Gieve Kazerouni's List: Battle of Midway

• The battle was a direct outcome of the Halsey-Doolittle Raid of April 1942. In that raid, an American task force centered on two aircraft carriers had been able to launch 16 U.S. Army bombers only 640 miles from the Japanese coast.
  
       The fact that the Americans could do this, while the Japanese forces were otherwise scoring stunning victories throughout Asia, was a severe loss of face to the Japanese Navy.
  
       To prevent any repeats of this American attack, Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto decided upon a two-pronged solution. First, destroy the existing American aircraft carriers, and then capture the American's forward-operating base of Pearl Harbor to prevent its use by future carriers.

  • On April 1942, the US were able to launch 16 U.S Army bombers 640 miles from the Japanese coast. This was known as the Halsey-Doolittle Raid. During the time Japan were a dominant and successful force throughout Asia and the fact that the US were able to make such an attack. This raid was what lead to the battle of Midway as Adm. Yamamoto decided to attack back. To do so he wanted to destroy the Americans aircraft carriers as well as the US's operating base in Pearl Harbor to prevent it from being used by any carriers
•      The island of Midway, the furthest west of the Hawaiian chain, was the ideal target to meet these goals. Both sides knew it was an ideal jump-off point for an invasion of Hawaii, and the Americans would have no choice but to defend it.
  

  • The island of Midway was an important target as it would be the perfect base to start an invasion to Hawaii.
•      Japan's battle plan for Midway called for two Japanese fleets, an amphibious force from the south, and a carrier attack force from the north. The amphibious force would arrive first, forcing the Americans to send their remaining carriers to Midway to confront it. Unbeknownst to the Americans, the northern force would then ambush them while their attention was on the amphibious invasion.
  

  • For Japan's attack on Midway, it was planned that there would be two Japanese fleets were an amphibious force (naval and landing force) will attack from the south and a carrier attack force from the north with the amphibious force arriving and confronting the US first. The plan was that the Americans would have to defend themselves against the Japanese and to do that they would have to use their remaining carriers. The Americans would not know the existence of the second force moving in from the North to ambush and trap the Americans by surprise while their attention was towards the amphibious force.
•      On the eve of the battle, the Americans had a major advantage. By March 1942, after two years of tedious work, the Pacific Fleet decoding organization called HYPO, under LCDR Joseph J. Rochefort, had broken the Japanese naval code JN-25B. The Americans knew from the outset what Japanese intended on doing.
  

  • The Americans could how know the Japanese activity after the HYPO figured out the Japanese's naval code JN-25B
• After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the code breakers were tasked with breaking the Japanese Navy's radio code, analyzing intelligence, and briefing ADM Chester Nimitz with the latest enemy movements and battle plans. Station HYPO, along with other code breakers throughout the Pacific, was devoted to averting any more offensive blows like Pearl Harbor. By early 1942, Rochefort and his code breakers were producing valuable intelligence.

  • Pacific Fleet decoding organization (HYPO) were devoted into decoding Japanese code to prevent any more offensive attacks like Pearl Harbor.
• But the Japanese code wasn't easy to crack. One of the ensigns, who worked for Rochefort as an intelligence analyst with the unit's cryptanalysts and Japanese linguists, was now-retired RADM Donald "Mac" Showers.
  
       "...There were more than 44,000 entries in the code book that made up JN25B. When we enciphered a message we would go through this dictionary of 44,000 code groups and pick out the codes for the words or phrases," said Showers.

  • It was not easy cracking Japan's code.
•    The HYPO unit was convinced that the Japanese were plotting an attack in the Pacific. They were certain that the Japanese code of "AF" (Affirm Fox) signified Midway, but not everyone was convinced.
  
       Showers remembered the day when Rochefort knew he had to convince Washington of the real meaning of AF.
  
       "That [event] took place right at my desk," said Showers. "I was the witness...and I can recite it in detail as if it had just occurred yesterday. CDR Jasper Holmes was standing by my desk talking with me when Rochefort approached him and said, 'Jasper, we've got to do something to prove to the world that AF is Midway.'"
  
       On May 19, 1942, Rochefort and Holmes, the author of Double-Edged Secrets, were both certain that Midway and Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands were specific Japanese objectives. To outwit the Japanese, Rochefort and Holmes had to convince Washington the real meaning of AF. But, once the concept was approved, it would be a case of luck and timing to bring all players together to beat the Japanese.

