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04 Oct 08

The nonlinear future

Though the thinking here seems sloppy, and though there are a number of inaccuracies, it is yet another example of bringing concepts from nonlinear science together with ideas about networks. And from a Lockheed Martin big whig no less!

www.armedforcesjournal.com/...3434676 - Preview

ncw nonlinear_science

The network metaphor dominates current thinking about national security. Network centricity carried to its logical conclusion, however, portends an environment that becomes increasingly biological over time. Biological environments lend themselves to nonlinear effects and outcomes. The path toward biological transformation in defense may express itself in a number of ways. It may impact the nature of system development, the operational concepts that leverage these systems and the business models that will be used by industry and government to field these new capabilities.
- I've read more of this kind of stuff that I can even mention. But this is one of the more incoherent pieces I've seen, substituting buzzwords and catch phrases for real thought more often than most other, similar pieces. The "environment" will become "increasingly biological over time"? What does that even mean? The "environment" is not "biological" now? And biological systems are more prone to nonlinearity than nonbiological ones, huh? But doesn't that undercut the dominant argument that nonlinearity is a universal phenonmemon? Or, is there circular reasoning at work here? If it's biological, then it will have nonlinearity; and, it's biological because it has nonlinearity? - on 2008-10-04
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The exponential growth patterns of foundational technologies (processing power, bandwidth and storage) and the interconnectivity of nodes availing themselves of this growth is what drives emergent effects.
- Certainly, these are important phenomena with profound impacts. But exponential growth is not an example of mathematical nonlinearity. Just because the plot on a graph is a curve and not a straight line, that doesn't make it a nonlinear equation. - on 2008-10-04
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- The geometrically expansive profile of processors, bandwidth and storage are the explosive ingredients resident in or available to every node in the network, be it a weapon, platform, sensor, software code module or human being. More importantly, the nodes themselves are also exponentially multiplying in number and in connectivity with each other. Taken together, the combinatorial inflation of these different dimensions of growth creates the makings of a biological transformation that will impact the defense industry in ways not fully understood or appreciated.
  - Again, very important phenomena, but not nonlinearity. And yet again, "biological transformation" is not explained. - on 2008-10-04
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21 Jun 08

Final Skynet satellite launched

In case you missed it. I would make a snarky comment about Sarah Connor, T-1000s, or Cyberdyne, but others have beaten me to the punch, in particular

http://www.geekologie.com/2008/06/post_28.php
and
http://1337g33k.wordpress.com/2008/06/13/sarah-connor-has-failed-the-british-just-built-skynet/

news.bbc.co.uk/...7451867.stm - Preview

information sharing infowar ncw

An advanced satellite that will improve greatly the ability of UK military forces to communicate around the globe has been launched into space.

19 Mar 08

The Man Between War and Peace

www.esquire.com/...fox-fallon - Preview

iran ncw

He is that rarest of creatures in the Bush universe: the good cop on Iran, and a man of strategic brilliance.
President George W. Bush, regularly trash-talks his way to World War III and his administration casually casts Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as this century's Hitler (a crown it has awarded once before, to deadly effect)
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- Those are fighting words to your average neocon -- not to mention your average supporter of Israel, a good many of whom in Washington seem never to have served a minute in uniform.
- If that were to happen, it may well mean that the president and vice-president intend to take military action against Iran before the end of this year and don't want a commander standing in their way.
- And so Fallon, the good cop, may soon be unemployed because he's doing what a generation of young officers in the U.S. military are now openly complaining that their leaders didn't do on their behalf in the run-up to the war in Iraq: He's standing up to the commander in chief, whom he thinks is contemplating a strategically unsound war.
- He is as patient as the White House is impatient
- the eager-to-please General David Petraeus in Iraq.
- Fallon was quietly opposed to a long-term surge in Iraq, because more of our military assets tied down in Iraq makes it harder to come up with a comprehensive strategy for the Middle East, and he knew how that looked to higher-ups.
- And it is a testament to his skill, and to the failure of American diplomacy, that so much is left for this military man to do himself.
- His calculus on this subject is far more complex than anyone else's. He is neither an idealist nor a fantasist.
- Last fall, it was reported in the press that Fallon had called General Petraeus an "ass-kissing little chickenshit" for being so willing to serve as the administration's political frontman on the Iraq surge.
- "Absolute bullshit," Fallon tells me.
- "I try to be reasonably predictable to my own people and very unpredictable to potential adversaries," he tells me.
  
