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FT.com / In depth / George Soros lectures - Soros: The Way Forward
"Global markets need global regulations, but the regulations that are currently in force are rooted in the principle of national sovereignty. There are some international agreements, most notably the Basel Accords on minimum capital requirements, and there is also good cooperation among market regulators. But the source of the authority is always the sovereign state. This means that it is not enough to restart a mechanism that has stalled; we need to create a regulatory mechanism that has never existed. As things stand now, the financial system of each country is being sustained and supported by its own government. The governments are primarily concerned with their own economies. This gives rise to what may be called financial protectionism, which threatens to disrupt and perhaps destroy global financial markets. British regulators will never again rely on the Icelandic authorities and Eastern European countries will be reluctant to remain entirely dependent on foreign-owned banks. "
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The point I am trying to make is that regulations must be international in scope. Without it, financial markets cannot remain global; they would be destroyed by regulatory arbitrage. Businesses would move to the countries where the regulatory climate is the most benign and this would expose other countries to risks they cannot afford to run. Globalization was so successful because it forced all countries to remove regulations but, the process does not work in reverse. It will be difficult to get countries to agree on uniform regulations. Different countries have different interests which drive them towards different solutions.
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The United States has been at the center of the international financial system ever since the Second World War. The dollar has served as the main international currency and the United States has derived immense benefits from it but lately it has abused its privilege. Starting in the 1980s it has built up an ever increasing current account deficit. This could have continued indefinitely because the Asian tigers, first under the leadership of Japan and then of China, were willing to finance that deficit by building up their dollar holdings, but the excessive indebtedness of United States households brought the process to an end. When the housing bubble burst, households found themselves overextended. The subprime crisis spread to other markets with alarming rapidity and after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the system actually broke down. The authorities were forced to replace the credit that collapsed with the only source of credit that remained intact, namely the State.
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Project Syndicate - The Cycles of Economic Discontent
"The response to the economic crisis in Thailand and Korea in the late 1990's was emphatic preaching about the inherent superiority of the so-called Anglo-Saxon economic model. But this vision, in turn, also became problematic, and it was unambiguously discredited in 2007-2008, amid a massive outbreak of European and Asian Schadenfreude ."
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FLORENCE – The nineteenth century was mesmerized by the cyclical behavior of business. The French economist Clement Juglar became famous for establishing that business cycles ran for around nine or ten years. We have recently had our own cycles of exuberance and disintegration. But they are very different.
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The next beautiful idea that failed, in 1997-1998, was the concept of a particular “Asian miracle” (as it had been dubbed in the title of an influential World Bank publication). Asian economies were supposedly better coordinated because of strategic interventions by the government along the lines of the initial postwar practices of Japan’s MITI. But, like the Soviet Union and its satellites, the smaller and dynamic Asian economies had taken on too much debt.
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House Financial Services Committee
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The Kanjorski amendment would empower federal regulators to rein in and dismantle financial firms that are so large, inter-connected, or risky that their collapse would put at risk the entire American economic system, even if those firms currently appear to be well-capitalized and healthy. Therefore, American taxpayers should no longer be on the hook for bailouts, as financial companies would not be able to become “too big to fail.” The Kanjorski amendment outlines clear and objective standards for regulators to examine financial companies and reduce the level of risk their activities pose to our financial stability and our economy.
CoVar
Tobias Adrian
Markus K. Brunnermeier
Staff Report no. 348
September 2008
Revised August 2009
Liquidity risk charges as a macro-prudential tool | vox - Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists
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The recent financial crisis was unprecedented in scale and speed of propagation. The original housing shock was severely compounded by banks’ extreme funding fragility (Brunnermeier 2009). Banks’ risk-absorbing capacity had been reduced not just by lower capital buffers but also by extremely short-term funding. The panic withdrawals of wholesale short-term investors propagated and compounded losses as they forced massive distress sales (Gorton 2009). These in turn caused rapid asset price declines, triggered further margin calls and thus more fire sales across markets. The resulting uncertainty undermined access to new financing, leading to inefficiently rapid deleveraging (Brunnermeier 2009).