  • HYPO were certain that the Japanese code of "AF" was supposed to mean Midway but not everyone was convinced that that was true.
•    According to Showers, a lot of people like to argue the value of intelligence in the Battle of Midway.
  
       "Intelligence enabled the United States to be there," said Showers. "We needed a way to find out if the Japanese were actually targeting Midway, and the only option was to fake them into revealing their cards too soon [and show] that were indeed targeting Midway."
  
       The problem with these codes were that many people in Washington thought that "AF" meant other locations, such as Johnston Island, Samoa, the U.S. West Coast or even Hawaii. To convince Washington of the real meaning, Rochefort and Holmes developed a ruse to finally confirm the meaning of the code.
  
       The ruse would be in the form of a naval message that would be sent from Midway to Pearl Harbor indicating the island of Midway had suffered a water casualty. Both Rochefort and Holmes knew that Tokyo would intercept the message and believe that the situation in Midway was dire and ripe for the taking.
  
       As expected, soon after the message was sent a decryption from Tokyo Naval Intelligence advised that a "water shortage at AF," was discovered. This intercept convinced Washington of the real meaning of AF, setting the Midway war plans in motion.
  

  • Many people thought that "AF" represented other locations like Johnston Island, Samoa, the U.S West Coast or even Hawaii. To convince Washington that "AF" meant Midway, Showers said that they would have to fake the Japanese "into revealing their cards too soon [ and show] that were indeed targeting Midway." Rochefort and Holmes made a ruse (trick) were a naval message would be send from Midway to Pearl Harbor saying that the island of Midway was having a water casualty (water accident that ended with injury). Rochefort and Holmes knew the Tokyo would decode and intercept the message and because of that become more influenced into attacking Midway at a more "weaker" state. The interception then convinced Washington that AF meant Midway and so began Midway battle plans
• Since they had no battleships, and the Japanese had five, the aircraft carriers were the only chance the Americans had of winning the battle. This meant using them not as a harassing force, but as the major, decisive striking force.
  
       Once the code was confirmed, it was luck that Nimitz had three carriers ready with crew willing to fight the Japanese. Fortunately for the crews of USS Hornet (CV 8), USS Enterprise (CV 6) and USS Yorktown (CV 5), they all knew their participation in the pending battle was going to be significant.
  

  • The US main artillery was their aircraft carriers to win the battle as they had to use them as a striking force. Nimitz had three carriers ready which were the USS Hornet, USS Enterprise, and USS Yorktown.
• "That's exactly what he did. There was a place called Point Luck. We were to go out there, about 150 to 200 miles northeast of Midway. We were to sit there and wait until the Japanese attacked Midway."

  • Point Luck was a place located 150 to 200 miles northeast of Midway were the carrier attack force would wait as the amphibious force confronted the Japanese attack.
• 
       By June 2, TF 16 and TF 17 joined up about 350 miles northeast of Midway, and Fletcher assumed tactical command. The three carriers had an arsenal of 234 aircraft. Also supporting the war effort were 110 fighters, bombers and patrol planes from Midway. Another 25 fleet submarines under the command of RADM Robert H. English were also deployed around Midway.
  

  • By June 2, Task Force 16 and 16 joined together 350 miles northeast of Midway were Fletcher assumed tactical command. The three carriers had 234 aircrafts. There was also 110 fighters, bombers, and patrol planes in Midway. Also there were 25 submarines deployed around Midway which was lead by Robert H. English
• At about 9 a.m., June 3, before the strikes on Midway, Navy patrol planes reported a strong force of enemy ships (the Southern Force) about 700 miles off Midway, proceeding eastward. The Japanese were approaching in five columns composed of cruisers, transports, cargo vessels and other escort ships. Nine U.S. Army B-17 Flying Fortresses, based on Midway, were ordered to intercept and attack the approaching enemy. The Army bombers scored hits on one cruiser and one transport. Both ships were severely damaged and left burning.
  

  • On June 3 9 a.m Navy patrol planes reported of a strong enemy force was present 700 miles from Midway. As expected, this force was the southern amphibious force. Nine U.S army b-17 planes which were based on Midway were sent out to confront and attack the enemy which was organised in 5 columns of cruisers, transports, cargo vessels, and other escort ships.
•  On the morning of June 4, steaming 240 miles northwest of Midway, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's four carriers launched 108 planes to attack the U.S. base there. But, the U.S. Pacific Fleet was armed and ready.
  

