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1994, Congress similarly sought to pre-empt state trucking regulation.

“[A] State . . . may not enact or enforce a law . . . related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.”

The first section forbids anyone other than a Maine-licensed tobacco retailer to accept an order for delivery of tobacco.

the retailer must “utilize a delivery service” that provides a special kind of recipient-verification service

The second section forbids any person “knowingly” to “transport” a “tobacco product” to “a person” in Maine unless either the sender or the receiver has a Maine license.

The District Court held (among other things) that federal law pre-empts the portions of the two sections we have described, namely the “recipient-verification” provision (§1555–C(3)(C)) and the “deemed to know” provision (

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed that federal law pre-empted the two provisions.

“when judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its judicial interpretations as well.”

In Morales,the Court determined: (1) that “[s]tate enforcement actions having a connection with, or reference to”carrier “ ‘rates, routes, or services’ are pre-empted,” 504 U. S., at 384 (emphasis added); (2) that such pre-emption may occur even if a state law’s effect on rates, routes or services “is only indirect,” id., at 386 (internal quotation marks omitted); (3) that, in respect to pre-emption, it makes no difference whether a state law is “consistent” or “inconsistent” with federal regulation, id., at 386–387 (emphasis deleted); and (4) that pre-emption occurs at least where state laws have a “significant impact” related to Congress’ deregulatory and pre-emption-related objectives,

Morales held that, given these principles, federal law pre-empts States from enforcing their consumer-fraud statutes against deceptive airline-fare advertisements

Morales said that federal law might not pre-empt state laws that affect fares in only a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral … manner,”

At the same time, the provision has a “significant” and adverse “impact” in respect to the federal Act’s ability to achieve its pre-emption-related objectives.

We concede that the regulation here is less “direct” than it might be, for it tells shippers what to choose rather than carriers what to do. Nonetheless, the effect of the regulation is that carriers will have to offer tobacco delivery services that differ significantly from those that, in the absence of the regulation, the market might dictate.

Maine replies that the regulation will impose no significant additional costs upon carriers. But even were that so (and the carriers deny it), Maine’s reply is off the mark.

Maine’s primary arguments focus upon the reason why it has enacted the provisions in question.

espite the importance of the public health objective, we cannot agree with Maine that the federal law creates an exception on that basis, exempting state laws that it would otherwise pre-empt.

The legislative history, however, does not suggest Congress made a firm judgment about, or even focused upon, the issue now before us. And the Synar Amendment nowhere mentions the particular state enforcement method here at issue; indeed, it does not mention specific state enforcement methods at all.

In this case, the state law is not general, it does not affect truckers solely in their capacity as members of the general public, the impact is significant, and the connection with trucking is not tenuous, remote, or peripheral.

There are both safety and economic aspects to the nuclear waste issue: first, if not properly stored, nuclear wastes might leak and endanger both the environment and human health;5 second, the lack of a long-term disposal option increases the risk that the insufficiency of interim storage space for spent fuel will lead to reactor-shutdowns, rendering nuclear energy an unpredictable and uneconomical adventure.

District Court

the two provisions are void because they are preempted by and in conflict with the Atomic Energy Act.

Both of these factors counsel in favor of finding the challenge to the waste disposal regulations in § 25524.2 ripe for adjudication.

postponement of decision would likely work substantial hardship on the utilities.

"One does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending, that is enough."

because "we cannot know whether the Energy Commission will ever find a nuclear plant's storage capacity to be inadequate," judicial consideration of this provision should await further developments

Absent explicit preemptive language, Congress' intent to supercede state law altogether may be found from a "scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to supplement it," "because the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject," or because "the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose."

"compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,

state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.

