If Not Civilizations, What? Huntington
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American Foreign Policy Toward the Muslim World -- Interview Transcript. Summer/Fall 2001 - Foreign Policy Studies
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the world of over one billion Muslims, most of whom are not Arabs, is very diverse, with differing priorities and cultures. Moreover, the Islamic world, like other parts of the world, is dominated by states, which are driven by their own interests and priorities and often have more conflict among themselves than with the West.
The Clash of Ignorance
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In this belligerent kind of
thought, he relies heavily on a 1990 article by the veteran
Orientalist Bernard Lewis, whose ideological colors are manifest in
its title, "The Roots of Muslim Rage." -
This far less visible
history is ignored in the rush to highlight the ludicrously
compressed and constricted warfare that "the clash of civilizations"
argues is the reality. When he published his book by the same title
in 1996, Huntington tried to give his argument a little more subtlety
and many, many more footnotes; all he did, however, was confuse
himself and demonstrate what a clumsy writer and inelegant thinker he
was. -
Huntington's assumption that his perspective, which is
to survey the entire world from a perch outside all ordinary
attachments and hidden loyalties, is the correct one, as if everyone
else were scurrying around looking for the answers that he has
already found. In fact, Huntington is an ideologist, someone who
wants to make "civilizations" and "identities" into what they are
not: shut-down, sealed-off entities that have been purged of the
myriad currents and countercurrents that animate human history, and
that over centuries have made it possible for that history not only
to contain wars of religion and imperial conquest but also to be one
of exchange, cross-fertilization and sharing.
Clash of Civilizations and Its Critiques
- Discussion on Huntington's Clash of Civilizations?post by samiam on 2006-07-18 12:05:17
Huntington: Clash of Civilizations
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It is my hypothesis
that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be
primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among
humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation
states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the
principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and
groups of different
civilizations. The clash of civilizations will be the battle lines of
the future. -
ideology
-
Western civil wars
-
With the
end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase,
and its center-piece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western
civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. In the politics of
civilizations, the people and governments of non-Western civilizations
no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism
but join the West as movers and shapers of history. -
group countries
-
in terms of their culture and civilization.
-
The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level
of identification with which he intensely identifies. -
Civilizations are nonetheless
meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp,
they are real. -
The broader reaches of human
history have been the history of civilizations -
The most important conflicts
of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these
civilizations from one another. -
These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox,
Latin American and possibly African civilization. -
First, differences among civilizations
are not only real; they are basic -
Second, the world is becoming
a smaller place -
Third, the processes of economic
modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people
from longstanding local identities -
In much of the world religion has moved in to
fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist." -
Fourth, the growth
of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. -
A West at the peak of its power confronts
non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources
to shape the world
in non-Western ways. -
A de-Westernization
and indigenization of elites is occurring in many non-Western countries
at the same time that Western, usually American, cultures, styles and
habits become more popular among the mass of the people -
Finally, economic regionalism
is increasing. -
The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase
in the future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce
civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism may
succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization. -
Common culture, in
contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of the economic
relations between the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Singapore and the overseas Chinese communities in other Asian countries. -
Culture and religion also
form the basis of the Economic Cooperation Organization, which brings
together ten non-Arab Muslim countries -
As people define
their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an
"us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves
and people of different ethnicity or religion. -
The clash of civilizations
thus occurs at two levels. At the micro-level, adjacent groups along the
fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the
control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different
civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle
over the control of international institutions and third parties, and
competitively promote
their particular political and religious values. -
As the ideological division of Europe has
disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity,
on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has
reemerged. -
coincides with the historic boundary between the Hapsburg
and Ottoman empires -
Conflict along the fault line
between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300
years. -
first Arab
nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism manifested themselves -
This
warfare between Arabs and the West culminated in 1990 -
This centuries-old
military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline -
In the Arab world, in short, Western
democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a passing
phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between Islamic countries
and the West. -
Those relations are also complicated
by demography. The spectacular population growth in Arab countries, particularly
in North Africa, has led to increased migration to Western Europe. -
On both sides the
interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilizations. -
Historically, the
other great antagonistic interaction of Arab Islamic civilization has
been with the pagan, animist, and now increasingly Christian black peoples
to the south. -
On the northern border of
Islam, conflict has increasingly erupted between Orthodox and Muslim peoples,
including the carnage of Bosnia and Sarajevo -
The historic clash between Muslim
and Hindu in the subcontinent manifests itself now not only is the rivalry
between Pakistan and India but also in intensifying religious strife within
India between increasingly militant Hindu groups and India's substantial
Muslim minority. -
The same phrase has been applied
to the increasingly difficult relations between Japan and the United States -
The economic issues between the United States and Europe are no less serious
than those between the United States and Japan, but they do not have thesame
political salience and emotional intensity because the differences between
American culture and European culture are so much less than those between
American civilization and Japanese civilization. -
With the Cold War over,
the underlying differences between China and the United States have reasserted
themselves in areas such as human rights, trade and weapons proliferation.
