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Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 061249 (2009) on 2009-11-09
- Wyeth, the manufacturer of the drug, had failed to provide an adequate warning of that risk and awarded damages to respondent Diana Levine to compensate her for the amputation of her arm. The warnings on Phenergan’s label had been deemed sufficient by the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) when it approved Wyeth’s new drug application in 1955 and when it later approved changes in the drug’s labeling
- and it can be administered intravenously through either the “IV-push” method, whereby the drug is injected directly into a patient’s vein, or the “IV-drip” method, whereby the drug is introduced into a saline solution
- 20 more annotations...
- - she received an intramuscular injection of Demerol for her headache and Phenergan for her nausea. Because the combination did not provide relief, she returned later that day and received a second injection of both drugs. This time, the physician assistant administered the drugs by the IV-push method, and Phenergan entered Levine’s artery, either because the needle penetrated an artery directly or because the drug escaped from the vein into surrounding tissue (a phenomenon called “perivascular extravasation”) where it came in contact with arterial blood. As a result, Levine developed gangrene, and doctors amputated first her right hand and then her entire forearm. In addition to her pain and suffering, Levine incurred substantial medical expenses and the loss of her livelihood as a professional musician.
  - arguing that Levine’s failure-to-warn claims were pre-empted by federal law.
  - whether the FDA’s drug labeling judgments “preempt state law product liability claims premised on the theory that different labeling judgments were necessary to make drugs reasonably safe for use.”
  - wo cornerstones of our pre-emption jurisprudence. First, “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.”
  - Levine’s state-law claims are pre-empted because it is impossible for it to comply with both the state-law duties underlying those claims and its federal labeling duties.
  - a manufacturer may only change a drug label after the FDA approves a supplemental application. There is, however, an FDA regulation that permits a manufacturer to make certain changes to its label before receiving the agency’s approval. Among other things, this “changes being effected” (CBE) regulation provides that if a manufacturer is changing a label to “add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction
  - Wyeth has failed to demonstrate that it was impossible for it to comply with both federal and state requirements.
  - requiring it to comply with a state-law duty to provide a stronger warning about IV-push administration would obstruct the purposes and objectives of federal drug labeling regulation
  - FDCA establishes both a floor and a ceiling for drug regulation: Once the FDA has approved a drug’s label, a state-law verdict may not deem the label inadequate, regardless of whether there is any evidence that the FDA has considered the stronger warning at issue. The most glaring problem with this argument is that all evidence of Congress’ purposes is to the contrary
  - It may also have recognized that state-law remedies further consumer protection by motivating manufacturers to produce safe and effective drugs and to give adequate warnings
  - Despite this evidence that Congress did not regard state tort litigation as an obstacle to achieving its purposes, Wyeth nonetheless maintains that, because the FDCA requires the FDA to determine that a drug is safe and effective under the conditions
  - In short, Wyeth has not persuaded us that failure-to-warn claims like Levine’s obstruct the federal regulation of drug labeling. Congress has repeatedly declined to pre-empt state law, and the FDA’s recently adopted position that state tort suits interfere with its statutory mandate is entitled to no weight. Although we recognize that some state-law claims might well frustrate the achievement of congressional objectives, this is not such a case.
  - because I cannot join the majority’s implicit endorsement of far-reaching implied pre-emption doctrines. In particular, I have become increasingly skeptical of this Court’s “purposes and objectives” pre-emption jurisprudence.
  - Nonetheless, the States retain substantial sovereign authority. U. S. Const., Amdt. 10 (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people
  - the Supremacy Clause must operate only in accordance with its terms. The clause provides:
  - “supreme” status only to those that are “made in Pursuance” of “[t]his Constitution.” Ibid.; see 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §18
  - The second structural limitation is the complex set of procedures that Congress and the President must follow to enact “Laws of the United States.
  - In light of these constitutional principles, I have become “increasing[ly] reluctan[t] to expand federal statutes beyond their terms through doctrines of implied pre-emption.”
  - are two categories of conflict pre-emption, both of which Wyeth contends are at issue in this case. First, the Court has found pre-emption “where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce.” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
    
    373 U. S. 132,
    142–143 (1963)
    . Second, the Court has determined that federal law pre-empts state law when, “under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz,
    
