Max Forte's List: AJP--Domestic Counterinsurgency and Militarism in Canada

• 10 November 2012
• The Red Poppy: Symbol of the New Militarism
• The Red Poppy: Symbol of Peace or Symbol of War? 
   
   

   By Nora Loreto,
   November 10, 2012
   rabble.ca
• Right after Halloween and just as every store is switching from its fall motif to Christmas-themed displays, most Canadians adorn the red poppy until November 11.

   
   

   The poppy, crystallized as a symbol of war and remembrance from John McCrae's poem In Flanders Fields, is worn by most Canadians for a few weeks leading up to November 11. 

   
   

   Most Canadians, except me.

   

   
  

   

   Growing up, I was deeply involved in Remembrance Day ceremonies in my hometown. Twice, I went to Holland to sing at Remembrance Day ceremonies. I spoke at Legions on the importance of remembrance as being necessary to peace.

   

   
  

   

   But, as the Canadian government has demonstrated its support for foreign wars, the symbol of the poppy has been hijacked. While it remains a symbol of peace and remembrance for many, it has also become a symbol of support of Canada's current war ambitions.

   

   
  

   

   Wrapped together with the yellow ribbon and a maple leaf, the poppy symbolizes a great myth: that there exists "just war" and that, through war, Canadians have been granted their freedom. Canada has been engaged in such a war for a decade, in Afghanistan.
• When I see billions of dollars spent on fighter jets, the same amount of money that could eliminate tuition fees for all Canadian college and university students, I question what exactly we are remembering.

   

   
  

   

   When I see veterans dying as a result of suicide, that Canadians are coming home with post-traumatic stress disorder and are being deserted by the government that sent them to Afghanistan, I question what exactly we are remembering.

   
   

   When I see statistics of the quality of life in Afghanistan or the rise in civilian deaths since the invasion in 2001, I question what exactly we are remembering. 

   
   

   Because, if we truly meant that we supported an end to all wars when we wear our poppies, surely Canadians could prevent our government from marching toward war. If our desire to remember led to a stated political will to end war, Canadian troops would have never been sent to Afghanistan in the first place.

   

   
   The red poppy has instead become so normalized that it's simply something that we wear. We leave them on our sun visors in our cars. We lose them. We buy others. We say we remember but we don't do what's next to turn our remembrance into action.
• Remembrance isn't enough to stop war.

   

   
  

   

   In 1933, in England, the Cooperative Women's Guild started to distribute white poppies as symbols of peace. Rather than glorify and honour the dead of one particular country, the white poppy commemorates all war dead and calls for and end to all war.

   

   
  

   

   The Peace Pledge Union continues to distribute these white poppies and, in 2005, actually came to an agreement with the British Legion on distributing the white poppy. In Canada, many pacifist and anti-war organizations make their own white poppies and distribute them in time for Remembrance Day.

   

   
  

   

   Remembrance Day remains a political public holiday that, for me, is an important time to talk about Canada's role in war today.

   

   
  

   

   My white poppy has turned a little grey as I wear it on my jacket year-round. But wearing a poppy isn't enough. All Canadians who support peace, whether they wear a white poppy, a red poppy, a poppy with a fleur-de-lys in the centre or nothing, must actively oppose any government agenda that seeks to send more Canadians to participate in foreign conflict.

   

   
  

   

   Otherwise, wearing a poppy is an empty gesture, a socialized custom that has become as normal as dressing up for Halloween.

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• 31 July 2012
• The Kanishka Program and the Securitization of the Social Sciences in Canada
• The following three reports were recently published on Zero Anthropology, focusing on the role of the Ministry of Public Safety working in collaboration with the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) to distribute funds under the "Kanishka Program". Drafting social scientists into serving the national security state to perform surveillance on Canadians, and engage in public propaganda exercises, is the explicit intention of the program. The program violates the core ethical principles of many disciplines and, ironically, would likely face a severe challenge under the official ethics instruments that govern all SSHRC funding. This program has been advanced with no public discussion or debate and academics have generally remained silent, until now. 
• Complying with “Counter-Terrorism”: State Securitization of Canadian Academia (part 1) 
   
   
   
   
  • Insidious Security
   
  • SSHRC, Kanishka and the Questions They Ask
   
  • Some of the Preliminary Questions We Need to Ask
   
   

   “As part of the Kanishka Project, Public Safety Canada is investing up to $3.7 million to support, in full or in part, with SSHRC, research and related activities addressing issues related to terrorism and counter-terrorism.”
• Complying with “Counter-Terrorism”: State Securitization of Canadian Academia (part 2)
   
   
   
   
  • Taking Hostages: Research Funding to “Prevent Terrorism”
   
  • Instructing Academics on What (Not) to Research
   
   
   On May 30, 2012, both Vic Toews and Jason Kenney, Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, announced the awarding of the first $1.1 million for Kanishka applicants. Vic Toews had this to say: 
   

   “Terrorism and violent extremism are global threats and Canada is not immune. I’m pleased to announce the funding awarded to the first six innovative research projects that will help build Canada’s knowledge and understanding of the complex issue of terrorism. Threats evolve, and we must strive to improve our knowledge and understanding to more effectively address these threats. With initiatives like the Kanishka Project, we are taking action to help build the resilience of our communities against the threats we face today.”
• Complying with “Counter-Terrorism”: State Securitization of Canadian Academia (part 3)
   
   
   
   
  • Complying with “Counter-Terrorism,” Practicing Domestic Counterinsurgency
   
  • From Scholarship to Police Work: Academic Support for Counter-Terrorism
   
  • Repeat After Me! “Harmony, Not Critique”
   
   

   “The Prevent element would focus on providing positive alternative narratives that emphasize the open, diverse and inclusive nature of Canadian society and seek to foster a greater sense of Canadian identity and belonging for all. Programs would be aimed at raising the public’s awareness of the threat and at empowering individuals and communities to develop and deliver messages and viewpoints that resonate more strongly than terrorist propaganda”.

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  22 November 2011

• Domestic Surveillance in Canada: Suspicious Incident Reporting 

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   
  

   

   From AJP member Craig Proulx:
• I am wondering if this tattletale site will be used against Aboriginal peoples in Canada. They are already under surveillance by the Canadian security state and have been labelled in the past as "terrorists" by the Canadian Military. The government gets reports on Aboriginal "hot spots" each week. I wonder if some of their information comes from (SIR)? Certainly a lot of these "critical infrastructure" companies must be terrified at the thought of blockades and protests interfering with their right to make cash for the settler elite. This sounds like just the tool to keep the market "free".
• Privacy Impact Assessment - Suspicious Incident Reporting (SIR): Executive Summary
   http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/pia-efvp/sir-ris-eng.htm
   
   The RCMP works in partnership with domestic and foreign agencies to strengthen prevention measures against the threat of terrorism in North America and elsewhere.  The RCMP has primary law enforcement responsibility under sec. 6(1), *Security Offences Act* for investigating threats to the security of Canada, as defined in sec. 2, *Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.*
   
   Within this mandate, the RCMP is a national partner in protecting Canada’s critical infrastructure (CI). The Emergency Management Framework for Canada defines CI as “the essential underlying systems and facilities upon which our standard of life relies”. It includes physical and information technology facilities, networks, services and assets essential to the health, safety, security or economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of government.
• A significant proportion of Canada’s CI is managed and protected by private owners and operators. As per the Participant list in Section 3.5 .The National Security Criminal Investigations ( NSCI) of the RCMP has launched a Suspicious Incident Reporting (SIR) project to collect information on suspicious incidents that could have a nexus to national security. The information provided by external CI Stakeholders is voluntary. Therefore, CI stakeholder handling of their data prior to its submission to the SIR system is not addressed in this privacy impact assessment (PIA)
   
   The collection, handling, storage, dissemination and disposal of personal information for the SIR system conforms to Government of Canada policies and procedures and is consistent with CMP PPU-025 (National Security Investigations Records) and CMP PPU-005 (Operational Case Records) in www.InfoSource.gc.ca. A separate PIA details any privacy issues associated to SPROS our main records system where all SIR incidents will be recorded. Retention and disposal of the SPROS/SIR record will correspond to the Occurrence Classification Table (OCT) as detailed in the SPROS PIA.
• Only authorized Critical Infrastructure Stakeholder employees, Police of Local Jurisdiction, or Government agencies may be given access to the SIR system. The Web-based accessed SIR system will be composed of two secure environments: the first is Protected B and the other is a Classified Environment (CE).
   