These differences are unlikely to moderate. A "new cold war,"
Deng Xaioping reportedly asserted in 1991, is under way between China
and America. -
The interactions
between civilizations vary greatly in the extent to which they are likely
to be characterized by violence. -
proliferation
of ethnic conflict, epitomized at the extreme in "ethnic cleansing,"
has not been totally random. It has been most frequent and most violent
between groups belonging to different civilizations. -
THE KIN-COUNTRY SYNDROME
GROUPS OR STATES belonging to one civilization that become involved in
war with people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support
from other members of their own civilization. -
First, in the Gulf War one
Arab state invaded another and then fought a coalition of Arab, Western
and other states. -
The rallying of substantial
sections of Arab elites and publics behind Saddam Hussein called those
Arab governments in the anti-Iraq coalition to moderate their activities
and temper their public statements. -
Muslims contrasted
Western actions against Iraq with the West's failure to protect Bosnians
against Serbs and to impose sanctions on Israel for violating U.N. resolutions.
The West, they allege, was using a double standard. A world of clashing
civilizations, however, is inevitably a world of double standards: people
apply one standard to their kin-countries and a different standard
to others. -
Second, the kin-country syndrome
also appeared in conflicts in the former Soviet Union. -
Russian troops fought on the Side of the Armenians, and Azerbaijan
accused the "Russian government of turning 180 degrees" toward
support for Christian Armenia. -
Third, with respect
to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, Western publics manifested sympathy
and support for the Bosnian Muslims and the horrors they suffered at the
hands of the Serbs. Relatively little concern was expressed, however,
over Croatian attacks on Muslims and participation in the dismemberment
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. -
Islamic governments and groups,
on the other hand, castigated the West for not coming to the defense of
the Bosnians. -
The governments of Saudi Arabia and other countries felt under
increasing pressure from fundamentalist groups in their own societies
to provide more vigorous support for the Bosnians. -
In the 1990s the Yugoslav conflict
is provoking intervention from countries that are Muslim, Orthodox and
Western Christian. -
Conflicts and violence
will also occur between states and groups within the same civilization.
Such conflicts, however, are likely to be less intense and less likely
to expand than conflicts between civilizations. -
Common membership in a
civilization reduces the probability of violence in situations where it
might otherwise occur. -
In the coming years,
the local conflicts most likely to escalate into major wars will be those,
as in Bosnia and the Caucasus, along the fault lines between civilizations.
The next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations. -
THE WEST IS NOW at
an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other civilizations. In
superpower opponent has disappeared from the map. Military conflict among
Western states is unthinkable, and Western military power is unrivaled.
Apart from Japan, the West faces no economic challenge. It dominates international
economic institutions. Global political and security issues are effectively
settled by a directorate of the United States, Britain and France,
world economic issues
by a directorate of the United States, Germany and Japan, all of which
maintain extraordinarily close relations with each other to the exclusion
of lesser and largely non-Western countries. -
The West in effect is using international institutions,
military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will
maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western
political and economic values. -
Differences in power and struggles for
military, economic and institutional power are thus one source of conflict
between the West and other civilizations. Differences in culture, that
is basic values and beliefs, are a second source of conflict. -
Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in
other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism,
human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets,
the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic,
Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures. Western efforts
to propagate each ideas produce instead a reaction against "human
rights imperialism" and a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as
can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger
generation in non-Western cultures. The very notion that there could be
a "universal civilization" is a Western idea, directly at odds
with the particularism of most Asian societies and their emphasis on what
distinguishes one people from another. -
The central axis
of world politics in the future is likely to be, in Kishore Mahbubani's
phrase, the conflict between "the West and the Rest" and the
responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values. -
IN THE FUTURE, as
people differentiate themselves by civilization, countries with large
numbers of people of different civilizations, such as the Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia, are candidates for dismemberment. Some other countries
have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether
their society belongs to one civilization or another.
