Todd Suomela's Library tagged cooperation →  View Popular, Search in Google

"The high levels of intelligence seen in humans, other primates, certain cetaceans and birds remain a major puzzle for evolutionary biologists, anthropologists and psychologists. It has long been held that social interactions provide the selection pressures necessary for the evolution of advanced cognitive abilities (the ‘social intelligence hypothesis’), and in recent years decision-making in the context of cooperative social interactions has been conjectured to be of particular importance. Here we use an artificial neural network model to show that selection for efficient decision-making in cooperative dilemmas can give rise to selection pressures for greater cognitive abilities, and that intelligent strategies can themselves select for greater intelligence, leading to a Machiavellian arms race. Our results provide mechanistic support for the social intelligence hypothesis, highlight the potential importance of cooperative behaviour in the evolution of intelligence and may help us to explain the distribution of cooperation with intelligence across taxa."

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"We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing mixed strategies in which each player may act as a cooperator or a defector over a large number of interactions with a certain probability. Our model is payoff-driven, i.e., we assume that the level of accumulated payoff at each node is a relevant parameter in the selection of strategies. Also, we consider that each player chooses his/her strategy in a context of limited information. We present a deterministic nonlinear model for the evolution of strategies. We show that the final strategies depend on the network structure and on the choice of the parameters of the game. We find that polarized strategies (pure cooperator/defector states) typically emerge when (i) the network connections are sparse, (ii) the network degree distribution is heterogeneous, (iii) the network is assortative, and surprisingly, (iv) the benefit of cooperation is high. "

social-networks networks game-theory agents social-science agent-based-model prisoners-dilemma model evolution strategy cooperation

"Many real-life social dilemmas contain third parties who cannot make decisions in the dilemma, but are affected by its outcome (receive externalities) nonetheless. Dilemmas with identical payoffs for decision-making actors may greatly vary in their externalities for third parties. If actors value the welfare of thirds, externalities will affect actors’ decisions. We test behavioral predictions from three leading ideas on social preferences (altruism, inequality aversion, competition) in two studies that employ four one-shot, 2-person prisoner’s dilemmas (PDs) that differ only in their externalities. The PDs respectively include a third party that (i) is indifferent, (ii) prefers defection, (iii) prefers cooperation. Our results show that while aggregate behavior is not affected by externalities, individual behavior is. Compared to a PD without externalities, prosocial individuals cooperate more when a third benefits from cooperation, but do not defect more when a third benefits from defection. The opposite pattern is found for competitive individuals. "

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"In other words, pro-social behaviour requires self-control, but this can be depleted by other things. And one of those other things is the amount of drudge work we have to do. If it takes all our self-discipline to turn up to work and do a routine job, we’ll have less self-discipline with which to act generously."

psychology politics altruism cooperation pro-social behavior ego ego-depletion work labor monotony

"1. The costs of protesting for a week - to take Brian Haw’s example cited by David - are high; the inconvenience and loss of wages. But the gains from changing policy - even if this happens - are spread over everyone. Narrow instrumental rationality will only very rarely tell us to be a sustained activist.
2. To undertake such a sacrifice, one must have a huge belief not only in the rightness of one’s cause, and in the chances of its success, but also in its importance. Such beliefs will very often owe more to over-confidence and fanaticism than to pure rationality. "

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"The conclusion is that simply thinking about money — even unconsciously — makes people more self-sufficient, more socially insensitive, and less cooperative."

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IPY = International Polar Year, concluding statement

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Coexistence of cooperators and defectors is common in nature, yet the evolutionary origin of such social diversification is unclear. Many models have been studied on the basis of the assumption that benefits of cooperative acts only accrue to others. Here, we analyze the continuous snowdrift game, in which cooperative investments are costly but yield benefits to others as well as to the cooperator. Adaptive dynamics of investment levels often result in evolutionary diversification from initially uniform populations to a stable state in which cooperators making large investments coexist with defectors who invest very little. Thus, when individuals benefit from their own actions, large asymmetries in cooperative investments can evolve.

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Understanding the fundamental patterns and determinants of human cooperation and the maintenance of social order in human societies is a challenge across disciplines. The existing empirical evidence for the higher levels of cooperation when altruistic punishment is present versus when it is absent systematically ignores the institutional competition inherent in human societies. Whether punishment would be deliberately adopted and would similarly enhance cooperation when directly competing with nonpunishment institutions is highly controversial in light of recent findings on the detrimental effects of punishment. We show experimentally that a sanctioning institution is the undisputed winner in a competition with a sanction-free institution. Despite initial aversion, the entire population migrates successively to the sanctioning institution and strongly cooperates, whereas the sanction-free society becomes fully depopulated. The findings demonstrate the competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions and exemplify the emergence and manifestation of social order driven by institutional selection.

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Trivial reminders of money made a surprisingly large difference. For example, where the control group would offer to spend an average of 42 minutes helping someone with a task, those primed to think about money offered only 25 minutes. Similarly, when som

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in list: Knowledge Management

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