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I discovered that Quine understood the problem with the claims about a priori truths and necessary truths more generally. Analyzing a concept can (perhaps) tell you what the concept means (at least means to some philosophers), but it does not tell you anything about whether the concept is true of anything in the world. But many philosophers in the second half of the 20th century really seemed to think that they were laying the foundations for science by laying down the conceptual (necessary) truths. I asked one: show me one example where 20th century conceptual analysis laid a foundational plank for any empirical science — any empirical science. No answer.
"Can science tell us about right and wrong?"
in list: Neuroethics
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She was providing the “yes” to another question, something more like “Can science tell us about right and wrong?”
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Each one of us is equipped with a neural circuitry that ensures our own self-caring and well-being
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in list: Neuroethics
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While she does treat mirror neuron hyped research with the contempt and dressing that it deserves by trying to explain more than is warranted; her own enthusiasm for Oxytocin as the magical trust molecule or the epitome of moral foundations, deserves similar treatment. Again it is to her credit that she does not shy away form discussing latest studies that have shown oxytocin in not so moral light as in when it is involved in out-group prejudice; but still the discussion of neurotransmitter or vasoprassin or mirror neurons detracts rather than amplifies her thesis that morality evolved from social living.
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she claims that morality is innate but seems reluctant to grant that it could also have a universal structure.
"As we break into a new millennium, we are still burdened with medieval beliefs about mind and consciousness. Paul Churchland, one of the foremost scientific philosophers of mind, leads the way toward a new neuroscientific understanding of our inner life. Professor of philosophy and a member of the cognitive science faculty at the University of California, San Diego, Churchland lays out a rational vision of mind in his latest book, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul. He has long championed developing neural networks to achieve artificial intelligence and stresses the importance of combining research from computer science, neurobiology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind to better understand consciousness. No armchair Platonist, Churchland represents the best of today's scientifically savvy philosophers."
The Science Network interview on video
Some philosophers believe that conceptual analysis will reveal the essence of mental states. Pat Churchland disagrees. In conversation with Nigel Warburton she explains how philosophers can learn from neuroscience and why some 'folk' psychological terms may need revision. philosophy bites
In 2003, the Archives of Neurology carried a startling clinical report. A middle-aged Virginian man with no history of any misdemeanour began to stash child pornography and sexually molest his 8-year-old stepdaughter. Placed in the court system, his sexual behaviour became increasingly compulsive. Eventually, after repeatedly complaining of headaches and vertigo, he was sent for a brain scan. It showed a large but benign tumour in the frontal area of his brain, invading the septum and hypothalmus - regions known to regulate sexual behaviour. (18 November 2006 - New Scientist)
NewScientist often features humorous little pieces on "nominative determinism," the idea that your name can control your destiny.
It's not quite perfect. Consider Patricia Churchland, a neurophilosopher who isn't exactly friendly to a theistic worldview, since she espouses "eliminative materialism," the idea that the mind is matter, and that's all that matters. (decorabilia: NewScientist at 50)
In this interview we talked about neurophilosophy, which is an approach to philosophy of mind that gives high priority to incorporating the empiric findings of neuroscience. We also talk about the evolving relationship between philosophy and neuroscience. Churchland shares her enthusiasm for how the discoveries of neuroscience are changing the way we see ourselves as human beings. We also talked a little about the issues of reductionism that I first brought up in Episode 53.
Churchland, Patricia S. 1996. Feeling reasons. In (A. Damasio, H. Damasio and Y. Christen, eds) Neurobiology of Decision-Making. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 181-199. Reprinted in (Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland, eds) On the Contrary: Critical Essays, 1987-1997 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998).
Video of Churchland's Stony Brook Mind Brain Lecture 2008; with links to additional resourses
in list: Neuroethics
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