Home
Member since Jul 05, 2008, follows 0 people, 0 public groups, 5 public bookmarks (56 total).
More »
Tags
More »
Recent Bookmarks and Annotations
-
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) on 2008-08-19
-
applied
-
Commerce
- 61 more annotations...
-
-
Commerce
-
applied
-
Commerce
-
Commerce
-
Aaron Ogden filed his bill
-
setting forth the several acts of the Legislature
-
enacted for the purpose of securing to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton,
the exclusive navigation of all the waters within the jurisdiction of that
State, with boats -
for a term of years which has not yet expired
-
and authorizing
-
Chancellor to award an injunction, restraining any person whatever from
navigating those waters with boats of that description -
Gibbons, the defendant
-
was in possession of two steam boats
-
employed in running between New-York and Elizabethtown, in violation of the
exclusive privilege -
injunction having been awarded
-
said acts were not repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States,
and were valid. This decree was affirmed in the Court -
Chancellor perpetuated the injunction
-
thereupon brought to this Court by appeal
-
appellant contends
-
laws which purport to give the exclusive privilege it sustains, are repugnant to
the constitution -
1st. To that clause in the constitution which authorizes
Congress to regulate commerce. -
225
-
that understanding which Providence has bestowed upon them, with that
independence which the people of the United States expect -
it is the province of this Court, while it respects, not to bow to it implicitly
-
Judges must exercise
-
when these allied sovereigns converted their league into a government
-
into a Legislature,
-
the whole character in which the States appear, underwent a change, the extent
of which must be determined by a fair consideration of the instrument by which
that change was effected. -
Congress is authorized 'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper'
for the purpose -
We do not, therefore, think ourselves justified in adopting it
-
The grant does not convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor, if
retained by himself, or which can enure solely to the benefit of the grantee;
but is an investment of power for the general advantage, in the hands of agents
selected for that purpose; which power can never be exercised by the people
themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, -
'Congress shall have power to regulate commerce
-
our constitution being
-
counsel for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or
the interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends navigation -
settle the meaning of the word
-
is intercourse
-
commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations
-
The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations,
which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation -
All America understands
-
the word 'commerce,' to comprehend navigation
-
The power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects
for which the people of America adopted their government -
It has, we believe, been universally admitted, that these words comprehend every
species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. -
commerce, as the word is used in the constitution, is a unit, every part of
which is indicated by the term -
Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that
commerce which concerns more States than one. The phrase is not one which would
probably have been selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a
State, because it is not an apt phrase for that purpose -
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be
-
but not to those which are completely within a particular State
-
applied to all the external concerns of the nation
-
completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for
the State itself -
What is this power?
-
This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the constitution. -
the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be
governed -
yet the States may severally exercise the same power, within their respective
jurisdictions -
The grant of the power to lay and collect taxes is, like the power to regulate
commerce, made in general terms, and has never been understood to interfere with
the exercise of the same power by the State; and hence has been drawn an
argument which has been applied to the question under consideration. But the two
grants are not, it is conceived, similar in their terms or their nature. -
when a State proceeds to regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among the
several States, it is exercising the very power that is granted to Congress, and
is doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to do -
sole question is, can a State regulate commerce with foreign nations and among
the States, while Congress is regulating it? -
That this restriction shows the opinion of the Convention, that a State might
impose duties on exports and imports, if not expressly forbidden -
cannot be admitted.
-
Congress may control the State laws, so far as it may be necessary to control
them, for the regulation of commerce -
as the word 'to regulate' implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be
regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform
the same operation on the same thing -
There is great force in this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it
has been refuted -
Should this collision exist, it will be immaterial whether those laws were
passed in virtue of a concurrent power 'to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several States,' or, in virtue of a power to regulate
their domestic trade and police. In one case and the other, the acts of New-York
must yield to the law of Congress -
the framers of our constitution foresaw this state of things, and provided for
it, by declaring the supremacy not only of itself, but of the laws made in
pursuance of it. The nullity of any act, inconsistent with the constitution, is
produced by the declaration, that the constitution is the supreme law
-
-
- LII: Constitution on 2008-08-19
-
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) on 2008-08-19
-
entirely speculative
-
Moreover, it is entirely speculative
- 50 more annotations...
