Review of Zombies and Consciousness (Robert Kirk, 2005)
Zombies and Consciousness has two aims. First, Kirk hopes to show that the notion of a zombie – a person of flesh and blood but without the inner light of experience – lacks logical conceivability; it is incoherent and thus cannot be used as grounds for proposing a ‘Hard Problem’ of consciousness.
Second, he wants to go the next step and show that ordinary physicalism can completely account for consciousness. He identifies a set of psychological functions, each of which is plausibly physical in its causation and, when bundled together, should result in a conscious being with no further (mental or otherwise non-physical) aspects left dangling. Consciousness would be just the sum of these material activities and nothing more.
Real-time data mining unmasks the power of imitation, kith and charisma in our face-to-face social networks
Coruzzi's NYU team and collaborator Hon-Ming Lam of the Chinese University of Hong Kong report their findings in the November 12th issue of Nature in a scientific correspondence entitled "Glutamate receptor genes in plants." For a copy of the article, contact Lauren Funkhouser at Nature at (202) 737-2355.
By Lee Cronk
Department of Anthropology at Rutgers University, lcronk@anthropology.rutgers.edu
A cue is any quality that can be perceived and interpreted for contextualizing. An unintentional cue, or evidence, is a quality that is interpreted without the intention of interpretation from the sender. An intentional cue, or signal, is a quality that is interpreted with the intention of interpretation from the sender.
Jo˜ao Queiroz and Charbel Ni˜no El-Hani, Received 5 January 2006; accepted in revised form 11 April 2006
Any description of the emergence and evolution of different types of meaning processes (semiosis, sensu C.S.Peirce) in living systems must be supported by a theoretical framework which makes it possible to understand the nature and dynamics of such processes. Here we propose
that the emergence of semiosis of different kinds can be understood as resulting from fundamental interactions in a triadically-organized hierarchical process.
Time really, really, really wants to know if animals can think: so much that it's done three separate cover stories on the issue.
"Why do so many different species of animals all use signals that are inherently expensive, in a wide range of different signalling contexts? Why not simply "whisper" the message to the intended receiver, rather than producing an elaborate and costly display? And why do these expensive signals seem to be so convincing to the intended signal receivers?"
Cues need not be intentional and the information gleaned from a cue may not be beneficial to person or animal producing the cue. The smell of CO2 that guides a mosquito to you is a cue to the insect - you did not choose to provide it with this information and indeed would preferred not to have done so. This is an unintentional cue; it is not beneficial to the producer of the cue. Signals are thus a subset of cues; allsignals are cues - they can be used as a guide to future action - but not all cues are signals.