    312 U. S. 52,
    67 (1941)
    .
  - In sum, the relevant federal law did not give Wyeth a right that the state-law judgment took away, and it was possible for Wyeth to comply with both federal law and the Vermont-law judgment at issue here. The federal statute and regulations neither prohibited the stronger warning label required by the state judgment, nor insulated Wyeth from the risk of state-law liability.
United Building and Construction Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984) on 2009-11-02
- ordinance of the city of Camden, New Jersey requires that at least 40% of the employees of contractors and subcontractors working on city construction projects be Camden residents. Appellant, the United Building and Construction Trades Council of Camden and Vicinity (the Council), challenges that ordinance as a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Article IV, § 2, of the United States Constitution
- challenged state approval of the resident hiring quota as ultra vires, and as unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution and under the 14th amendment's Equal Protection Clause
- 15 more annotations...
- - court also held that the quota did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it was not aimed primarily at out-of-state residents. "It almost certainly affects more New Jersey residents not living in Camden than it does out-of-state residents.
  - the same three constitutional challenges to the resident hiring quota
  - 1983 Camden amended its affirmative action plan. The one-year residency requirement was deleted, thereby mooting appellant's equal protection challenge based on that durational requirement. Now, a resident of the city of Camden is defined simply as "any person who resides in the City of Camden.
  - Because of these changes, the only question left for our consideration is whether the Camden ordinance, as now written, violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause.7 We first address the argument, accepted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, that the Clause does not even apply to a municipal ordinance such as this
  - a municipality is merely a political subdivision of the State from which its authority derives
  - even if the ordinance had been adopted solely by Camden, and not pursuant to a state program or with state approval, the hiring preference would still have to comport with the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
  - The primary purpose of this clause, like the clauses between which it is located—those relating to full faith and credit and to interstate extradition of fugitives from justice—was to help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign States
  - We have never read the Clause so literally as to apply it only to distinctions based on state citizenship. A person who is not residing in a given State is ipso facto not residing in a city within that State
  - Not all forms of discrimination against citizens of other States are constitutionally suspect.
  - hen, we must determine whether an out-of-state resident's interest in employment on public works contracts in another State is sufficiently "fundamental" to the promotion of interstate harmony so as to "fall within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
  - Our decision in White turned on a distinction between the city acting as a market participant and the city acting as a market regulator. The question whether employees of contractors and subcontractors on public works projects were or were not, in some sense, working for the city was crucial to that analysis
  - Commerce Clause acts as an implied restraint upon state regulatory powers. Such powers must give way before the superior authority of Congress to legislate on (or leave unregulated) matters involving interstate commerce.
  - of Camden contends that its ordinance is necessary to counteract grave economic and social ills. Spiralling unemployment, a sharp decline in population, and a dramatic reduction in the number of businesses located in the city have eroded property values and depleted the city's tax base.
  - That is, they "live off" Camden without "living in" Camden. Camden contends that the scope of the discrimination practiced in the ordinance, with its municipal residency requirement, is carefully tailored to alleviate this evil without unreasonably harming nonresidents, who still have access to 60% of the available positions.
    
    29
    
    Every inquiry under the Privileges and Immunities Clause "must . . . be conducted with due regard for the principle that the states should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures
  - impossible to evaluate Camden's justification on the record as it now stands. No trial has ever been held in the case. No findings of fact have been made. The Supreme Court of New Jersey certified the case for direct appeal after the brief administrative proceedings that led to approval of the ordinance by the State Treasurer. It would not be appropriate for this Court either to make factual determinations as an initial matter or to take judicial notice of Camden's decay. We, therefore, deem it wise to remand the case to the New Jersey Supreme Court. That court may decide, consistent with state procedures, on the best method for making the necessary findings.
    
