Sangeetha Krishnakumar's Profile

O'CONNOR

The issue before us is whether plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit. We hold that they do not.

some of the tax-exempt racially segregated private schools created or expanded in desegregating districts in fact have racially discriminatory policies.

some of the tax-exempt racially segregated private schools created or expanded in desegregating districts in fact have racially discriminatory policies

harms them in two ways

support for racially segregated educational institutions

encourages

institutions providing racially segregated educational opportunities

The District Court thereupon considered and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint,

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed

Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual "cases" and "controversies."

case-or-controversy doctrines state fundamental limits on federal judicial power in our system of government

The Art. III doctrine that requires a litigant to have "standing" to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of these doctrines. "In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues."

A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.

not susceptible of precise definition.

Like most legal notions, the standing concepts have gained considerable definition from developing case law.

standing question can be answered chiefly by comparing the allegations of the particular complaint to those made in prior standing cases.

the idea of separation of powers.

We conclude that neither suffices to support respondents' standing. The first fails under clear precedents of this Court because it does not constitute judicially cognizable injury. The second fails because the alleged injury is not fairly traceable to the assertedly unlawful conduct of the IRS.19

stigmatic injury

right to have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court.

stigmatizing injury

accords a basis for standing only to "those persons who are personally denied equal treatment" by the challenged discriminatory conduct,

If the abstract stigmatic injury were cognizable, standing would extend nationwide to all members of the particular racial groups against which the Government was alleged to be discriminating by its grant of a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory school, regardless of the location of that school.

second claim of injury

children's diminished ability to receive an education in a racially integrated school

whether Congress has constitutional authority to thus supersede Miranda.

The Miranda opinion itself begins by stating that the Court granted certiorari "to explore some facets of the problems of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." 384 U.S., at 441-442 (emphasis added). In fact, the majority opinion is replete with statements indicating that the majority thought it was announcing a constitutional rule.4 Indeed, the Court's ultimate conclusion was that the unwarned confessions obtained in the four cases before the Court in Miranda "were obtained from the defendant under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege."5 Id., at 491.

the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.

the warnings have become part of our national culture

constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively

Reversed.

That holding was that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids States to use their governmental powers to bar children on racial grounds from attending schools where there is state participation through any arrangement, management, funds or property.

It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States 'any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.'

Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, ¶3 'to support this Constitution.'

If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery

responsibility for public education is primarily the concern of the States, but it is equally true that such responsibilities, like all other state activity, must be exercised consistently with federal constitutional requirements as they apply to state action.

Our constitutional ideal of equal justice under law is thus made a living truth.

The first question to be considered is, whether the jurisdiction of this Court is excluded by the character of the parties, one of them being a State, and the other a citizen of that State?

second section of the third article of the constitution

Jurisdiction is given to the Courts of the Union in two classes of cases. In the first,

jurisdiction depends on the character of the cause, whoever may be the parties.

controversies

In the second class, the jurisdiction depends entirely on the character of the parties.

If it could be doubted, whether from its nature, it were not supreme in all cases where it is empowered to act, that doubt would be removed by the declaration, that 'this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby; any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.'

From this general grant of jurisdiction, no exception is made of those cases in which a State may be a party.

We think a case arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, is cognizable in the Courts of the Union, whoever may be the parties to that case.

The constitution gave to every person having a claim upon a State, a right to submit his case to the Court of the nation.

Different States may entertain different opinions on the true construction of the constitutional powers of Congress.

How extensive may be the mischief if the first decisions in such cases should be final!

If a State be a party, the jurisdiction of this Court is original; if the case arise under a constitution or a law, the jurisdiction is appellate. But a case to which a State is a party may arise under the constitution or a law of the United States. What rule is applicable to such a case? What, then, becomes the duty of the Court? Certainly, we think, so to construe the constitution as to give effect to both provisions, as far as it is possible to reconcile them, and not to permit their seeming repugnancy to destroy each other. We must endeavor so to construe them as to preserve the true intent and meaning of the instrument.

The constitution declares, that in cases where a State is a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction; but does not say that its appellate jurisdiction shall not be exercised in cases where, from their nature, appellate jurisdiction is given, whether a State be or be not a party.

the very clause which is urged to prove, that the Circuit Court could give no judgment in the case, is also urged to prove, that its judgment is irreversible.

The Court may imply a negative from affirmative words, where the implication promotes, not where it defeats the intention.

the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in cases where a State is a party, refers to those cases in which, according to the grant of power made in the preceding clause, jurisdiction might be exercised in consequence of the character of the party, and an original suit might be instituted in any of the federal Courts; not to those cases in which an original suit might not be instituted in a federal Court. Of the last description, is every case between a State and its citizens, and, perhaps, every case in which a State is enforcing its penal laws. In such cases, therefore, the Supreme Court cannot take original jurisdiction. In every other case, that is, in every case to which the judicial power extends, and in which original jurisdiction is not expressly given, that judicial power shall be exercised in the appellate, and only in the appellate form. The original jurisdiction of this Court cannot be enlarged, but its appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in every case cognizable under the third article of the constitution, in the federal Courts, in which original jurisdiction cannot be exercised; and the extent of this judicial power is to be measured, not by giving the affirmative words of the distributive clause a negative operation in every possible case, but by giving their true meaning to the words which define its extent.

We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.

we find this tribunal invested with appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the constitution and laws of the United States. We find no exception to this grant, and we cannot insert one.

any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States

The second objection to the jurisdiction of the Court is, that its appellate power cannot be exercised, in any case, over the judgment of a State Court.

The constitution and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void.

We think that in a government acknowledgedly supreme, with respect to objects of vital interest to the nation, there is nothing inconsistent with sound reason, nothing incompatible with the nature of government, in making all its departments supreme, so far as respects those objects, and so far as is necessary to their attainment. The exercise of the appellate power over those judgments of the State tribunals which may contravene the constitution or laws of the United States, is, we believe, essential to the attainment of those objects.

single tribunal

They give to the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. The words are broad enough to comprehend all cases of this description, in whatever Court they may be decided.

If some of these cases might be entertained by state tribunals, and no appellate jurisdiction as to them should exist, then the appellate power would not extend to all, but to some, cases. If state tribunals might exercise concurrent jurisdiction over all or some of the other classes of cases in the constitution without control, then the appellate jurisdiction of the United States might, as to such cases, have no real existence, contrary to the manifest intent of the constitution.

That motive is the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution.

The first object of inquiry is,

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second inquiry;

The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.

peculiar character

a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.

mandamus

mandamus

'a command issuing in the king's name from the court of king's bench, and directed to any person, corporation, or inferior court of judicature within the king's dominions, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to their office and duty, and which the court of king's bench has previously determined, or at least supposes, to be consonant to right and justice.'

Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.

[...]

It has already been stated that the applicant has, to that commission, a vested legal right, of which the executive cannot deprive him. He has been appointed to an office, from which he is not removable at the will of the executive; and being so appointed, he has a right to the commission which the secretary has received from the president for his use. The act of congress does not indeed order the secretary of state to send it to him, but it is placed in his hands for the person entitled to it; and cannot be more lawfully withheld by him, than by another person.

The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction.

The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.

The rule must be discharged.