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08 Oct 09

Learning Networks and Connective Knowledge

Long paper by Stephen Downes on the nature of knowledge, connectivism, learning, and e-learning 2.0

it.coe.uga.edu/...paper92.html - Preview

CCK09 connectivism teaching education learning networks learningtheories e-learning

In other
words, cognitivists defend an approach that may be called ‘folk
psychology’. “In our everyday social interactions we
both predict and explain behavior, and our explanations are couched
in a mentalistic vocabulary which includes terms like ‘belief’
and ‘desire’.” The argument, in a nutshell, is that
the claims of folk psychology are literally true, that there is, for
example, an entity in the mind corresponding to the belief that
'Paris is the capital of France', and that this belief is, in fact,
what might loosely be called 'brain writing' - or, more precisely,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between a person's brain states
and the sentence itself.
- I've never heard cognitivism compared to "folk psychology" before. I'm not totally convinced by this argument. Cognitivist methods do have some research support, after all. (Think multimedia learning, Clark & Mayer's "ELearning and the Science of Instruction.") But their methods could (at least sometimes) be right even if their explanation of the underlying mechanism is wrong. - on 2009-10-06
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We may contrast cognitivism, which is a
causal theory of mind, with connectionism, which is an
emergentist
theory of mind. This is not to say that connectionism
(see also)
does away with causation altogether; it is not a ‘hand of God’
theory. It allows that there is a physical, causal connection
between entities, and this is what makes communication possible. But
where it differs is, crucially: the transfer of information does
not reduce to this physical substrate. Contrary to the
communications-theoretical account, the new theory is a non-reductive
theory. The contents of communications, such as sentences, are not
isomorphic with some mental state.
- From Wikipedia: "A property of a system is said to be emergent if it is more than the sum of the properties of the system's parts." If I understand Stephen's argument correctly, part of what he's saying here is that rather than knowledge being exactly what we perceive it to be (a sentence like "Paris is a city in France"), what's happening in our brains is more than that. When a teacher shares knowledge with a learner, it doesn't work like a copy machine where the teacher gives the learner a duplicate of the original and then both people have discrete copies of that knowledge. - on 2009-10-06
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- For
  example (and there are many we could choose from), consider
  Randall O’Reilly on how the brain represents conceptual
  structures, as described in Modeling
  Integration and Dissociation in Brain and Cognitive Development.
  He explicitly rejects the ‘isomorphic’ view of mental
  contents, and instead describes a network of distributed
  representations. "Instead of viewing brain areas as being
  specialized for specific representational content (e.g., color,
  shape, location, etc), areas are specialized for specific
  computational functions by virtue of having different neural
  parameters...
  - I struggle a bit with the neurological arguments, but it does seem to make sense that the brain is divided by the different functions and not by the symbols we've created to communicate. And certainly when you look at brain scans of people doing different tasks, the activity isn't just in one area: multiple areas of the brain are involved in any complex task.
    
    But I'm also cautious about the brain evidence because, frankly, I don't really understand it that well. I'm also aware of research about how people find arguments more convincing when they're shown with pictures of brain scans, even if it's the same text. I don't want to fall prey to that fallacy. - on 2009-10-06
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- For example,
  when I say, "What makes something a learning object is how we
  use the learning object," I am asserting a functionalist
  approach to the definition of learning objects (people are so
  habituated to essentialist definitions that my definition does not
  even appear on lists of definitions of learning objects).
  
  It's
  like asking, what makes a person a 'bus driver'? Is it the colour of
  his blood? The nature of his muscles? A particular mental state? No -
  according to functionalism, what makes him a 'bus driver' is the fact
  that he drives buses. He performs that function.
  - These are better examples; this makes more sense to me. It does seems to support creating learning environments where content can be used multiple different ways, which fits with connectivism. - on 2009-10-06
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- To illustrate this concept, I
  have been asking people to think of the concept 'Paris'. If 'Paris'
  were represented by a simple symbol set, we would all mean the same
  thing when we say 'Paris'. But in fact, we each mean a collection of
  different things and none of our collections is the same. Therefore,
  in our own minds, the concept 'Paris' is a loose association of a
  whole bunch of different things, and hence the concept 'Paris' exists
  in no particular place in our minds, but rather, is scattered
  throughout our minds.
  - Back to the cognitivist idea of the teacher as mental copy machine handing a student a duplicate copy of knowledge--this is the opposite of that. It's more like if 20 artists sit down to draw the same scene; there will be similarities and overlaps, but nobody's picture will be the same. This is, perhaps, part of why connectivism makes more sense when applied to learning complex topics. You don't need connectivism to explain memorizing the state capitals or multiplication tables; the idea of the mental copy machine is probably a functional enough explanation. But if you're trying to learn a big, gnarly topic, a model that works for regurgitating facts isn't enough. - on 2009-10-06
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- As we
  examine the emergentist theory of mind we can arrive at five major
  implications of this approach for educational theorists:
  