  No wonder Fallon sticks out like a sore thumb with the neocons, who have the unfortunate tendency to come off as unpredictable to their allies and predictable to their enemies. Which is the opposite of strategy.
- If it seemed as though Fallon was downplaying the threat of North Korea's missiles, it was because he preferred pushing a regional response that signaled a united front but still left the door open for North Korea to come in from the cold.
- If anything has been sorely missing to date in America's choices in the Middle East and Central Asia, it has been a strategic mind-set that consistently keeps its eyes on the real prize: connecting these isolated regions in a far more broadband fashion to the global economy. Instead of effectively countering the efforts of others (e.g., the radical Salafis, Saudi Arabia's Wahhabists, Russia's security services, China's energy sector) who would fashion such connectivity to their selfish ends, Washington has wasted precious time focusing excessively on transforming the political systems of Iraq and Afghanistan, as though governments somehow birth functioning societies and economies instead of the other way around.
  
  Waiting on perfect security or perfect politics to forge economic relationships is a fool's errand. By the time those fantastic conditions are met in this dangerous, unstable part of the world, somebody less idealistic will be running the place -- the Russians, Chinese, Pakistanis, Indians, Turks, Iranians, Saudis.
- Freeing the United States from being tied down in Iraq means a stronger effort in Afghanistan, more focus on Pakistan, and more time spent creating networks of relationships in Central Asia.
- Just the kind of incident that doughy neocons dream sweetly about.