    31
    
    The judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983) on 2009-11-02
- issued an executive order1 which required that all construction projects funded in whole or in part by city funds, or funds which the city had the authority to administer, should be performed by a work force consisting of at least half bona fide residents of Boston.2 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided that the order was unconstitutional, observing that the Commerce Clause "presents a clear obstacle to the city's order."
- was substantially the same as if Maryland had withdrawn altogether the availability of bounties on hulks delivered by unlicensed suppliers to licensed non-Maryland processors
- 3 more annotations...
- - Maryland was participating in the market, rather than acting as a market regulator, we concluded that the Commerce Clause was not "intended to require independent justification
  - the Commerce Clause responds principally to state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national marketplace
  - hold that on the record before us the application of the mayor's executive order to the contracts in question did not violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) on 2009-11-02
- hold that the laws in both States discriminate against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and that the discrimination is neither authorized nor permitted by the Twenty-first Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which invalidated the Michigan laws; and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which upheld the New York laws.
- through a three-tier distribution system. Separate licenses are required for producers, wholesalers, and retailers. See FTC, Possible Anticompetitive Barriers to E-Commerce: Wine 5-7 (July 2003) (hereinafter FTC Report), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf (all Internet materials as visited May 11, 2005, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). The three-tier scheme is preserved by a complex set of overlapping state and federal regulations.
- 12 more annotations...
- - The differential treatment between in-state and out-of-state wineries constitutes explicit discrimination against interstate commerce.
  - `Does a State's regulatory scheme that permits in-state wineries directly to ship alcohol to consumers but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so violate the dormant Commerce Clause in light of § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment?'" 541 U.S. 1062 (2004).
  - tate laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter." Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)
  - rule prohibiting state discrimination against interstate commerce follows also from the principle that States should not be compelled to negotiate with each other regarding favored or disfavored status for their own citizens.
  - The perceived necessity for reciprocal sale privileges risks generating the trade rivalries and animosities, the alliances and exclusivity, that the Constitution and, in particular, the Commerce Clause were designed to avoid.
  - Michigan allows in-state wineries to ship directly to consumers, subject only to a licensing requirement. Out-of-state wineries, whether licensed or not, face a complete ban on direct shipment.
  - that it does not ban direct shipments altogether.
  - There is some confusion over the precise steps out-of-state wineries must take to gain access to the New York market, in part because no winery has run the State's regulatory gauntlet. New York's argument, in any event, is unconvincing.
  - New York discriminates against out-of-state wineries in other ways. Out-of-state wineries that establish the requisite branch office and warehouse in New York are still ineligible for a "farm winery" license, the license that provides the most direct means of shipping to New York consumers.
  - Court has held that state laws that violate other provisions of the Constitution are not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment. The Court has applied this rule in the context of the First Amendment,
  - Second, the Court has held that § 2 does not abrogate Congress' Commerce Clause powers with regard to liquor.
  - States have broad power to regulate liquor under § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. This power, however, does not allow States to ban, or severely limit, the direct shipment of out-of-state wine while simultaneously authorizing direct shipment by in-state producers. If a State chooses to allow direct shipment of wine, it must do so on evenhanded terms. Without demonstrating the need for discrimination, New York and Michigan have enacted regulations that disadvantage out-of-state wine producers. Under our Commerce Clause jurisprudence, these regulations cannot stand.
    
    75
    
    We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) on 2009-11-02
- whether an Iowa statute that prohibits the use of certain large trucks within the State unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce.
- One consists of a three-axle tractor pulling a 40-foot two-axle trailer. This unit, commonly called a single, or "semi," is 55 feet in length overall. Such trucks have long been used on the Nation's highways. Consolidated also uses a two-axle tractor pulling a single-axle trailer which, in turn, pulls a single-axle dolly and a second single-axle trailer. This combination, known as a double, or twin, is 65 feet long overall.1 Many trucking companies, including Consolidated, increasingly prefer to use doubles to ship certain kinds of commodities.
- 9 more annotations...
- - Iowa's statute permits cities abutting the state line by local ordinance to adopt the length limitations of the adjoining State. Iowa Code § 321.457(7) (1979). Where a city has exercised this option, otherwise oversized trucks are permitted within the city limits and in nearby commercial zones.
  - Consolidated cannot use its 65-foot doubles to move commodities through the State. Instead, the company must do one of four things: (i) use 55-foot singles; (ii) use 60-foot doubles; (iii) detach the trailers of a 65-foot double and shuttle each through the State separately; or (iv) divert 65-foot doubles around Iowa.
    
