statedept - Robert Maguire on Diigo

04 Dec 09

in Afghanistan and with Pakistan

Message to People of Afghanistan

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03 Dec 09

the highlights of Richard Armitage's interview with Prism - By Tom Ricks | The Best Defense

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an
interesting interview
to Prism
"The second surprise was frankly how successful we were for
the first 4 years-almost 5 years-at keeping the ISI [Pakistan's Inter-Service
Intelligence] relatively out of it. They were so shocked with the speed at
which we invaded Afghanistan that I think the ISI felt it was only a matter of
time until we prevailed."
5 more annotations...
- Armitage's timeline here suggests to me that
  Afghanistan started really falling apart when the ISI went back in. That's an
  interesting conclusion
- He says Bush and his war cabinet never formally
  considered whether to invade Iraq. "Never to my knowledge, and I'm pretty sure I'm right on
  this, did the President ever sit around with his advisors and say, 'Should we
  do this or not?' He never did it."
- The Bush administration didn't
  understand democracy and how to encourage it.
- "The Bush administration's push
  for votes as though voting equals democracy was wrong-headed because a vote is
  something that happens inside a democracy, but is not necessary for a democracy.
  You can have a democratic system without having people raise their hands and
  have a secret ballot. Loya jirgas to some extent are these."
- He believes Bush administration actions undercut the
  American position abroad. "It's harder and made more complex when we abuse the
  writ of habeas corpus here or when we torture people."

01 Dec 09

In Indiana, practice for 'civilian surge' in Afghanistan - washingtonpost.com

www.washingtonpost.com/...AR2009112004043.html - Preview

civilian surge afghanistan US politics waronterror reference statistics indiana obama statedept dod funding counterinsurgency

When President Obama announced what the White House called a "comprehensive new strategy" for the Afghanistan war last March, he called for a "dramatic increase in our civilian effort" that included additional diplomats and experts in agriculture, education, health and rule of law sent to Kabul and to provincial reconstruction teams across the country. Despite early difficulties finding and clearing sufficient numbers of volunteers, Deputy Secretary Jacob L. Lew said during a visit to Indiana on Thursday that the State Department was "on track" to triple the number of civilians, to 974, by early next year.
U.S. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry has asked for at least 300 more civilians over the next three years, as the number of both civilians and U.S. military troops in Afghanistan is expected to surpass those in Iraq. The 2010 Defense budget for the first time projected higher expenditures for the Afghan war than for the waning Iraq conflict; the State Department has $6 billion to spend in combined 2009 and 2010 funds.
2 more annotations...
- Senior Pentagon officials and soldiers on the ground have repeatedly complained that promised civilians have been slow to arrive and sometimes ill-equipped for their assigned tasks. The State Department, massively outmanned and out-resourced by the military, is ever-suspicious of being overwhelmed.
- The soldiers are real. So are the Afghans -- recruited by a Virginia Beach-based defense consulting firm, the McKellar Corporation, from U.S. immigrant communities. The search began at the Bamiyan, an Afghan restaurant in Falls Church, contractor Jim McKellar said. Through word of mouth, he assembled a stable of 500 Afghan actors like Mohammed Pir Mohammad, a former Afghan diplomat who frequently plays the role of provincial governor or district official.

27 Nov 09

COP15

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Climate Change is one of the greatest threats facing our planet, and the United States is taking significant action to meet this challenge. Under President Obama, The U.S. has done more to reduce greenhouse gas emissions than ever before, and is demonstrating its commitment to lead through robust domestic action including historic investments in clean energy, stringent vehicle and appliance efficiency standards, and comprehensive clean energy and climate legislation that is making its way through Congress.
Stay Connected
Get involved today and join the discussion on the Copenhagen Climate Conference. Through Facebook or Twitter talk with your friends and others about the issues being discussed at this year’s conference. Join the discussion today.