30 Jan 08

French General Challenges Military Transformation

www.defensenews.com/story.php - Preview

ncw transformation

A new book by a serving French Army general argues that military transformation is largely irrelevant to future conflicts, which are likely to be waged against irregular fighters in cities, and in which adaptability, not planning, will deliver the political prize of stability.
- Wait, how is the identification and adoption of ideas, technologies, and organizational structures meant to allow information sharing and adaptation (a.k.a. transformation) irrelevant to fighting irregulars in cities or to adaptation? - on 2008-01-30
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“There has been a disconnect between the military effect and political effect,” said Desportes
- Right. Which is why NCW theorists are always talking about "effects-based operations." - on 2008-01-30
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- He argues that the U.S. focus on weapon technology and operating tempo have led to confusion over means and ends.
  - While I agree that the focus on "tempo" or "speed" for its own sake can and has sometimes led to what I call the "back-flipping chihuahua syndrome," the idea that acting quicker relative to the adversary is still essential. Next, NCW cannot be said to have been focused on WEAPON technology as much as on INFORMATION and/or NETWORK technology, which is not necessarily the same. Which explains some of the criticism: it's harder to visualize and sell a network to soldiers or Congressmen than it is to visualize and sell a tank or an airplane. - on 2008-01-30
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- Moreover, the Army has warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff risks losing “operational coherence” if spending continues weak. The concern is that money is to be diverted into big platform programs.
  - Well, if the French effort at transformation is leading to "money being diverted into big platform programs" then this is further evidence that they didn't get it. NCW and transformation advocates argued AGAINST being "platform-centric" in procurement. - on 2008-01-30
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- He argues that sending small expeditionary forces that sought lightning victories delivered instead the continued crisis in Afghanistan and the calamitous aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
  - And what would heavy, non-expediationary forces that were unable to reach Afghanistan or Iraq in a timely manner have delivered? - on 2008-01-30
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- The Lebanon war showed the Israeli high-tech approach to be inadequate against an agile and inventive Hizbollah, which refused to engage in ways that would have given the advantage to the Israeli Army, expert in network-centric warfare.
  - The problem was not the technology but the strategy. The assumption here, which underlies so much military thought (including, unfortunately, much of NCW), is that the technology determines the tactics and strategy. Technological determinism in NCW is a little more forgiveable because it assumes that flexible or adaptive technologies lead to flexible or adaptive forces. At least there is the willingness to admit that technologies can be flexible, an assumption that is typically missing in these kind of critiques, as it is here. However, it is still deterministic. It is possible for a force to use flexible technologies in rigid and unimaginative ways. Might it be that this was Israel's problem? - on 2008-01-30
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- Desportes says an excessive reliance on transformation, which puts a premium on destructive technology over manpower, is the equivalent of the Maginot line, the static defense that failed to protect France from German invasion in 1940.
  - Oh. Good. Lord. This argument again?!?!? This was a favorite of the military reform crowd in the U.S. in the late 1970s: The U.S./NATO strategy of forward defense which relied on firepower and attrition is a "Maginot mentality." First, "transformation" is not a tactic or a strategy. Transformation is a set of policies meant to implement a set of tactics and a strategy known as network-centric warfare. And NCW does not focus on destruction; nor does it advocate being static. Rather, it focuses on information to promote greater situational awareness so that forces can use destructive force more judiciously and precisely, and so that forces can disperse and move. NCW is about information and movement, not destruction and stasis. - on 2008-01-30
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- But in Desportes’ view, future wars will be against an enemy that seeks to outflank the Western technical and industrial armory. That undercuts the effectiveness of the transformation effort
  - Just because they will seek to "outflank" our technical capability does not mean that we should abandon technology. Let me see...we can prevent them from outflanking our technology by not developing our technology? Does that make sense? of course not. Any worthy adversary, potential or actual, will try to "outflank" our technology. The appropriate response is not a static, "Maginot mentality" where tech is concerned, but rather, to just keep moving....hopefully forward. - on 2008-01-30
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- Transformation has been ineffective against nonstate entities like the Taliban, now fighting from caves, insurgents triggering roadside bombs in Iraq and suicide bombers. In Afghanistan, small groups of combatants avoid attacking in open ground.
  - Transformation is NOT strategy or tactics!!! It makes no sense to say that "Transformation has not been effective against nonstate entities." Transformation is about implementing NCW. It could make sense to say that NCW has been ineffective against nonstate actors, but not transformation. Next, NCW has had a great deal of success, especially initially in Afghanistan. The appropriate question is, "Would armor-heavy, Cold-War era forces have fared better against nonstate actors?" No. NCW compared to some sort of ideal or perfect force completely optimized for irregular warfare might not stack up. But we don't have that force. We have what we have, and we had what we had. And what we have is probably more appropriate for what we're doing than what we had would have been! Yep. It's confusing. But sometimes life is confusing. But if we engage our brains we can figure it out. - on 2008-01-30
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- Thus, while precision-strike weapons are necessary, they are insufficient to winning the war
  - Yep. And no one would argue against that. But admitting that they are NECESSARY is not a logical basis for argue that we should ignore them! Too many times the argument that I find in military discourse is that if something is not sufficient but merely necessary, then it is unnecessary. Necessary = unnecessary. Yeah. Illogical. I know. News flash: No one thing will ever be sufficient!! It's all only necessary. That means that you have to think about more than one thing at a time and make tough decisions and trade-offs. - on 2008-01-30
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- Technology is useful, but troops must be able to fight without sophisticated networks, because such systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks.
  - So then, I guess the best way to ensure that they know how to fight without a network is to not give them a network in the first place? That's like saying that because my car might break down I should just forget about the car and ride a bike. Of course, my bike could break too. So, I guess the best thing to do would be to just walk. Because bad things might happen in life, we should just not try really. Yeah. That sounds like a great plan. Agreed: soldiers need to know how to fight minus their network...or their tanks....or their guns...or... X. But that does not mean we should not give them a network.....or tanks....or guns....or... X in the first place! - on 2008-01-30
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- a network-centric Army is one that is geared to destruction, and therefore counterproductive in the strategic sense
  - It CAN but must not NECESSARILY be geared towards destruction. How are information sharing and greater situational awareness NECESSARILY all about destruction? They are not. They can benefit any kind of force, destruction oriented or not. - on 2008-01-30
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- Rather than putting faith in planning, troops need to be adaptable, taking hits and responding quickly to new situations, he said.
  - No kidding? Really? Adaptation and acting quickly is important? HAVE YOU READ ANY OF THE NCW LITERATURE?!?!!? That's what it's all about!! BUT...didn't you just tell us at the beginning that we have focused too much on acting quickly?? So which is it? Act quickly or not? And how will soldiers be adaptable and quick if they don't have the capability to share information and situational awareness? - on 2008-01-30
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- The government needs to be able to buy in small batches and off the shelf, rather than be locked into long production runs.
  - Again....DO YOUR HOMEWORK!! This is exactly what transformation advocates have called for! - on 2008-01-30
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- Because French troops have not been in front-line combat operations, they have not been able to buy new armored vehicles as the Germans and British have, he said.
- The Army needs helicopters
- Army numbers are an issue
- There are calls for UAVs and satellites, but the question, he said, is, “Have we got enough soldiers?” It would be a big mistake to cut Army numbers.
  - Ah...so there's the rub, right at the end of the article. He's platform- and numbers-centric. He wants more money for tanks, helicopters, and soldiers, not networks to connect them all together. First, the two do not have to be mutually exclusive. Second, will the French actually spend the money for more tanks, helicopters, and soldiers? If not, then forgoing networking what you do have in favor of supporting what you don't and won't have does not make any sense. Networking is not meant to replace platforms and people. Rather, it is meant to make the platforms and people we do have (new or old) more capable by connecting them and allowing them to share. - on 2008-01-30
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DOD considers prohibiting personal use of networks

