Shane Gordon (hubrys)'s Public Profile in the Diigo Community

I am interested in American History,Politics,Philosophy of Technology,Existentialism. My favorite music are Andrew Bird,The Smiths,The Decemberists,The Cure,Tori Amos,Rufus Wainwright,Depeche Mode. Movies: Monty Python and the Holy Grail,Everything is Illuminated,Sin City,Dark Knight,Superman Returns,A.I.,The Royal Tenenbaums. TV: John Adams,Heroes,Seinfeld,The Simpsons,Family Guy,The Boondocks,The Daily Show,Colbert Report,Venture Bros.,Squidbillies,Futurama. Books: Lord of the Rings,Jonathan Strange and Mr. Norrell,Mythology,One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest,Dune,A People's History of the United States,Alexander Hamilton,John Adams,American Sphinx,His Excellence: George Washington,Founding Brothers,A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius,Harry Potter. My Heros are Thomas Jefferson,John Adams,Prometheus.

Member since Jul 04, 2008, follows 7 people, 0 public groups, 14 public bookmarks (32 total).

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Recent Bookmarks and Annotations

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) on 2008-10-16
- That presupposition, first observed over a century ago in Hans v.
  Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890), has two parts:
  first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and second,
  that " '[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the
  suit of an individual without its consent.
- Congress' intent to abrogate the States' immunity from suit must be obvious from
  "a clear legislative statement."
- 1 more annotations...
- - In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the
    background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh
    Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an
    area, like the regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive
    control of the Federal Government. Even when the Constitution vests in Congress
    complete law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment
    prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against
    unconsenting States.16
    The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and
    Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed
    upon federal jurisdiction. Petitioner's suit against the State of Florida must
    be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction.
Clinton v. NY, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) on 2008-09-18
- Insofar as the degree of political, "law-making'' power conferred upon the
  Executive is concerned, there is not a dime's worth of difference between
  Congress's authorizing the President to cancel a spending item, and
  Congress's authorizing money to be spent on a particular item at the President's
  discretion. And the latter has been done since the Founding of the Nation.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952) on 2008-09-04
- A basic rule is the duty of the Court not to pass on a constitutional issue at
  all, however narrowly it may be confined, if the case may, as a matter of
  intellectual honesty, be decided without even considering delicate problems of
  power under the Constitution. It ought to be, but apparently is not a matter of
  common understanding that clashes between different branches of the government
  should be avoided if a legal ground of less explosive potentialities is properly
  available. Constitutional adjudications are apt by exposing differences to
  exacerbate them.
- 1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
  authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all
  that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.2
  In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be
  worth), to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held
  unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal
  Government as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure executed by the
  President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of
  presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden
  of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.
  
  341
  2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
  grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers,
  but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
  authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional
  inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
  matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
  responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on
  the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
  theories of law.³
  
  342
  3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the
  expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then
  he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
  powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential
  control in such a case only be disabling the Congress from acting upon the
  subject.4
  Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be
  scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibruim established by
  our constitutional system.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) on 2008-09-01
- 'In determining whether a question falls within (the political question)
  category, the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing
  finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of
  satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations.'
- The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the
  separation of powers. Much confusion results from the capacity of the 'political
  question' label to obscure the need for case-by-case inquiry. Deciding whether a
  matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch
  of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority
  has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional
  interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of
  the Constitution. To demonstrate this requires no less than to analyze
  representative cases and to infer from them the analytical threads that make up
  the political question doctrine.
- 1 more annotations...
- - It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly
    according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political
    question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as
    essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of
    any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
    constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
    a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
    the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
    clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
    undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
    coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
    adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
    embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
    question.
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) on 2008-09-01
- Without undertaking to survey the intricacies of the ripeness doctrine15
  it is fair to say that its basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through
  avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
  disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies
  from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized
  and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. The problem
  is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of
  the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding
  court consideration.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) on 2008-08-28
- "(a) constitutes tangible federal financial aid and other
  support for racially segregated educational institutions, and
  