17 Nov 09

The Department of State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review

www.state.gov/...125956.htm - Preview

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16 Nov 09

Matthew Yglesias » Anne-Marie Slaughter on Increasing USAID Capacity

yglesias.thinkprogress.org/...-increasing-usaid-capacity.php - Preview

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the new Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
But it’s been a twenty, twenty-five year process where the number of employees that AID has has steadily decreased, the number of contract that AID manages has steadily increased. So instead of having an agency that has a whole set of knowledge experts and experts in the field and then also contracts that it manages, you’ve got a small number of people managing a very large number of contracts just without the number of people or the resources that it needs to be the world class development agency we want it to be. So we’re looking very specificially at what AID is going to need in terms of specific sectors in terms of, again, how does it lead whole of governmnet projects both on the grounds but also in Washington.

13 Nov 09

Hitting Bottom in Foggy Bottom | Foreign Policy

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The most pressing
issues are stateless: pandemics, recession, terrorism, poverty, proliferation, and
conflict. But as report after report, investigation after investigation, has
highlighted, the State Department is broken and paralyzed, unable to respond to
the new 21st-century paradigm.
for example, the Government Accountability Office (gao) found that the department completely
failed in its now
four-year-old attempt to reorganize its nonproliferation bureau (a bureau that remains
leaderless). Besides failing to address mission overlap, low morale, and lack
of career opportunities, the failed reorganization caused a significant drop in
expertise in offices focused on proliferation issues -- including "today's
threats posted by Iran, North Korea, and Syria," the gao's report said -- and coordination
with bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency.
11 more annotations...
- Another
  report by the
  State Department's inspector general this year described severe and broad
  dysfunction within the Africa bureau, while ignoring -- perhaps considering it
  a given -- the lack of departmentwide integration and leadership in operations.
  Examples of the dysfunction range from not providing public diplomacy personnel
  with computers capable of reading interoffice memos to a failure to effectively
  work with the new Africa Command.
- Foggy Bottom relies on Pentagon funding and even personnel for basic
  operations central to its mission.
- In Somalia, for example, the State Department's budget for public
  diplomacy is $30,000. The Pentagon's is $600,000. And, in the State Department's
  bureaucratic wisdom, the $30,000 does not even belong to its undersecretary for
  public diplomacy and public affairs.
- A 2008 report by a congressional
  ombudsman, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, described a
  systemic failure to support and train public diplomacy officers in the field, as
  well as professional discrimination against those in the career track.
- No
  less than Defense Secretary Robert Gates and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
  of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, have long suggested transferring funds from the Defense
  Department to State Department. But the situation is so dire that the State Department,
  at this point, could not even absorb and spend that much-needed infusion of
  cash. If there were a wholesale transfer of funds tomorrow, the lack of
  capacity and skills at the State department would mean it would have to give it
  back to the Defense Department or dole it out to contractors.
- The
  creeping militarization of U.S. foreign policy is itself deeply worrying, not
  just to Gates and Mullen, but also to such luminaries as Secretary Clinton and
  Vice President Joe Biden. In 2008, then-Senator Biden questioned the "expanding
  role of the military in U.S. foreign policy." He said
  he was concerned by the "migration of functions and authorities from U.S.
  civilian agencies to the Department of Defense."
- Some
  commentators have even wondered aloud whether the best way to fix the State Department
  might be to destroy it. Foggy Bottom could retain a small core staff for its embassies
  and ambassadors. All other functions -- such as public diplomacy, countering
  misinformation and propaganda, and development, including provincial
  reconstruction staffing -- could migrate to the Pentagon or become wholly
  independent agencies.
- To transform Foggy Bottom in this way will require breaking the
  rigid hierarchy, stovepipes, and bottlenecks which make the Pentagon look lean
  and dynamic in comparison.
- Modern global affairs are not
  compartmentalized by political borders. Besides expanding the overly shallow
  and narrow authorities of the public diplomacy bureau, Clinton must restructure
  the State Department to focus less on countries and more on regions. Currently,
  each of Foggy Bottom's regional bureaus, such as Near East Affairs, is
  configured to oversee its patch of embassies.
- Clinton
  should name the regional bureau heads, currently assistant secretaries, to
  undersecretary status. This would help eliminate an unnecessary bureaucratic
  layer and would also align the State Department with the Defense Department (which
  has powerful regional commands, such as Centcom and Africom). The State Department's
  regional leaders would hold an equivalent civilian rank to four-star combatant commanders
  like Gen. David Petraeus. These changes would promise to improve
  communications, synchronize missions, and put the department on the right path
  for today's requirements.
- The question asked over the last eight years
  as the State Department abrogated its various responsibilities -- if not
  Defense, then who? -- will not, indeed cannot, be answered until the department
  steps up to the plate and becomes effective and visible in leading and
  implementing U.S. foreign policy.

