dan mcquillan's List: social media campaigning IS71055A - lecture 9 - breaks & flows: the philosophers

• GILLES DELEUZE: Possibly we're in the process of experiencing a new relationship between theory and practice. At one time, practice was considered an application of theory, a consequence; at other times, it bad an opposite sense and it was thought to inspire theory, to be indispensable for the creation of future theoretical forms. In any event, their relationship was understood in terms of a process of totalisation. For us, however, the question is seen in a different light. The relationships between theory and practice are far more partial and fragmentary. on one side, a theory is always local and related to a limited field, and it is applied in another sphere, more or less distant from it. The relationship which holds in the application of a theory is never one of resemblance. Moreover, from the moment a theory moves into its proper domain, it begins to encounter obstacles, walls, and blockages which require its relay by another type of discourse (it is through this other discourse that it eventually passes to a different domain). Practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one practice to another. No theory can develop without eventually encountering a wall, and practice is necessary for piercing this wall.
• For example, your work began in the theoretical analysis of the context of confinement, specifically with respect to the psychiatric asylum within a capitalist society in the nineteenth century. Then you became aware of the necessity for confined individuals to speak for themselves, to create a relay (it's possible, on the contrary, that your function was already that of a relay in relation to them); and this group is found in prisons -- these individuals are imprisoned. It was on this basis that You organised the information group for prisons (G.I.P.)(1), the object being to create conditions that permit the prisoners themselves to speak. It would be absolutely false to say, as the Maoist implied, that in moving to this practice you were applying your theories. This was not an application; nor was it a project for initiating reforms or an enquiry in the traditional sense. The emphasis was altogether different: a system of relays within a larger sphere, within a multiplicity of parts that are both theoretical and practical. A theorising intellectual, for us, is no longer a subject, a representing or representative consciousness. Those who act and struggle are no longer represented, either by a group or a union that appropriates the right to stand as their conscience. Who speaks and acts? It is always a multiplicity, even within the person who speaks and acts. All of us are "groupuscules."(2) Representation no longer exists; there's only action-theoretical action and practical action which serve as relays and form networks.
• DELEUZE: Precisely. A theory is exactly like a box of tools. It has nothing to do with the signifier. It must be useful. It must function. And not for itself. If no one uses it, beginning with the theoretician himself (who then ceases to be a theoretician), then the theory is worthless or the moment is inappropriate. We don't revise a theory, but construct new ones; we have no choice but to make others. It is strange that it was Proust, an author thought to be a pure intellectual, who said it so clearly: treat my book as a pair of glasses directed to the outside; if they don't suit you, find another pair; I leave it to you to find your own instrument, which is necessarily an investment for combat. A theory does not totalise; it is an instrument for multiplication and it also multiplies itself. It is in the nature of power to totalise and it is your position. and one I fully agree with, that theory is by nature opposed to power.
• If the protests of children were heard in kindergarten, if their questions were attended to, it would be enough to explode the entire educational system.
• The other day I was speaking to a woman who bad been in prison and she was saying: "Imagine, that at the age of forty, I was punished one day with a meal of dry bread." What is striking about this story is not the childishness of the exercise of power but the cynicism with which power is exercised as power, in the most archaic, puerile, infantile manner. As children we learn what it means to be reduced to bread and water. Prison is the only place where power is manifested in its naked state, in its most excessive form, and where it is justified as moral force. "I am within my rights to punish you because you know that it is criminal to rob and kill . . . ...
• What is fascinating about prisons is that, for once, power doesn't hide or mask itself; it reveals itself as tyranny pursued into the tiniest details; it is cynical and at the same time pure and entirely "justified," because its practice can be totally formulated within the framework of morality. Its brutal tyranny consequently appears as the serene domination of Good over Evil, of order over disorder.
• But, of course, the idea of the "ruling class" has never received an adequate formulation, and neither have other terms, such as "to dominate ... .. to rule ... .. to govern," etc. These notions are far too fluid and require analysis. We should also investigate the limits imposed on the exercise of power-the relays through which it operates and the extent of its influence on the often insignificant aspects of the hierarchy and the forms of control, surveillance, prohibition, and constraint. Everywhere that power exists, it is being exercised.
• I would venture the following hypothesis: the thrust of Marxism was to define the problem essentially in terms of interests (power is held by a ruling class defined by its interests). The question immediately arises: how is it that people whose interests are not being served can strictly support the existing power structure by demanding a piece of the action? Perhaps, this is because in terms of investments, whether economic or unconscious, interest is not the final answer; there are investments of desire that function in a more profound and diffuse manner than our interests dictate. But of course, we never desire against our interests, because interest always follows and finds itself where desire has placed it.
• We cannot shut out the scream of Reich: the masses were not deceived; at a particular time, they actually wanted a fascist regime!

