tony curzon price's Library tagged ethics →  View Popular

In a series of experiments, we demonstrate that certain players of an economic game reject unfair offers even when this behavior
increases rather than decreases inequity. A substantial proportion (30–40%, compared with 60–70% in the standard ultimatum game) of
those who responded rejected unfair offers even when rejection reduced only their own earnings to 0, while not affecting the
earnings of the person who proposed the unfair split (in an impunity game). Furthermore, even when the responders were not
able to communicate their anger to the proposers by rejecting unfair offers in a private impunity game, a similar rate of rejection was observed. The rejection of unfair offers that increases inequity cannot be explained by the social preference for inequity aversion or reciprocity; however, it does provide support
for the model of emotion as a commitment device. In this view, emotions such as anger or moral disgust lead people to disregard
the immediate consequences of their behavior, committing them to behave consistently to preserve integrity and maintain a
reputation over time as someone who is reliably committed to this behavior.

To deal with such situations, we developed immediate, emotionally based intuitive responses to the infliction of personal violence on others. The thought of pushing the stranger off the footbridge elicits these responses. On the other hand, it is only in the last couple of centuries – not long enough to have any evolutionary significance – that we have been able to harm anyone by throwing a switch that diverts a train. Hence the thought of doing it does not elicit the same emotional response as pushing someone off a bridge.