ignt rn's List: Increase Troops in Afghanistan

• Before its ouster by U.S.-led forces in 2001, the Taliban controlled some 90 percent of Afghanistan's territory, although it was never officially recognized by the United Nations. After its toppling, the Taliban has proven resilient. In November 2007, the London-based Senlis Council (renamed the International Council on Security and Development, or ICOS), estimated that the Taliban maintained a permanent presence in 54 percent of Afghanistan (PDF), and continued to exert influence on regions outside the central government's sphere of control, predominantly in southern and eastern provinces. By December 2008, the Taliban had expanded its sphere of influence (PDF) to 72 percent of the country. "Confident in their expansion beyond the rural south," ICOS reported, "the Taliban is at the gates of the capital and infiltrating the city at will."

   

  Western military analysts say it is difficult to gauge the number of Taliban fighters under arms in Afghanistan. In October 2007, the New York Times reported the group might field as many as ten thousand fighters, but a much smaller fraction--less than three thousand--are full-time insurgents. Those numbers inched up in June 2008, when coordinated suicide bombings freed roughly four hundred Taliban fighters from a prison in Kandahar. Analysts also note that the Taliban and its core of fighters have become increasingly fragmented, and are driven to battle for a variety of competing reasons.

• President Barack Obama’s revised Afghanistan strategy calls for July 2011 as the start date of a thinning out of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
• There are now between 180,000 to 190,000 Afghan security forces, McChrystal said, divided between military forces and the police. More Afghan security forces are needed, he noted.
  
• By the fall of 2010, McChrystal said, there should be about 134,000 Afghan soldiers and just over 100,000 Afghan police.
  
  And, by July 2011, he said, there should be about 300,000 Afghan security forces divided between soldiers and police.

1 more annotation...

• Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence
• At an operational level, the ISI is a close partner of the CIA. Officers of the two services work together nearly every night on joint operations against al-Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal areas, perhaps the most dangerous region in the world. Information from the ISI has helped the CIA plan its Predator drone attacks, which have killed 14 of the top 20 targets over the past several years.
• But on the political level, there is mistrust on both sides. The United States worries that the ISI isn't sharing all it knows about Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis, meanwhile, view the United States as an unreliable ally that starts fights it doesn't know how to finish.
• The ISI leadership thinks the United States can't afford to lose in Afghanistan, and it worries about a security vacuum there that would endanger Pakistan. But at the same time, the ISI fears that a big military surge, like the up to 40,000 additional troops McChrystal wants, could be counterproductive.
• ISI officials say they want to help America with political reconciliation in Afghanistan. But they argue that to achieve this goal, the U.S. must change its posture -- moving from "ruler mode" to "support mode" -- so that Afghan voices can be heard.
• The American suspicion that the ISI is withholding information about the Taliban, or is otherwise "hedging its bets," makes ISI leaders visibly angry. Pakistanis have the most to lose from a Taliban victory in Kabul, they argue, because it would inevitably strengthen the Taliban in Pakistan, too. A Pakistani version of Mohammad Omar is anathema to them, the ISI leaders say.

4 more annotations...

• The war in Afghanistan is not going well, and the critical problem is the same one that dogged our efforts in Iraq for years: grossly inadequate troop levels. Western troop totals there have just inched over 60,000, while Afghan security forces total some 140,000. Let's put this into perspective: We are trying to do with 200,000 personnel what it took 700,000 soldiers and police (plus 100,000 "volunteers") to accomplish in Iraq. But Afghanistan is even larger than Iraq, and more populous
• Thankfully, in a broader strategic sense we can be patient. While the human toll of the Afghanistan war is tragic, it remains far less bloody than was Iraq at its peak levels of violence. And the Afghan people, while less impressed with their own government and with the United States than before, remain hopeful and resilient according to public-opinion polls

• Army Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, who heads up Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan, cited signs of promise since the Afghan government announced major changes in its pay system in late November.
• Army Lt. Gen. David M. Rodriguez, commander of International Security Assistance Force Joint Command,
• During the first seven days of December, 2,659 recruits joined the Afghan army – halfway toward the month’s 5,253-recruit objective, Caldwell said.
  
  In November, the army fell 21 percent below its recruiting goal, recruiting 4,303 members but falling short of its 5,442-recruit objective. In October, the army fell 14 percent short of its 4,408-recruit objective, signing on 3,811 members. September figures were particularly dismal: 65 percent short of the goal of 2,400 members, with only 831 new soldiers being recruited.
• These efforts will be an important step toward the goal of 287,000 Afghan national security forces by July 2011, he said. That’s when President Barack Obama expects to begin reducing the U.S. force commitment in Afghanistan, subject to conditions on the ground.

2 more annotations...

• December 7th, 2009

• The US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, and defence secretary, Robert Gates, both offered heavy qualifications to the date yesterday, although they provided assurances on other issues – including a note of confidence that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe, aided by US security measures. 

