Matthew Raketti's Public Library

Although sending more troops is necessary to tip the balance of power against the insurgents, the move will have a lasting impact only if it is accompanied by a political "surge," a committed effort to persuade large groups of Taliban fighters to put down their arms and give up the fight. Both the recent interagency white paper on U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan and Obama's March 27 speech announcing a new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan acknowledged that integrating reconcilable insurgents will be a key complement to the military buildup. Yet U.S. policymakers have not adequately developed a vision of how to achieve reconciliation. Admitting their lack of knowledge about the precise character of the insurgency, they equate reconciliation with merely cajoling Taliban foot soldiers into crossing over to the U.S. side.

Such a minimalist approach is unlikely to deliver peace. What is required instead is a nimble, sophisticated political campaign that is built on a proper understanding of the nature of the insurgency and that, combined with the reconciliation efforts of the Afghan government, the United States' NATO allies, and Pakistan, enables insurgent commanders and their supporters to realign with the Afghan government. The overriding lesson of the U.S. experience in Iraq -- first its failures and more recently its successes -- is that no occupying power can hope to quash an insurgency by killing and capturing its way to victory. It must make friends, especially among its enemies. In Afghanistan, a counterinsurgency strategy that includes a credible attempt at reconciliation is more likely to achieve stability than one that relies solely on foreign troops and victories in the battlefield.