    7
    
    Dissatisfied with these options, Consolidated filed this suit in the District Court averring that Iowa's statutory scheme unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce.8 Iowa defended the law as a reasonable safety measure enacted pursuant to its police power.
  - The total effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight and problematical that it does not outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences that seriously impede it." 475 F.Supp., at 551 (emphasis in original).
  - Iowa thus substantially burdens the interstate flow of goods by truck. In the absence of congressional action to set uniform standards,11 some burdens associated with state safety regulations must be tolerated.
  - Iowa's law substantially burdens interstate commerce.
  - Iowa's law may aggravate, rather than ameliorate, the problem of highway accidents. Fifty-five foot singles carry less freight than 65-foot doubles.
  - two particularly significant exemptions. First, singles hauling livestock or farm vehicles were permitted to be as long as 60 feet. Iowa Code §§ 321.457(5), 321.457(3) (1979). As the Court of Appeals noted, this provision undoubtedly was helpful to local interests
  - the statutory exemptions, their history, and the arguments Iowa has advanced in support of its law in this litigation, all suggest that the deference traditionally accorded a State's safety judgment is not warranted
  - Because Iowa has imposed this burden without any significant countervailing safety interest,26 its statute violates the Commerce Clause.27 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) on 2009-11-02
- The appellant is the official charged with enforcing the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act.1 A provision of the Act requires that, with certain exceptions, all cantaloupes grown in Arizona and offered for sale must 'be packed in regular compact arrangement in closed standard containers approved by the supervisor
- for many years been engaged in the business of growing, harvesting, processing, and packing fruits and vegetables at numerous locations in Arizona and California for interstate shipment to markets throughout the Nation
- 11 more annotations...
- - has harvested a large cantaloupe crop there in each subsequent year
  - prohibiting the company from shipping its cantaloupes out of the State unless they were packed in containers in a manner and of a kind approved by the appellant. Because cantaloupes in the quantity involved can be so packed only in packing sheds, and because no such facilities were available to the company at Parker or anywhere else nearby in Arizona, the company faced imminent loss of its anticipated 1968 cantaloupe crop in the gross amount of $700,000. It was to prevent this unrecoverable loss that the District Court granted preliminary relief.
  - to compel the company to build packing facilities in or near Parker, Arizona, that would take many months to construct and would cost approximately $200,000. After briefing and argument, the court issued a permanent injunction, finding that 'the order complained of constitutes an unlawful burden upon interstate commerce.'
  - even though the challenged order expressly forbids the interstate bulk shipment of the company's cantaloupes, it imposes no burden upon interstate commerce. If the Arizona Act is complied with, he argues, all that will be regulated will be the intrastate packing of goods destined for interstate commerce
  - criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that emerges can be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
  - in terms of 'direct' and 'indirect' effects and burdens.
  - are the requirements that fruits and vegetables shipped from Arizona meet certain standards of wholesomeness and quality, and that they be packed in standard containers in such a way that the outer layer or exposed portion of the pack does not 'materially misrepresent' the quality of the lot as a whole.
  - of exceptionally high quality
  - The appellant, in other words, is not complaining because the company is putting the good name of Arizona on an inferior or deceptively packaged product, but because it is not putting that name on a product that is superior and well packaged.
  - appellant argues that the above cases are different because they involved statutes whose express or concealed purpose was to preserve or secure employment for the home State, while here the statute is a regulatory one and there is no hint of such a purpose. But in Toomer v. Witsell, supra, the Court indicated that such a burden upon interstate commerce is unconstitutional even in the absence of such a purpose.
  - order issued under the Arizona statute does not impose such rigidity on an entire industry, it does impose just such a straitjacket on the appellee company with respect to the allocation of its interstate resources
Dept. of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 06666 (2008) on 2009-10-26
- ere is whether Kentucky’s version of this differential tax scheme offends the Commerce Clause. We hold that it does not.
- e Commonwealth of Kentucky taxes its residents’ income
- 35 more annotations...
- - Interest on bonds issued by Kentucky and its political subdivisions is thus entirely exempt,³ whereas interest on municipal bonds of other States and their subdivisions is taxable. (Interest on bonds issued by private entities is taxed by Kentucky regardless of the private issuer’s home.)
    