First, they submit that the statute—because it regulates construction of nuclear plants and because it is allegedly predicated on safety concerns—ignores the division between federal and state authority created by the Atomic Energy Act, and falls within the field that the federal government has preserved for its own exclusive control. Second, the statute, and the judgments that underlie it, conflict with decisions concerning the nuclear waste disposal issue made by Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Third, the California statute frustrates the federal goal of developing nuclear technology as a source of energy. We consider each of these contentions in turn.

The Commission, however, was not given authority over the generation of electricity itself, or over the economic question whether a particular plant should be built.

"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the authority or regulations of any Federal, State or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the Commission . . ."

we emphasize that the statute does not seek to regulate the construction or operation of a nuclear powerplant. It would clearly be impermissible for California to attempt to do so, for such regulation, even if enacted out of non-safety concerns, would nevertheless directly conflict with the NRC's exclusive authority over plant construction and operation.

the federal government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the states.25

The Committee explained that the lack of a federally approved method of waste disposal created a "clog" in the nuclear fuel cycle.

we accept California's avowed economic purpose as the rationale for enacting § 25524.2. Accordingly, the statute lies outside the occupied field of nuclear safety regulation.

Nor has California sought through § 25524.2 to impose its own standards on nuclear waste disposal.

we do not find § 25524.2 preempted any more by the NRC's obligations in the waste disposal field than by its licensing power over the plants themselves.

it is certainly possible to interpret the Act as directed at solving the nuclear waste disposal problem for existing reactors without necessarily encouraging or requiring that future plant construction be undertaken.

Finally, it is strongly contended that § 25524.2 frustrates the Atomic Energy Act's purpose to develop the commercial use of nuclear power.

There is little doubt that a primary purpose of the Atomic Energy Act was, and continues to be, the promotion of nuclear power. The Act itself states that it is a program "to encourage widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum extent consistent with the common defense and security and with the health and safety of the public."

The Court of Appeals' suggestion that legislation since 1974 has indicated a "change in congressional outlook" is unconvincing.

The evident desire of Congress to prevent safety from being compromised by promotional concerns does not translate into an abandonment of the objective of promoting nuclear power.

Congress has allowed the States to determine—as a matter of economics—whether a nuclear plant vis-a-vis a fossil fuel plant should be built.

Therefore, while the argument of petitioners and the United States has considerable force, the legal reality remains that Congress has left sufficient authority in the states to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped for economic reasons.

[n]othing in the purpose animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others." Id., at 810, 96 S.Ct., at 2498 (footnotes omitted). Because Maryland was participating in the market, rather than acting as a market regulator, we concluded that the Commerce Clause was not "intended to require independent justification,"

when a state or local government enters the market as a participant it is not subject to the restraints of the Commerce Clause.

the court held that the resident quota was not subject to challenge under the Commerce Clause because the State was acting as a market participant rather than as a market regulator.

also held that the quota did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it was not aimed primarily at out-of-state residents.

First, the Court decided White v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 103 S.Ct. 1042, 75 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983), which held that an executive order of the Mayor of Boston, requiring that at least 50% of all jobs on construction projects funded in whole or part by city funds be filled by bona fide city residents, was immune from scrutiny under the Commerce Clause because Boston was acting as a market participant rather than as a market regulator. In light of the decision in White, appellant has abandoned its Commerce Clause challenge to the Camden ordinance.

The one-year residency requirement was deleted, thereby mooting appellant's equal protection challenge based on that durational requirement. Now, a resident of the city of Camden is defined simply as "any person who resides in the City of Camden."

It now applies to any construction project "which is funded in whole or in part with City funds or funds which the City expends or administers in accordance with the terms of a grant."

the 40% resident hiring requirement was changed from a strict "quota" to a "goal" with which developers and contractors must make "every good faith effort" to comply

The fact that the ordinance in question is a municipal, rather than a state, law does not somehow place it outside the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. First of all, one cannot easily distinguish municipal from state action in this case: the municipal ordinance would not have gone into effect without express approval by the State Treasurer

a municipality is merely a political subdivision of the State from which its authority derives. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187, 43 S.Ct. 534, 536, 67 L.Ed. 937 (1923). It is as true of the Privileges and Immunities Clause as of the Equal Protection Clause that what would be unconstitutional if done directly by the State can no more readily be accomplished by a city deriving its authority from the State.

even if the ordinance had been adopted solely by Camden, and not pursuant to a state program or with state approval, the hiring preference would still have to comport with the Privileges and Immunities Clause.