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• On Foucault's account, the relation of power and knowledge is far closer than in the familiar Baconian engineering model, for which “knowledge is power” means that knowledge is an instrument of power, although the two exist quite independently. Foucault's point is rather that, at least for the study of human beings, the goals of power and the goals of knowledge cannot be separated: in knowing we control and in controlling we know.

• As a philosophical historian and an observer of human relations, his work focused on the dominant genealogical and archaeological knowledge systems and practices, tracking them through different historical eras, including the social contexts that were in place that permitted change - the nature of power in society. He wrote that power "reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives" (Foucault 1980,30).
• Along with other social theorists, Foucault believed that knowledge is always a form of power, but he took it a step further and told us that knowledge can be gained from power; producing it, not preventing it.
• Knowledge linked to power, not only assumes the authority of 'the truth' but has the power to make itself true. All knowledge, once applied in the real world, has effects, and in that sense at least, 'becomes true.' Knowledge, once used to regulate the conduct of others, entails constraint, regulation and the disciplining of practice. Thus, 'there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations (Foucault 1977,27).
• Foucault did not view the effects of power negatively. For him, power didn't exclude, repress, censor, mask, and conceal. Foucault saw it as a producer of reality: "it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth" (Foucault 1977,194). The importance for him always lay in the effect that power has on entire networks, practices, the world around us, and how our behaviour can be affected, not power itself.
• One of the techniques/regulatory modes of power/knowledge that Foucault cited was the Panopticon, an architectural design put forth by Jeremy Bentham in the mid-19th Century for prisons, insane asylums, schools, hospitals, and factories. Instead of using violent methods, such as torture, and placing prisoners in dungeons that were used for centuries in monarchial states around the world, the progressive modern democratic state needed a different sort of system to regulate its citizens. The Panopticon offered a powerful and sophisticated internalized coercion, which was achieved through the constant observation of prisoners, each separated from the other, allowing no interaction, no communication. This modern structure would allow guards to continually see inside each cell from their vantage point in a high central tower, unseen by the prisoners. Constant observation acted as a control mechanism; a consciousness of constant surveillance is internalized.
• The Panopticon was a metaphor that allowed Foucault to explore the relationship between 1.) systems of social control and people in a disciplinary situation and, 2.) the power-knowledge concept. In his view, power and knowledge comes from observing others. It marked the transition to a disciplinary power, with every movement supervised and all events recorded. The result of this surveillance is acceptance of regulations and docility - a normalization of sorts, stemming from the threat of discipline. Suitable behaviour is achieved not through total surveillance, but by panoptic discipline and inducing a population to conform by the internalization of this reality.
• For Foucault, the real danger was not necessarily that individuals are repressed by the social order but that they are "carefully fabricated in it" (Foucault, 1977),
• If power systems are already immersed in society, does smart mob technology offer any real opportunities for significant counter-power? Should we even bother to hope that we can change the world? Who or what should we develop a resistance against, if we want to see real change? Foucault says it is better to forget the State in our struggle against power, and instead, concentrate on local struggles. Are recent street protests against globalization a good point of departure? Can we really expect that the right thing will be done just because? Can local cooperation and resistance make a difference globally?

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• Himanen (2001) argues that hacking should be understood as a new philosophy of business. He believes hackers have created a new way of working appropriate to the twenty–first century that can be captured in seven values: passion, freedom, social worth, openness, activity, caring and, the highest value, creativity.

    

  “… creativity — that is, the imaginative use of one’s own abilities, the surprising continuous surpassing of oneself and the giving to the world of a genuinely valuable contribution.” [1]

• In opposition to this business orientation, Wark (2004) believes hackers are the new radicals of the twenty–first century. Hackers in their pursuit of free creativity turn out to be, for Wark, the revolutionary class of the twenty–first century.

    