   Doing the rounds of Sunday morning news programmes, Clinton played down the withdrawal date: "We're not talking about an exit strategy or a drop-dead deadline." 
• "We will begin to thin our forces and begin to bring them home," said Gates. "But how quickly it goes will very much depend on the conditions on the ground. We will have a significant number of forces there for some considerable time beyond that."

1 more annotation...

• Let’s be clear that the date of July 2011 to begin transferring security responsibility and thinning our troops and bringing them home is firm. What is 'conditions based' is the pacing at which our troops will come home and the pace at which we will turn over responsibility to the Afghans. And that will be based on conditions on the ground.  

     

  Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates
    ABC Face the Nation
    Washington, D.C.
    Dec. 6, 2009

• The results have been mixed. While the army has taken on the Pakistani Taliban, it has failed to go after Afghan Taliban leaders who base their operations in the tribal areas in the border region. At the same time, anti-Western sentiment in Pakistan has grown.
• accepting U.S. funds to crack down on Pakistani militants while tolerating the Afghan Taliban in the expectation that the radical Islamic movement will take power in Afghanistan once the Americans withdraw.
• In London on Thursday, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani signaled his country's cautious response to Obama's new policy by declining to endorse the U.S.-led troop surge. Gilani said his government needs more information about Obama's plan.

1 more annotation...

• But what about the heart of the strategy, the Afghan National Army? This force is supposed to "stand up as we stand down." Sadly this is a phantom Army. Made up from the recombined remnants of Northern Alliance militias, held together by British and American money and training, it has nowhere near the numbers needed nor claimed. Drug addiction and demoralization are rampant among its soldiers.

    

  Most importantly, the ANA is a largely Tajik army. Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and are based in the north of the country. The Pashtun are the largest group and dominate the south. The Taliban draws its support from the Pashtun. Tajik and Pashtuns are bitter rivals.

    

  In the eyes of Tajik leaders, Karzai (a Pashtun) isn't "their" president, and this isn't "their" war, nor are Tajiks too keen on getting killed in it, as many US soldiers have noticed.

    

  Even if Tajik forces were willing to fight and replace NATO soldiers, sending the Tajik dominated ANA into the south to control the Pashtun would not amount to a "national army" fighting "its own" war. The Pashtun would and do see these Tajiks as invaders.

• $57,077.60. That's what we're paying per minute
• estimated $1 million to send each of them surging into Afghanistan for one year. So a 30,000-person surge will be at least $30 billion, which brings us to that $57,077.60
• According to a recent report issued by the Political Economy Research Institute, that sum could generate a whopping 537,810 construction jobs, 541,080 positions in healthcare, fund 742,740 teachers or employ 831,390 mass transit workers.

1 more annotation...

• The bottom line: Afghanistan's terrible infrastructure means that any surge of troops there could be more like a slow roll, compared with Iraq.

  "I anticipate that as soon as the president makes a decision, we can probably begin flowing some forces pretty quickly after that," Mr. Gates told reporters Thursday. "But it is a bigger challenge than certainly was the case in Iraq."

  After President Bush decided to surge forces into Iraq, it took roughly five months for about 30,000 forces to hit the ground – about a brigade per month plus supporting forces.
• Afghanistan, however, is a landlocked country with few serviceable roads, making air transport of personnel and equipment the only practical choice. But the country only has two airfields – in Kandahar in the south and Bagram in the northeast. That limits the rate at which forces and their equipment can be deployed.

• The more forces Mr. Obama sends, the harder it will be to deploy them quickly. But Mr. O'Hanlon says it can happen.

  "There is a complexity here, there are reasons that it can get harder and slower, but the basic proposition of getting 30,000 to 40,000 more forces there is a job we can basically get done in six months," O'Hanlon says. "We've already done it before."

1 more annotation...

• It shows a heavy or permanent Taliban presence in 80 percent of Afghanistan. The term "permanent" is defined as provinces that report an average of one or more insurgent attacks per week.

  The group says the Taliban also has a "substantial" presence in an additional 17 percent of the country. That description is based on an average of one or more insurgent attacks per month and includes accounts from residents who believe the Taliban is active in the area.

  "Eight years after the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban has returned to touch almost every corner of Afghanistan," said Alexander Jackson, a policy analyst who worked on the study.

  In November 2007, the group determined that the Taliban had a permanent presence in just over half of Afghanistan. That number shot up to 72 percent in its next report issued in November 2008.

• President Obama ordered an additional 21,000 troops to Afghanistan this year, raising the total number of U.S. forces there to about 64,000, in an effort to curb the resurgent Taliban.

  August was the deadliest month of the war for U.S. forces since the conflict began in 2001, with 47 troops killed in Afghanistan, according to The Associated Press.

  The ICSD report says the Taliban appears to be spreading out from traditional strongholds in the south and east of the country.

