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08 Sep 09

Ancient Greek Skepticism [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

Although all skeptics in some way cast doubt on our ability to gain knowledge of the world, the term “skeptic” actually covers a wide range of attitudes and positions. There are skeptical elements in the views of many Greek philosophers, but the term “ancient skeptic” is generally applied either to a member of Plato’s Academy during its skeptical period (c. 273 B.C.E to 1st century B.C.E.) or to a follower of Pyrrho (c. 365 to 270 B.C.E.). Pyrrhonian skepticism flourished from Aenesidemus’ revival (1st century B.C.E.) to Sextus Empiricus, who lived sometime in the 2nd or 3rd centuries C.E. Thus the two main varieties of ancient skepticism: Academic and Pyrrhonian.

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philosophy skepticism ancient epistemology knowledge certainty belief history

Skepticism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Much of epistemology has arisen either in defense of or in opposition to various forms of skepticism. Indeed, one could classify various theories of knowledge by their responses to skepticism. For example, rationalists could be viewed as skeptical about the possibility of empirical knowledge while not being skeptical with regard to a priori knowledge and empiricists could be seen as skeptical about the possibility of a priori knowledge but not so with regard to empirical knowledge. In addition, many traditional problems, for example the problem of other minds or the problem of our knowledge of God's existence, can be seen as restricted forms of skepticism which hold that we cannot have knowledge of any propositions in some particular domain thought to be within our ken.

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philosophy skepticism contemporary epistemology knowledge certainty belief

Even before examining the various general forms of skepticism, it is
crucial that we distinguish between philosophical skepticism and
ordinary incredulity because doing so will help to explain why
philosophical skepticism is so intriguing.
The point here is that in this case, and in all ordinary
cases of incredulity, the grounds for the doubt can, in principle, be
removed. As Wittgenstein would say, doubt occurs within the context of
things undoubted. If something is doubted, something else must be held
fast because doubt presupposes that there are means of removing the
doubt.^[2]
We doubt that the bird is a robin because,
at least in part, we think we know how robins typically fly and what
their typical coloration is. That is, we think our general picture of
the world is right — or right enough — so that it does
provide us with both the grounds for doubt and the means for
potentially removing the doubt. Thus, ordinary incredulity, say about
some feature of the world, occurs against a background of sequestered
beliefs about the world. We are not doubting that we have any knowledge
of the world. Far from it, we are presupposing that we do know some
things about the world. To quote Wittgenstein, “A doubt without an end
is not even a doubt” (Wittgenstein 1969, ¶ 625).
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- In contrast, philosophical skepticism attempts to render doubtful
  every member of a class of propositions that we think falls
  within our ken. One member of the class is not pitted against another.
  The grounds for either withholding assent to the claim that we can have
  such knowledge or denying that we can have such knowledge are such that
  there is no possible way to either answer them or neutralize them by
  appealing to another member of the class. Thus, philosophic doubt or
  philosophical skepticism, as opposed to ordinary incredulity, does not,
  in principle, come to an end. Or so the philosophic skeptic will
  claim!
- Let us use “EI-type” propositions to refer to epistemically
  interesting types of propositions. Such types of propositions
  contain tokens some of which are generally thought to be known given
  what we ordinarily take knowledge to be. Thus, it would not be
  epistemically interesting if we did not know exactly what the rainfall
  will be on March 3 ten years from now. That kind of thing (a fine
  grained distant future state) is not generally thought to be known
  given what we ordinarily take knowledge to be. But it would be
  epistemically interesting if we cannot know anything about the future,
  or anything about the contents of someone else's mind, or anything
  about the past, or anything at all about the “external world.” We think
  we know many propositions about those types of things.
- consider the (meta) proposition concerning the scope of our
  knowledge, namely: We can have knowledge of EI-type
  propositions. Given that there are just three stances we can have
  toward any proposition when considering whether to assent to it, we
  can:
  
  Assent that we can have knowledge of EI-type propositions.
  Assent that we cannot have knowledge of EI-type propositions.
  Withhold assent to both that we can and that we cannot have
  knowledge of EI-type propositions.
  
  Let us call someone with the attitude depicted in (i) an
  “Epistemist.”^[4]
  Such a person assents to the claim that we
  can have knowledge of EI-type propositions.

Contemporary Skepticism [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

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philosophy skepticism contemporary epistemology knowledge certainty belief

Philosophical views are typically classed as skeptical when they involve advancing some degree of doubt regarding claims that are elsewhere taken for granted. Varieties of skepticism can be distinguished in two main ways, depending upon the focus and the extent of the doubt.
As regards the former, skeptical views typically have an epistemological form, in that they are focused on the epistemic status of certain beliefs. For example, one common variety of skepticism concerns our beliefs about the past and argues that such beliefs lack positive epistemic status – that they are not justified, or are not rational, or cannot constitute knowledge (and perhaps even all three). Where skepticism does not have this epistemological focus, then it tends to be of an ontological form in that it is directed at beliefs about the existence of some supposedly problematic entity, such as the self or God. Here the target of the skepticism is not so much one’s putative knowledge of these entities (though it may be that as well), but rather the claim that they exist at all.

As regards the latter, one can differentiate between skeptical views that are either local or radical. Local varieties of skepticism will only concern beliefs about a certain specific subject matter, such as beliefs in abstract objects or the conclusions of inductive arguments. Since ontological varieties of skepticism tend to be concerned with the existence of particular sorts of entities, they are usually (though not always) of this local form. In contrast, radical forms of skepticism afflict most of our beliefs and thus pose, at least potentially, the most pressing philosophical challenge.
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- What is common to both of these historical approaches, and which lives on in the contemporary discussion of skepticism, is the primary conception of skepticism as resting on an entirely intuitive and pre-theoretical understanding of our epistemic concepts. In this sense it has the form of a paradox – a series of wholly plausible and intuitive claims that, collectively, lead to an intellectually devastating conclusion. Recent discussion of skepticism also treats the problem as having this paradoxical form, though the epistemic focus of the discussion is now not so much the lack of grounds for belief which counter the skeptic’s grounds against belief, or the lack of certainty, but rather the lack of knowledge. Contemporary discussions of skepticism have thus tended to make the radical epistemological claim that we fail to know (hardly) anything.

22 Jul 09

The Failure of Macroeconomics « ThinkMarkets

it is not simply a matter of finding the right explanation of the recent financial meltdown and recession. The search by most macroeconomists is constrained by a certain set of unquestioned methodological precepts. These precepts go to the heart of the conception of Economics as a Science.

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economics macroeconomic methodology ideology scientism certainty mathematics modeling

27 Jun 09

Ferdinand Vieider - Ambiguity Aversion

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ambiguity discount future probability knowledge certainty

19 Dec 08

Stumbling and Mumbling: Experts & the demand for certainty

To point out that experts are wrong, however, is to misunderstand the purpose of them. Their function is not to provide knowledge, and still less clear thinking. Instead, it is to provide certainty. People hate dissonance, doubt and uncertainty. Experts help dispel these.

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expertise bias decision-making rationality philosophy certainty psychology