12 Nov 09

Blackwater Attempted a $1,000,000 Bribe To Cover Up Massacre • videosift.com

U.S. envoy resists troop increase, cites Karzai as problem - washingtonpost.com

www.washingtonpost.com/...AR2009111118432_2.html - Preview

US afghanistan waronterror eikenberry obama mcchrystal politics karzai UN corruption statedept hillary gates costs

"They may or may not return," he said. "I don't think Afghanistan will notice it."
Earlier this summer, he asked for $2.5 billion in nonmilitary spending for 2010, a 60 percent increase over what Obama had requested from Congress, but the request has languished even as the administration has debated spending billions of dollars on new troops.
5 more annotations...
- The ambassador also has worried that sending tens of thousands of additional American troops would increase the Afghan government's dependence on U.S. support at a time when its own security forces should be taking on more responsibility for fighting. Before serving as the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Eikenberry was in charge of the Afghan army training program.
- Each of the four options that were presented to Obama on Wednesday were accompanied by troop figures and the estimated annual costs of the additional deployments, roughly calculated as $1 billion per thousand troops. All would draw the United States deeper into the war at a time of economic hardship and rising fiscal concerns at home.
- Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates have backed a major increase in U.S. forces to drive the Taliban from populated areas and provide Afghan security forces and the government the space to snuff out corruption and undertake development projects. They have argued that only a large-scale counterinsurgency effort can produce a strong Afghan government capable of preventing the country from once again become an al-Qaeda haven.
- Military planners put the additional annual cost of McChrystal's recommendation at $33 billion, although White House officials say the number is probably closer to $50 billion. The extra troops would allow U.S. forces to attempt to take back and hold several Taliban havens in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan.
- One compromise option put forward by the Pentagon, with the backing of Gates, would deploy an additional 30,000 to 35,000 U.S. troops -- fewer than McChrystal's optimal number to carry out his strategy -- and rely on NATO allies to make up the 5,000- to 10,000-troop difference. The third option, known by military planners as "the hybrid," would send 20,000 additional U.S. troops to shore up security in 10 to 12 major population areas. In the rest of the country, the military would adopt a counterterrorism strategy targeting forces allied with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, primarily in the north and east, with fighter jets, Predator drones and Special Operations troops that leave a light U.S. footprint on the ground. The military puts the annual cost of that option at $22 billion.
  
  The most modest option calls for deploying an additional 10,000 to 15,000 troops. While under consideration at the White House, the proposal holds little merit for military planners because, after building bases to accommodate 10,000 or so additional soldiers and Marines, the marginal cost of adding troops beyond that figure would rise only slightly.

