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Ancient Greek Skepticism [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
Although all skeptics in some way cast doubt on our ability to gain knowledge of the world, the term “skeptic” actually covers a wide range of attitudes and positions. There are skeptical elements in the views of many Greek philosophers, but the term “ancient skeptic” is generally applied either to a member of Plato’s Academy during its skeptical period (c. 273 B.C.E to 1st century B.C.E.) or to a follower of Pyrrho (c. 365 to 270 B.C.E.). Pyrrhonian skepticism flourished from Aenesidemus’ revival (1st century B.C.E.) to Sextus Empiricus, who lived sometime in the 2nd or 3rd centuries C.E. Thus the two main varieties of ancient skepticism: Academic and Pyrrhonian.
Skepticism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Much of epistemology has arisen either in defense of or in opposition to various forms of skepticism. Indeed, one could classify various theories of knowledge by their responses to skepticism. For example, rationalists could be viewed as skeptical about the possibility of empirical knowledge while not being skeptical with regard to a priori knowledge and empiricists could be seen as skeptical about the possibility of a priori knowledge but not so with regard to empirical knowledge. In addition, many traditional problems, for example the problem of other minds or the problem of our knowledge of God's existence, can be seen as restricted forms of skepticism which hold that we cannot have knowledge of any propositions in some particular domain thought to be within our ken.
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Even before examining the various general forms of skepticism, it is
crucial that we distinguish between philosophical skepticism and
ordinary incredulity because doing so will help to explain why
philosophical skepticism is so intriguing. -
The point here is that in this case, and in all ordinary
cases of incredulity, the grounds for the doubt can, in principle, be
removed. As Wittgenstein would say, doubt occurs within the context of
things undoubted. If something is doubted, something else must be held
fast because doubt presupposes that there are means of removing the
doubt.[2]
We doubt that the bird is a robin because,
at least in part, we think we know how robins typically fly and what
their typical coloration is. That is, we think our general picture of
the world is right — or right enough — so that it does
provide us with both the grounds for doubt and the means for
potentially removing the doubt. Thus, ordinary incredulity, say about
some feature of the world, occurs against a background of sequestered
beliefs about the world. We are not doubting that we have any knowledge
of the world. Far from it, we are presupposing that we do know some
things about the world. To quote Wittgenstein, “A doubt without an end
is not even a doubt” (Wittgenstein 1969, ¶ 625). - 3 more annotations...
Contemporary Skepticism [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
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Philosophical views are typically classed as skeptical when they involve advancing some degree of doubt regarding claims that are elsewhere taken for granted. Varieties of skepticism can be distinguished in two main ways, depending upon the focus and the extent of the doubt.
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As regards the former, skeptical views typically have an epistemological form, in that they are focused on the epistemic status of certain beliefs. For example, one common variety of skepticism concerns our beliefs about the past and argues that such beliefs lack positive epistemic status – that they are not justified, or are not rational, or cannot constitute knowledge (and perhaps even all three). Where skepticism does not have this epistemological focus, then it tends to be of an ontological form in that it is directed at beliefs about the existence of some supposedly problematic entity, such as the self or God. Here the target of the skepticism is not so much one’s putative knowledge of these entities (though it may be that as well), but rather the claim that they exist at all.
As regards the latter, one can differentiate between skeptical views that are either local or radical. Local varieties of skepticism will only concern beliefs about a certain specific subject matter, such as beliefs in abstract objects or the conclusions of inductive arguments. Since ontological varieties of skepticism tend to be concerned with the existence of particular sorts of entities, they are usually (though not always) of this local form. In contrast, radical forms of skepticism afflict most of our beliefs and thus pose, at least potentially, the most pressing philosophical challenge.
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slacktivist: Still not rock bottom
To be confident of the claim that they are better than some other group, they have chosen to compare themselves to a eugenic Nazi regime that euthanizes senior citizens. That such a regime is wholly a figment of their warped imaginations is less revealing than the fact that they have been forced to imagine such a horrifying scenario in order to find something with which they can believe they compare favorably.
Study: choir prefers being preached to by 2:1 margin - Ars Technica
There are two competing ideas on the process that governs the formation and maintenance of beliefs: 1) people maintain a belief because they have limited access to opposing beliefs, or 2) because they actively filter information in a way that avoids conflicting views. A new meta-analysis of past studies confirms the existence of active avoidance; when people are offered an opposing viewpoint, they will ignore it in favor of a supportive viewpoint in two out of three instances
The Analysis of Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
justified true belief
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- Jones owns a
Ford.[5]
- Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston.
- Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.
- Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.
In his short 1963 paper, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?",
Edmund Gettier presented two effective counterexamples to the JTB
analysis (Gettier 1963). The second of these goes as follows. Suppose
Smith has good evidence for the false proposition
Since (1) entails each of the propositions (2) through (4), and since
Smith recognizes these entailments, he is justified in believing each
of propositions (2)-(4). Now suppose that, by sheer coincidence, Brown
is indeed in Barcelona. Given these assumptions, we may say that
Smith, when he believes (3), holds a justified true belief. However,
is Smith's belief an instance of knowledge? Since Smith has no
evidence whatever as to Brown's whereabouts, and so believes what is
true only because of luck, the answer would have to be
‘no’. Consequently, the three conditions of the JTB
account — truth, belief, and justification — are not
sufficient for
knowledge.[6]
How must the analysis of knowledge be modified to make it immune to
cases like the one we just considered? This is what is commonly
referred to as the "Gettier problem". - Jones owns a
Half an Hour: Relativism and Science
Nice explanation of why relativism doesn't imply lack of standards or an anything-goes attitude.