Clause is phrased in terms of state citizenship and was designed "to place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned."

We cannot accept this argument. We have never read the Clause so literally as to apply it only to distinctions based on state citizenship.

It is true that New Jersey citizens not residing in Camden will be affected by the ordinance as well as out-of-state citizens.

We conclude that Camden's ordinance is not immune from constitutional review at the behest of out-of-state residents merely because some in-state residents are similarly disadvantaged

As an initial matter, the court must decide whether the ordinance burdens one of those privileges and immunities protected by the Clause.

we must determine whether an out-of-state resident's interest in employment on public works contracts in another State is sufficiently "fundamental" to the promotion of interstate harmony so as to "fall within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause."

We have held that there is no fundamental right to government employment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.

And in White, 103 S.Ct., at 1046, n. 7, we held that for purposes of the Commerce Clause everyone employed on a city public works project is, "in a substantial if informal sense, 'working for the city.' "

But the distinction between market participant and market regulator relied upon in White to dispose of the Commerce Clause challenge is not dispositive in this context. The two Clauses have different aims and set different standards for state conduct.

When the State acts solely as a market participant, no conflict between state regulation and federal regulatory authority can arise.

The Privileges and Immunities Clause, on the other hand, imposes a direct restraint on state action in the interests of interstate harmony.

It is discrimination against out-of-state residents on matters of fundamental concern which triggers the Clause, not regulation affecting interstate commerce.

In sum, Camden may, without fear of violating the Commerce Clause, pressure private employers engaged in public works projects funded in whole or in part by the city to hire city residents.

A determination of whether a privilege is "fundamental" for purposes of that Clause does not depend on whether the employees of private contractors and subcontractors engaged in public works projects can or cannot be said to be "working for the city."

We have stressed in prior cases that "[l]ike many other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities clause is not an absolute."

It does not preclude discrimination against citizens of other States where there is a "substantial reason" for the difference in treatment.

As part of any justification offered for the discriminatory law, nonresidents must somehow be shown to "constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed."

esident hiring preference is designed, the city contends, to increase the number of employed persons living in Camden and to arrest the "middle class flight" currently plaguing the city.

Camden contends that the scope of the discrimination practiced in the ordinance, with its municipal residency requirement, is carefully tailored to alleviate this evil without unreasonably harming nonresidents, who still have access to 60% of the available positions.

Reversed and Remanded.

ustice BLACKMUN, dissenting.

Today, however, the Court casually extends the scope of the Clause by holding that it applies to laws that discriminate among state residents on the basis of municipal residence, simply because discrimination on the basis of municipal residence disadvantages citizens of other States "ipso facto."

It observed that the statute "does not simply make distinctions between native-born Alaskans and those who migrate to Alaska from other States;" instead, it "also discriminates among long-time residents and even native-born residents."

rather, it discriminated among state residents in a way that disadvantaged nonresidents as well but did not thereby implicate the underlying concerns of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Camden ordinance presently before the Court occupies precisely the same position.

As a practical matter, therefore, the scope of the Clause may be measured by asking whether failure to link the interests of those who are disadvantaged with the interests of those who are preferred will consign the former group to "the uncertain remedies afforded by diplomatic processes and official retaliation."

discrimination on the basis of municipal residence simply does not consign residents of other States, in the words of Toomer, supra, to "the uncertain remedies afforded by diplomatic processes and official retaliation." The Court thus has applied the Privileges and Immunities Clause without regard for the political ills that it was designed to cure.