  - first,
  knowledge is subsymbolic.
  Mere possession of the words does not mean that there is knowledge;
  the possession of knowledge does not necessarily result in the
  possession of the words (and for much more on this, see Michael
  Polanyi's discussion of 'tacit
  knowledge' in 'Personal
  Knowledge').
  
  - second,
  knowledge is distributed. There is no specific 'mental entity' that
  corresponds to the belief that 'Paris is the capital of France'. What
  we call that 'knowledge' is (an indistinguishable) pattern of
  connections between neurons. See, for example, Geoffrey Hinton,
  'Learning
  Distributed Representations of Concepts'.
  
  - third,
  knowledge is interconnected. The same neuron that is a part of 'Paris
  is the capital of France' might also be a part of 'My dog is named
  Fred'. It is important to note that this is a non-symbolic
  interconnection - this is the basis for non-rational associations,
  such as are described in the recent Guardian article, 'Where
  Belief is Born'
  
  - fourth,
  knowledge is personal. Your 'belief' that 'Paris is the capital of
  France' is quite literally different from my belief that 'Paris is
  the capital of France'. If you think about it, this must be the case
  - otherwise Gestalt
  tests would be useless; we would all utter the same word when
  shown the same picture.
  
  - fifth,
  what we call 'knowledge' (or 'belief', or 'memory') is an emergent
  phenomenon. Specifically, it is not 'in' the brain itself, or even
  'in' the connections themselves, because there is no 'canonical' set
  of connections that corresponds with 'Paris is the capital of
  France'. It is, rather (and carefully stated), a recognition of a
  pattern in a set of neural events (if we are introspecting) or
  behavioural events (if we are observing). We infer to mental contents
  the same way we watch Donald Duck on TV - we think we see something,
  but that something is not actually there - it's just an organization
  of pixels.
- If this is
  the case, then the concepts of what it is to know and what
  it is to teach are very different from the traditional theories
  that dominate distance education today. Because if learning is not
  the transfer of mental contents – if there is, indeed, no such
  mental content that exists to be transported – then we need to
  ask, what is it that we are attempting to do when we attempt to teach
  and learn.
  - I'm finding myself resisting some of these ideas, and I'm not quite sure why. Is it because it's so different from what I've been taught and assumed? Is it because I'm just too used to the folk psychology ideas and I need to unlearn them? I still feel like even cognitivism is a "good enough" explanation for some basic kinds of knowledge that do seem to operate as content transfer. Cognitivism isn't a perfect model, but a simple knowledge transfer model might be good enough for some areas. But maybe education has focused too much on the simple knowledge transfer because it's easy and we have an easy model to explan how it works--and education should be about a lot more than the kinds of learning that cognitivism explains well. The learning theories we believe must affect what we choose to teach, and not just how we choose to teach it. - on 2009-10-06
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- we can identify the essential elements of
  network semantics.
  
  First,
  context, that is, the localization of entities in a network.
  Each context is unique – entities see the network differently,
  experience the world differently. Context is required in order to
  interpret signals, that is, each signal means something different
  depending on the perspective of the entity receiving it.
  
  Second,
  salience, that is, the relevance or importance of a message.
  This amounts to the similarity between one pattern of connectivity
  and another. If a signal creates the activation of a set of
  connections that were previously activated, then this signal is
  salient. Meaning is created from context and messages via salience.
  
  Third,
  emergence, that is, the development of patterns in the
  network. Emergence is a process of resonance or synchronicity, not
  creation. We do not create emergent phenomena. Rather
  emergence phenomena are more like commonalities in patterns of
  perception. It requires an interpretation to be recognized; this
  happens when a pattern becomes salient to a perceiver.
  