    3
    The ostensible reason for this regime is the attractiveness of tax-exempt bonds at “lower rates of interest … than that paid on taxable … bonds of comparable risk.
  - Kentucky and its subdivisions issued $7.7 billion in long-term bonds to pay for spending on transportation, public safety, education, utilities, and environmental protection, among other things.
  - Funding the work of government this way follows a tradition going back as far as the 17th century. S
  - The municipal bond market had swelled by the mid-1840s, when the aggregate debt of American cities exceeded $27 million, and the total debt of the States was nearly 10 times that amount
  - Differential tax schemes like Kentucky’s have a long pedigree, too. State income taxation became widespread in the early 20th century,
  - espondents George and Catherine Davis are Kentucky residents who paid state income tax on interest from out-of-state municipal bonds, and then sued the tax collectors in state court on a refund claim that Kentucky’s differential taxation of municipal bond income impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the National Constitution
  - relying in part on our cases recognizing the “market-participant” exception to the dormant Commerce Clause limit on state regulation
  - In a brief discussion, it rejected the reasoning of an Ohio case upholding a similar tax scheme challenged under the Commerce Clause
  - The Commerce Clause empowers Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce … among the several States,” Art. I, §8, cl. 3, and although its terms do not expressly restrain “the several States” in any way, we have sensed a negative implication in the provision since the early days
  - law has had to respect a cross purpose as well, for the Framers’ distrust of economic Balkanization was limited by their federalism favoring a degree of local autonomy
  - essence of our federal system is that within the realm of authority left open to them under the Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal
  - discriminatory law is “virtually per se invalid
  - and an exception covers States that go beyond regulation and themselves “participat[e] in the market” so as to “exercis[e] the right to favor [their] own citizens over others
  - Our most recent look at the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause came just last Term, in a case decided independently of the market participation precedents. United Haulers, supra, upheld a “flow control” ordinance requiring trash haulers to deliver solid waste to a processing plant owned and operated by a public authority in New York State. We found “[c]ompelling reasons” for “treating [the ordinance] differently from laws favoring particular private businesses over their competitors
  - And if more had been needed to show that New York’s object was consequently different from forbidden protectionism, we pointed out that “the most palpable harm imposed by the ordinances—more expensive trash removal—[was] likely to fall upon the very people who voted for the laws,” rather than out-of-state interests
  - In United Haulers, we explained that a government function is not susceptible to standard dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny owing to its likely motivation by legitimate objectives distinct from the simple economic protectionism the Clause abhors.
  - This logic applies with even greater force to laws favoring a State’s municipal bonds, given that the issuance of debt securities to pay for public projects is a quintessentially public function, with the venerable history we have already sketched
  - this emphasis on the public character of the enterprise supported by the tax preference is just a step in addressing a fundamental element of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the principle that “any notion of discrimination assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities
  - United Haulers provides a firm basis for reversal. Just like the ordinances upheld there, Kentucky’s tax exemption favors a traditional government function without any differential treatment favoring local entities over substantially similar out-of-state interests. This type of law does “not ‘discriminate against interstate commerce’ for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause
  - may also be seen under the broader rubric of the market participation doctrine, although the Davises say that market participant cases are inapposite here. In their view, we may not characterize state action under the Kentucky statutes as market activity for public purposes, because this would ignore a fact absent in United Haulers but central here
  - make a fair point to the extent that they argue that Kentucky acts in two roles at once, issuing bonds and setting taxes, and if looked at as a taxing authority it seems to invite dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny of its regulatory activity
  - there is no ignoring the fact that imposing the differential tax scheme makes sense only because Kentucky is also a bond issuer. The Commonwealth has entered the market for debt securities, just as Maryland entered the market for automobile hulks,
  - when Kentucky exempts its bond interest, it is competing in the market for limited investment dollars, alongside private bond issuers and its sister States, and its tax structure is one of the tools of competition.
  - Kentucky tax scheme falls outside the forbidden paradigm because the Commonwealth’s direct participation favors, not local private entrepreneurs, but the Commonwealth and local governments. The Commonwealth enacted its tax code with an eye toward making some or all of its bonds more marketable
  - Issuing bonds must therefore have the same significance under the dormant Commerce Clause as government trash processing, junk car disposal, or construction
  - Concluding that a state law does not amount to forbidden discrimination against interstate commerce is not the death knell of all dormant Commerce Clause challenges, for we generally leave the courtroom door open to plaintiffs invoking the rule in Pike, that even nondiscriminatory burdens on commerce may be struck down on a showing that those burdens clearly outweigh the benefits of a state or local practice
  - First, it harms out-of-state issuers (i.e., other States and their subdivisions) by blocking their access to investment dollars in Kentucky. Second, it similarly harms out-of-state private sellers (e.g., underwriters, individuals, and investment funds) who wish to sell their bonds in Kentucky. Third, it harms the national municipal bond market and its participants by distorting and impeding the free flow of capital. Fourth, it harms Kentucky investors by promoting risky, high-cost investment vehicles. Fifth, it harms the States by compelling them to enact competing discriminatory laws that decrease their net revenues.” Brief for Respondents 9.
    
