Angus Ware's Profile

416 There.com users were approached at random. Somewhat amusingly, about 20 of those approached for each test did something unexpected. For FITD, they simply teleported away before the question could be completed. Even more oddly, over 20 people agreed to spend a few hours taking screenshots with random strangers.

The FITD approach, which depends on people feeling good about themselves, increased cooperation on the second request from roughly 55 percent to 75 percent. DITF did even better, boosting the fraction of those who agreed to the second request to over 80 percent—but only if the avatar making the request was white. If that avatar was black, the response dropped to 60 percent, which was statistically indistinguishable from the control.

The power to punish treason against the U.S. conflicts with the First Amendment freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from a question of mere theory, that conflict threatens to chill public dissent to the War on Terrorism. The government has already demonstrated its willingness to punish treasonous expression. After World War II, the United States won several prosecutions against citizens who had engaged in propaganda on behalf of the Axis powers. Today, critics of the War on Terrorism likewise face accusations of treason. Under the law of treasonous expression developed following World War II, those accusations could credibly support prosecutions. Any such prosecutions could win convictions, moreover, unless courts narrow the law of treasonous expression to satisfy the First Amendment. That potential clash between the power to punish treason and our freedoms of expression has, thanks to advances in communications technologies, become a matter of everyday concern.

In terms of abstract doctrine, the law of treason condemns anyone who owes allegiance to the U.S., who adheres to U.S. enemies, and who gives them aid and comfort by an overt act to which two witnesses testify. As courts have applied that doctrine, however, it threatens any citizen or resident of the U.S. who publicly expresses disloyal sentiments. The Internet has made it cheap, easy, and dangerous to publish such sentiments. It hosts many an expression that an eager prosecutor could cite both as proof of adherence to U.S. enemies — a subjective state of mind — and as proof of an overt act giving them aid and comfort — an objective fact to which any two of the expression's readers could testify. Even if no prosecutions for treason arise, the alarmingly broad yet ill-defined reach of the law of treason threatens to unconstitutionally chill innocent dissent. This paper details the scope of the law of treasonous expression, explains why technology threatens to bring that law into conflict with the First Amendment, and suggests a way to safely separate the power to punish treason from our freedoms of expression.

Bell, Tom W., "Treason, Technology, and Freedom of Expression"
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Arizona State Law Journal, Vol. 37, p. 999, 2005 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=936889

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or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.680694

Hricik, David C., "Ethics of Blawging"
(January 1, 2006).
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=917180

As more and more people create personal websites and blogs, courts are more frequently asked to rule on questions related to the Internet boom. Specifically, an issue has arisen concerning what standard to apply in defamation suits brought against anonymous bloggers. Courts have wrestled with producing an appropriate standard for revealing the identity of an anonymous blogger who posts allegedly defamatory material on a message board or website. Recently, in Doe v. Cahill, the Delaware Supreme Court created a strict standard that makes it extremely difficult for defamation victims to bring suit against anonymous bloggers. The standard created is far too sympathetic to anonymous bloggers and fails to address important issues facing victims of defamation.

It is important not to silence communication on the Internet, but it is just as important not to silence victims of defamation. Therefore, this comment argues for the protection of libel plaintiffs facing defamatory comments from anonymous bloggers.

Malloy, Betsy, "Anonymous Blogging and Defamation: Balancing Interests of the Internet"
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Washington University Law Review, Vol. 84, p. 1187, 2006 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093525

To forecast how blogging will impact the practice of law, we need to consider how some similar, equally revolutionary technology has impacted attorneys. I nominate the clock radio. Given that example, you might suppose that I don't think blogging will radically change the practice of law. Correct. Blogging has many virtues. It offers a largely harmless outlet for extroverted cranks and cheap entertainment for procrastinating office workers. Blogging even stands to do some very real good. I have nothing against blogging; I blog, myself. I simply don't think it will change the practice of law very much. Why not? First, because blogs seldom offer the sort of detailed and applied legal analysis that a careful attorney must perform. Second, because an attorney would find it next to impossible to practice law via a blog without violating several rules of professional responsibility. I thus conclude that neither reading nor writing blogs will have a significant influence on the practice the law.

Bell, Tom W., "The Impact of Blogging on the Practice of Law: Hit the Snooze Button"
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Nexus Law Journal, Vol. 11, p. 75, 2006 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=922127

Wikileaks further states that, "in response to the attempted suppression, Wikileaks will release several thousand additional pages of Scientology material next week."