billbailey25 's List: Statutory Interpretation

• Statutory Interpretation is not a straight forward task for many reasons. Firstly it is not easy to know what parliament intended when passing the act. For example, if an act stated, ¡¥Dogs, Cats, Hamsters and other animals¡¦, then it would be difficult to know which animals were included in the generalisation ¡¥other

• R v Sigsworth (1935) 
   

   
   
  • A son had murdered his mother.
   
  • Mother had not made a will   but, as per rules in Administration   of Justice Act 1925, her next   of kin (her son) would inherit. No ambiguity in the wording of the Act,   but the court refused to let a murderer benefit from his crime. Held   that the literal rule should not apply and the golden rule was used   to prevent a repugnant situation.

• The golden rule is a modification or extension of the literal rule. It can be applied in either a narrow sense or a wider sense. When applied narrowly, the court will look at and apply a different meaning of a word in an Act in order to avoid an absurd situation arising – see Jones v DPP (1962), and R v Allen (1872). When applied in the wider sense the court will read in words into an Act as necessary to avoid a repugnant situation arising – see Re Sigsworth (1935).  

• Why Do We Need Rules For The Interpretation of Statutes?  
   
   
  •  
    Words are an imperfect means of communication
     
  •  
    Words very often have more than one meaning i.e. they can be ambiguous
     
  •  
    A broad term may be used in a statute which can give rise to confusion and uncertainty
     
  •  
    There may be errors or omissions when the statute is drafted
     
  •  
    New developments in society can make the words used in a statute out of date and they may no longer cover the current situation

• Law is a fashion industry. Over the last two or three decades the fashion in interpretation has changed from textualism to contextualism. Literal interpretation – a focus on the plain or ordinary meaning of particular words – is no longer in vogue. Purposive interpretation is what we do now. However, as one English judge put it, sometimes it becomes necessary to “separate the purposive sheep from the literalist goats” [1].
  

• The task of the courts is to interpret the words used by the parliament. It is not to divine the intent of the parliament[3]. In an era where a purposive approach to interpretation is emphasised, and indeed required by statute[4], the distinction between interpretation and divination is not always observed. The courts must determine what parliament meant by the words it used. The courts do not determine what parliament intended to say[5].
• It also lends support to the contemporary approach to statutory construction which emphasises purpose.
• Problems of legal interpretation are not solved satisfactorily by ritual incantations which emphasize the clarity of meaning which words have when viewed in isolation, divorced from their context. The modern approach to interpretation insists that the context be considered in the first instance, especially in the case of general words, and not merely at some later stage when ambiguity might be thought to arise.
• the modern approach to statutory interpretation (a) insists that the context be considered in the first instance, not merely at some later stage when ambiguity might be thought to arise, and (b) uses 'context' in its widest sense to include such things as the existing state of the law and the mischief which, by legitimate means ... one may discern the statute was intended to remedy. Instances of general words in a statute being so constrained by their context are numerous.

2 more annotations...

• Statutory language, like all language, is capable of an almost infinite gradation of 'register' - i.e. it will be used at the semantic level appropriate to the subject matter and to the audience addressed (the man in the street, lawyers, merchants, etc). It is the duty of a court of construction to tune in to such register and so to interpret the statutory language as to give to it the primary meaning which is appropriate in that register (unless it is clear that some other meaning must be given in order to carry out the statutory purpose or to avoid injustice, anomaly, absurdity or contradiction). In other words statutory language must always be given presumptively the most natural and ordinary meaning which is appropriate in the circumstances."1
  
• However, the word "ambiguity" itself, perhaps ironically enough, is not without its own difficulty. Frequently, in the context of statutory interpretation, the word "ambiguity" is used in a more general sense. It is applied, not only to situations in which a word has more than one meaning, but to any situation in which the intention of Parliament with respect to the scope of a particular statutory situation is, for whatever reason, doubtful.
• • Have to mention ambiguity in both cases of the word and the intention of legislators. were they really trying to correct a particular mischief?
• 'ambiguity'. In ordinary language this term is often confined to situations in which the same word is capable of meaning two different things; but in relation to statutory interpretation, judicial usage sanctions the application of the word 'ambiguity' to describe any kind of doubtful meaning of words, phrases, or longer statutory provisions.
• • all of this is speaking to the contemporary approach being guided by the context of the particular case
• A rule of law enacted by statute consists of a proposition which gives rise to legal consequences when the act or omission of some person falls within the factual outline delineated by that proposition ... The difficulty is to determine whether Parliament intended a particular set of facts to fall within the factual outline of the proposition. That is, the difficulty is to determine the ambit of the factual outline which Parliament intended to enact.
• In many cases, the grammatical or literal meaning of a statutory provision will give effect to the purpose of the legislation. Consequently, it will constitute the 'ordinary meaning' to be applied. If however, the literal or grammatical meaning of a provision does not give effect to that purpose, that meaning cannot be regarded as the 'ordinary meaning' and cannot prevail. It must give way to the construction which will promote the underlying purpose or object of an Act

5 more annotations...