    38
    
    Even if each of these drawbacks does to some degree eventuate from the system, it must be apparent to anyone that weighing or quantifying them for a cost-benefit analysis would be a very subtle exercise.
  - but the unsuitability of the judicial process and judicial forums for making whatever predictions and reaching whatever answers are possible at all
  - The complexities of factual economic proof always present a certain potential for error, and courts have little familiarity with the process of evaluating the relative economic burden of taxes
  - it is not our business to suggest that the current system be reconsidered, if it is to be placed in question a congressional forum has two advantages. Congress has some hope of acquiring more complete information than adversary trials may produce, and an elected legislature is the preferable institution for incurring the economic risks of any alteration in the way things have traditionally been done.
  - we are being asked to apply a federal rule to throw out the system of financing municipal improvements throughout most of the United States, and the rule in Pike was never intended to authorize a court to expose the States to the uncertainties of the economic experimentation the Davises request.
    
    44
    The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
  - . I will apply our negative Commerce Clause doctrine only when stare decisis compels me to do so. In my view it is “an unjustified judicial invention, not to be expanded beyond its existing domain
  - Stare decisis does not compel invalidation of Kentucky’s statute. As the Court explains, it would be no small leap from invalidating state discrimination in favor of private entities to invalidating state discrimination in favor of the State’s own subdivisions performing a traditional governmental function
  - But rather than apply a body of doctrine that “has no basis in the Constitution and has proved unworkable in practice,” I would entirely “discard the Court’s negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
  - even those most prescient, could not foresee our technological and economic interdependence. Yet they understood its foundation. Free trade in the United States, unobstructed by state and local barriers, was indispensable if we were to unite to ensure the liberty and progress of the whole Nation and its people. This was the vision, and a primary objective, of the Framers of the Constitution. History, as we know, vindicates their judgment. The national, free market within our borders has been a singular force in shaping the consciousness and creating the reality that we are one in purpose and destiny. The Commerce Clause doctrine that emerged from the decisions of this Court has been appropriate and necessary to implement the Constitution’s purpose and design.
South Central Timber v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) on 2009-10-26
- held that Alaska's requirement that timber taken from state lands be processed within the State prior to export was "implicitly authorized" by Congress and therefore does not violate the Commerce Clause.
- the Alaska Department of Natural Resources published a notice that it would sell approximately 49 million board-feet of timber in the area of Icy Cape, Alaska, on October 23, 1980. The notice of sale, the prospectus, and the proposed contract for the sale all provided, pursuant to 11 Alaska Admin.Code § 76.130 (1974), that "[p]rimary manufacture within the State of Alaska will be required as a special provision of the contract
- 14 more annotations...
- - The stated purpose of the requirement is to "protect existing industries, provide for the establishment of new industries, derive revenue from all timber resources, and manage the State's forests on a sustained yield basis." G
  - must first decide whether the court was correct in concluding that Congress has authorized the challenged requirement. If Congress has not, we must respond to respondents' submission that we should affirm the judgment on two grounds not reached by the Court of Appeals: (1) whether in the absence of congressional approval Alaska's requirement is permissible because Alaska is acting as a market participant, rather than as a market regulator; and (2), if not, whether the local-processing requirement is forbidden by the Commerce Clause.
  - The first of these issues is whether Alaska's restrictions on export of unprocessed timber from state-owned lands are exempt from Commerce Clause scrutiny under the "market-participant doctrine
  - it had the effect of reducing the flow of goods in interstate commerce
  - Court upheld a South Dakota policy of restricting the sale of cement from a state-owned plant to state residents, declaring that "[t]he basic distinction drawn in Alexandria Scrap between States as market participants and States as market regulators makes good sense and sound law.
  - he Court rejected the argument that the city was not entitled to the protection of the doctrine because the order had the effect of regulating employment contracts between public contractors and their employees
  - State may not impose conditions, whether by statute, regulation, or contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that particular market.10 Unless the "market" is relatively narrowly defined, the doctrine has the potential of swallowing up the rule that States may not impose substantial burdens on interstate commerce even if they act with the permissible state purpose of fostering local industry
  - as a matter of intuition a state market participant has a greater interest as a "private trader" in the immediate transaction than it has in what its purchaser does with the goods after the State no longer has an interest in them
  - antitrust laws place limits on vertical restraints
  - Second, downstream restrictions have a greater regulatory effect than do limitations on the immediate transaction. Instead of merely choosing its own trading partners, the State is attempting to govern the private, separate economic relationships of its trading partners; that is, it restricts the post-purchase activity of the purchaser, rather than merely the purchasing activity
  - Viewed as a naked restraint on export of unprocessed logs, there is little question that the processing requirement cannot survive scrutiny under the precedents of the Court
  - We held that if the Commerce Clause for bids a State to require work to be done within the State for the purpose of promoting employment, then, a fortiori, it forbids a State to impose such a requirement to enhance the reputation of its producers
  - that the restriction is invalid by the fact that foreign commerce is burdened by the restriction. It is a well-accepted rule that state restrictions burdening foreign commerce are subjected to a more rigorous and searching scrutiny
  - I believe Alaska's in-state processing requirement constitutes market regulation that is not authorized by Congress. In my view, Justice WHITE's treatment of the market-participant doctrine and the response of Justice REHNQUIST point up the inherent weakness of the doctrine.
United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 051345 (2007) on 2009-10-26
- “Flow control” ordinances require trash haulers to deliver solid waste to a particular waste processing facility.
- We find this difference constitutionally significant
- 19 more annotations...
- - flow control ordinances in this case benefit a clearly public facility, while treating all private companies exactly the same
  - States and municipalities are not private businesses—far from it. Unlike private enterprise, government is vested with the responsibility of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.
  - it does not make sense to regard laws favoring local government and laws favoring private industry with equal skepticism. As our local processing cases demonstrate, when a law favors in-state business over out-of-state competition, rigorous scrutiny is appropriate because the law is often the product of “simple economic protectionism.
  - citizens of Oneida and Herkimer Counties have chosen the government to provide waste management services, with a limited role for the private sector in arranging for transport of waste from the curb to the public facilities
  - We should be particularly hesitant to interfere with the Counties’ efforts under the guise of the Commerce Clause because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function
  - been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States
  - The policy of the State of New York favors “displac[ing] competition with regulation or monopoly control” in this area
  - dormant Commerce Clause cases often find discrimination when a State shifts the costs of regulation to other States, because when “the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political restraints normally exerted when interests within the state are affected
  - could not detect any disparate impact on out-of-state as opposed to in-state businesses.
  - unnecessary to decide whether the ordinances impose any incidental burden on interstate commerce because any arguable burden does not exceed the public benefits of the ordinances.
    
