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Federal Register Document Drafting Handbook
The Document Drafting Handbook is intended to help agencies prepare documents for publication in the Federal Register.
SSRN-Chevron as a Canon, not a Precedent: An Empirical Test of what Motivates Judges in Agency Deference Cases by William Eskridge, Connor Raso
Legal scholars almost universally believe that federal judges defer to agency interpretations of statutes. The debate has therefore focused on when judges should defer and how judges should operationalize a deference regime doctrinally. Such normative debates about deference rest upon factual assumptions that have not been rigorously tested; drawing from the entire population of Supreme Court cases (1984-2006) our empirical finds that Supreme Court Justices do not generally afford deference precedents stare decisis effect, but that the policies underlying the major deference regimes do have bite at the Supreme Court level. We also find that judicial ideology affects the Justices’ applications of deference regimes but does not explain why different Justices prefer different doctrinal formulations; we advance the hypothesis that the Justices’ expressed preferences are genuine, but do not dominate ideology and other context based factors in actual cases. Deference regimes are more like canons of statutory construction, applied episodically but reflecting deeper judicial commitments, than binding precedents, pretty faithfully applied or distinguished. Our study suggests that most academic proposals to “reform” deference doctrines would have little or no bite at the Supreme Court level; more modest proposals to clarify such doctrines would probably be (modestly) helpful, however.
Legal History Blog: Roscoe Pound and the Administrative State
Many legal historians find themselves face to face with Pound at some point in their research. For legal historians of the American administrative state, he is an inescapable presence because of the harshly critical report he published as chairman of the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Administrative Law in 1938.
SSRN-Democratizing the Administrative State by Richard Pierce
Scholars have long questioned the political and constitutional legitimacy of the administrative state. By 1980, a majority of Justices seemed to be poised to hold that large portions of the administrative state are unconstitutional. In 1984, the Court stepped back from that abyss and took a major step toward legitimating and democratizing the administrative state. The Court instructed lower courts to defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered statute. The Court based this doctrine of deference on the superior political accountability of agencies. Henceforth, politically-unaccountable judges were prohibited from substituting their policy preferences for those of politically-accountable agencies. The Court recognized that agencies are politically accountable to the people because they are subject to the control of the elected President. The Court's 1984 effort to democratize the administrative state has fallen far short of its potential because of temporal problems with the manner in which the Supreme Court defines and implements the deference doctrine the Court announced in 1984 and the other two doctrines that require courts to defer to agency interpretations of agency-administered texts. The most important of those deference doctrines is explicitly premised on the Court's understandable belief that policy decisions should be made by the politically accountable President rather than by politically unaccountable judges. Yet, the Court's present method of implementing the deference doctrines has two unfortunate effects. First, in a high proportion of cases, there is a lag of four to eight years between the time that a President takes office and the time when a court is willing to acquiesce in implementation of the policies preferred by the President. In other words, each President is required to implement the policies preferred by his predecessor for at least one term and perhaps even for two terms. Second, in some important situations, regulatees are required to incur large c
Administrative Law Prof Blog: Judicial review: When collateral estoppel bars a second bite
Sometimes an individual, unsuccessful in one lawsuit, will commence another legal action involving essentially the same issues and parties. However, applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating an issue which has already been decided by the courts involving the same parties and issues. ... [T]he doctrine may apply to bar relitigating issues decided by administrative agencies if those decisions are "quasi-judicial" in nature. According to the ruling, an administrative agency is quasi-judicial in nature if it is given express statutory authority to act adjudicatively.\nIn contrast, if an agency only invokes its executive powers under the governing statute in making its determination, it is not exercising "quasi-judicial powers." ... [C]hallenging the administrative agency's decision in court in situations where the agency did not arrive at its decision as a result of its acting in an adjudicative or judicial capacity would not be barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. ...
Slate > The FTC's Mad Power Grab: The commission's preposterous new endorsement guidelines
SSRN-Disclosing 'Political' Oversight of Agency Decision Making by Nina Mendelson
Scholars and courts have been divided on whether presidential supervision enhances the legitimacy of the administrative state. For some, that the president can supervise administrative agencies is key to arguing that agency action is legitimate, because t
SSRN-Using an Ethnographic Method to Explore Administrative Justice by Laverne Jacobs
This chapter is an excerpt from a study in which an ethnographic methodology was used to explore the concept of "tribunal independence" within access to information and privacy commissions in Canada. This chapter sets out the theory behind the ethnographi
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