  • The US Pacific fleet was prepared to face 108 Japanese planes sent out by Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's four carriers 240 miles northwest of Midway.
• 
       Two squadrons of Enterprise dive bombers, led by its Air Group commander, LCDR C. Wade McClusky, searched for the Japanese. While airborne, McClusky and his crew soon realized they were past the point where they should have intercepted the Japanese.
  
       "They had a choice--to turn south toward Midway, or to turn north," Kernan recalled. When McClusky saw a Japanese destroyer below heading north, he decided it must be racing to rejoin the fleet, so he followed it. That decision to follow the fleeing Japanese during the height of the fierce battle led their unit to sink the three carriers.

  • McClusky lead two squadrons of Enterpirse dive bombers to find the Japanese yet they were not present at were they thought they would be. They were thinking weather they should go south or North. Luckily for McClusky, he was able to spot a Japanese destroyer heading north and decided to follow that destroyer. That decision was vital for the US as because of the dive bombers going north this leads up to them sinking three Japanese Carriers.
•      "If they had not sunk those carriers, if McClusky had turned south, Yorktown would have still sunk one, which they did," added Kernan. "But, there would've been three others left to launch attacks against the American fleet and things would've have turned out very, very differently."
  

  • If it had not been for McClusky and his group to destroy the 3 Japanese carriers, the outcome of the battle would have been very different.
•      Meanwhile, McClusky spotted a lone Japanese cruiser heading northeast and altered his group's course to the direction of it. Continuing on the diverted course McClusky's group spotted the Japanese carrier strike force. Picking the two nearest carriers in the line of approach, McClusky ordered the attack on the two largest carriers in formation--Kaga and Akagi.
  

  • As McClusky and his group followed the lone destroyer they were able to spot the Japanese carrier strike force and order the diver bombers to attack the two largest carriers, Kaga and Akagi.
•      Kleiss was successful, scoring a direct hit alongside Kaga's forward elevator. A second hit struck fueling equipment, spraying the bridge with burning gasoline. As many as six other hits followed from other aviators in the group. Flame and smoke made it impossible to count hits with precision. In the hangar decks, fuel and munitions set off a conflagration which soon overwhelmed the ship.
  

  • One of the members of the McClusky's diver bombers was able to take out a carrier by hitting Kaga's elevator as well as the carriers fuelling equipment which ended with burning gasoline all over the bridge.
•      The battle didn't come without a cost on both sides. Yorktown was attacked by 12 to 15 enemy torpedo planes escorted by fighters.
  

  • Both sides ended up loosing things as Yorktown was attacked by 12 to 15 enemy torpedo planes.
•      By sundown on June 4, U.S. forces had gained control of the air around Midway.
  

  • On June 4 the US had control of the air of Midway.
•      However, the Japanese were able to deal one more decisive blow to the American fleet when Japanese submarine (I 168) interrupted the U.S. salvage operations, torpedoing Yorktown and torpedoing and sinking destroyer USS Hammann (DD 412). Yorktown, suffering from numerous torpedo hits, finally rolled over and sank at dawn on June 7.
  

  • The Japanese were able to hurt the US's naval fleet when a Japanese submarine torpeded Yorktown and alright sinking destroyer USS Hammann. This lead to both Yorktown and USS Hamman sink after taking many hits in the battle.
•      During the next two days, Japanese intercepts documented the withdrawal of Japanese forces toward Saipan and the Home Islands.
  

  • Japanese forces retreat to Saipan and Home Islands
• • The Battle of Midway gave a good name towards aircraft carriers as production and orders for them increased.

  •      Afterwards, some orders for new battleships were cancelled, and orders for new aircraft carriers increased--setting the stage for the carrier-centered Navy of today. 
    
•      An estimated 275 Japanese aircraft were destroyed or lost at sea through a lack of flight decks on which to land. Approximately, 4,800 Japanese were killed. The carriers Akagi, Hiryu, Kaga and Soryu were also sunk, as well as the cruiser Mikuma.
  
• • The Battle of Midway ended with the US in a dominant position as they now could think of attacking instead of defending while Japans naval army was severely destroyed and weakened

  • The Battle of Midway permanently weakened the Japanese Navy and allowed the United States to seize the initiative in the Pacific and go on the offensive. 
    
•      The Americans won the battle through the hard work of code breaking, the aggressive and innovative use of the aircraft carrier and the bravery and resolve of the Sailors who were there. Instead of being the victims of an ambush, they had turned the tables on the Japanese Navy and had ambushed them.
  

  • Through the work of code breaking, bravery, soldiers, and use of weaponry, the US were able to turn the tables as they were the ones who ended up ambushing the Japanese in the end.

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