   Access to the Protected “B” SIR System for external users will be granted through the use of the RCMP Internet Presence Environment (IPE), a secure common web hosting environment where authentication is made through the employment of ePass. Public Works and Government Services (PWGSC) maintains and updates a separate PIA for ePass. CI Stakeholder users will be designated as points of contact through MOUs or formal agreements with participating organizations. In order to be allowed rights to be assigned to their profile prospective users will be screened for at least a Level II Secret RCMP clearance. RCMP Personnel will gain access through the use of NPSN and PMI Secure Access Portal. The Classified Environment ( CE) is an RCMP internal one with no connection to the Protected B SIR system. SIR data received will be manually transferred to the CE systems.
  
• The external facing SIR system application has roles that assign rights to the user and dictates what information they can view at the time of submission. The complete un-vetted SIR containing personal information will be made available to RCMP and POJ for national security criminal intelligence purposes. The originator of the report can also select other participating and RCMP security cleared organizations, with a need to know, to receive a SIR submission that has been vetted of personal information.
   
   The Classified Environment (CE) is an RCMP internal one with no connection to the Protected B SIR system.  SIR data received will be manually transferred to the CE systems.
   
   Data matching and profiling will not occur within the SIR System.
• Reference section 5 (3)b of the *Privacy Act*, persons identified as being involved in suspicious incidents will not be notified about the collection of their personal information as it would defeat the purpose of collecting that information for criminal investigative purposes
   
   This Executive Summary will be available to all stakeholders, including the general public, via the RCMP web site. Current participants in the SIR project and key government stakeholders will be notified that the PIA has been filed with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC). New participants in the SIR project will be advised that a PIA has been filed with the OPC. Communications surrounding the SIR project, including presentations and briefings, will reference key messages on privacy. A vetted version of the PIA will be available if requested under Access to Information. At the upcoming Annual Revision of Info Source, the applicable PIBs (CMP PPU 005 and 025) will be updated to mention the SIR Project.
• Treasury Board is responsible for the annual creation and dissemination of a publication that provides a description of government organizations, program responsibilities and descriptions of records with sufficient clarity and detail to enable the public to exercise its rights under the *Access to Information Act*.
   
   Treasury Board is also responsible for the annual publication of an index of personal information that will both serve to keep the public informed of how the government handles personal information, as well as facilitating the public’s ability to exercise its rights under the *Privacy Act*.

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• 03 July 2010
• Counterinsurgency: From Afghanistan to First Nations Resistance in Canada
• Canada's brewing 'insurgency'

  By Jon Elmer

  (Originally published by Al Jazeera, 26 June 2010)
• Canada's native communities are using the G20 and G8 gatherings to bring attention to land rights issues, poverty and poor living conditions

  
   

  As leaders of the richest nations gather in Toronto for the annual G8 and G20 summits, Canada has mounted an unprecedented security operation that stands to go down as the largest in the country's history.

  
   

  The local and federal governments have resorted to significant measures: barricading the downtown core behind a massive galvanised perimeter fence, erecting checkpoints with x-rays, uprooting trees that police say could be used by demonstrators, and converting a sound stage into a massive temporary detention facility in preparation for mass arrests of protesters.

  
   

  But with Canadian soldiers, snipers, commandos and police tactical units representing the sharp end of a security budget that is poised to top $1bn, the most significant threat to business as usual for the summit may turn out to be far-flung rural blockades enacted by Canada's long suffering native communities.
• "It's a very dangerous situation," said Douglas Bland, a retired Canadian forces lieutenant-colonel who is now the chair of defence management studies at Queen's University.

  
   

  In recent years in particular, Canada's indigenous communities have shown the will and potential to grind the country's economic lifelines to a halt through strategically placed blockades on the major highways and rail lines that run through native reserves well outside of Canada's urban landscape.

  
   

  "The Canadian economy is very vulnerable," said Bland.
• "More than 25 per cent of our GDP comes from exports of raw materials, but especially oil, natural gas and electricity to the United States."

  
   

  "It's undefended and undefendable infrastructure, the pipelines and power lines and so on, and it runs through great spaces of open countryside and they run through aboriginal territories.

  
   

  "It would take a very small number of people very little time to bring [it] down," said Bland, who is the author of a "barely fictionalised" account of native insurgency in Canada, entitled Uprising.
• Blockades

  
   

  In 2007, the Mohawk community at Tyendinaga, 200 kilometres east of Toronto, blocked the trans-continental rail line and Canada's largest highway in protest at the government's failure to address land rights and basic issues of survival within First Nations - including safe drinking water, which the community lacked.

  
   

  That episode was a hint of the leverage indigenous peoples in Canada possess, as hundreds of millions of dollars in cargo was stalled by simple barricades placed across a rural stretch of the Canadian National railway's mainline between Toronto and Montreal.
• "The message resounded," said Shawn Brant, a high profile Mohawk activist involved in the 2007 blockades.

  
   

  "We are not going to live in abject poverty, to have our children die, to have our women abducted, raped and murdered without any investigations. We are not going to live with the basic indignities that occur to us daily. We would bring them to an end."

  
   

  In 2007, Brant characterised the blocking of the 401 highway and CN main rail line as a "good test run".
• "We showed that we would meet the severity of what was happening to us with a reaction and a plan, a strategy that would be equally as severe," Brant said.

  
   

  Last week, Aboriginal Peoples Television Network broadcast footage of Canadian intelligence agents threatening a native activist ahead of the G8 summit.

  
   

  "I will tell you straight up," said an agent of the Canadian security and intelligence service to an indigenous activist, "there [are] other forces that are from other countries that will not put up with a blockade in front of their president".
• The twin summits, held in Toronto and Huntsville, a rural community that lies 225 kilometres north of Toronto, are separated by a major highway that runs through large swathes of indigenous territory adjacent to the major travel arteries.

  
   

  A determined blockade could wreak havoc on the summit and cast light on Canada's darkest shame.

  
   

  Blockades, said Harrison Friesen, a spokesperson for native rights movement Red Power United, would be intended to show the world that "everything is not okay in Canada for native people".
• Insurgency?

  
   

  Bland argues that the situation within First Nations in Canada has all the attributes of an insurgency.

  
   

  "These root causes, these abysmal conditions for some of the aboriginal people are serious."

