Nathan Hale High School Library's List: 11th_CBA_VietnamWAR
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May 25, 10
Select links in this order:
1. Interactive Timeline
2. Exhibits
3. Lyndon Johnson
4. The Gulf of Tonkin -
May 25, 10
Source: The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 3, pp.561-562
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May 25, 10
Titled: Australian Senate Talks Over Vietnam (102 pages) [06 May 1965]\n\nDiscussion/Debate about Australian involvement in impending Vietnam War, United States involvement, Chinese intentions.
Begin reading halfway down on right side of first page. -
May 25, 10
Titled: Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964.
Provides some analysis of events of the first and second attacks. -
May 25, 10
Titled: Info Telegraph Tonkin Gulf
Dated August 7, 1964.
Read closely along with Tonkin Gulf essay to compare information about events. -
May 25, 10
Outgoing Telegram from Department of State to U.S. Military about attack on U.S. Ship in Tonkin Gulf. Read closely in combination with TASS statement.
Dated August 8, 1964.
Declassified: March 31, 1978 -
May 25, 10
Titled: U.S. Tonkin Gulf Acts Worsen Tense Situation : TASS Statement
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May 25, 10
Titled: Infiltration
Some reference to debate about intelligence information prior to escalation. -
May 25, 10
Titled: Sino-DRV Air and Ground Action: February, 1965-February, 1966
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May 25, 10
Titled: Chinese Military Activity, September 1964-January 1965
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May 25, 10
Harry Kreisler interviews John A. McCone about conflict of U.S. Intelligence and Military Analysis of Vietnam conflict and escalation.
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May 25, 10
Read in combination with the NSA Archive Gulf of Tonkin intercepts.
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Controversy over Johnson administration claims regarding the Gulf of Tonkin incident began not long after the events themselves and grew over time, leading to an unusual review of the events in a new set of hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1968. Secretary McNamara again served as the administration's lead witness and claimed that the issue of provocation had been "fully explored" at the 1964 hearings. Specifically, McNamara declared that Congress had investigated whether the attacks "were in any way provoked by or related to certain South Vietnamese naval activity." McNamara later reasserted that the 34-A missions were "countermeasures being taken by the South Vietnamese in response to North Vietnamese aggression." (Note 5) These administration assertions were highly misleading as the declassified documentary record of OPLAN 34-A makes abundantly clear.
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The leading edge of doubt which ultimately forced the February 1968 review of the Gulf of Tonkin incident arose over whether a second attack on U.S. warships had occurred on the night of August 4. Following the initial naval battle of August 2, President Johnson ordered a second U.S. destroyer, the USS C. Turner Joy, to join the Maddox, after which both ships sailed back up the Gulf of Tonkin. On the night of August 4, both ships thought they had come under attack again and sent messages reporting enemy contacts, torpedoes in the water, and so on, while directing a good deal of fire at the supposed adversary. Following this supposed repeat challenge to "innocent passage," President Johnson ordered retaliatory bombing against North Vietnam and asked for the congressional resolution with which he prosecuted the Vietnam war.
But the certainty of the "second attack" would never be so clear as the first. The initial battle took place in daylight. There were photographs of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats engaged in a fire-fight with the Maddox, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer retained a dud shell from one of the Vietnamese vessels as a souvenir, and numerous Maddox sailors confirmed sighting at least three torpedoes. However, there was no physical evidence at all for the August 4 attack claims. The supposed surface action took place at night and in poor weather. The skipper and four seamen aboard the C. Turner Joy variously claimed having seen a searchlight, boat cockpit lights, smoke at a location where they claimed their gunfire had hit a Vietnamese vessel in the water, and one, or perhaps two, torpedo wakes. The Navy further claimed their vessels had sunk two attacking torpedo boats. But there was no wreckage, nor bodies of dead sailors. No photographs or other physical evidence existed. Radar and sonar sightings provided an exceedingly confusing set of data at best. (Note 6)
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May 25, 10
Read carefully to see summarized reports of enemy messages intercepted by U.S. Naval Military. Note Vietnamese aircraft used and a Vietnam cargo ship for monitoring and staging attack on Maddox. Read in combination with 40th Anniversary Essay about intercepts and escalation.\n\nOriginal Document: August, 1964\nDeclassified: March 13, 2003
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May 25, 10
Filmmaker Errol Morris focuses on history through the eyes of a single man in The Fog of War. The man is former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, whose imprint on global affairs includes Vietnam, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the firebombing of Tokyo. Morris speaks with NPR's Steve Inskeep about the film.
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May 25, 10
Forty years ago, President Lyndon Johnson asked Congress to grant him power to use force in Vietnam. The events that led to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution have long been the subject of debate and controversy. NPR's Bruce Auster reports."
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May 25, 10
Bill Moyers considers a President's decision to escalate troop levels in a military conflict. Through LBJ's taped phone conversations and his own remembrances, Bill Moyers looks at Johnson's deliberations as he stepped up America's role in Vietnam.
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May 25, 10
Bill Moyers considers a President's decision to escalate troop levels in a military conflict. Through LBJ's taped phone conversations and his own remembrances, Bill Moyers looks at Johnson's deliberations as he stepped up America's role in Vietnam.
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