Dustin Burke's Profile

Whenever we send more troops, violence will spike almost by definition. This is for two reasons: a) the observer effect, more troops on the ground means more eyes on the ground, means more incidents get reported; b) more combatants means more combat.

Successful counterinsurgencies take 15-20 years. Unsuccessful ones take 9-11 years. Since 1816, 80% of counterinsurgencies have been successful, but when you control for whether those campaigns are being waged on domestic or foreign soil and whether the governments in question were willing to negotiate with the insurgents, the number can vary widely.

sent to the University of Washington by the Brigade Commander for 6 months to learn about how to start small businesses in preparation for deployment to Iraq.

focused on stabilization, which isn't taught in any of our officer courses or NCOES

sent to the University of Washington by the Brigade Commander for 6 months to learn about how to start small businesses in preparation for deployment to Iraq.

Stabilization, Development and Economics are linear processes in my mind. If the area does not have persistent security and the population's grievances are not addressed, then don't even worry about Development or "Economics."

for example, a “unit of motivation”? People need to “feel safe enough to go to work” but how is the feeling of safety noted? How is satisfaction with electrical services noted?

the movement of people from one behavior stock to another as a means of using and understanding soft variables. More people going to work indicates that more people feel safe enough to go to work. So going to work moves a person from the unsafe to the safe stock

he main model combines five sub-models that consider security, governance, services, economic development, and host nation security forces to provide a thorough examination of leverage points (e.g. adding surge soldiers to security detail, increasing access to electricity) that could, in combination, result in victory.

Giving civilian organizations — many of which show up during crises with little or no prior notice — a means of accessing Defense networks and portals is largely an unresolved issue

military should start seeking authentication mechanisms other than the Common Access Card system so unanticipated users can quickly plug into vital networks.

deployment estimates provided input for establishing concepts of operations and timing for military operations

used to track ships, provide delivery forecasts, and analyze what-if scenarios such as canal closings and maintenance delays

In addition to analyzing support for humanitarian efforts such as those in Rwanda and Somalia, and NATO operations such as those in Bosnia, USTRANSCOM and the Joint Planning Community used JFAST to determine the transportation feasibility of U.S. National Defense Plans

JFAST uses Object Linking and Embedding

one mouse click produces a twenty slide briefing in approximately thirty seconds

JFAST receives movement requirements from the Joint Operations, Planning and Execution System (JOPES) as a part of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). Data regarding airlift and sealift apportionments and port characteristics are received from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the respective Component Commands (AMC, MSC and SDDC). Aircraft characteristics data are received from the Air Force’s Table Management Distribution System (TMDS)

JFAST also has the capability to build notional plans (Time Phased Force Deployment Data-TPFDDs) by selecting and time-phasing major forces in a graphical user interface called the Notional Requirements Generator

NRG automatically estimates the combat support and combat service support, as well as the non-unit resupply-by class of supply. The TPFDD produced by NRG can then be loaded into JFAST for transportation analysis or sent to the JOPES database in GCCS

JFAST can export movement schedules and manifests to several external systems such as the Enhanced Logistics Intratheater Support Tool (ELIST), the Air Mobility Platform (AMP), the Airport of Debarkation Model (APOD Model), and the Global Transportation Network’s Exercise System (GES), the Global Decision Support System (GDSS) and downstream Command and Control systems (C2). JFAST has also been linked to the MAGTF Tactical Warfare Simulation (MTWS) through an XML data interface. This allows JFAST to communicate strategic scheduling and manifest information directly to the MTWS simulation which, in turn, models Logistics Over the Shore