  
   

  There are more than 800 outstanding native land claims held against the Canadian government. And in many First Nations communities there is deep crisis, with poverty, unemployment and overcrowding the norm.
• According to figures from the Assembly of First Nations, more than 118 First Nations lack safe drinking water and some 5,500 houses do not have sewage systems.

  
   

  Almost one half of homes on native reserves are in need of "major repairs", compared with 7 per cent of non-native homes.

  
   

  Natives suffer a violent crime rate that is more than 300 times higher than Canada's non-native population, while natives represent 18.5 per cent of the male prison population and one-quarter of the female population, although natives only constitute 4 per cent of the total population.
• In some provinces, the incarceration rates are starker.

  
   

  In Manitoba, 71 per cent of prisoners are native, although natives represent only 15 per cent of the province's population; in Saskatchewan, the number is even higher, with natives accounting for 80 per cent of prisoners but only 11 per cent of the population.

  
   

  The Royal Canadian Mounted Police recently characterised the prison system as "community colleges for [native] gangs".

  
   

  These "gangs" are increasingly politicised and some of Canada's leading military planners are warning that a full-blown uprising is gathering.
• The groups operate in what the military calls "ungoverned spaces" that are increasingly difficult to police.

  
   

  They are also sophisticated, operating under the "Robin Hood" principle of robbing from the rich and giving to the poor, say military planners.

  
   

  When combined with their tangible grievances, "you have the root causes which can be the fuel for an insurgency. It's entirely feasible," said Bland.
• Counterinsurgency posture

  
   

  In 2007, a draft edition of Canada's army counterinsurgency field manual highlighted the Mohawk Warrior Society as a case study insurgency.

  
   

  But after the excerpt was made public by media reports, Gordon O'Connor, the then defence minister, issued a statement saying that the reference would be removed from the final draft, which was released in 2008.

  
   

  "The withdrawal of the topic out of the counterinsurgency manual was typical of the reaction by government for fear of upsetting the precarious status quo of relations in the country right now," said Bland.
• "It is an example of a trend in Canadian political leadership.

  
   

  "There is a great reluctance to name, point to, suggest that we have an internal security problem in Canada based in either the aboriginal communities or in what the Royal Canadian Mounted Police call the aboriginal based criminal organisations.

  
   

  "One of the difficulties of discussing the issue and more seriously acting against it," said Bland, "is that by acting against an individual native protest or activity, you might incite the entire community across the country".
• Political leaders "fear baiting what they don't want to happen, so you see them backing off all the time".

  
   

  Indeed, the threat of blockades by more than 40 First Nations communities this week forced the provincial government in Ontario to back down on a plan to enforce a new harmonised sales tax on native communities, in contravention of longstanding treaty agreements.

  
   

  The message has been received, said Brant. "We've shown that, unified, we are capable of not just disruption, not just protest, but a willingness to use the economy as a tool in the arsenal to fight."

  
   

  "The government ran its infrastructure through our land because no one else wanted it to run through theirs," said Brant.
• "Now it serves as an incredibly power[ful] tool of influence that allows us now as a society to engage government in a dialogue, a relationship based on us having power."

  
   

  In 2007, Chief Terrance Nelson of Manitoba's Roseau River Anishinabe First Nation made headlines when he told a television reporter that "there are only two ways of dealing with the white man ... either you pick up the gun or you stand between him and his money".

  
   

  There is no shortage of examples of either tactic of native resistance in recent Canadian history.

  
   

  In 1990, an historic armed standoff between Mohawks and the Canadian army near Oka, Quebec lasted more than two months when the provincial government tried to convert a native burial ground into a golf course.
• Five years later, in 1995, the Canadian government used helicopters, armoured personnel carriers, improvised explosives and more than 77,000 rounds of ammunition during a three-month standoff over land title at Gustafsen Lake, in British Columbia.

  
   

  Speaking at a senate hearing in May, Canada's top general in Afghanistan suggested that the country's counterinsurgency war in Kandahar and its "whole of government" strategy has helped prepare Canadian forces and its civilian partners for such eventualities.

  
   

  "If Canada were having an issue of insurgency," said Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance, "there would be a multi-discipline, multi-department operation with the government managing and directing carefully what its military and police forces would do".

  
   

  "We experienced a little of that ... with the events at Oka." But now, said Vance, "the government is engaged".
• Bland agreed, saying that the counterinsurgency experience fighting the Taliban in Kandahar is "completely relevant to what might happen here, and to what happened at Oka".

  
   

  That posture, Brant said, is a "grave mistake".

  
   

  "Since Oka, we've evolved from being reactionary to instances that occur to having a strategy. We've become communities that have embraced the injustices of the past and combined them with the indignities of the present. We have been able to inspire all elements in our communities," said Brant.

  
   

  "We've created a unity that they don't have the military or policing capabilities to confront."

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• 13 June 2011

• Domestic Counterinsurgency in Canada 

   

   

   

   

    

  By Walter Pels via Marion Doss from Scranton, Kansas, USA (080727-N-1974P-046) [Public domain or CC-BY-SA-2.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons
• We have previously posted on Canadian counterinsurgency with an article by Jon Elmer--see: "Counterinsurgency: From Afghanistan to First Nations Resistance in Canada." Now we want to feature extracts from the controversial 2005 draft Counterinsurgency Operations manual (leaked in 2007) and the final 2008 version, both produced by the Department of National Defence (and available below). We will also underline some key points of public discussion that have transpired, which we think help us to understand the significance of these documents, and add some further analytical considerations of our own.
• The Counterinsurgency Manuals

  
   To begin, the draft Counterinsurgency manual contained the following section on page 11, in paragraph 37, in Section Three (Overview of Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies):

  The rise of radical Native American organizations, such as the Mohawk Warrior Society, can be viewed as insurgencies with specific and limited aims. Although they do not seek complete control of the federal government, they do seek particular political concessions in their relationship with national governments and control (either overt or covert) of political affairs at a local/reserve ("First Nation") level, through the threat of, or use of, violence.
• This is the paragraph that attracted a lot of controversy and condemnation. The DND appears to be accusing the Mohawks of being guilty of wanting self-determination. It alleges they do not seek "complete control" of the federal government, as if they ever mention wanting any such control. The language used ensures heightened alarm, even when speaking of goals that are not Mohawk goals, while delegitimating their demands that treaties be respected by calling these "concessions." Nor does the document address the excessive violence routinely used against Aboriginal persons and communities by the authorities. What is also instructive is that the above paragraph, highlighted as a box quote in the document, follows paragraphs that suggest violent insurgencies may use "terrorism" against the civilian populace and, interestingly enough, that they emerge in failed and failing states that ignore the basic needs of the populace. Perhaps it was the placement of a Canadian example in that context that led to the erasure of the box quote from the final draft, more than any concern for having offended Aboriginals.
• [As a side note, like its American counterpart which has been accused of containing numerous plagiarized sections, the block quote above was lifted directly, and without credit, "from the master’s thesis of military historian Timothy Winegard who has written a book on the 1990 Oka Crisis" (APTN).]
• The revised and finalized version, issued on 13 December 2008 (the second document below), removed the Mohawk example, but still distributed the key ideas of indigenous self-determination as insurgency, across several paragraphs. For example, the new document now refers to these elements:
   
  • occupying authority (par. 1, p. 11)
   
  • nationalist desires for independence or autonomy (par. 4, p. 12)
   
  • inherent racial, cultural, religious or ideological divisions that lead to a lack of national cohesion (par. 5, p. 12)
   
  • acquire specific but limited political advantages or control (par. 7, p. 12)
   
  • may only require the support of a powerful portion of the populace (tribe, business class, ethnic minority (par. 10, p. 13)
• Thus the document manages to preserve and even amplify the typical traits associated with indigenous self-determination movements, without mentioning Mohawks, but retaining a sense of broad applicability to an even wider variety of Aboriginal organizations in Canada--which struggle against what they identify as occupation, seek greater autonomy, emphasize cultural difference, seek limited control, and are based on support within their nations. In other words, Canada's Department of National Defence manages to effectively criminalize what is in the UN Charter on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, even while the reluctant federal government eventually signed on to that same Charter. The final document is arguably more disturbing than the draft.
• Afghan Blowback or Canadian Colonial Continuity?
   