Philosophy, et cetera: Personal vs. Objective Justification
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The propositions of a priori philosophy and mathematics don't seem to be supported by evidence in the ordinary sense. Compare: our contingent experiences provide evidence for some empirical beliefs over others, and what we ought to believe about the world depends on these contingent observations. But truths of reason seem importantly different. Whatever "evidence" or reasons there are to believe one philosophical claim over its negation don't seem contingent in quite the same way; rather, they are presumably available (broadly speaking) to any rational agent as such -- hence the label 'truths of reason'. This allows us to drop all that complicating talk of "evidence available in circumstances C"; a priori justifications are "generally available" in the strong sense of being universally available (to sufficiently rational agents). We can thus understand talk of a proposition's being 'objectively justified' as simply a matter of its being a priori justifiable.
Maverick Philosopher: Is the Scamp Worse Than the Hypocrite? Right and Left Perspectives
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To me it seems clear that the hypocrite, though perhaps not much better than the scamp, is yet morally superior to him. The reason is that the hypocrite at least pays lip-service to high standards of behavior. Lip-service is better than no service.
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Leftists, many of whom are of a rebellious and adolescent cast of mind, have a problem with what they perceive to be phoniness. They are always out to unmask things, to cut through 'false consciousness' and 'bourgeois ideology.' Connected with this hatred of phoniness is a keen sensitivity to what they take to be hypocrisy. They are ever on the lookout for it. So when conservative pundit Bill (William J.) Bennett was caught wasting money on the slot machines in Las Vegas a while back, his opponents on the Left pounced and denounced: "Hypocrite!" they cried.
So pouncing and denouncing, they proved that they do not know what hypocrisy is. Although Mr. Bennett’s behavior was suboptimal, it was neither illegal nor immoral: he’s got the dough to blow if that’s his pleasure. Given his considerable accomplishments, is he not entitled to a bit of R & R? Nor was there anything hypocritical about Bennett's behavior.
A hypocrite is not someone who is morally imperfect or who fails to engage in supererogatory acts. Nor is a hypocrite one who preaches high ideals but falls short. Otherwise, we would all be hypocrites. But if everyone is, then no one is: the term has been drained of meaning. Rightly understood, a hypocrite is someone who preaches high ideals but makes no attempt at living up to them. The difference is between failing to do what one believes one ought to do and not even trying to do what one says one ought to do.
Less Wrong: The Skeptic's Trilemma
Works out three possible responses to Atlantis: explain, worship, ignore. Criticizes simplistic skeptics who immediately choose ignore because talk about Atlantis is silly or a nuisance.
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So someone tells you that Plato, normally a pretty smart guy, wrote a long account of a lost continent called Atlantis complete with a bunch of really specific geographic details that seem a bit excessive for a meaningless allegory. Plato claims to have gotten most of the details from a guy called Solon, legendary for his honesty, who got them from the Egyptians, who are known for their obsessive record-keeping.
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One option is to hit Worship. Between the Theosophists, Edgar Cayce, the Nazis, and a bunch of well-intentioned but crazy amateurs including a U.S. Congressman, we get a supercontinent with technology far beyond our wildest dreams, littered with glowing crystal pyramids and powered by the peaceful and eco-friendly mystical wisdom of the ancients, source of all modern civilization and destined to rise again to herald the dawning of the Age of Aquarius.
Or you could hit Ignore. I accuse the less pleasnt variety of skeptic of taking this option. Atlantis is stupid. Anyone who believes it is stupid. Plato was a dirty rotten liar. Any scientist who finds anomalous historical evidence suggesting a missing piece to the early history of the Mediterranean region is also a dirty rotten liar, motivated by crazy New Age beliefs, and should be fired. Anyone who talks about Atlantis is the Enemy, and anyone who denies Atlantis gains immediate access to our in-group and official Good Rational Scientific Person status. - 1 more annotations...
Philosophy Talk: The Blog: The Place of Scepticism and Sceptical Arguments
"it seems to me that the real question of philosophical interest isn't what to say about the slippery concept of "knowledge" but what to say about rational inquiry and rational belief fixation."
Creationism Feels Right, but That Doesn't Make it So: Scientific American
For the past decade, University of Michigan psychologist Margaret Evans has been investigating why creationist thinking comes more easily to the human mind than does evolutionary thinking. “Persistence [of creationist beliefs] is not simply the result of fundamentalist politics and socialization,” writes Evans. “Rather, these forces themselves depend on certain propensities of the human mind.” According to Evans, the preponderance of creationist beliefs—as well as their recalcitrance in the face of logical science—is due in large part to the way our cognitive systems have (ironically enough) evolved.
slacktivist: Still in Hell
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Hell, or something like Hell, seems necessary in a sense to satisfy our need to believe in ultimate justice. This is an actual thing, a real, measurable phenomenon that exists. Not the reality of ultimate justice itself, of course -- that may be true but can't be measured or proved -- but the reality of our desire for it.
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The first question is something like, "Do you believe that there will be some kind of ultimate accountability for evil?"
My answer to that question is yes. I believe there will be. I can't prove this, mind you, but I believe it. And this assertion -- that the arc of the universe is long, but it bends toward justice
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