, “We don’t ask them about their needs—paratroopers just don’t think that way.” By prominently displaying this quotation, the program managers imply that this officer’s inability to understand or execute simple counterinsurgency tactics is typical” (62)