Civilian Contractor Toll in Iraq and Afghanistan Ignored by Defense Dept. - ProPublica

www.propublica.org/...istan-ignored-by-pentagon-1009 - Preview

US politics reference statistics civilians waronterror casualities usaid afghanistan iraq private contractors statedept

As the war in Afghanistan entered its ninth year, the Labor Department recently released new figures [1] for the number of civilian contract workers who have died in war zones since 9/11. Although acknowledged as incomplete, the figures show that at least 1,688 civilians have died and more than 37,000 have reported injuries while working for U.S. contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.
More than 5,200 soldiers have died in the two war zones, meaning that one civilian contractor has died for every three soldiers
4 more annotations...
- Civilian contractors make up [2] about half the total U.S. forces in the war zones and they have been deployed on the front lines far more than any previous U.S. conflict [3]. Iraq and Afghanistan are the most outsourced wars in U.S. history.
- the Defense Department hasn’t been measuring their sacrifice
- A little-noticed report [4] from the Government Accountability Office last week noted that the Pentagon has yet to implement a Congressional requirement to track contractor fatalities.
- The Department of Defense is not alone in its lack of attention to the issue. Neither the State Department nor USAID could tell with certainty how many contractors they employed, the GAO found. USAID, for instance, failed to report how many civilians it had put to work under a $91 million contract to develop hydroelectric plants and small and medium businesses in Afghanistan. A State Department contracting officer insisted that there was no need to track local Iraqi hires, despite specific statutory language to the contrary, the report found. "Officials acknowledged that they are likely undercounting the actual number of contractors working in Iraq and Afghanistan," the GAO concluded. State, USAID and DOD officials all told the GAO that they were working to fix the problem.

11 Nov 09

An articulate plan for security | The AfPak Channel

afpak.foreignpolicy.com/...n_articulate_plan_for_security - Preview

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As someone who talks to many Afghans -- from government
officials to shopkeepers, students and others -- and the international
community on a daily basis, the answer is very clear: Afghans need security and
stability before anything else can be put forth.
In terms of security, more troops are fundamental. But this
has to be spelled out clearly by the Obama administration. When speaking to
Afghans here, they agree that more troops are needed, but an entire plan is
also needed to know when the troops will arrive, where they will be deployed, what
will they carry out, and -- this is what concerns Afghans a lot -- when they
will be leaving. The what part is the most important one; Afghans here agree
that more troops are necessary to support Afghanistan's own security forces,
the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.
2 more annotations...
- Among the increased number of troops, Afghanistan needs many experts to
  train and coach Afghans in security-related issues. Not only will
  this involve Afghans in rebuilding their own country, but it will also enable
  them to see results coming from their work. This will also allow a realistic
  timetable for U.S.
  forces to leave: as soon as effective and transparent outcomes are seen.
- Moreover, focus needs to be placed on clearing out Taliban
  strongholds in the border region of Pakistan
  and Afghanistan.

More talking, not more troops | The AfPak Channel

afpak.foreignpolicy.com/...more_talking_not_more_troops - Preview

US politics diplomacy statedept military waronterror taliban al-qaeda pakistan afghanistan statistics reference

Building a country at gunpoint has failed.
But how many roads are
built in rural Afghanistan
these days without paying bribes to local insurgents? How many Pashtun
villagers would get polio vaccinations without permission from the Taliban?
Making the country better doesn't necessarily require fighting the insurgents;
in many cases, it requires working with them.
3 more annotations...
- A mythology has emerged that Afghanistan was abandoned and immediately fell
  to pieces; in fact, the Najibullah government survived as long as money flowed
  from Moscow.
  Without foreign troops to support the regime, Najibullah bribed his opponents
  and gave up territory to local tribes. That's not a great model, but it's
  better than escalating war.
- A Georgetown
  University study reached two
  conclusions about that period of history: 1) the Afghan rebels were good at
  resisting invaders, but poorly organized for conventional war; and 2) the
  insurgents squabbled among themselves after the common enemy departed.
- he
  organizations that could deliver the best intelligence about al Qaeda are the
  Taliban, the Haqqani network, and the Hekmatyar group. Fighting terrorism
  doesn't necessarily require killing insurgents; in many cases, it requires
  working with them.

10 Nov 09

Interview on the Charlie Rose Show

www.state.gov/...131713.htm - Preview

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QUESTION: Is Germany on board with respect to Afghanistan?