    29
    The ordinances give the Counties a convenient and effective way to finance their integrated package of waste-disposal services. While “revenue generation is not a local interest that can justify discrimination against interstate commerce
  - increase recycling in at least two ways, conferring significant health and environmental benefits upon the citizens of the Counties. First, they create enhanced incentives for recycling and proper disposal of other kinds of waste.
  - Counties’ ordinances are exercises of the police power in an effort to address waste disposal, a typical and traditional concern of local government
  - In the alternative, they maintain that the Counties’ laws cannot survive the more permissive Pike test, because of asserted burdens on commerce
  - historical record provides no grounds for reading the Commerce Clause to be other than what it says—an authorization for Congress to regulate commerce.
  - today’s opinion makes clear, the flow-control law at issue in this case meets neither condition
  - Court’s policy preferences are an unsuitable basis for constitutional doctrine because they shift over time, as demonstrated by the different theories the Court has offered to support the nondiscrimination principle. In the early years of the nondiscrimination rule, the Court struck down a state health law because “the enactment of a similar statute by each one of the States composing the Union would result in the destruction of commerce among the several States
  - that the Court must choose between economic protectionism and the free market. But the Constitution vests that fundamentally legislative choice in Congress.
  - we held that “a so-called flow control ordinance, which require[d] all solid waste to be processed at a designated transfer station before leaving the municipality,” discriminated against interstate commerce and was invalid under the Commerce Clause because it “depriv[ed] competitors, including out-of-state firms, of access to a local market
  - Nor has this Court ever suggested that discriminatory legislation favoring a state-owned enterprise is entitled to favorable treatment. To be sure, state-owned entities are accorded special status under the market-participant doctrine. But that doctrine is not applicable here.
    
