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PrawfsBlawg: More Problems With Hypothesis Testing (From a More Technical Perspective)
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The confidence level is set in advance. The resulting p-value is a random variable. To adjust the level in response to the p-value is an improper ex post move. So if the pre-set level of significance is 95% and the resulting p-value is 0.0001, the proper response is to say "The results are significant at the 95% level (p = 0.0001)." To readjust the claim to "The results are significant at the 99% level (since) p = 0.0001" is simply incorrect.
Thus: there should only be one star per table, at whatever level the analyst sets in advance.
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And so it is disappointing that rarely if ever do we see a paper wrestle with the proper level of significance, such as by asking whether this is a case where a false negative is better or worse than a false positive. After all, it is not always clear that we are best served by the conservatism of the 95% confidence interval. A false positive may be worse than a false negative in criminal law ("better 10 guilty men go free..."), but a false negative may be worse in some medical situations, such as whether a particular pill works.
Greg Mankiw Gets Technical, Arnold Kling | EconLog | Library of Economics and Liberty
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Under the unit-root hypothesis, which I thought was well established, I see the attempt to do macroeconometrics as basically hopeless. The way I see it, with a unit root, every change is a structural change. As a result, there is no way to use macroeconomic data from different decades as if they allowed you to conduct a controlled experiment.
Causal Analysis in Theory and Practice » Where is economic modelling today?
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udging by his assertion that surgery may violate parameter stability, it seems that Heckman conflates the DEFINITION of causal effect with the practical means available for TESTING it. Whereas the latter can be crude or inadequate, the former is always pure and incisive.
This conflation is reflected again on page 43, where Heckman states: "If for a given model, the parameters of (16a) or (16b) shift when external variables are manipulated, or if external variables cannot be independently manipulated, causal effects of one internal variable on another cannot be defined within that model (italic in the original)." The first part of the sentence speaks about physical manipulation, while the second speaks about a mathematical definition. The sentence as a whole, implies that the causal effect of Y2 on Y1 depends on the technology available to the experimenter — hardly a dependency we would expect from a "definition".
On page 44, Heckman argues again that the definition of causal effects must depend on the physical manipulations available to the experimenter. He describes a situation in which the behavior of agent 2 changes, depending on whether U1 is randomized or chosen naturally . He then says: "At issue is whether such a randomization would recover c12. It [randomizing U1] might fundamentally alter agent 1's response to Y2 if that person is randomly assigned as opposed to being selected by the agent. Judging the suitability of an invariance assumption entails a thought experiment — a purely mental act." Again, Heckman confuses the causal effect c12 as encoded in (16), with some perturbed causal effect c'12 that prevails when certain interventions are implemented to measure c12. Obviously, if an experimental intervention modifies c12 or has other side-effects, the modification must be encoded in the model and assessed whether the original c12 can be recovered from data obtained under such imperfect manipulation. But this does not change the fact that the original c12 (prior to intervention) is the parameter of interest and, more importantly, that c12 can be defined within the original unperturbed model Eqs (16a) and (16b) by a mental act of shutting down eq. (16b), fixing every variable on the rhs to a constant, Y1=y1, X1=x1, X2=x2, and computing mathematically the partial derivative (with respect to y1) of the expected value of Y<!-- ∂ --> und
Social Science Statistics Blog: Is There a Statistics/Economics Divide?
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economists tend to focus more on parameter estimation, asymptotics, unbiasedness, and paper-and-pencil solutions to problems (which can then be implemented via canned software like STATA), whereas applied statisticians are leaning more towards imputation and predictive inference, Bayesian thinking, and computational solutions to problems (which require programming in packages such as R)
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Econometrics/Economics focus on unbiased estimation because the objective of research is recovering structural parameters describing economic behavior.
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