   The Counterinsurgency Operations handbook appears at a particular time and within a specific context. It follows Canadian participation in the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, counterinsurgency in Haiti and the overthrow of President Aristide, and Canadian involvement in Iraq. It also comes as Canada has effectively eliminated its engagement in peacekeeping and ended its posture as a more or less neutral party in international affairs. It closely follows the turn to counterinsurgency in U.S. foreign policy and military doctrine. However, it also comes after the deployment of Canadian soldiers during the 1990 Oka crisis, and the 1995 Ipperwash conflict, on top of a long history of Canadian suppression of Aboriginal resistance, including outright warfare. It therefore becomes a challenge to understand whether counterinsurgency doctrine in Canada reflects part of the blowback of Canadian intervention in Afghanistan and Haiti, reflecting an importation and application at home of what has been learned and practiced abroad, or whether it manifests a further articulation of experience gained at home in ongoing internal colonialism, or both. The drive to dominate on all fronts, military, political, economic, and cultural, with so-called "whole of government" approaches, "three block war," and "full spectrum" dominance is apparent in varying degrees in both, and they may be reinforcing each other.
• Either way, it seems clear with the production and adoption of this document that the Canadian state has made war central to its policy in confronting substantive difference and opposition outside of parliament. It shows a weakening ability to secure legitimacy and negotiate resolutions. As much as the counterinsurgents appeal to "culture," the doctrine manifests a failure to understand or respect difference in the first place, with the eventual resort to violence coming into play. At best, it offers partial diplomatic approaches after the fact of war, which is a failure of diplomacy itself. This development also reflects the growing militarization of public policy at home and foreign relations abroad, alongside an even tighter alignment to U.S. and NATO imperialism. It stands as an affront to peace, and it should worry all Canadians, because while one might argue that the state has exported its war against "the Indians" to places such as Afghanistan, it seems that the state is equally willing to "bring back home" what it has done abroad.
• Some of the steps taken can be seemingly innocuous, but are part of the counterinsurgency doctrine's "winning hearts and minds" and employing propaganda: deploying Canadian troops to Manitoba and Quebec to assist victims of flooding (when the government always has the option of using civilian public workers instead) is part of a plan to raise the profile of the Canadian military in local communities, to heighten military visibility, and to ensure a presence that seeks to win support and build respect for the institution. This tool is used to remove beyond question the significantly increased resources devoted to a military buildup, and to make the military look like a natural, and thus inevitable, part of Canadian social life. The result is to make local and present what was for a while marginal and justified for defense from foreign attack. Regimentation of politics and mindsets is the apparent, sought after outcome of keeping Canada in a permanent "state of exception," and that too should worry Canadians.
• To read more on this subject, see:
   
  • Military to say sorry for Mohawk inclusion in counter-insurgency manual, APTN, Jorge Barrera, 07 December 2010
   
  • The Future of Warfare: Canadian counterinsurgency manual reflects US-Canada "synergy", The Dominion, Anthony Fenton, 11 July 2009
   
  • Canada's Plan Exposed to Assassinate Mohawks, Censored News, Brenda Norrell, 01-02 April 2007
   
  • Counterinsurgency Manual Shows Military's New Face, IPS, Jon Elmer, 22 March 2007
   
  • The Empire’s "Good Cop": Canada's New Counter-Insurgency Doctrine, GlobalResearch.ca, Steven Da Silva, 27 April 2007

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• 09 June 2011
• "America never went to war with a country that had a McDonald's"
• The title for this post comes from a statement spoken by a U.S. soldier on patrol in Iraq, as we heard and saw in a documentary we previously posted, "Mission Accomplished." It speaks to the irreconcilable values between the counterinsurgents and those they deem to "liberate," and throughout the film we hear U.S. military personnel awkwardly recite the officially sanctioned belief that U.S. forces in Iraq are there to "free" the Iraqis from bondage. When one American in uniform is asked what if Iraqis want to be free of the U.S. presence, the interviewer (Sean Langan) gets a cold stare. "We are here to help you," blasts an American Humvee in thick Baghdad traffic as seen above, amplifying the U.S. presence as one that is an alien invasion, announced by heavily clad troops resembling imperial storm troopers. When someone says he is here to help you, one has to wonder: if it was obvious and welcome, why then is there a need to declare it? "Maybe we should slap down five or six McDonald's on this strip, then the people would be happy" (see "Mission Accomplished"). If you cannot make the locals "happy" with the foreign occupation, then you have to kill them: in the same film, following U.S. troops on a night raid, after an order to "go in hard," the microphone picks up the voice of one of the men saying to another, "you can kill anything if you want to." Anything.
• Building rapport with the host nation civilians--and yet brutal violence on a staggering scale. Gaining trust--and yet the shocking night raids. Winning hearts and minds--and yet the widespread and routine sexual, physical, and psychological abuse against innocent inmates at Abu Ghraib. Helping to build a new nation--and yet the torture, arbitrary detention, and outright theft. Defeating terrorism--and yet attacking and occupying countries and peoples that never caused any harm to Americans or Canadians. Counterinsurgency, in actual practice, is as schizophrenic as it is frenetic. While the writers of doctrine preach "less is more," that never seems to apply to the foreign presence to begin with, which in both Iraq and Afghanistan underwent massive "surges". Never we do see an ability to recognize and understand that counterinsurgency, like all other forms of violent and imposed occupation, will always generate more and more reaction against it. We have had endless evidence of this fact after a decade of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq--no one has the right to treat the observation as if it were controversial any more. Counter-counterinsurgency (understood on many different levels) is not only inescapable, it is necessary and legitimate.
• The need to see the world with reference to McDonald's symbolizes an approach to difference that treats the latter as a problem, to be cured (by candies or by cudgels). Jean Baudrillard put this best when he wrote in "The Despair of Having Everything,"
• The West's mission is to make the world's wealth of cultures interchangeable, and to subordinate them within the global order. Our culture, which is bereft of values, revenges itself upon the values of other cultures.... 
• Singularities are not inherently violent. Some can be subtle, unique characteristics of language, art, culture or the human body. But violent singularities do exist, and terrorism is one of them. Violence revenges all the varied cultures that disappeared to prepare for the investiture of a single global power. This is not really a clash of civilisations. Instead, this anthropological conflict pits a monolithic universal culture against all manifestations of otherness, wherever they may be found. 
• Global power — as fundamentalist as any religious orthodoxy — sees anything different or unorthodox as heretical, and the heretics must be made to assume their position within the global order or disappear completely. The West's mission (we could call it the "former West" since it lost its defining values long ago) is to reduce a wealth of separate cultures into being interchangeable, of equal weight, by any brutal means possible. A culture that is bereft of values revenges itself on the values of other cultures. Beyond politics and economics, the primary aim of warfare (including the conflict in Afghanistan) is to normalise savagery and beat territories into alignment. Another objective is to diminish any zone of resistance, to colonise and tame any terrain, geographical or mental.
• Military strategists and policy makers pay tribute to counterinsurgency (COIN) as a "new" way of winning hearts and minds and part of a nation-building strategy aimed at defeating "terrorism" (and many other ever shifting goals, all packed into one confusing jumble). The actual practice is much more sobering: both superficial and deadly, and at times inconsequential. Turning to Afghanistan, in the audio and video below produced by Stars and Stripes ("Marines wrestle with exasperation in battle for hearts and minds") this is what we get: a U.S. Marine says, "I wish I could go out and just shoot everybody"; another Marine says "If you facilitate the Taliban, then you're just as guilty, and that includes women and kids too." Then watch a patrol get stuck in the mud, out in the open, for hours, and as they start fearing a Taliban attack...what do they do? They bring in the village boys closer, and pay them to shovel mud. Had there been a Taliban attack, and those boys had been killed, inevitably the Taliban would have been blamed. There would be no official report, nor media discussion, about how this is a clear instance of U.S. Marines using locals as human shields.
• Yet the Marines claim this is a successful COIN Op. Having armed men pay a young boy to do work for them is treated as if support had been won. There is no open admission about how paying people to do something, does not mean that they like and support you. The Marines cannot even communicate verbally with the locals. Even as they claim to have built bridges, one of the Marines finds his equipment has been stolen by the local boys.
• Canadian forces in Afghanistan are supposedly about to bring their combat mission to an end. A Canadian soldier was killed just a few days ago, as an ill conceived mission shifts, not having achieved any of its broader goals. What has been the outcome of years of Canadian counterinsurgency in Afghanistan?
• • A war fought without legitimacy, consistently opposed by the majority of the Canadian public;
   
