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The Zombie Within http://t.co/G9p11iGs
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share ideas, interests and beliefs.
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conscious of themselves and conscious of others
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New theory doesn’t limit consciousness to the brain
Namit Arora considers the complexity of consciousness and its implications for artificial intelligence.
Representational Consciousness
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many conscious states have both phenomenal and intentional properties, such as visual perceptions
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More cautiously, each theory attempts to explain its target phenomenon in terms of intentionality, and assumes that intentionality is representation.
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An intentional state represents an object, real or unrea
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"Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this standard, broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem."
in list: Androids, Zombies and Brains
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I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character.
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something it is like
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account qualitatively for a large set of matched pairs of conscious and unconscious processes
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Consciousness resembles a bright spot on the theater stage of Working Memory (WM), directed there by a spotlight of attention, under executive guidance
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Notes on Dennett and Cartesian theater
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a mental screen or stage on which images are presented for viewing by my mind's eye
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"In fact there is not a single stream of neural activity coming into a middle and sending a new stream out; there is massive parallel processing. There are feedback loops, complex cell assemblies forming and dissolving, mutual interactions between distant areas, and so on."
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"Dennett has various targets in his book; they all seem to get lumped together, but in fact some seem distinct from others. Here are three that it might be useful to distinguish." Curtis Brown
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I'm worried about the verificationism here
"The multiple drafts model of consciousness (Dennett, 1991, 1996, 1998, Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992) was developed as an alternative to the perennially attractive, but incoherent, model of conscious experience Dennett calls Cartesian materialism, the idea that after early unconscious processing occurs in various relatively peripheral brain structures "everything comes together" in some privileged central place in the brain–which Dennett calls the Cartesian Theater --for "presentation" to the inner self or homunculus. There is no such place in the brain, but many theories seem to presuppose that there must be something like it." (Dennet & Akins, Scholarpedia)
in list: Androids, Zombies and Brains
"The central "Cartesian" claim Dennett targets is that there is a specific location in the brain "arrival at which is the necessary and sufficient condition for conscious experience" (p. 106). His argument consists mainly in denying that there's always a fact of the matter about when, exactly, an experience occurs, if one considers events at very small time scales (on the order of tenths of a second). He appears to draw from this argument what seems to be the fairly radical anti-"Cartesian" conclusion that there are, in general, no definitive facts of the matter about the flow of conscious experiences independent of the changing "narratives" we construct about them." The Splintered Mind
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The central "Cartesian" claim Dennett targets is that there is a specific location in the brain "arrival at which is the necessary and sufficient condition for conscious experience"
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The only question is how large that center is.
"Dennett maintains that cognitive discriminations need only be made once. The information does not then need to travel to any special area of the brain in order to become conscious. Without the 'theatre', there is no need for such a 'presentation' to take place." - Philosophy, et cetera
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cognitive discriminations need only be made once. The information does not then need to travel to any special area of the brain in order to become conscious. Without the 'theatre', there is no need for such a 'presentation' to take place
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our brains can represent time using a medium other than time itself
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