Recent Bookmarks and Annotations
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Moral Reason and Literate Analysis Applied to Cultural Meltdown on 2009-12-18
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Foucault’s concession that other approaches may be legitimate
is belied by this universalizing of the power-knowledge
principle, which would only be legitimate, to my way of thinking,
if he employed it for purposes of prediction. Reduced to signs and
evidence, therefore, his history is deficient on two grounds: first,
because the constant repetition of the power-knowledge principle through
ever more predictable symbolism becomes excruciatingly tiresome; second,
because his capricious standards of evidence exclude both intention and
outcome. All that remains is his subjective interpretation of such
things as the "concerted distribution of bodies". It’s hard to
imagine a more narcissistic application of historical method, and one that
is more insulting to the reader’s common sense.
-
Foucault’s concession that other approaches may be legitimate
is belied by this universalizing of the power-knowledge
principle, which would only be legitimate, to my way of thinking,
if he employed it for purposes of prediction. Reduced to signs and
evidence, therefore, his history is deficient on two grounds: first,
because the constant repetition of the power-knowledge principle through
ever more predictable symbolism becomes excruciatingly tiresome; second,
because his capricious standards of evidence exclude both intention and
outcome. All that remains is his subjective interpretation of such
things as the "concerted distribution of bodies". It’s hard to
imagine a more narcissistic application of historical method, and one that
is more insulting to the reader’s common sense.
-
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Foucault’s concession that other approaches may be legitimate
is belied by this universalizing of the power-knowledge
principle, which would only be legitimate, to my way of thinking,
if he employed it for purposes of prediction. Reduced to signs and
evidence, therefore, his history is deficient on two grounds: first,
because the constant repetition of the power-knowledge principle through
ever more predictable symbolism becomes excruciatingly tiresome; second,
because his capricious standards of evidence exclude both intention and
outcome. All that remains is his subjective interpretation of such
things as the "concerted distribution of bodies". It’s hard to
imagine a more narcissistic application of historical method, and one that
is more insulting to the reader’s common sense.
-
Foucault’s concession that other approaches may be legitimate
is belied by this universalizing of the power-knowledge
principle, which would only be legitimate, to my way of thinking,
if he employed it for purposes of prediction. Reduced to signs and
evidence, therefore, his history is deficient on two grounds: first,
because the constant repetition of the power-knowledge principle through
ever more predictable symbolism becomes excruciatingly tiresome; second,
because his capricious standards of evidence exclude both intention and
outcome. All that remains is his subjective interpretation of such
things as the "concerted distribution of bodies". It’s hard to
imagine a more narcissistic application of historical method, and one that
is more insulting to the reader’s common sense.
-
Foucault’s concession that other approaches may be legitimate
is belied by this universalizing of the power-knowledge
principle, which would only be legitimate, to my way of thinking,
if he employed it for purposes of prediction. Reduced to signs and
evidence, therefore, his history is deficient on two grounds: first,
because the constant repetition of the power-knowledge principle through
ever more predictable symbolism becomes excruciatingly tiresome; second,
because his capricious standards of evidence exclude both intention and
outcome. All that remains is his subjective interpretation of such
things as the "concerted distribution of bodies". It’s hard to
imagine a more narcissistic application of historical method, and one that
is more insulting to the reader’s common sense.
-
Foucault’s concession that other approaches may be legitimate
is belied by this universalizing of the power-knowledge
principle, which would only be legitimate, to my way of thinking,
if he employed it for purposes of prediction. Reduced to signs and
evidence, therefore, his history is deficient on two grounds: first,
because the constant repetition of the power-knowledge principle through
ever more predictable symbolism becomes excruciatingly tiresome; second,
because his capricious standards of evidence exclude both intention and
outcome. All that remains is his subjective interpretation of such
things as the "concerted distribution of bodies". It’s hard to
imagine a more narcissistic application of historical method, and one that
is more insulting to the reader’s common sense.
-
Foucault’s concession that other approaches may be legitimate
is belied by this universalizing of the power-knowledge
principle, which would only be legitimate, to my way of thinking,
if he employed it for purposes of prediction. Reduced to signs and
evidence, therefore, his history is deficient on two grounds: first,
because the constant repetition of the power-knowledge principle through
ever more predictable symbolism becomes excruciatingly tiresome; second,
because his capricious standards of evidence exclude both intention and
outcome. All that remains is his subjective interpretation of such
things as the "concerted distribution of bodies". It’s hard to
imagine a more narcissistic application of historical method, and one that
is more insulting to the reader’s common sense.
