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Todd Suomela's Library tagged probability   View Popular

23 Jul 09

Between Cell Phones And Higher Speed Limits, 25,000 Deaths And $1 Trillion Lost On US Roads? » INFRASTRUCTURIST

Why are we so reluctant to regulate driving with cell phones or lower speed limits despite clear statistical evidence that the number of deaths caused by these items is significant?

www.infrastructurist.com/...nd-1-trillion-lost-on-us-roads - Preview

transportation risk perception speed automobile death statistics probability freedom cell-phone

10 May 09

[cs/0406061] The Complexity of Agreement

A celebrated 1976 theorem of Aumann asserts that honest, rational Bayesian agents with common priors will never "agree to disagree": if their opinions about any topic are common knowledge, then those opinions must be equal. Economists have written numerous papers examining the assumptions behind this theorem. But two key questions went unaddressed: first, can the agents reach agreement after a conversation of reasonable length? Second, can the computations needed for that conversation be performed efficiently? This paper answers both questions in the affirmative, thereby strengthening Aumann's original conclusion.

arxiv.org/0406061 - Preview

reasoning rationality bayes probability philosophy agreement disagreement

23 Apr 09

Are Probabilities Overweighted or Underweighted When Rare Outcomes Are Experienced (Rarely)?

When making decisions involving risky outcomes on the basis of verbal descriptions of the outcomes and their associated probabilities, people behave as if they overweight small probabilities. In contrast, when the same outcomes are instead experienced in a series of samples, people behave as if they underweight small probabilities. We present two experiments showing that the existing explanations of the underweighting observed in decisions from experience are not sufficient to account for the effect. Underweighting was observed when participants experienced representative samples of events, so it cannot be attributed to undersampling of the small probabilities. In addition, earlier samples predicted decisions just as well as later samples did, so underweighting cannot be attributed to recency weighting. Finally, frequency judgments were accurate, so underweighting cannot be attributed to judgment error. Furthermore, we show that the underweighting of small probabilities is also reflected in the best-fitting parameter values obtained when prospect theory, the dominant model of risky choice, is applied to the data.

www3.interscience.wiley.com/...abstract - Preview

probability risk perception behavior judgment journal research psychology bias

07 Apr 09

Random Thoughts: Points and Poisson (d’Avril) « In the Dark

  • People are actually pretty hopeless at understanding what “really” random processes look like, probably because the word random is used so often in very imprecise ways and they don’t know what it means in a specific context like this.  The point about random processes, even simpler ones like repeated tossing of a coin, is that coincidences happen much more frequently than one might suppose.

Perceiving Randomness | Cosmic Variance | Discover Magazine

Humans are not very good at generating random sequences; when asked to come up with a “random” sequence of coin flips from their heads, they inevitably include too few long strings of the same outcome. In other words, they think that randomness looks a lot more uniform and structureless than it really does.

blogs.discovermagazine.com/...perceiving-randomness - Preview

chance probability randomness perception meaning

08 Mar 09

Rationally Speaking: The very foundations of science

  • The first way to think about probability is as a measure of the frequency of an event: if I say that the probability of a coin to land heads up is 50% I may mean that, if I flip the coin say 100 times, on average I will get heads 50 times. This is not going to get us out of Hume’s problem, because probabilities interpreted as frequencies of events are, again, a form of induction
  • Secondly, we can think of probabilities as reflecting subjective judgment. If I say that it is probable that the coin will land heads up, I might simply be trying to express my feeling that this will be the case. You might have a different feeling, and respond that you don’t think it's probable that the coin will lend heads up. This is certainly not a viable solution to the problem of induction, because subjective probabilities are, well, subjective, and hence reflect opinions, not degrees of truth.
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05 Mar 09

More statin madness | The Blog of Michael R. Eades, M.D.

  • When the data were looked at from the perspective of how many people actually took the drug as prescribed, the researcher discovered that those subjects who took at least 80 percent or more of their clofibrate had a five year mortality of only 15.0 percent, substantially less than the overall five-year mortality.  Those who took their clofibrate sporadically had a five-year mortality of 24.6 percent, significantly higher than those who took it as directed, a piece of data that would seem to confirm the efficacy of clofibrate.  Right?  Not necessarily.  Let’s look at compliance with the placebo.


    Turns out that those subjects on the placebo who regularly took their placebo had a five-year mortality of 15.1 percent while those who took their placebo sporadically had a five-year mortality of 28.3 percent.  What this study really showed was that there is something intrinsic to people who religiously take their medicine that makes them live longer.  There was no difference between the drug and placebo in either those who took them regularly or those who took them sporadically, but there was a huge difference in mortality between those who took either drug or placebo on schedule and those who didn’t.

  • What they’re saying here is that statins have been shown to reduce mortality from heart disease in those who have elevated LDL, which is true.  But this decrease in deaths from heart disease is compensated for by an increase in deaths from cancer and other causes, so there really isn’t a gain.  You’re still dead.  Just maybe not from heart disease, but what difference does it make.  Are you going to spend $200 per month for the rest of your life and stay on medications that may make you feel lousy and lose your memory just so you can die of something other than heart disease?


    In the last paragraph in the quote above, the authors confess that the data from actual randomized control trials show that statins confer no all-cause mortality benefits to women of any age and to men over 69.  They are playing a little fast and loose with the truth here because as I have posted before, the gold standard trials have shown no benefit for women and no benefit to men over 65 or to men under 65 who have never had heart disease.  The only improvement in all-cause mortality has been in men under 65 who have been diagnosed with heart disease, and even that benefit is so small that many people question if the extra cost and side effects of the statins are worth it.

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