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Liquidity risk charges should be stable but adjustable by the macro-prudential authority in response to aggregate risk accumulation, such as asset bubbles based on fragile funding. The charges would grant some control over the build up of financial fragility without increasing the cost of credit for non-speculative (long-term) activities.
Macro-prudential policy choice would include additive or multiplicative shifts to the structure of the charges applied to various maturities. Policy tightening may be achieved by a further penalisation of very short maturities or by adding surcharges for increases in exposure above some baseline level, discouraging incremental expansion in short-term funding.
The Network | The New Republic
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The current crisis "probably was the result of inadequate information with too much financial innovation," says Malcolm Knight, a vice-chairman of Deutsche Bank who led the Bank for International Settlements, the bank of the world's central banks, from 2003 to 2008.
Project Syndicate - The Great Contraction of 2008-2009
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The optimists say not to worry. Credit will soon come to everyone else as easily as it has to the banks. After all, credit also dried up during the 1991 global recession, and yet funds were flowing briskly within 18 months.
But this parallel fails to recognize the fact that balance sheets remain far more impaired this time. Housing prices are being propped up temporarily by myriad subsidies, while a commercial real-estate tsunami looms. Many banks’ weaknesses are simply being masked by government guarantees.
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Indeed, G-20 governments now face the daunting prospect of trying to rein in the monster they have created. It is now very clear that the taxpayer will always be there to guarantee that bondholders get paid. Unchecked, large financial firms will be able to tap bond markets for decades to come at rates just above what the government pays, regardless of the inherent risk of their asset positions. Lenders to banks will not bother worrying about what kinds of gambles and investments financial institutions are making, or whether regulation is effective.
The good news is that most governments do see the need to implement significant new regulation on financial firms. But here’s the rub: financial regulation is enormously complicated, all the more so given that there must be some degree of international consistency. It would be a disaster if countries were to rush in individually to implement their own new system.
On the other hand, if regulators take their time to “get it right,” there will be a huge shadow of uncertainty hanging over the financial system. Banks know that they face higher capital requirements, which will force them to scale back lending relative to their resources). But how much higher? There is much discussion of breaking up banks that are too big to fail. But what will actually happen?
Given this environment, no wonder credit is still contracting in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. If banks don’t know what the rules of the game are going to be, they have to be very cautious about over-extending their balance sheets.
So government regulators – and ultimately all of us – are caught between a rock and a hard place. Regulate in haste, repent at leisure. Overly strict regulation could seriously impair global growth for decades. But if regulation is too soft, the next monster global financial crisis could come within a decade. And even if regulators take their time to try to get it right, as most of us think they should, the world may have to live with weak credit expansion as banks hold back, awaiting a clearer verdict on their future.
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C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics: The Global Financial Crisis: Causes and Consequences - Council on Foreign Relations
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The Lehman default was one of the most extraordinary economic events in global financial history. It's remarkable in so many different characteristics that I don't think that until we look back upon it, over the years, we will recognize this as truly a once in either a century or a once in 80 year event.
The critical characteristic of this particular period is perhaps shown by the extent to which short-term credits, which are the strongest part of any financial intermediary system, collapsed.
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But we almost never find a situation in which short-term debt disappears. It did in 1907, when the coal money rate literally had no offerings for 24 hours. And it did in part in the '30s on occasion.
But none were as severe as the one we are going through, because when the Lehman crisis hit, within days, you began to see the whole collapsing of the system and especially for trade credit.
Trade credit is something we rarely think about, and one of the reasons it's one of the really bread-and-butter pieces of transactions and product that the banking system offers. It virtually disappeared or in certain cases, the price went to 600 basis points over LIBOR, effectively shutting down the market.
The result was a collapse in export trade of unprecedented proportions around the world. You could look country by country, and every single one of them had a flat export pattern for a very long period of time, and then they all went off the cliff, and essentially simultaneously.
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