  Fourth,
  memory is the persistence of patterns of connectivity, and in
  particular, those patterns of connectivity that result from, and
  result in, salient signals or perceptions.
  - Earlier in this section, Stephen says that the constructivist idea of "making meaning" is meaningless. But here he says "Meaning is created from context and messages via salience." What's the difference between "making meaning" and "creating meaning"? I don't get it. - on 2009-10-06
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- For
  example, in order to illustrate the observation that ‘knowledge
  is distributed’ I have frequently appealed to the story of the
  747. In a nutshell, I ask, “who knows how to make a 747 fly
  from London to Toronto?” The short answer is that nobody
  knows how to do this – no one person could design a 747,
  manufacture the parts (including tires and aircraft engines), take it
  off, fly it properly, tend to the passengers, navigate, and land it
  successfully. The knowledge is distributed across a network of
  people, and the phenomenon of ‘flying a 747’ can exist at
  all only because of the connections between the constituent members
  of that network.
  - This is an example of complicated knowledge, I think, and not complex, but the idea of complicated knowledge being distributed makes sense. - on 2009-10-06
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- “What
  happens,” I asked, “when online learning ceases to be
  like a medium, and becomes more like a platform? What happens when
  online learning software ceases to be a type of content-consumption
  tool, where learning is "delivered," and becomes more like
  a content-authoring tool, where learning is created?”
  
  The answer
  turns out to be a lot like Web 2.0: “The model of e-learning as
  being a type of content, produced by publishers, organized and
  structured into courses, and consumed by students, is turned on its
  head. Insofar as there is content, it is used rather than read—
  and is, in any case, more likely to be produced by students than
  courseware authors. And insofar as there is structure, it is more
  likely to resemble a language or a conversation rather than a book or
  a manual.”
  - Summary of e-learning 2.0, although so much of what is being developed is still about content consumption - on 2009-10-07
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- The idea
  behind the personal learning environment is that the management of
  learning migrates from the institution to the learner.
- Learning therefore evolves
  from being a transfer of content and knowledge to the production of
  content and knowledge.
  - I'm not sure if learning always has to be about the "production" of content by the learners; it could be about analyzing, summarizing, aggregating, tagging, etc. Am I really "producing content" with my comments on this article? I don't feel like I'm producing something new, but I definitely feel like this is e-learning 2.0. I'm building on Downes' work. But maybe my problem is with how I'm defining "content"; if "content" includes tagging and critiquing and commenting, then I am producing content now. - on 2009-10-07
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- In
  a distributed environment, however, the design is no longer defined
  as a type of process. Rather, designers need to characterize the
  nature of
  the connections between the constituent entities.
  - An interesting idea for instructional design. Usually a big part of what we do as instructional designer is think about the structure and order of learning objects. But if the learning objects are scattered in different places and nonsequential, then the support learners need isn't being told what order to follow: it's how the objects relate to each other. - on 2009-10-07
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- In
  effective networks, content and services are disaggregated.
  Units of content should be as small as possible and content should
  not be ‘bundled’. Instead, the organization and structure
  of content and services is created by the receiver.
  - The problem from everyone who has tried reusable learning objects is that it's so hard to get objects that are really independent and free of context. I think this is a very difficult thing to actually achieve. - on 2009-10-07
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- An
  effective network is desegregated. For example, in network
  learning, learning is not thought of as a Separate Domain. Hence,
  there is no need for learning-specific tools and processes. Learning
  is instead thought of as a part of living, of work, of play. The same
  tools we use to perform day-to-day activities are the tools we use to
  learn.
  - This is already happening to some extent. Blogs, wikis, and Twitter weren't designed as learning tools, but lots of people use them as such. A look at Jane Hart's top tools collection shows lots of tools used by learning professionals that weren't originally intended for learning. - on 2009-10-08
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- Knowledge
  is a network phenomenon. To 'know' something is to be organized in a
  certain way, to exhibit patterns of connectivity. To 'learn' is to
  acquire certain patterns.
  - If learning is about acquiring patterns, then the "to learn is to practice and reflect" would be ways of following and reinforcing those patterns. I suspect for this to really make sense that "pattern" has to be my individual pattern as a learner; my pattern isn't the same as Stephen's, even as I'm learning from him. But my pattern might be similar to Stephen's or overlap with his, or connect with his. - on 2009-10-08
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- Downes
  Educational Theory
  