  “To hack is to differ … . Hackers create the possibility of new things entering the world. Not always great things, or even good things, but new things. In art, in science, in philosophy and culture, in any production of knowledge where data can be gathered, where information can be extracted from it, and where in that information new possibilities for the world produced, there are hackers hacking the new out of the old.” [2]
• Yet, from a different angle, Wark and Himanen are similar because both see the hack as a moment of creativity or of making a difference. This means that both definitions of hacking have become detached from material practices related to computer, communications and network technologies and have made hacking into an abstract process of creativity or of producing differences. Their analysis eliminates empirical specificity, lifting hacking out of time and space and making it into an abstract “difference engine”. For this reason their work has limited value despite their seeming identification of the core of hacking.
• To move an understanding of hacking forward we can adopt the claim that hacking means creativity but remember that hacks are also material practices that generally take place in relation to computer, communication and network technologies. Hacks involve interactions with such technologies and are thus also material practices, as opposed to the abstract practices proposed by Wark and Himanen. A hack is a form of material practice that creates a difference in computer, communication and network technologies.
• To this initial definition we should add two conclusions that emerge from the most significant existing empirical work on hacking which is found in Taylor (1999), Turkle (1984) and Thomas (2002). All three find that hackers are attracted to illicit acts, both in individual moments when they may transgress a law or social convention and in collective moments when they set up alternative technical infrastructures.
• From their work we can also draw the second proposition that hackers are deeply concerned with differentiating and identifying themselves in relation to each other through arguments over the quality of hacks couched in technical language.
• Drawing on this prior work on hackers, I suggest the initial definition to be that a hack is a material practice that involves making a difference in computer, communication and network technologies, which may well be illicit and be subject to seemingly technical criteria of excellence through which community relations are negotiated.
• o place this initial definition into the world we can look at, in turn, the two central types of material practices of hacking and their communities: cracking and free programming (free software and open source).
• Acts can be briefly outlined through four different types of cracks: day zero exploit, day zero+one exploit, social engineering and script–kidding. The acts are different types of “cracks”, and the community in which these actions are taken can be understood as being driven by a particular interaction between peer recognition and peer education. I will briefly outline these in turn.
• We can already see that at heart cracking is about taking a social ambition (to control a computer or network) and reordering technologies to fulfil that ambition, while at the same time starting from a technological basis (only being able to take certain actions due to the technologies to hand) from which only certain social ambitions may be realised. There are a number of elements here that need untangling and which this argument will return to, the core three being social, technological and causation/determination. Cracking is about using social norms to determine technological constraints and it is about using technological determinations to cause different social norms.
• Hacking the social and hacking the non–hack
• These kinds of technological determinism places technology at a “social” or macro level in which technological changes, usually a series of in retrospect linked technological changes, force widespread social change. Such views have been widely disproven across the social sciences, for a number of reasons but chiefly because they position technology outside of society and extended work in the social studies of technology and science demonstrates that technologies are as much social enterprises as anything else (Mackenzie and Wajcman, 1999). Yet despite the widely accepted refutation of technological determinism that social studies of technology offers, hacking suggests a difficulty with views that fail to take account of some kind of mutually determinative power between technologies and societies. An absolute rejection of technological determinism in any form makes activities such as FOSS programming very difficult to understand because of the interaction between determinations that constitute it.

• It follows that it is important to acknowledge a problem with accounts of technology that imply or argue that technologies do not have specific material and determinative effects. Hutchby’s work is relevant here [15] and he suggests the concept of affordances provides an answer.

    

  “… different technologies pose different affordances, and these affordances constrain the way that they can be read. … The concept of affordances is associated with the work of Gibson in the psychology of perception. For Gibson, humans, along with animals, insects, birds and fishes, orient to objects in their world (rocks, trees, rivers, etc.) in terms of what he calls their affordances: the possibilities that they offer for action. … Affordances may differ from species to species and from context to context. However, they cannot be seen as freely variable. While a tree offers an enormous range of affordances for a vast variety of species, there are things a river can afford which the tree cannot, and vice versa.” [16]

• Hutchby suggests that while technologies can be read or utilised in variable ways, they also possess “affordances” that constrain the range of actions that can be taken with a particular technology. This is useful for this account of hacking because captures the sense in which technologies both are and are not open to social influence and it reasserts the influence of technology on society. It is this mutual sense of determination and redetermination that is at the core of hacking. A further aspect of Hutchby is worth drawing out as, though he does not use the term, the everyday seems to be the site of these mutual determinations.

    

  “… the uses and the ‘values’ of things are not attached to them by interpretative procedures or internal representations but are a material aspect of the thing as it is encountered in the course of action. We are able to perceive things in terms of their affordances, which in turn are properties of things; yet those properties are not determinate or even finite, since they only emerge in the context of material encounters between actors and objects.” [17]
• Affordances productively point us toward the ways technologies are open to re–use and re–interpretation by different people, leading to different uses of technology, while at the same time noting that an individual technology is not open to any use; you cannot make ice cream with a word processing programme, though you can edit an ice cream–making recipe.
• This re–insertion of the material into everyday actions (leaving aside the issue whether the actor is human or not) allows a politics of technology to emerge in the ways different technologies create different sets of possible actions which in turn build different social norms and institutions. This politics is inaccessible to those who reject any discussion of determination and seek the neutrality of connections and associations, instead of the politics of affordances and determinisms. To keep this notion of politics to the fore in the analysis I have proposed, it seems appropriate to pull the notions of affordance and determination together. For this reason, hacking can be thought of as a community engaged in constant determinative affordances between technology and society in the realm of computer and network technologies.

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