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The most worrisome aspect about our current slump is that it combines obvious short-term problems — from the financial crisis — with less obvious long-term problems. Those long-term problems include a decade-long slowdown in new-business formation, the stagnation of educational gains and the rapid growth of industries with mixed blessings, including finance and health care.
Together, these problems raise the possibility that the United States is not merely suffering through a normal, if severe, downturn. Instead, it may have entered a phase in which high unemployment is the norm.
"Which is why I'm ending this post as I ended the last post I made on this topic by invoking Marc Bousquet, who sees the central challenge we face not as public hostility to the humanities nor our unwillingness to mount a vigorous enough defense of our intellectual specialties, but rather as the deteriorating conditions of our employment and our inability--or unwillingness--to successfully oppose these changes. Rather than simply reiterating our claims to specialness--which we are much better at and more willing to do than Dames thinks we are--humanities professionals in the academy need to understand that we are becoming victims of the same economic forces that are affecting other professionals and working people throughout our society and around the world. "
..the economic problems of the future will not be about growth but about something more nettlesome: the ineluctable increase in the number of people with no marketable skills, and technology's role not as the antidote to social conflict, but as its instigator.
So, when the government is called to action, the economic profession has replaced Keynes’s “fiscal policy via public works” with a “leaky bucket pump-priming mechanism.”
in list: Economic Crisis
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The truth is that no one really knows how fast GDP needs to grow and how large government spending needs to be in order to bring the unemployment rate down. To a large degree, this is because we don’t know how leaky the bucket is. Will indebted households save or spend their tax cuts? Will the unemployed spend much of their unemployment insurance on mortgage payments? How long would layoffs and other cost-cutting measures last before private firms fix their own balance sheets and start hiring? How large a government injection into the private sector is necessary to improve profit expectations and employment conditions?
All of this is rather uncertain, which is why Keynes, never had any “leaky bucket” or “pump priming” idea in mind. For him “the real problem fundamental yet essentially simple…[is] to provide employment for everyone” (Keynes 1980, 267) and the most bang for the buck from fiscal policy would be achieved via direct job creation. This he called “on the spot” employment via public works. -
useful to think of Keynesian fiscal policy, not as aggregate demand management, but as labor demand management. Yes, Keynes believed that priming the pump would prevent severe depressions, but it couldn’t be counted on to bring the economy to full employment. This is in part because it tends to push prices and erode income distribution once the economy begins to recover. To dodge these problems, in all circumstances, government spending had to be targeted to the unemployed themselves. He urged that when the government couldn’t take the worker to the contract, it should bring the contract to the worker.
This paper argues that John Maynard Keynes had a targeted (as contrasted with aggregate) demand approach to full employment. Modern policies, which aim to “close the demand gap,” are inconsistent with the Keynesian approach on both theoretical and methodological grounds. Aggregate demand tends to increase inflation and erode income distribution near full employment, which is why true full employment is not possible via traditional pro-growth, pro-investment aggregate demand stimuli. This was well understood by Keynes, who preferred targeted job creation during expansions. But even in recessions, he did not campaign for wide-ranging aggregate demand stimuli; this is because different policies have different employment creation effects, which for Keynes was the primary measure of their effectiveness. There is considerable evidence to argue that Keynes had an “on the spot” approach to full employment, where the problem of unemployment is solved via direct job creation, irrespective of the phase of the business cycle.
in list: Economic Crisis
We use detailed information about wages, education and occupations to shed light on the evolution of the U.S. financial sector over the past century. We uncover a set of new, interrelated stylized facts: financial jobs were relatively skill intensive, complex, and highly paid until the 1930s and after the 1980s, but not in the interim period. We investigate the determinants of this evolution and find that financial deregulation and corporate activities linked to IPOs and credit risk increase the demand for skills in financial jobs. Computers and information technology play a more limited role. Our analysis also shows that wages in finance were excessively high around 1930 and from the mid 1990s until 2006. For the recent period we estimate that rents accounted for 30% to 50% of the wage differential between the financial sector and the rest of the private sector.
Employee Free Choice Act.
Mostly complaints about government control of wages and prices during Great Depression...assertions that this was bad.
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