  A good
  student learns by practice, practice and reflection.
  A good
  teacher teaches by demonstration and modeling.
  The essence of
  being a good teacher is to be the sort of person you want your
  students to become.
  The most important learning outcome is a
  good and happy life.
  - One thing I've been wrestling with a bit lately is the idea of teachers demonstrating and modeling. It seems like demonstrating and modeling are mostly the same thing. What's the difference between the two? And I do feel like "teacher" implies something a little more active than being a model off in the distance. What if we say that good teachers model and nurture instead? Nurturing doesn't imply direct instruction or even most of what we think of as teaching, but it does imply interacting with students in ways that supports them and helps bring out the best in them. - on 2009-10-08
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- In
  essence, on this theory, to learn is to immerse oneself in the
  network. It is to expose oneself to actual instances of the
  discipline being performed, where the practitioners of that
  discipline are (hopefully with some awareness) modeling good
  practice in that discipline. The student then, through a process of
  interaction with the practitioners, will begin to practice by
  replicating what has been modeled, with a process of reflection
  (the computer geeks would say: back
  propagation) providing guidance and correction.
  - This description is helpful, but I again don't see how demonstrating is different from modeling. - on 2009-10-08
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- These
  environments cut across disciplines. Students will not study algebra
  beginning with the first principles and progressing through the
  functions. They will learn the principles of algebra as
  needed, progressing more deeply into the subject as the need for
  new knowledge is provoked by the demands of the simulation. Learning
  opportunities - either in the form of interaction with others, in the
  form of online learning resources (formerly known as learning
  objects), or in the form of interaction with mentors or instructors -
  will be embedded in the learning environment, sometimes presenting
  themselves spontaneously, sometimes presenting themselves on request.
  - This reinforces what Stephen said earlier about tools not being specific to learning; learning tools should be the tools we live and work and play with, integrated in our daily lives. - on 2009-10-08
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- This
  does not mean that a 'science' of learning is impossible. Rather, it
  means that the science will be more like meteorology than like
  (classical) physics. It will be a science based on modeling and
  simulation, pattern recognition and interpretation, projection and
  uncertainty.
  - This is in the postscript about the futility of traditional empirical research on learning. Maybe this is where I run into problems reconciling the cognitivist research I've read (which is all traditional "change one variable" research) with connectivism. This would also explain why some of the cognitivist research that works OK in a lab environment fails in real classrooms; a lab environment doesn't actually reflect the chaos of a classroom well enough. I've heard Stephen make this argument on a number of occasions, but I've always assumed that it meant any educational research would be worthless. That isn't what he's saying though; he's saying that educational research is a different type of research. Now it's finally making sense to me; of course educational research should be more like psychology, where we have trends and patterns but few absolutes. - on 2009-10-08
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06 Oct 09

CCK09: What about teaching?

Stephen Downes on connectivism and teaching, arguing that this theory isn't really about classroom teaching.

ltc.umanitoba.ca/...discuss.php - Preview

CCK09 connectivism teaching education learning

This theory is, first and foremost, a theory about learning. This is why I tweeted a few weeks ago that people - including teachers - should be viewing Connectivism as a theory describing how to learn, not how to teach. And what it says about learning, essentially, is that you should immerse yourselve in the relevant environment, observe and practice the common actions in that environment, and reflect on that practice.
So - insofar as there is a pedagogy attached to Connectivism, I content that it involves more and more removing students from a structured and managed classroom environment, and more and more providing means for them to be immersed in communities of practitioners, and for this to happen at a younger and younger age, and in addition, to more and more create in practitioners the expectation and responsibility of working openly and including new and inexperienced members into their communities.
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- So to me, an answer to the question "What impact does networked learning have on *in class* activity?" should be, "it eliminates it".
  
  Now I realize that this is not helpful to teachers looking for tips and tricks for in-class activities. Such teachers, I contend, shpuld be looking for eays of moving their students out of their classrooms and into authentic learning environments, while at the same time fostering the communicative and reasoning skills (which has often been neglected) that will enable them to begin participating in such environments.

30 Sep 09

Social-Network-Basics.pdf (application/pdf Object)

A one-page explanation of social networks, defining actors, relations, and ties

www.networkedlearningconference.org.uk/...Social-Network-Basics.pdf - Preview

CCK09 socialnetworking networks

29 Sep 09

Plain_Gillian - Reflections on Learning: How Connectivism and Constructivism Differ

More ideas on how connectivism & constructivism differ, looking at the role of personal perception in constructivism versus the role of the network in providing dynamic feedback in connectivism

plaingillian.blogspot.com/...tivism-and-constructivism.html - Preview

connectivism constructivism CCK09