These are town countries. -
Mexico has stopped defining itself by its opposition to
the United States and is instead attempting to imitate the United States
and to join it in the North American Free Trade Area. -
Mexico as in Turkey, significant elements in society resist the redefinition
of their country's
identity. In Turkey, European-oriented leaders have to make gestures to
Islam (Ozal's pilgrimage to Mecca); so also Mexico's North American-oriented
leaders have to make gestures to those who hold Mexico to be a Latin American
country (Salinas' Ibero-American Guadalajara summit). -
Globally the most important torn country
is Russia. -
President Yeltsin
is adopting Western principles and goals and seeking to make Russia a
"normal" country and a part of the West. Yet both the Russian
elite and the Russian public are divided on this issue. -
To redefine its civilization
identity, a torn country must meet three requirements. First, its political
and economic elite has to be generally supportive of and enthusiastic
about the move. Second, its public has to be willing to acquiesce in the
redefinition. Third, the dominant groups in the recipient civilization
have to be willing to embrace the convert. All three requirements in large
part exist with respect to Mexico. The first two in large part exist with
respect to Turkey. It is not clear that any of them exist with respect
to Russia's joining the West. -
Australia's future, they argue,
is with the dynamic economies of East Asia. But, as I have suggested,
close economic cooperation normally requires a common cultural base. In
addition, none of the three conditions necessary for a torn country to
join another civilization is likely to exist in Australia's case. -
Those countries that for reason of culture and power do not wish to, or
cannot, join the West compete with the West by developing their own economic,
military and political power. They do this by promoting their internal
development and by cooperating with other non-Western countries. The most
prominent form of this cooperation is the Confucian-Islamic connection
that has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and power. -
One result is the
emergence of what Charles Krauthammer has called "Weapon States,"
and the Weapon States are not Western states. Another result is the redefinition
of arms control, which is a Western concept and a Western goal -
In the post-Cold War world the primary objective
of arms control is to prevent the development by non-Western societies
of military capabilities that could threaten Western interests. The West
attempts to do this through international agreements, economic pressure
and controls on the transfer of arms and weapons technologies. -
The West promotes
nonproliferation as a universal norm and nonproliferation
treaties and inspections as means of realizing that norm. It also threatens
a variety of sanctions against those who promote the spread of sophisticated
weapons and proposes some benefits for those who do not. The attention
of the West focuses, naturally on nations that are actually or potentially
hostile to the West. -
The non-Western
nations, on the other hand, assert their right to acquire and to deploy
whatever weapons they think necessary for their security. -
Nuclear
weapons, chemical weapons and missiles are viewed, probably erroneously,
as the potential equalizer of superior Western conventional power. -
Centrally important
to the development of counter-West military capabilities is the sustained
expansion of China's military power and its means to create military power.
Buoyed by spectacular economic development, China is rapidly increasing
its military spending and vigorously moving forward with the modernization
of its armed forces. -
A Confucian-Islamic military
connection has thus come into being, designed to promote acquisition by
its members of the weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter
the military powers of the West. -
A new form of arms competition
is thus occurring between Islamic-Confucian states and the West. -
In this new form of arms
competition, one side is developing its arms and the other side is attempting
not to balance but to limit and prevent that arms build-up while at the
same time reducing its own military capabilities. -
differences between civilizations are real and
important; civilization-consciousness is increasing; conflict between
civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as
the dominant global form of conflict; international relations, historically
a game played out within Western civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized
and become a game in which non-Western civilizations are actors and not
simply objects; successful political, security and economic international
institutions are more likely to develop within civilizations than across
civilizations; conflicts between groups in different civilizations will
be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between
groups in the same civilization; violent conflicts between groups in different
civilizations are the
most likely and most dangerous source of escalation that could lead to
global wars; the paramount axis of world politics will be the relations
between "the West and the Rest"; the elites in some torn non-Western
countries will try to make their countries part of the West, but in most
cases face major obstacles to accomplishing this; a central focus of conflict
for the immediate future
will be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states. -
In the short term it is clearly
in the interest of the West to promote greater cooperation and unity within
its own civilization, particularly between its European and North American
components; to incorporate into the West societies in Eastern Europe and
Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the West; to promote
and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and Japan; to prevent
escalation of local
inter-civilization conflicts into major inter-civilization wars; to limit
the expansion of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic states;
to moderate the reduction of counter military capabilities and maintain
military superiority in East and Southwest Asia; to exploit differences
and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states; to support in other
civilizations groups sympathetic to Western values and interests; to strengthen
international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests
and values and to promote the involvement of non-Western states in those
institutions. -
West will increasingly have to accommodate these
non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the West
but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of the
West. This will require the West to maintain the economic and military
power necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations.
It will also, however, require the West to develop a more profound understanding
of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other
civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see
their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality
between Western and other civilizations.
Panel on Huntington book
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