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A small group of strategic thinkers are flexing their intellectual muscle, and a new opponent model is taking shape against which America’s ground forces will be configured to fight (with the Marines way ahead of the Army). Called “hybrid” enemies, they come equipped with high-end, precision guided weapons, yet fight in distributed networks of small units and cells more akin to guerrillas. One of the leading scholars in this group, Frank Hoffman, who advises the Marines and is a researcher at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, says hybrid wars, “blend the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare.” Theory moved to reality when Hezbollah, equipped with loads of advanced missiles and skillfully using urban terrain, fought the Israeli army to a stand still in 2006. Hezbollah, Hoffman says, “is representative of the rising hybrid threat.”

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has given his imprimatur to the hybrid opponent as the new OpFor, first in his recent Foreign Affairs piece, and then again in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee. In his Senate hearing, speaking about the Army’s FCS program, Gates said that unless new weapons and vehicles can be shown to be effective in complex hybrid wars, they shouldn’t be funded. I’ve also heard that some services, I’m thinking of the Marines here, were loathe to buy into the irregular warfare mission as they couldn’t justify their more expensive new systems to fight counterinsurgencies, but they have a better chance at getting what they want if they play up the hybrid threat.

Defense officials are conducting no fewer than three separate strategy assessments to help Mr. Obama decide on a new approach
to confront the radical Islamic forces sowing unrest in the region. One report will come from Gen. David Petraeus, who came
to represent the voice of the Bush administration on Iraq and who now oversees the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Another
due in coming days is from Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, the "war czar" at the National Security Council.

But the one that may count the most, say sources in and outside the Pentagon, is the assessment by Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For months, the chairman has said the US must do more to reverse deteriorating security in Afghanistan
– a view Obama is known to share.

In the spring of 2005, a tactical problem met a technical solution. While working as a program manager in the Information Processing Technology Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Mari Maeda began speaking with soldiers returning from Iraq and discovered an operational need: Soldiers at the battalion level and below needed additional information technology to better conduct counterinsurgency operations.

Every day, soldiers were learning about their operating environment and their enemy. The knowledge they gained while on patrol or conducting a mission could mean the difference between life and death, mission success or failure. However, they had only limited information technology assets available and none properly suited to the challenges of counterinsurgency, where information must not only be passed between echelons, it must be shared laterally between small units and stored for replacement units.

Troops in theater had been creative in their approaches to the challenge. Some units developed databases employing Microsoft Access, some used massive spreadsheets linked to relevant files, others simply did things the old fashioned way — with filing cabinets full of paper reports. One of the more creative and well-resourced approaches was the development of CavNet by the 1st Cavalry Division. Developed entirely in house by 1st Cavalry, CavNet was essentially a collection of blogs and forums that allowed junior leaders down to the squad level to share information with one another across the entire division. It was so successful that various forms are still in use.

MAP-CENTRIC SOFTWARE

TIGR is map-centric software developed to aid information-sharing at the battalion and below, with emphasis on the squad and platoon levels. Along with Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below (FBCB2), it is one of very few pieces of information technology created for small units.

Though FusionNet was developed and fielded with astonishing rapidity by military standards, it had not yet been officially certified for use on Army networks by the Army G-6 (information management). The corps commander made the decision to operate FusionNet “at risk” and thereby bypassed the G-6 certification process. Primarily because of this, the system became unique to XVIII Airborne Corps and has been phased out in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Following the departure of the corps, the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) came into prominence. Developed by Intelligent Software Solutions in conjunction with III Corps and championed by Central Command, CIDNE is a Web-based system with similar attributes to FusionNet, but with enhancements such as a leader engagement tool. Like FusionNet and TIGR, CIDNE incorporated commercial off-the-shelf technologies in a novel way. With four major releases since fall 2006, CIDNE has become standard for enemy activity reporting in Iraq, though it has not been adopted Army-wide. Like FusionNet, CIDNE has a suite of tools generally used at brigade and above. Discussions are underway for linking CIDNE and TIGR to address the needs of higher-echelon staff users that CIDNE serves and the patrol leaders that are served by TIGR.

MarineLink was conceived about the same time as TIGR and CIDNE. MarineLink is similar to the other programs in that it is a web-based system developed by a small team of software engineers working directly with troops in the field to fill an operational need. What really set MarineLink apart was the rapidity with which it was adopted across the Marine Corps and became ubiquitous among Marine units. In contrast, FusionNet essentially ceased to exist outside of the XVIII Airborne Corps, while CIDNE and TIGR are generally restricted to Iraq.

What made the difference was the fielding system the Marine Corps had in place for networked software. While the requirements are the same as those for the Army — with regard to bandwidth, information security and other requirements — the Marine Corps has put emphasis on expediting review and approval for new systems that meet operational needs in the field. The result is Marines have the information technology they need down to the lowest level and have in place the infrastructure to support the program worldwide.

FusionNet, TIGR and CIDNE were able to reach theater rapidly because theater commanders approved “at risk” operation. They are still bogged down with further certification.

Though the Army has made an effort to streamline its acquisitions process and had some successes, the process for information technology remains slow. It is important to protect networks, to ensure unity of effort and to ensure IT platforms can communicate with one another. However, the process could be made to operate more efficiently. With MarineLink, the Marine Corps demonstrated an ability to do in months what takes the Army years.

TECH-SAVVY ENEMIES

A great deal has been made of the “revolution in military affairs” that accompanied the incorporation of information technology into U.S. military forces. We must keep in mind a similar revolution has occurred among the nonstate enemies the U.S. is confronting in Iraq, Afghanistan and the wider war on terrorism. Our enemies have access to wireless communications, satellite communications, the Internet, computers and many of the same software tools used within the military. They have relatively flat hierarchies, so information can flow quickly from one group to the next. Attacks can be planned and coordinated via e-mail, executed with the assistance of cell phones and reported for propaganda value on a Web site.

The information technology employed by insurgents and terrorists is easy to use, inexpensive and readily available via commercial channels. Because these are relatively small organizations, they are able to upgrade capabilities rapidly.

However, Russia's invasion of Georgia in support of the breakaway region of South Ossetia may have strengthened the position
of those advocating a renewed emphasis on preparing to fight future conventional wars. The case for extending the procurement
of the F-22 has seemingly been strengthened by events in the Caucasus, even if conflict in Georgia may not establish a firm
requirement for additional Raptors.

The US Air Force (USAF) has seen a huge increase in the number of bombing missions it has carried out over Iraq since the
United States' troop 'surge' began. The service's role is poised to expand even as ground forces withdraw, according to current
and former defence officials.

Former Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne said that the USAF's breakthroughs in targeting technology and tactics have
led to a 400 per cent increase in the amount of ordnance being dropped by the service's aircraft in Iraq since the surge was
launched in February 2007.

One key technology breakthrough in close air support has been the USAF-developed ROVER (Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver),
a laptop that can exchange live video imagery with pilots in the cockpit.

The system can be linked to targeting pods on fighter aircraft so that everyone in the targeting loop can see the same things
at the same time.

Doctrine is collaborative and basically an effort in consensus-building within an institution for practices that some members are already using (or rejecting). Academic writing for peer review is about delivering information to a guild-like community through prescribed forms and standards, mostly by individuals or very small groups. Not the same thing.

Military doctrinal writing that tries really be peer review will not be of much use to 18 year old recruits. Or their commanding officers. Or often, the civilian policy makers. The COIN manual paid attention to the substance of Anthropology, a novelty in itself, but not to Anthropology's weird, little, professional fetishes prized by bearded dudes who have cubicle offices on campus.