SECRETARY CLINTON: I think Germany is committed to the effort in Afghanistan. They’re waiting, like the rest of the world is, the United States, and through President Obama, to announce our intentions and our way forward. But they have a deep understanding of why this is important for NATO, why this is important for the larger international community. And I think that given the right measures of accountability that we need to be seeking from President Karzai and his government, we’re going to see a commitment not just from Germany, but from many of our NATO allies.

Charlie Rose - Home

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04 Nov 09

Interview With Jackie Northam of NPR

www.state.gov/...131328.htm - Preview

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SECRETARY CLINTON: No, not at all, no. I mean, as you saw, the whole purpose of my trip was to try to clear the air with the Pakistani people and government, to reassert our support for Pakistan, particularly in this very difficult conflict they’re engaged in with the Taliban, and to listen and absorb all the criticisms they have. They had this sort of pent-up frustration with the United States. And as you know and as you saw, I listened and under – and tried to convey understanding of all of their questions about our policy, going back years.
But at the same time, I wanted to stress that we’re looking for a partnership, and they have to listen to our concerns as well as we listen to their concerns. I feel strongly that as we move forward in these very complex areas that pose real concerns to our national security, concerns to partners like Pakistan’s security, that it is important to make clear to the people – not just the leaders – that we have to speak openly with each other.
And the reaction that I got in Pakistan was overwhelmingly positive – and I’ve been reading a lot of the blogging and the reaction on the press – in part because they’re not used to anyone from the United States Government coming and opening herself to their concerns. They’re just used to saying – to having somebody say, take it or leave it, with us or against us, go forward or not. And so I think we’re building a stronger base for our relationship.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I spoke with President Karzai after the election results were announced. And I told him that we now had a lot of work to do, and there were expectations on both sides. But certainly, from the American perspective, we believed it was important for him to establish a compact with the people of Afghanistan that would commit him and his new government to an anti-corruption campaign, to more accountability and transparency, to a recognition that there has to be more cooperation with local officials, that they have to work with us to build an adequate Afghan security force to protect and defend their country.
So we are laying out very clear expectations. We’re willing to offer our assistance, but we’re going to hold the Government of Afghanistan accountable for what they claim they want, which is the United States and the international community’s assistance in providing security for their people and in producing results for them as well.
QUESTION: Does he appear to be on board with all these initiatives that the --
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, he certainly – he and I have a long relationship, and I have met with him many times over the last eight years, both in Afghanistan, in Washington, even in New York when he came to visit Fort Drum in upstate New York, where a lot of the soldiers who were part of the first wave of the invasion against the Taliban and al-Qaida in 2001 were based.
So he and I know each other. I have been waiting for the election, frankly, to finally be over. It has caused a delay in our policy, because how do you decide on important matters that are going to depend upon whatever agreements you make with the government until you finally get a result? So that is, thankfully, over. And our people, both Ambassador Holbrooke and Ambassador Eikenberry and the people working with them, are working to implement what we see as the necessary assurances we require from him.

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Message to People of Pakistan

Message to People of Afghanistan

the highlights of Richard Armitage's interview with Prism - By Tom Ricks | The Best Defense

In Indiana, practice for 'civilian surge' in Afghanistan - washingtonpost.com

COP15

The Department of State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review

Matthew Yglesias » Anne-Marie Slaughter on Increasing USAID Capacity

Hitting Bottom in Foggy Bottom | Foreign Policy

Blackwater Attempted a $1,000,000 Bribe To Cover Up Massacre • videosift.com

U.S. envoy resists troop increase, cites Karzai as problem - washingtonpost.com

Civilian Contractor Toll in Iraq and Afghanistan Ignored by Defense Dept. - ProPublica

An articulate plan for security | The AfPak Channel

More talking, not more troops | The AfPak Channel

AfPak experts advise Obama | The AfPak Channel

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