  • The unacceptable complicity of Canadian Forces in human rights abuses;
   
  • Our government's disrespect for parliament and senior diplomats in covering up its complicity;
   
  • The increasingly shrill politics of the pro-war crowd that would seek to militarize mainstream Canadian values and appropriate Canadians' democratic achievements to the military;
   
  • Over $18.5 billion spent (and more spent than in any other Canadian foreign development assistance);
   
  • Mounting Canadian casualties;
   
  • Continuing deaths of civilians;
   
  • An Afghan resistance that has never been more powerful and never more legitimate;
   
  • Rather than some fabled war against misogyny, women's rights have receded dramatically under a regime dominated by warlords, which our government and our taxes support;
   
  • The occupation has spread war into Pakistan;
   
  • And, yet the public statements of several high-ranking NATO military officers attesting to the fact that the war cannot be won.
• The armour-plating, the longing for a Big Mac and porno, the loud speakers that blare peace from a vehicle of military occupation--these wars were unjust and immoral to start with, but now they are not even slightly credible, on the very terms of those doing the fighting. What we need to still fight is the blowback of increased militarization at home, erosion of democracy, and the domestic application of counterinsurgency. If Canadians opposed counterinsurgency abroad, they have all the more reason to counter it at home.
• "The state – an institution that is defined in terms of enjoying a monopoly on the use of violence – is particularly attractive to men and women whose 'dark sides' are closer to the surface than those of more tolerant and peaceful persons. When the state energizes this 'dark side' – which it does particularly in wartime, the quality that led Randolph Bourne to identify war as 'the health of the state' – otherwise decent men and women can turn themselves into agents of savage brutality. When their murderous acts are conducted on behalf of the state – with which most people identify themselves – their actions acquire an aura of legitimacy that would not have obtained under other circumstances.... 
• "Identifying ourselves with the state, in other words, has a way of turning us into sociopaths. It is not that the state does this to us, but that our willingness to attach ourselves to external entities – and the values upon which they are grounded – separates us from our focused inner sense of being. This applies not just to the pilots of helicopter gun-ships over Baghdad, but to more visible political figures such as Madeleine Albright – who defended her Clinton-era policies that led to the deaths of 500,000 Iraqi children – and Janet Reno, who defended her massacre of Branch Davidian men, women, and children at Waco. More recent application of these dynamics are found in George W. Bush’s fascination with starting pre-emptive wars against the rest of the world, and Barack Obama’s apparent willingness to use nuclear weapons in future pre-emptive attacks, as well as to assassinate Americans. 
• "People who are willing to embrace – or even to tolerate – such sociopathic conduct, have lost all touch with what it means to be human; have lost their souls. No federal bailouts; no increase in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, or decrease in unemployment levels, will overcome this loss. Nor can any “stimulus package” be enacted – with or without bipartisan support – to restore the personal integrity long since lost." (Butler Shaffer, "How We Lost Our Souls")

14 more annotations...

• 08 June 2011

• First Nations Under Surveillance: Harper Government Prepares for First Nations “Unrest" 

   

   

   

   

   

    

  Quebec riot police advance on Barriere Lake community members after a peaceful blockade in October, 2008 in north-western Quebec.
• By Russell Diabo and Shiri Pasternak
   Published on 07 June 2011 in The Media Co-Op
• Internal documents from Indian Affairs and the RCMP show that shortly after forming government in January of 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper had the federal government tighten up on gathering and sharing intelligence on First Nations to anticipate and manage potential First Nation unrest across Canada.

   

   
  

   

   Information obtained by Access to Information requests reveals that almost immediately upon taking power in 2006, the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) was given the lead role to spy on First Nations. The goal was to identify the First Nation leaders, participants and outside supporters of First Nation occupations and protests, and to closely monitor their actions.
• To accomplish this task, INAC established a “Hot Spot Reporting System.” These weekly reports highlight all those communities across the country that engage in direct action to protect their lands and communities. They include Tobique First Nation, Tsartlip First Nation, the Algonquins of Barriere Lake, Teztan Biny (Fish Lake) First Nation, Six Nations, Grassy Narrows, Stz’uminous First Nation, the Likhts’amsiyu Clan of the Wet’suwet’en First Nation, Gitxaala First Nation, Wagmatcook First Nation, Innu of Labrador, Pikangikum First Nation, and many more. They include bands from the coast of Vancouver Island to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean.

   

   
  

   

   What we see in these documents – from the hot spot reports themselves, to the intelligence-sharing between government and security forces – is a closely monitored population of First Nations, who clearly are causing a panic at the highest levels of Canadian bureaucracy and political office.
• Fear of Aboriginal "Hotspots"

   

   In 2006, INAC gave the name “hot spots” to those First Nations conflicts of “growing concern” due to “unrest” and increasing “militancy.” In a briefing presentation that INAC gave the RCMP that year, they identified certain communities as hotspots: Caledonia, Ontario (Douglas Creek Estates occupation); Belleville, Ontario (Montreal/Toronto Rail Blockade in sympathy to Caledonia); Brantford, Ontario (Grand River Conservation Authority Lands); Desoronto, Ontario (Occupation of Quarry); Grassy Narrows (Blockade of Trans Canada Hwy by environmentalists); and Maniwaki, Quebec (Blockade of Route 117).
• But the “hot spot binder” prepared each week by INAC officials closely monitors any and all action taking place across the country and names dozens more communities as sources of potential unrest. A particular concern of the federal government is that these “hotspots” are unpredictable protests because they are led by what the federal government labels as “splinter groups” of “Aboriginal Extremists.”  As INAC describes in the same presentation to the RCMP:

   

   “Incidents led by splinter groups are arguably harder to manage as they exist outside negotiation processes to resolve recognized grievances with duly elected leaders. We seek to avoid giving standing to such splinter groups so as not to debase the legally recognized government. Incidents are also complicated by external groups such as Warrior Societies or non-Aboriginal counter-protest groups.”
• Telling in the INAC statement above is that the identified protests are “outside of negotiation processes” with elected councils. Canada is clearly spooked by the spectre of First Nations demanding Crown recognition of Indigenous sovereignty and self-determination, as well as Aboriginal and Treaty Rights, beyond the narrow confines of Crown land claims and self-government policies. These so-called “splinter” groups also threaten the status quo by demanding their own First Nation leaders, staff and advisors to pull out of the compromising negotiations.