-
Foucault’s concession that other approaches may be legitima
-
Foucault’s concession that other approaches may be legitimate
is belied by this universalizing of the power-knowledge
principle, which would only be legitimate, to my way of thinking,
if he employed it for purposes of prediction. Reduced to signs and
evidence, therefore, his history is deficient on two grounds: first,
because the constant repetition of the power-knowledge principle through
ever more predictable symbolism becomes excruciatingly tiresome; second,
because his capricious standards of evidence exclude both intention and
outcome. All that remains is his subjective interpretation of such
things as the "concerted distribution of bodies". It’s hard to
imagine a more narcissistic application of historical method, and one that
is more insulting to the reader’s common sense.
-
Foucault’s concession that other approaches may be legitimate
is belied by this universalizing of the power-knowledge
principle, which would only be legitimate, to my way of thinking,
if he employed it for purposes of prediction. Reduced to signs and
evidence, therefore, his history is deficient on two grounds: first,
because the constant repetition of the power-knowledge principle through
ever more predictable symbolism becomes excruciatingly tiresome; second,
because his capricious standards of evidence exclude both intention and
outcome. All that remains is his subjective interpretation of such
things as the "concerted distribution of bodies". It’s hard to
imagine a more narcissistic application of historical method, and one that
is more insulting to the reader’s common sense.
-
Foucault’s concession that other approaches may be legitimate
is belied by this universalizing of the power-knowledge
principle, which would only be legitimate, to my way of thinking,
if he employed it for purposes of prediction. Reduced to signs and
evidence, therefore, his history is deficient on two grounds: first,
because the constant repetition of the power-knowledge principle through
ever more predictable symbolism becomes excruciatingly tiresome; second,
because his capricious standards of evidence exclude both intention and
outcome. All that remains is his subjective interpretation of such
things as the "concerted distribution of bodies". It’s hard to
imagine a more narcissistic application of historical method, and one that
is more insulting to the reader’s common sense.
-
Foucault’s concession that other approaches may be legitimate
is belied by this universalizing of the power-knowledge
principle, which would only be legitimate, to my way of thinking,
if he employed it for purposes of prediction. Reduced to signs and
evidence, therefore, his history is deficient on two grounds: first,
because the constant repetition of the power-knowledge principle through
ever more predictable symbolism becomes excruciatingly tiresome; second,
because his capricious standards of evidence exclude both intention and
outcome. All that remains is his subjective interpretation of such
things as the "concerted distribution of bodies". It’s hard to
imagine a more narcissistic application of historical method, and one that
is more insulting to the reader’s common sense.
-
Foucault’s concession that other approaches may be legitimate
is belied by this universalizing of the power-knowledge
principle, which would only be legitimate, to my way of thinking,
if he employed it for purposes of prediction. Reduced to signs and
evidence, therefore, his history is deficient on two grounds: first,
because the constant repetition of the power-knowledge principle through
ever more predictable symbolism becomes excruciatingly tiresome; second,
because his capricious standards of evidence exclude both intention and
outcome. All that remains is his subjective interpretation of such
things as the "concerted distribution of bodies". It’s hard to
imagine a more narcissistic application of historical method, and one that
is more insulting to the reader’s common sense.
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NZAVS: The 3Rs, Reduction, Refinement, Replacement - a critique on 2009-12-12
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The Body of the Condemned on 2009-12-09
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Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish (1975), Panopticism on 2009-11-20
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The body problematic: political ... - Google Books on 2009-10-24
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Michel Foucault: materialism and ... - Google Books on 2009-10-24
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YouTube - A Vision of Students Today on 2009-10-01
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Foucault - Order of Things I on 2009-09-23
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untitled on 2009-09-23
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In 1637, René Descartes agreed with Harvey's ideas about the circulation of the blood since there was seemingly a connection between Harvey's ideas and Descartes' theories of man as a machine. René Descartes' opinions led him to argue that animals had no soul and could not have consciousness. This theory was critical at that time and promoted the idea that animals could not possibly suffer; animals were only machines and could experience neither pain nor pleasure. Thus, Descartes seemed to resolve the theological question as why God should allow animals to suffer so irremediably, under man's dominion, since they were not responsible for Adam's original sin. This theory encouraged many people to be brutal to animals.
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In 1637, René Descartes agreed with Harvey's ideas about the circulation of the blood since there was seemingly a connection between Harvey's ideas and Descartes' theories of man as a machine. René Descartes' opinions led him to argue that animals had no soul and could not have consciousness. This theory was critical at that time and promoted the idea that animals could not possibly suffer; animals were only machines and could experience neither pain nor pleasure. Thus, Descartes seemed to resolve the theological question as why God should allow animals to suffer so irremediably, under man's dominion, since they were not responsible for Adam's original sin. This theory encouraged many people to be brutal to animals.
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More Foucault on 2009-09-21
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