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Boumediene v. Bush - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia on 2008-09-16
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AEDPA applies in practice to those prisoners serving a sentence after having been tried in open court and whose sentences have been upheld on direct appeal, whereas the MCA suspends the application of the writ to those detainees whose guilt has not yet been legally determined.
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detainees are not required to exhaust review procedures in the court of appeals before pursuing habeas corpus actions in the district court.
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struck down section 7 of the MCA, but left intact the Detainee Treatment Act.
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Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 061195 (2008) on 2008-09-15
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We hold these petitioners do have the habeas corpus privilege.
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We hold that those procedures are not an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus.
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operates as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ
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it does not follow that a habeas corpus court may disregard the dangers the detention in these cases was intended to prevent.
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the Suspension Clause does not resist innovation in the field of habeas corpus
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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) on 2008-09-10
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that petitioner Yaser Hamdi's detention was legally authorized and that he was entitled to no further opportunity to challenge his enemy-combatant label.
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We hold that although Congress authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged here, due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.
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whether the Executive has the authority to detain citizens who qualify as "enemy combatants.
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whether the detention of citizens falling within that definition is authorized.
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no explicit congressional authorization is required, because the Executive possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant to Article II of the Constitution.
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Congress has in fact authorized Hamdi's detention, through the AUMF.
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We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the "necessary and appropriate force" Congress has authorized the President to use.
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in permitting the use of "necessary and appropriate force," Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here.
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Hamdi's detention could last for the rest of his life.
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If the record establishes that United States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan, those detentions are part of the exercise of "necessary and appropriate force," and therefore are authorized by the AUMF.
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]To the extent that JUSTICE SCALIA accepts the precedential value of Quirin, he argues that it cannot guide our inquiry here because "[i]n Quirin it was uncontested that the petitioners were members of enemy forces," while Hamdi challenges his classification as an enemy combatant. Post, at 571. But it is unclear why, in the paradigm outlined by JUSTICE SCALIA, such a concession should have any relevance. JUSTICE SCALIA envisions a system in which the only options are congressional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or prosecution for treason or some other crime. Post, at 554. He does not explain how his historical analysis supports the addition of a third option—detention under some other process after concession of enemy-combatant status—or why a concession should carry any different effect than proof of enemy-combatant status in a proceeding that comports with due process. To be clear, our opinion only finds legislative authority to detain under the AUMF once it is sufficiently clear that the individual is, in fact, an enemy combatant
[...]; whether that is established by concession or by some other process that verifies this fact with sufficient certainty seems beside the point.
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we necessarily reject the Government's assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances
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t most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.
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while we do not question that our due process assessment must pay keen attention to the particular burdens faced by the Executive in the context of military action, it would turn our system of checks and balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his government, simply because the Executive opposes making available such a challenge.
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Since the Government has given no reason either to deflect the application of § 4001(a) or to hold it to be satisfied, I need to go no further; the Government hints of a constitutional challenge to the statute, but it presents none here.
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the President is not Commander in Chief of the country, only of the military
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must at least be limited by the emergency; Hamdi has been locked up for over two years.
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Where the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our constitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal court for treason or some other crime
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he principle "ingredien[t]" for "energy in the executive" is "unity
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They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry." Ibid.
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That is, although it is appropriate for the Court to determine the judicial question whether the President has the asserted authority, see,
e.g., Ex parte Endo, supra, we lack the information and expertise to question whether Hamdi is actually an enemy combatant, a question the resolution of which is committed to other branches.
[...]
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Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) on 2008-09-08
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whether the detention of petitioners by respondent for trial by Military Commission, appointed by Order of the President of July 2, 1942, on charges preferred against them purporting to set out their violations of the law of war and of the Articles of War, is in conformity to the laws and Constitution of the United States.
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n attaining his majority he elected to maintain German allegiance and citizenship or in any case that he has by his conduct renounced or abandoned his United States citizenship.
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All had received instructions in Germany from an officer of the German High Command to destroy war industries and war facilities in the United States, for which they or their relatives in Germany were to receive salary payments from the German Government. They also had been paid by the German Government during their course of training at the sabotage school and had received substantial sums in United States currency, which were in their possession when arrested.
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try petitioners for offenses against the law of war and the Articles of War, and prescribed regulations for the procedure on the trial and for review of the record of the trial and of any judgment or sentence of the Commission.
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by Proclamation, the President declared that 'all persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the United States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such nation, and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States * * * through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals'.
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denied access to the courts.
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Violation of the law of war.
25 2. Violation of Article 81 of the Articles of War, defining the offense of relieving or attempting to relieve, or corresponding with or giving intelligence to, the enemy.
26 3. Violation of Article 82, defining the offense of spying.
27 4. Conspiracy to commit the offenses alleged in charges 1, 2 and 3.