-
-
an asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law is not
sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court -
to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools
-
deny tax-exempt status to racially
-
deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory
-
it is entirely speculative
-
fulfill its obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory
private -
Parents of black public school children allege in this nation-wide class action
that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has not adopted sufficient standards and
procedures to fulfill its obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory private schools. They assert that the IRS thereby harms them
directly and interferes with the ability of their children to receive an
education in desegregated public schools -
Respondents allege that, despite the IRS policy of denying tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory private schools and despite the IRS guidelines and
procedures for implementing that policy, some of the tax-exempt racially
segregated private schools created or expanded in desegregating districts in
fact have racially discriminatory policies. -
allege that the challenged Government conduct harms them in two
ways. The challenged conduct8"(a) constitutes tangible federal financial aid and other
support for racially segregated educational institutions, and9"(b) fosters and encourages the organization, operation and
expansion of institutions providing racially segregated educational
opportunities for white children avoiding attendance in desegregating public
school districts and thereby interferes with the efforts of federal courts, HEW
and local school authorities to desegregate public school districts which have
been operating racially dual school systems." -
ask for a declaratory judgment that the challenged IRS tax-exemption practices
are unlawful. They also ask for an injunction requiring the IRS to deny tax
exemptions to a considerably broader class of private schools than the class of
racially discriminatory private schools. -
Finally, respondents ask for an order directing the IRS to replace its 1975
guidelines with standards consistent with the requested injunction. -
District Court thereupon considered and granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss the complaint, concluding that respondents lack standing, that the
judicial task proposed by respondents is inappropriately intrusive for a federal
court -
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed,
concluding that respondents have standing -
We granted certiorari
-
and now reverse
-
The case-or-controversy doctrines state fundamental limits on federal judicial
power in our system of government -
the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court
decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. -
Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the
exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a
litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication
of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative
branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone
of interests protected by the law invoked. -
requirement of standing, however, has a core component derived directly from the
Constitution. A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief. -
injury alleged must be, for example, " 'distinct and palpable,'
-
and not "abstract" or "conjectural" or "hypothetical,"
-
injury must be "fairly" traceable to the challenged action, and relief from the
injury must be "likely" to follow from a favorable decision. -
the law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea—the idea of
separation of powers -
Is the injury too abstract, or otherwise not appropriate, to be considered
judicially cognizable? Is the line of causation between the illegal conduct and
injury too attenuated? Is the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a
result of a favorable ruling too speculative? These questions and any others
relevant to the standing inquiry must be answered by reference to the Art. III
notion that federal courts may exercise power only "in the last resort, and as a
necessity," -
and only when adjudication is "consistent with a system of separated powers and
[the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through
the judicial process," -
This Court has repeatedly held that an asserted right to have the Government act
in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction
on a federal court. -
"[A]ssertion of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which the
Government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the
requirements of Art. III without draining those requirements of meaning." -
Respondents here have no standing to complain simply that their Government is
violating the law. -
consequences of recognizing respondents' standing on the basis of their first
claim of injury illustrate why our cases plainly hold that such injury is not
judicially cognizable. If the abstract stigmatic injury were cognizable,
standing would extend nationwide to all members of the particular racial groups
against which the Government was alleged to be discriminating by its grant of a
tax exemption to a racially discriminatory school, regardless of the location of
that school. -
Recognition of standing in such circumstances would transform the federal courts
into "no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of
concerned bystanders." -
respondents' second claim of injury cannot support standing because the injury
alleged is not fairly traceable to the Government conduct respondents challenge
as unlawful -
illegal conduct challenged by respondents is the IRS's grant of tax exemptions
to some racially discriminatory schools. The line of causation between that
conduct and desegregation of respondents' schools is attenuated at best. -
diminished ability of respondents' children to receive a desegregated education
would be fairly traceable to unlawful IRS grants of tax exemptions only if there
were enough racially discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions in
respondents' communities for withdrawal of those exemptions to make an
appreciable difference in public school integration -
it is entirely speculative, as respondents themselves conceded in the Court of
Appeals, see n. 17, supra, whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from any
particular school would lead the school to change its policies -
also pure speculation whether, in a particular community, a large enough number
of the numerous relevant school officials and parents would reach decisions that
collectively would have a significant impact on the racial composition of the
public schools -
The links in the chain of causation between the challenged Government conduct
and the asserted injury are far too weak for the chain as a whole to sustain
respondents' standing -
Carried to its logical end, [respondents'] approach would have the federal
courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive
action; such a role is appropriate for the Congress acting through its
committees and the 'power of the purse'; it is not the role of the judiciary,
absent actual present or immediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful
governmental action -
the Government has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the
"dispatch of its own internal affairs," -
Constitution, after all, assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the
Judicial Branch, the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." -
-
Court "uses 'standing to slam the courthouse door against plaintiffs who are
entitled to full consideration of their claims on the merits.' " -
At a minimum, the standing requirement is not met unless the plaintiff has "such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends. . . ." -
this "personal stake" requirement is satisfied if the person seeking redress has
suffered, or is threatened with, some "distinct and palpable injury," -
respondents have alleged a direct causal relationship between the Government
action they challenge and the injury they suffer: their inability to receive an
education in a racially integrated school is directly and adversely affected by
the tax-exempt status granted by the IRS to racially discriminatory schools in
their respective school districts -
most disturbing about today's decision, therefore, is not the standing analysis
applied, but the indifference evidenced by the Court to the detrimental effects
that racially segregated schools, supported by tax-exempt status from the
Federal Government, have on the respondents' attempt to obtain an education in a
racially integrated school system -
STEVENS, with whom Justice BLACKMUN joins, dissenting
-
(1) respondents have adequately alleged "injury in fact"; (2) their injury is
fairly traceable to the conduct that they claim to be unlawful; and (3) the
"separation of powers" principle does not create a jurisdictional obstacle to
the consideration of the merits of their claim -
In final analysis, the wrong respondents allege that the
Government has committed is to subsidize the exodus of white children from
schools that would otherwise be racially integrated. The critical question in
these cases, therefore, is whether respondents have alleged that the Government
has created that kind of subsidy. -
"[T]he standing question is whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of
federal-court jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial
powers on his behalf." -
Thus, the " 'fundamental aspect of standing' is that it focuses primarily on the
party seeking to get his complaint before the federal court rather than 'on the
issues he wishes to have adjudicated,' "
-
-
- Noticias principales de negocios, economía y finanzas personales - CNNExpansion.com on 2008-08-13
- Wiseman - Constitutional Law I -- Fall 2008 on 2008-08-06
More »
Groups
Mickey manfredi havn't joined any group yet.
Recent Visitors (6 visits)
-
on 2008-08-28
Highlighter, Sticky notes, Tagging, Groups and Network: integrated suite dramatically boosting research productivity. Learn more »
Join Diigo