   

   
  

   

   Also telling here is the cozy cooperative relationship between INAC and the RCMP. The INAC briefing to the RCMP is almost indistinguishable from a presentation one would expect to see from security forces, rather than from a government ministry. Contrary to their claims, Indian Affairs is not an institution of reconciliation and negotiation, but rather appears to be a management office to control the costs of Native unrest, and they are willing to work closely with law enforcement to accomplish this task.
• In addition to the hotspot reporting, the Deputy Ministers of Public Safety Emergency Preparedness Canada and INAC directed that a summer operational plan be prepared in 2006 to deal with Aboriginal occupations and protests. A progress report on the operational plan reveals the blueprint for security integration on First Nations issues.

   

   
  

   

   The “Standing Information Sharing Forum,” for example, is Chaired by the RCMP and includes as its members the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Department of Fisheries, Government of Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Transportation Canada, and involves weekly conference calls and continuous information dissemination by INAC to its partners.
• Harper is moving towards a security paradigm familiar since the War on Terror was launched in 2001. The inclusion of Transportation Canada at the Information Sharing Forum should also alert us to the commercial threat of blockades to the free trade agenda.

   

   
  

   

   Aboriginal people who are defending their lands are now treated on a spectrum from criminals to terrorists. On either side, under Harper, an intensification of intelligence gathering and surveillance procedures now govern the new regime.
• Haudenosaunee/Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy

   

   It is also clear from INAC’s presentation to the RCMP that they are particularly worried about the Haudenosaunee/Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy. They mention “Warrior Societies” and an “illicit agenda,” referring at several points to concerns around smuggling. The federal government deems the tobacco/cigarette trade as “illicit” because Canada is not getting paid taxes by the Mohawks who are operating the businesses.
• However, the 1995 federal Aboriginal Self-Government policy, which was developed unilaterally by the federal government, does not allow for sharing jurisdiction with First Nations for real powers over trade and commerce matters.  The federal self-government policy only allows small business operations on-reserve. Historically, the federal government has used the Indian Act to control and manage on-reserve economic development so there was no real competition with surrounding non-Indian businesses and towns. On the prairies, First Nations agriculture was undermined and led to the failure of farming on-reserve because of complaints from non-Indians. This policy of non-competition is still the reality today.

   

   
  

   

   The federal government is particularly concerned about the Haudenosaunee/Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy actions at Caledonia, as the INAC 2006 report describes it: “Caledonia was and remains a significant event in risk management.”
• The RCMP agree. In a 2007 report to CSIS, they state: “Caledonia continues to serve as a beacon on land claims and Aboriginal rights issues across Canada.”

   

   
  

   

   Canada is extremely worried about First Nations taking back lands and resources outside the scope of their one-sided land claims and self-government “negotiation processes,” as was done at Kanenhstaton/Caledonia.
• In order to contain the situation, the Crown governments have dispatched hard-nosed, experienced negotiators who have presented unmovable positions from the Harper government, which is likely why there hasn’t been any negotiated resolution of the situation at Kanenhstaton/Caledonia to this date. The Crown government obviously remain worried more lands will be “occupied” by the Six Nations “extremist” “splinter groups.”

   

   
  

   

   Ever since the 1990 stand-off in Kanesatake and Kahnawake, the federal government, the security and police agencies, and the Canadian army have been worried about a repeat of coordinated First Nation political actions across Canada.
• The 2007 National Day Of Action 

   

   Specific information about policing First Nations was obtained in a series of Access to Information requests about the AFN National Day of Action that took place on June 29th, 2007. A 2007 RCMP brief to CSIS lays out a number of concerns regarding the National Day of Action.

   

   
  

   

   First of all, the RCMP is mainly concerned about protecting their men and women in uniform, both from the perspective of First Nations confronting the police on front lines, and from the perspective of negative public sentiment for their potential handling of the event: “The often disparate and fractured nature of these events can lead the police to become the proverbial ‘meat in the sandwich’ and the subject of negative public sentiment.”
• The RCMP also show concern that a lack of coordination, or “a fractured and inconsistent approach” by police forces, could “galvanize Nations throughout Canada.” Is this to say that violence instigated by police could lead to solidarity actions by First Nations across the country? Or that perceived weakness in policing could lead other First Nations to take a stand? Either way, in response, cooperation between departments, security forces, and ministries are deemed to be necessary to provide a strong united front against First Nations protest.

   

   
  

   

   The RCMP also caution that, “Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal extremists often see these events as an opportunity to escalate or agitate the conflict.” By inference, we can guess that they may be referring to groups unaffiliated with the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), unwilling to negotiate under Crown policies, or prepared to engage in tactics not sanctioned by the official leadership, such as property destruction and armed conflict. Non-Aboriginal groups are also cited here as potentially threatening, giving credence to recent targeting of G20 “ringleaders” who feel their Indigenous solidarity work has made them targets of the Crown and police forces.
• Cost is a serious concern to the RCMP, as well. Not only is the price tag for policing these nation-wide events “exorbitant,” and therefore can lead to rash policing decisions to use force in order to bring a quick end to conflicts, but the economic risks of blockades are themselves potentially catastrophic. As the RCMP warn, “The recent CN strike represents the extent in which a national railway blockade could effect the economy of Canada.”

   

   
  

   

   The RCMP also express this curious concern: “The police role may be complicated by the conventional and sometimes political view that there is a clear distinction between policy and police operations.” Clearly, where the distinction slips between police and policy roles, the RCMP become simply Indian Agents, carrying out the colonial work of the department. Given the information disclosed here, this distinction is impossible to maintain. Where police intimidate and arrest Indigenous peoples on their own lands, there is no law on the police’s side.
• There is also a considerable public relations issue at stake here. The RCMP displayed concern at the potential fall-out of a number of “perception” problems that could befall the forces:

   

   

   “Perception of a two-tiered approach to enforcement can generate significant criticism and motivate non-Aboriginal activists.”

   

   

   

   “An intense and protracted event may lead to long-standing erosion of relationships for the police and the community – they are usually always the victims.” 

   

   

   

   “Because there are limitations on what the police can negotiate and success often depends on others, the role of the police can become frustrating.”
• The RCMP realize to some extent that they must choose between First Nations approval of their policing tactics and the wrath of a public convinced that blockades are criminal, rather than political acts. The police, however, contrary to their assertions, are not the victims here. They are just the dupes in a much older game of cowboys and Indians.

