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This time is different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crisis
This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of
Financial Crises*
Carmen M. Reinhart, University of Maryland and NBER
Kenneth S. Rogoff, Harvard University and NBER
confronting-high-risk-and-banks: Personal Finance News from Yahoo! Finance
"She said she would like to see one accounting change that FASB is talking about, which would make it easier for banks to take reserves against loans in good times. "With better reserving methodology," she said, capital and reserves would have been higher before the current crisis erupted, and banks safer.
The financial crisis showed that regulators should have required banks to hold much more capital than they did. Some regulators figured that out.
In Spain, some smaller banks are in trouble from real estate loans, but the big banks seem to have emerged in good shape. One reason is that Spanish regulators were not fooled by things like SIVs, and insisted that if any bank wanted to create one, it could, but would have to hold reserves anyway. Since there was no business reason -- other than capital arbitrage -- for a SIV, those banks shied away. Good regulation is not easy. A new paper by Amir E. Khandani and Andrew W. Lo of M.I.T., and Robert C. Merton of Harvard, estimates that repeated "cash-out" refinancings of mortgages led to more than $1 trillion in additional losses in this crisis."
The Limits of Business Intelligence: An Organizational Learning Approach
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By the time a user of the BI suite accesses information in the DW, he/she is already two levels removed from the actual phenomena that are being viewed through the lens of the BI suite. Depending on the preconceptions of the BI user, there may be additional levels of distance from real-world phenomena. These preconceptions have been termed mental models by Peter Senge in his management classic, The Fifth Discipline, and termed occupational cultures by Edgar Schein in his work on organizations. (2,3) They are the cognitive lenses through which users individually and collectively view and manipulate information. For example, if managers hold a view of the business as separate products and/or organizational "silos," they may not be receptive to information from the BI suite that shows that customers experience the business as a single entity and expect a consistent experience across all contact channels. In short, a BI system is an abstraction of the reality it is designed to analyze, and the preconceptions of its users can further cloud this abstraction if they are not aware of them.
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In addition to its distance from the actual business reality that the DW attempts to model, there is the consideration of its ability to capture the complexity of real-world phenomena. A real-world business involves many elements and relationships, interacting dynamically. The philosophical idea behind this is that there may be one real world "out there," but there are many possible descriptions of it some of them useful and others not so useful. This distinction is relevant because both organizations and individuals interact with the real world on the basis of their internalized descriptions of it.
The Bank Channel
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- What do customers do in their daily lives
- What will they do in the future?
- How can Intel help customers in their current and future daily lives?
Dr. Genevieve Bell is an anthropologist who’s worked at Intel for over 10 years. Genevieve runs a team of social scientists, human factor engineers and interaction designers at Intel. Her team works to answer three very important questions that drive Intel’s future product development: - What do customers do in their daily lives
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Why does Intel go to all this trouble? Why not just ask people questions in surveys and focus groups, the way Banks do? Well, it turns out that there’s often a big difference between what people say they do, and what they really do. Sometimes it’s accidental (they forget, or don’t think something’s important enough to mention), other times it’s on purpose (they’ll tell us what they think they’re expected to say, or deliberately hold information back for privacy, status or other reasons).
Soros Launches Effort to Battle Free-Market Zeal | Newsweek Voices - Michael Hirsh | Newsweek.com
"Even Alan Greenspan appears to be engaged in a fierce argument ... with his own younger self. "U.S. regulators should consider breaking up large financial institutions considered 'too big to fail,' " he said earlier this month. But for most of his life, Greenspan was an Ayn Rand libertarian who abhorred the idea that government should break up anything; he once wrote that "the entire structure of antitrust statutes in this country is a jumble of economic irrationality and ignorance." Bigger was better, he said, and that way of thinking largely governed his stewardship of the Fed from 1987 to 2005. "The control by Standard Oil, at the turn of the century, of more than eighty percent of refining capacity made economic sense and accelerated the growth of the American economy," Greenspan wrote in Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal in 1961. But Greenspan now has this to say about banks: "If they're too big to fail, they're too big. In 1911, we broke up Standard Oil—so what happened? The individual parts became more valuable than the whole. Maybe that's what we need to do.""
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Even Alan Greenspan appears to be engaged in a fierce argument ... with his own younger self. "U.S. regulators should consider breaking up large financial institutions considered 'too big to fail,' " he said earlier this month. But for most of his life, Greenspan was an Ayn Rand libertarian who abhorred the idea that government should break up anything; he once wrote that "the entire structure of antitrust statutes in this country is a jumble of economic irrationality and ignorance." Bigger was better, he said, and that way of thinking largely governed his stewardship of the Fed from 1987 to 2005. "The control by Standard Oil, at the turn of the century, of more than eighty percent of refining capacity made economic sense and accelerated the growth of the American economy," Greenspan wrote in Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal in 1961. But Greenspan now has this to say about banks: "If they're too big to fail, they're too big. In 1911, we broke up Standard Oil—so what happened? The individual parts became more valuable than the whole. Maybe that's what we need to do."
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