Ms_Armstrong !'s List: PACS - Syria

• France had previously backed the US plan for military action, and was the only country other than the US to commit to using force.
• France has been amongst the most hawkish Western countries
• first to recognise the main opposition coalition as the Syrian people's legitimate representative
• France, along with the UK, successfully lobbied for the EU's arms embargo to be lifted so as to allow further supplies to the rebels.
• most important international backers
• China has joined Russia in blocking resolutions critical of Syria at the UN Security Council. It has also criticised the prospect of strikes against Syria.
• Berlin has ruled itself out of participation in any military action.
• urkish government has been one of the most vocal critics of Syrian President Assad since early on in the uprising
• authorised cross-border action
• country was ready to join an international coalition for action against Syria

• Saudi Arabia has been a rival of the Syrian government for years and has been particularly active in pushing for action against Mr Assad.

   
• Thought to be one of the main suppliers of weapons to Syrian rebels, Qatar has expressed support for the proposed US strike on Syria.
• refrained from commenting publicly on whether or not it supports US strikes on Syria,
• backing by Israel could be seen in the Arab world as evidence of collusion in US decision-making, and turn public opinion in the region against military intervention.
• Israel also wants to avoid giving reason to Hezbollah, Syria's and Iran's militant Shia Islamist ally in Lebanon, to attack it, ostensibly in retaliation for a US strike on Syria.
• Lebanon 

  There is deep division in the country between supporters and opponents of President Assad.
• Hezbollah has openly taken part in combat in Syria on the side of the government,
• reports of some in the Sunni community fighting on the side of the rebels
• host to the largest number of Syrian refugees of any country.
• back limited military action
• half a million Syrian refugees
• warned US intervention in Syria risked sparking a regional war.
• Iraq has not been as critical of Syria as some other Arab countries and will also be concerned at the effect that any escalation in Syria could have on increasing sectarian violence.
• Iran had won Iraqi support for its efforts to oppose US military action
• Egypt's military-backed interim government has come out strongly against a US strike on Syria, saying it rejects any such action without the authorisation of the UN.
• Egyptian public opinion - among both supporters and opponents of Mr Morsi - is also firmly against US military intervention in an Arab country.

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• Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki has positioned itself as a supporter of Bashar al-Assad, as he struggles to face down a Sunni dominated rebellion, largely out of fear that it will empower similar forces in Iraq
• For two years Lebanese actors have effectively waged a proxy war in Syria through direct support to the warring parties, but mounting tensions and a growing number of clashes within Lebanon are raising fears that a domestic eruption is becoming hard to avoid
• In 2007, Iraq stated it had evidence that fifty percent of terrorism was entering the country from Syria.
• For Maliki, Assad was playing a dirty game in Iraq by conspiring with jihadists to destabilise Iraq and keep the Americans bogged down there
• Iraqi government now believes that a victory for the rebels in Syria will mean not just a post-Assad neighbour under the influence of hostile Gulf forces intent on destabilising Maliki’s rule, but also a resurgent al-Qaeda at home
• in Baghdad there are growing fears – probably correct in their assessment – that the insurgency in Syria is helping to revitalise, materially and ideologically, Sunni militants in Iraq based in the Sunni-majority province of Anbar that borders Syria
• Maliki believes that the same states that are supporting the rebels in Syria, particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, are playing nefarious roles in Iraq by supporting his rivals and even terrorist elements within the country
• ears that the Syrian uprising is part of a broader advance also directed against him
• As a result of Maliki’s almost existential fears associated with the Syrian uprising, he has maintained a dual-track policy since it began. Publicly, the Iraqi leadership has repeatedly called for dialogue between Assad and the Syrian opposition because a negotiated political solution offers the most viable way to end the conflict – and, at the same time, is likely to necessitate a power-sharing compromise that will ensure that Syria does not fall completely under the influence of potentially hostile Syrian and regional Sunni forces. Privately, however, Iraq’s government has increasingly acted in ways that indicate it wishes to see Assad prevail, including by permitting Iranian over-flights allegedly delivering weapons and supplies to the Syrian military. It has also hosted and provided medical help to Syrian regime fighters and even engaged the Free Syrian Army from across the border. Baghdad is also alleged to be providing ongoing economic assistance to the Assad regime.
• Baghdad has done little to stem an increasing flow of Iraqi Shia fighters travelling to Syria to fight on behalf of the Assad regime
• Most of these militias are believed to be affiliated with the Iran-backed Hezbollah
• ears of Syrian spillover, in the form of a resurgent Iraqi Sunni movement that would directly threaten his grip on power and ability to maintain control over Sunni provinces neighbouring Syria
• If Assad were to fall in Syria, some Iraqi politicians believe that Iraq’s international border would eventually lie at Abu Ghraib, on the outskirts of Baghdad. They envisage the entire western region of Iraq (currently home to large-scale anti-government protests) being lost to tribal elements, Al-Qaeda fighters, and forces sympathetic to the new post-Assad Syrian government.
• Iraq’s fear of a Sunni-dominated and unstable post-Assad Syria is an entirely different issue to that of Iran, which risks losing a vital regional ally in Assad, and a corridor to Lebanon and Hezbollah.
• strengthening the very forces in Syria that it is working against in Iraq
• Where the Shia dominated government sees a threat, Iraq’s Sunni actors and Kurds see an opportunity
• This intensification of the already emerging regional map, pitting a Shia Tehran-Baghdad axis against a Sunni Levant and Gulf, would perhaps be the most significant geo-political regional effect of the Syria crisis.

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