  9
  "(b) fosters and encourages the organization, operation and
  expansion of institutions providing racially segregated educational
  opportunities for white children avoiding attendance in desegregating public
  school districts and thereby interferes with the efforts of federal courts, HEW
  and local school authorities to desegregate public school districts which have
  been operating racially dual school systems."
- Moreover, it is entirely speculative, as respondents themselves conceded in the
  Court of Appeals, see n. 17, supra, whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from
  any particular school would lead the school to change its policies. See 480
  F.Supp., at 796. It is just as speculative whether any given parent of a child
  attending such a private school would decide to transfer the child to public
  school as a result of any changes in educational or financial policy made by the
  private school once it was threatened with loss of tax-exempt status. It is also
  pure speculation whether, in a particular community, a large enough number of
  the numerous relevant school officials and parents would reach decisions that
  collectively would have a significant impact on the racial composition of the
  public schools.
Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428 (2000) on 2008-08-25
- Given §3501's express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of
- Because of the obvious conflict between our decision in Miranda and §3501, we
  must address whether Congress has constitutional authority to thus supersede
  Miranda. If Congress has such authority, §3501's totality-of-the-circumstances
  approach must prevail over Miranda's requirement of warnings; if not, that
  section must yield to Miranda's more specific requirements.
- 3 more annotations...
- - But Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and
    applying the Constitution.
  - Relying on the fact that we have created several exceptions to Miranda's
    warnings requirement and that we have repeatedly referred to the Miranda
    warnings as "prophylactic," New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984), and "not themselves rights protected
    by the Constitution," Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974),2
    the Court of Appeals concluded that the protections announced in Miranda are not
    constitutionally required.
  - The Miranda opinion itself begins by stating that the Court granted certiorari
    "to explore some facets of the problems of applying the privilege against
    self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete
    constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to
    follow."
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) on 2008-08-25
- The controlling legal principles are plain. The command of the Fourteenth
  Amendment is that no 'State' shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction
  the equal protection of the laws. 'A State acts by its legislative, its
  executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way. The
  constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the State, or
  of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any
  person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by
  virtue of public position under a State government, * * * denies or takes away
  the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as
  he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State's power,
  his act is that of the State. This must be so, or the constitutional prohibition
  has no meaning.'
- In short, the constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against
  in school admission on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in the
  Brown case can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or
  state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through
  evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted 'ingeniously or ingenuously.'
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821) on 2008-08-25
- It is authorized to decide all cases of every description, arising under the
  constitution or laws of the United States. From this general grant of
  jurisdiction, no exception is made of those cases in which a State may be a
  party.
- Will the spirit of the constitution justify this attempt to control its words?
  We think it will not. We think a case arising under the constitution or laws of
  the United States, is cognizable in the Courts of the Union, whoever may be the
  parties to that case.
- 4 more annotations...
- - After bestowing on this subject the most attentive
    consideration, the Court can perceive no reason founded on the character of the
    parties for introducing an exception which the constitution has not made; and we
    think that the judicial power, as originally given, extends to all cases arising
    under the constitution or a law of the United States, whoever may be the
    parties.
  - The original jurisdiction of this Court cannot be enlarged, but its appellate
    jurisdiction may be exercised in every case cognizable under the third article
    of the constitution, in the federal Courts, in which original jurisdiction
    cannot be exercised; and the extent of this judicial power is to be measured,
    not by giving the affirmative words of the distributive clause a negative
    operation in every possible case, but by giving their true meaning to the words
    which define its extent.
  - In doing this, on the present occasion, we find this tribunal invested with
    appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the constitution and
    laws of the United States. We find no exception to this grant, and we cannot
    insert one.
  - The American people may certainly give to a national tribunal a supervising
    power over those judgments of the State Courts, which may conflict with the
    constitution, laws, or treaties, of the United States, without converting them
    into federal Courts, or converting the national into a State tribunal. The one
    Court still derives its authority from the State, the other still derives its
    authority from the nation.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) on 2008-08-21
- The government of the United States has been emphatically termed
  a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this
  high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested
  legal right.
  
  62
  If this obloquy is to be cast on the jurisprudence of our
  country, it must arise from the peculiar character of the case.
  
  63