  The most dramatic shift over the past few months has been the dissolving security situation in the north of Afghanistan, in provinces that have been relatively stable, such as Kunduz and Balkh. Over the past few months, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of attacks against international, Afghan government and civilian targets in these areas.

• The US ambassador to Afghanistan has dramatically intervened in the debate  about troop reinforcements, warning President Obama against committing tens  of thousands of extra troops to the country.  

   

   Karl Eikenberry, a retired army general who commanded US forces in Afghanistan  from 2005-2007, detailed his concerns in two classified cables last week.  
• Mr Eikenberry's concerns reportedly focused on the behaviour of Hamid Karzai,  the Afghan president recently re-elected for a five-year term in a poll  tainted by allegations of systematic fraud. He is said to have questioned Mr  Karzai's suitability as a long-term strategic partner, because of widespread  corruption in his first administration and the presence of warlords and  drugs smugglers in positions of influence.

• 68,000, more than double the number there when Bush left office.
• When Gen. David H. Petraeus announced that the surge would end, he spoke only of the withdrawal of the combat units because he needed to retain many of the support troops in Iraq.

• One in every four combat soldiers quit the Afghan National Army   (ANA) during the year ending in September, published data by the US Defense   Department and the Inspector General for Reconstruction in Afghanistan reveals. 
   
    That high rate of turnover in the ANA, driven by extremely high rates of   desertion, spells trouble for the strategy that US President Barack Obama has   reportedly decided on, which is said to include the dispatch of thousands of   additional US military trainers to rapidly increase the size of the ANA.
• The 35,000 troops recruited in the year ending September 1 is the highest by   the ANA in any year thus far, but the net increase of 19,000 troops for the   year is 33% less than the 26,000 net increases during both of the previous two   years.
• Those figures indicate that the rate of turnover in the ANA is accelerating   rather than slowing down.
• The reports also confused the question of turnover in the ANA by using   questionable accounting methods in the DoD's reporting on monthly changes in   personnel. It provided figures for total ANA personnel in 2009 showing an   increase from 66,000 in September 2008 to 94,000 in September 2009. 
  
• The graphs in the DoD reports of January and June 2009 are still identified as   "Afghan National Army Trained and Assigned". But the text of the report reveals   that the personnel totals shown on the graph were no longer for the ANA but for   the Ministry of Defense. 
   
    That meant that the totals included for the first time those still in training,   including even high school cadets, and others not assigned to any unit.
• That deceptive accounting change obscured the fact that the total number of   personnel assigned to ANA units in September 2009 was actually 82,000 rather   than the 94,000 shown, and that the increase in ANA personnel over the year was   only 16,000 rather than 28,000.

4 more annotations...

• The Pentagon has begun a massive building operation to construct new barracks  and facilities in Afghanistan for 20,000 extra US troops that will pour into  the country early next year.
• There are 8,100 British troops in Afghanistan, mostly deployed in the southern  Helmand province, where the Taleban insurgency has been the most fierce and  effective. The US has had to send forces south to bolster the British and  Canadian contingents, amid growing allegations among American military  officials that the British have not effectively taken the fight to the  enemy.
• On Wednesday, the Nato Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said that  Nato needs more troops in Afghanistan. "The classic counter-insurgency  tactics...require more forces in Afghanistan, simply to be able to hold  territory to start with development and reconstruction," he said.
• The president-elect announced this week that he is retaining Mr Bush's Defence  Secretary, Robert Gates, who will be central in overseeing the increase of  troops. His choice for National Security Adviser, retired Marine General  James Jones, conducted a sweeping review of the war in Afghanistan last  year. He concluded: "Make no mistake, Nato is not winning in  Afghanistan."

2 more annotations...

• Obama said Tuesday night the additional 30,000 troops would begin deploying early next year at "the fastest pace possible."
• Gen. James Jones, Obama's national security adviser, said Wednesday that the president's six-month time frame is "an achievable goal."
• Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, said Wednesday that the focus will be on sending troops to the south.

• A lack of paved roads outside the largest cities are easy places for the Taliban to place roadside bombs, known as IEDs, or improvised explosive devices.

  In addition, the main way to move troops and supplies around the country is by helicopter. The country is landlocked, and no navigable waterways lead to the ocean. Supplies must be flown in or shipped to Pakistan and driven to Afghanistan.

  The weather also poses a problem for the troops. Temperatures can dip to -10 degrees Fahrenheit in winter and soar above 110 degrees in summer.
• Obama's second surge. Earlier in the year, he ordered more than 20,000 troops to Afghanistan.

3 more annotations...

• The Taliban now has a permanent presence in 80% of Afghanistan, up from 72% in November 2008, according to a new map released today by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS). According to ICOS, another 17% of Afghanistan is seeing ‘substantial’ Taliban activity. Taken together, these figures show that the Taliban has a significant presence in virtually all of Afghanistan.
• 10 September 2009