   

   
  

   

   The above RCMP statements show that even with all of the federal financial and managerial control over First Nation Chiefs and Leaders, except, apparently for the former AFN National Chief, Phil Fontaine, the Chiefs and Leaders were still not entirely trusted by the federal government and that a large concern in 2007 was the potential for a broad national coordinated series of local and regional political actions by First Nations.
• One insight emerges strongly here: most threatening of all to security and government forces is coordinated First Nations action. This can be seen clearly from the reports. At one point in the 2007 INAC to RCMP briefing, concern is expressed about a First Nations conference because, “The 2006 Numbered Treaty Conference proposed a ‘national’ movement of independent actions to express discontent.”

   

   
  

   

   Their fear is palpable where they follow the trajectory of the Day of Action. It was first proposed by Chief Terrance Nelson at the Assembly of First Nations' general assembly, where the motion carried. The nation-wide event was later confirmed in a personal meeting between the RCMP Commissioner and then-National Chief Phil Fontaine. “Mr. Fontaine expressed his concern over the sense of frustration that seems to exist among First Nation leaders and the growing resolve to support a June 29th blockade,” a memo states.

   

   
  

   

   The growing unrest, of course, cannot be resolved through greater coordination of security and government forces. First Nation frustration with this strategy will only continue to mount.
• Crown Reward-Punishment System Divides Leaders and People

   

   If coordinated action gets the goods, special attention must be paid to the government’s particular interest in “splinter” groups.

   

   
  

   

   Under Canada’s colonial system, the struggle for Indigenous sovereignty, self-determination, Aboriginal and Treaty rights has historically been undermined by First Nations who cooperated with the Crown government turning in those First Nations who were resisting the Crown’s colonial system.

   

   
  

   

   Over time this evolved into the Crown dividing First Nations into the “progressive” Indian Bands and the backward or “traditional” Indian Bands. The federal government through the various Indian Affairs departments, developed an approach to reward the “progressive” Indians and punish the “traditional” Indians.
• This federal reward-punishment approach still exists, though the “Indian Agents” have been replaced by the Band Councils who now deliver Crown programs and services to their community members. The Band Councils and other First Nation organizations’ formula-funding are controlled by a system of legislation, policies, terms and conditions – all designed, controlled and managed largely by the federal Crown bureaucracy and politicians in Ottawa.

   

   
  

   

   The First Nations Chiefs and Leaders who become more known and prominent are largely the individuals who have been trained and supported by federal bureaucrats. These individuals become known for their seeming ability to get federal capital dollars to build new houses, schools and other community infrastructure, or additional program dollars for enhancing Band programs.
• However, the point is, none of these individuals would have gotten anywhere without federal support to advance their political careers. This is the reward system at work. For those Chiefs and Leaders who don not cooperate with the federal government, they can be ignored and/or stalled on funding requests. In some circumstances the federal government will even support “splinter groups” to take out the offending Chief or Leader. A current prominent example of this is the Algonquins of Barriere Lake in Western Quebec, but this also occurred historically at the Six Nations Grand River Territory.

   

   
  

   

   The INAC and RCMP documents make it clear that while the Canadian State Security Apparatus is concerned about “splinter groups,” they also are somewhat concerned about Chiefs and Leaders from Indian Act Band Councils and First Nation establishment organizations like AFN and their Provincial/Territorial Organizations becoming Aboriginal “extremists.”
• What the INAC and RCMP briefings show is that there needs to be unity on the ground with coordinated political actions between First Nations Peoples in order to protect, defend and advance First Nation pre-existing sovereignty, and First Nation Aboriginal and Treaty rights to lands and resources. Divide and conquer tactics can only be met with new strategies of alliance-building, and by bringing the leadership back down to the land.

   

   
  

   

   An earlier version of this article appeared in the First Nations Strategic Bulletin.

22 more annotations...

• 28 May 2011
• The Militarization and Securitization of the Canadian University
• Here are some links to pages worthy of note, on the securitization and militarization of the Canadian university, and how priorities for research are being reoriented to surveillance at home and intervention abroad, realigning academic research with the imperatives of the national security state and not with the broader public that funds our universities. As AJP comes across more resources, we will consolidate these for readers and interested colleagues, with a specific focus on Canadian universities. In the meantime, please visit our Documents and Library pages for more resources that are relevant.

  
   

  "The hottest postsecondary field? Intelligence: Demand is so high, universities simply cannot keep up," by Jeff Sallot, The Globe and Mail, 01 January 2007:
   

  "...Once considered an arcane branch of Cold War-era political science, security and intelligence studies now attracts interest from historians, sociologists -- even engineers trying to design structures that might become terrorist targets. At least 10 Canadian universities offer courses dealing with security and intelligence issues....The U.S. government's response to the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks resulted in the allocation of billions of dollars for intelligence and security agencies. The spillover is felt at American colleges and universities that have been able to start new courses and programs. The Department of Homeland Security finances faculty positions at 'centres of excellence' at six universities and 23 partner universities....Ottawa has also allocated considerable sums for security in recent years, but academics in Canada say they aren't seeing the same kind of benefit as their American colleagues...."

  "Canada Boost Intelligence," Canadian Press, 04 February 2007:
   

  "As universities struggle to meet the growing post-9-11 demand for courses in security and intelligence, Canada's spy agency has revved up recruiting efforts to fill positions soon to be vacated by retiring baby boomers."
• Here are some links to pages worthy of note, on the securitization and militarization of the Canadian university, and how priorities for research are being reoriented to surveillance at home and intervention abroad, realigning academic research with the imperatives of the national security state and not with the broader public that funds our universities. As AJP comes across more resources, we will consolidate these for readers and interested colleagues, with a specific focus on Canadian universities.
• "It’s All About the People: Cultural Intelligence (CQ) as a Force Multiplier in the Contemporary Operating Environment," by Emily Spencer (University of Northern British Columbia), in Journal of Conflict Studies,Vol. 29, 2009:
   
   Counterinsurgency within "the national domain":
   

  "16 Within the domestic realm there are a number of audiences that are critical for the Canadian Forces to fully understand — each with its specific beliefs, values, and attitudes and, consequently, behaviors. The first target domestic audience is the general Canadian public itself. Understanding Canadian beliefs, values, and attitudes is critically important for a number of reasons. First, public confidence and support is crucial for the continuing vitality of the CF. The 'decade of darkness' of the 1990s, when a series of scandals eroded governmental and public confidence and support in the CF, demonstrated the danger of losing touch with Canadian societal sensitivities and beliefs in such basic concepts as accountability, integrity, and transparency. This erosion in CF support impacted the Department of National Defence (DND) and the CF in a myriad of ways from budgetary support to recruiting and the ability to investigate and regulate itself as an autonomous profession. In essence, public support engenders political support, which can lead directly to credibility and trust, which in turn leads to freedom of action. Indeed, continuing Canadian participation in Afghanistan is directly tied to public sentiment and support.
   
   "17 A 'cultural' comprehension of the general Canadian public also has an impact on recruiting. An understanding of what is important to Canadians, and what triggers their commitment and support, is key to developing the necessary approaches to attract young Canadians to join the CF. If the public understand the CF and its members, if there is a deep-rooted connection between them and the CF, particularly its mission and importance to national security, temporary crises or scandals will be less traumatic and have a shorter lasting effect.
   
   "18 Finally, a cultural understanding of the general Canadian public is an important source of information. As the threat to Western societies grows through both the interconnected globalized world and through radicalization of home-grown terrorists through the internet or simply from domestic disenfranchised elements, the CF will increasingly be called on to assist law enforcement agencies (LEA) in a domestic context. As such, understanding what is important to Canadians from a cultural, ideological, and/ or attitudinal perspective will be critical for ensuring active support of the CF and equally to prevent alienation, passivity, or even active resistance while assisting LEAs in Canada."