www.fcw.com/...151440-1.html - Preview

ncw

The Defense Department is considering a policy that would banish all traffic not proven to be purely official DOD business from its networks, said Lt. Gen. Charles Croom, director of the Defense Information Systems Agency, last week at the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement’s Network Centric Warfare 2008 conference in Washington.
In practical terms, the rules are intended to eliminate traffic that’s entering DOD networks as employees surf Web sites that aren’t expressly banned or blocked but that would be difficult to justify as necessary purely for official business, Croom said. DOD hasn’t yet calculated what percentage of the traffic on its networks now violates the rules, he said. Unofficial early estimates, however, are that 70 percent of the traffic on DOD networks today is unofficial and would be banned, said sources close to the department.

05 Nov 07

Defense Secretary Robert Gates told students at an elite Russian military academy Saturday that much of the inspiration for the U.S. military's modernization in the 1980s came from Moscow.
He said the seeds of U.S. combat successes in the 1991 Gulf war were sown a decade earlier with an infusion of new ideas on using modern technologies to fundamentally change the nature of warfighting.
"What is less well known _especially in America — is that much of the original thinking on these matters was done by the Soviet military as far back as the 1970s when officers wrote about what was then called a `military technical revolution,'" he said.
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- In his prepared remarks, Gates cited the Soviet military's work in the 1970s on how to use sensors, reconnaissance and command-and-control systems to gain a battlefield edge. In the next decade, he said, top Soviet generals envisioned a scenario in which conventional weapons could be as effective as nuclear weapons — "owing to the gains made in precision, information technology and communications."
  That became the standard for U.S. military innovation, which first bore fruit in the successful campaign to oust the Iraqi army from Kuwait after it invaded in August 1990 and triggered a U.S.-led invasion.

New Open Source Project Supports Contextual Collaboration

limnthis.typepad.com/...new-open-source.html - Preview

ncw technology web2.0

01 Oct 07

Cebrowski praises changes to Army's Future Combat Systems plans

www.gcn.com/...26832-1.html - Preview

cebrowski ncw transformation

Cebrowski said the Defense Department will increasingly equip smaller forces with radios and a mix of lethal and nonlethal, active and passive weapons, based on techniques learned from public safety and police departments.
The Stryker Brigade program is "doing very well," he said—not so much because of the vehicles as because of the networked structure. "The soldiers offload their packs and arrive more ready to fight, physically and mentally," he said.
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- Because intelligence is being collected faster and in huge quantities, he said, "We need to automate the triage and automate the analysis. We'll all become analysts" and remedy the intelligence shortfall found by the 9/11 Commission.

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