    72
    Under the market-participant doctrine, a State is permitted to exercise “ ‘independent discretion as to parties with whom [it] will dea
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1993) on 2009-10-26
- solid waste output continues apace and landfill capacity becomes more costly and scarce, state and local governments are expending significant resources to develop trash control systems that are efficient, lawful, and protective of the environment.
- so-called flow control ordinance, which requires all solid waste to be processed at a designated transfer station before leaving the municipality.
- 26 more annotations...
- - low control ordinance violates the Commerce Clause.
  - he town agreed to close its landfill located on Route 303 in West Nyack and build a new solid waste transfer station on the same site. The station would receive bulk solid waste and separate recyclable from nonrecyclable items. Recyclable waste would be baled for shipment to a recycling facility; nonrecyclable waste, to a suitable landfill or incinerator.
  - amortize the cost of the transfer station: the town would finance its new facility with the income generated by the tipping fees.
  - C & A Carbone, Inc., a company engaged in the processing of solid waste, and various related companies or persons, all of whom we designate Carbone
  - 23 bales of solid waste struck an overpass on the Palisades Interstate Parkway. When the police investigated the accident, they discovered the truck was carrying household waste from Carbone's Clarkstown plant to an Indiana landfill. The Clarkstown police put Carbone's plant under surveillance, and in the next few days seized six more tractor-trailers leaving the facility.
  - The court declared the flow control ordinance constitutional and enjoined petitioners to comply with it. The federal court then dissolved its injunction.
  - we confirm that the flow control ordinance does regulate interstate commerce, despite the town's position to the contrary.
  - The Carbone facility in Clarkstown receives and processes waste from places other than Clarkstown, including from out of State
  - The ordinance thus deprives out-of-state businesses of access to a local market. These economic effects are more than enough to bring the Clarkstown ordinance within the purview of the Commerce Clause. It is well settled that actions are within the domain of the Commerce Clause if they burden interstate commerce or impede its free flow.
  - whether the flow control ordinance is valid despite its undoubted effect on interstate commerce. For this inquiry, our case law yields two lines of analysis: first, whether the ordinance discriminates against interstate commerce
  - and second, whether the ordinance imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits
  - Commerce Clause to invalidate local laws that impose commercial barriers or discriminate against an article of commerce by reason of its origin or destination out of State
  - effects of the ordinance on interstate commerce goes far toward refuting the town's contention that there is no discrimination in its regulatory scheme. The town's own arguments go the rest of the way.
  - flow control ordinance discriminates, for it allows only the favored operator to process waste that is within the limits of the town.
  - rior cases teach that a State (or one of its political subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce Clause by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of the State, rather than through the State itself
  - the flow control ordinance is just one more instance of local processing requirements that we long have held invalid.
  - Put another way, the offending local laws hoard a local resource -- be it meat, shrimp, or milk -- for the benefit of local businesses that treat it.
  - The flow control ordinance has the same design and effect. It hoards solid waste, and the demand to get rid of it, for the benefit of the preferred processing facility.
  - flow control ordinance at issue here squelches competition in the waste-processing service altogether, leaving no room for investment from outside.
  - suggest that as landfill space diminishes and environmental cleanup costs escalate, measures like flow control become necessary to ensure the safe handling and proper treatment of solid waste.
  - Nor may Clarkstown justify the flow control ordinance as a way to steer solid waste away from out-of-town disposal sites that it might deem harmful to the environment. To do so would extend the town's police power beyond its jurisdictional bounds. States and localities may not attach restrictions to exports or imports in order to control commerce in other states.
  - Clarkstown maintains that special financing is necessary to ensure the long-term survival of the designated facility.
  - State and local governments may not use their regulatory power to favor local enterprise by prohibiting patronage of out-of-state competitors or their facilities. We reverse the judgment and remand the case for proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.
  - it does so to strike down an ordinance unlike anything this Court has ever invalidated.
  - What the majority ignores, however, are the differences between our local processing cases and this one: the exclusion worked by Clarkstown's Local Law 9 bestows no benefit on a class of local private actors, but instead directly aids the government in satisfying a traditional governmental responsibility
  - The Commerce Clause was not passed to save the citizens of Clarkstown from themselves. It should not be wielded to prevent them from attacking their local garbage problems with an ordinance that does not discriminate between local and out-of-town participants in the private market for trash disposal services and that is not protectionist in its purpose or effect

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