  The same article also evaluates the utility of the U.S. Army's Human Terrain System (HTS) for its possible lessons for Canadian cultural counterinsurgency. For more along those lines, see the next item:
• 
   CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES - JCSP 34 / PCEMI 34 - MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES PAPER - From the Physical to the Cognitive: The Changing Nature of the Army in Post-Modern Operations. By /par Maj C.W. Kean, 25 April 2008:
   

  "The Human Terrain System (HTS) is an innovative method of gaining an appreciation for and understanding of the cultural aspects that shape different perspectives within a given society. When properly implemented, the Human Terrain System (HTS) helps clarify previous assumptions or gaps in understanding that had plagued the Army in previous years. This tool allows the commander and his or her staff the ability to visualize the complexity of the social systems within their area of operations so that they are more capable of understanding root causes of conflict and conceptualizing possible second and third-order consequences of their actions. It further allows the commander and his staff the ability to better understand the situation from the perspective of the population and potential adversaries." (page 55)
• The Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society, at the University of New Brunswick:
   

  Our strengths: Internationally recognized faculty specializing in peacekeeping, modern stability building, terrorism, intelligence and military and naval history...

  The Journal of Conflict Studies, from the Gregg Centre (above):
   

  Topics Include:
   

  • revolutionary or civil war
   
  • guerrilla warfare
   
  • terrorism
   
  • counter-insurgency and counter-terror operations
   
  • propaganda and psychological warfare
   
  • intelligence activities
   
  • media coverage of such conflict
   
  • peacekeeping
   
  • foreign/military policy
   
  • strategic studies as they relate to the field
• Canadian Intelligence Resource Centre: Academic Community and Research Groups
   
   Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies--see links to ACADEMIC PROGRAMS

  
   

  "Keeping tabs on the world of terrorism," by Donna Jacobs, The Ottawa Citizen, 11 September 2006--a profile of Carleton University's Professor Martin Rudner.

  
   

  2010 CASIS International Conference--The Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) held their annual conference in Ottawa from October 14th to 15th. The theme of this year's conference was "Understanding National Security". This session on October 14th was on "The Toronto 18 and Radicalization in Canada" and featured presentations by Mubin Shaikh (a former undercover agent in the Toronto 18 investigation), Michael King (Department of Psychology at McGill University) and Stewart Bell (senior reporter for the National Post).

  
   

  2009 CASIS International Conference--From October 29th to 31st, 2009, the 2009 CASIS International Conference was held in Ottawa. The theme of this year's conference was "Terrorism, Cyberspies and a New ‘Cold’ War: Emerging Challenges for Security and Intelligence." In the fourth panel discussion on October 30th, 2009, government analysts, scholars and independent researchers participated in a roundtable on radicalization and extremism.

   

   

   

   

    You might also like: 
• Canadian Intelligence Resource Centre: Academic Community and Research Groups
   
   Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies--see links to ACADEMIC PROGRAMS

  
   

  "Keeping tabs on the world of terrorism," by Donna Jacobs, The Ottawa Citizen, 11 September 2006--a profile of Carleton University's Professor Martin Rudner.

  
   

  2010 CASIS International Conference--The Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) held their annual conference in Ottawa from October 14th to 15th. The theme of this year's conference was "Understanding National Security". This session on October 14th was on "The Toronto 18 and Radicalization in Canada" and featured presentations by Mubin Shaikh (a former undercover agent in the Toronto 18 investigation), Michael King (Department of Psychology at McGill University) and Stewart Bell (senior reporter for the National Post).
• 2009 CASIS International Conference--From October 29th to 31st, 2009, the 2009 CASIS International Conference was held in Ottawa. The theme of this year's conference was "Terrorism, Cyberspies and a New ‘Cold’ War: Emerging Challenges for Security and Intelligence." In the fourth panel discussion on October 30th, 2009, government analysts, scholars and independent researchers participated in a roundtable on radicalization and extremism.

8 more annotations...

• 23 November 2011

• First Nations Under Surveillance in Canada 

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   
  

   In our continuing coverage of reports of surveillance and domestic forms of counterinsurgency in Canada, we present this material, first aired on the CBC's radio program, The Current, from Thursday, 17 November, 2011.
• It demonstrates the state's continuing efforts to spy on the public sphere and to treat Aboriginals as if they were a potential insurgent threat, a domestic implementation of espionage techniques that tie in with the "return investment" on Canada's participation in foreign counterinsurgency wars, as first demonstrated by the inclusion of First Nations in the draft counterinsurgency manual of the Canadian Forces. For more background, see the prior reports we published on these topics:
• • Domestic Surveillance in Canada: Suspicious Incident Reporting -- 22 November 2011
   
  • Militarization, Decolonization, and Indigenous Sovereignty -- 19 October 2011
   
  • For the Sake of Mining Interests and "Security": Canadian and U.S. Surveillance and Suppression of Indigenous Communities in the Americas, as Revealed by Wikileaks -- 29 June 2011
   
  • Domestic Counterinsurgency in Canada -- 13 June 2011
   
  • First Nations Under Surveillance: Harper Government Prepares for First Nations “Unrest" -- 08 June 2011
   
  • Counterinsurgency: From Afghanistan to First Nations Resistance in Canada -- 03 July 2010
• From the CBC:
   
   Why is the govt spying on Cindy Blackstock? Cindy Blackstock is an advocate for First Nations children and youth. She has an email trail that shows bureaucrats from the Department of Aboriginal Affairs are tailing her, showing up at more than 70 speeches and appearances, taking notes, following her Facebook page and sharing what they find with their Dept and the Dept of Justice. She calls the surveillance, chilling and politically motivated.
   
   Canada spends millions of dollars each year monitoring and tracking individuals and groups thought to threaten national security. Law abiding citizens aren't typically under the government's microscope. But when Cindy Blackstock applied for access to government documents, she received a fat folder that showed she was being watched. Cindy Blackstock runs The First Nations Child and Family Caring Society.
• In 2007, her organization filed a human rights complaint against the federal government, alleging under-funding of child welfare services on reserves. Her Access to Information request revealed, the Federal Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development has amassed a large file on her activities, much of it based on first-hand accounts from government employees who tailed her at public appearances. Cindy Blackstock joined us from our studio in Ottawa.
   
   Martin Papillon is a professor of political science at the University of Ottawa. Among other things, his research focusses on Aboriginal self-determination and he was in our Ottawa studio.
   
   For his take on whether and when the federal government should monitor native groups and why it might be keeping tabs on Cindy Blackstock, we were joined by Tim Powers. He's the Vice President of Summa Communications and a Conservative Party strategist. He also worked in the Department of Aboriginal Affairs in the mid 1990s. Tim Powers was in Ottawa.
• The Current asked to speak to someone from the Prime Minister's Office. We did not receive a reply. We asked to speak to Aboriginal Affairs Minister John Duncan. Neither he nor anyone else from the department was available this morning, but Minister Duncan's spokesperson did provide us with this statement. It reads:
   

   I can tell you that our government takes Canadians' privacy very seriously. The Minister has asked the Deputy Minister for Aboriginal Affairs to report to him on whether privacy rules were respected.

   We also asked to speak to someone from the Department of National Defence. We received no response. The Government's Leader in the Senate, Conservative Senator Marjory LeBreton, was not available to speak to us this morning.

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