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Petitioners' main contention is that the President is without any statutory or constitutional authority to order the petitioners to be tried by military tribunal for offenses with which they are charged; that in consequence they are entitled to be tried in the civil courts with the safeguards, including trial by jury, which the Fifth and Sixth Amendments guarantee to all persons charged in such courts with criminal offenses.
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insists that petitioners must be denied access to the courts,
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enemy aliens or have entered our territory as enemy belligerents,
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But there is certainly nothing in the Proclamation to preclude access to the courts for determining its applicability to the particular case
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he Constitution and laws of the United States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military commission.
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provide for the common defence'
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that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases.
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Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our Armed Forces, has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals.
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Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.
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those who though combatants do not wear 'fixed and distinctive emblems'
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concluded that § 2 of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments cannot be taken to have extended the right to demand a jury to trials by military commission, or to have required that offenses against the law of war not triable by jury at common law be tried only in the civil courts.
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Since the Amendments, like § 2 of Article III, do not preclude all trials of offenses against the law of war by military commission without a jury when the offenders are aliens not members of our Armed Forces, it is plain that they present no greater obstacle to the trial in like manner of citizen enemies who have violated the law of war applicable to enemies.
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we conclude that Charge I, on which petitioners were detained for trial by the Military Commission, alleged an offense which the President is authorized to order tried by military commission; that his Order convening the Commission was a lawful order and that the Commission was lawfully constituted; that the petitioners were held in lawful custody and did not show cause for their discharge. It follows that the orders of the District Court should be affirmed, and that leave to file petitions for habeas corpus in this Court should be denied.
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Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952) on 2008-09-04
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whether the President was acting within his constitutional power when he issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation's steel mills
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resident's order amounts to lawmaking
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President was acting within the aggregate of his constitutional powers as the Nation's Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States.
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Should final determination of the constitutional validity of the President's order be made in this case which has proceeded no further than the preliminary injunction stage? Second. If so, is the seizure order within the constitutional power of the President?
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The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.
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his is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities.
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President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker
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The President's order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress—it directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President.
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Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) on 2008-09-01
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to redress the alleged deprivation of federal constitutional rights. The complaint, alleging that by means of a 1901 statute of Tennessee apportioning the members of the General Assembly among the State's 95 counties, 'these plaintiffs and others similarly situated, are denied the equal protection of the laws accorded them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by virtue of the debasement of their votes,' was dismissed by a three-judge court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2281 in the Middle District of Tennessee
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Apportionment of representatives
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Apportionment of senators
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Tennessee's standard for allocating legislative representation among her counties is the total number of qualified voters resident in the respective counties, subject only to minor qualifications
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'made no apportionment of Representatives and Senators in accordance with the constitutional formula * * *, but instead arbitrarily and capriciously apportioned representatives in the Senate and House without reference * * * to any logical or reasonable formula whatever
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the 1901 statute became 'unconstitutional and obsolete
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hese plaintiffs and others similarly situated, are denied the equal protection of the laws accorded them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by virtue of the debasement of their votes.'
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that the Court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, and (2) that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted * * *.'
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fail to come within that language of Article III of the Constitution
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court will not proceed because the matter is considered unsuited to judicial inquiry or adjustment
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The opinion reveals that the court rested its dismissal upon lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and lack of a justiciable cause of action without attempting to distinguish between these grounds.
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hat there are indeed some rights guaranteed by the Constitution for the violation of which the courts cannot give redress.' 179 F.Supp., at 828.
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that the court possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter; (b) that a justiciable cause of action is stated upon which appellants would be entitled to appropriate relief; and (c) because appellees raise the issue before this Court, that the appellants have standing to challenge the Tennessee apportionment statutes
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inappropriateness of the subject matter for judicial consideration—what we have designated 'nonjusticiability.'
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nonjusticiability, consideration of the cause is not wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather, the Court's inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded
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In the instance of lack of jurisdiction the cause either does not 'arise under' the Federal Constitution, laws or treaties (or fall within one of the other enumerated categories of Art. III, § 2), or is not a 'case or controversy' within the meaning of that section; or the cause is not one described by any jurisdictional statute.
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Dismissal of the complaint upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter would, therefore, be justified only if that claim were 'so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,'
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For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.
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We hold that the District Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the federal constitutional claim asserted in the complaint.
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egislative apportionment held unconstitutional, their suit presented a 'political question' and was therefore nonjusticiable.
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We hold that this challenge to an apportionment presents no nonjusticiable 'political question.' The cited cases do not hold the contrary.
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We hold that the claim pleaded here neither rests upon nor implicates the Guaranty Clause and that its justiciability is therefore not foreclosed by our decisions of cases involving that clause
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That review reveals that in the Guaranty Clause cases and in the other 'political question' cases, it is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the 'political question.'
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We conclude then that the nonjusticiability of claims resting on the Guaranty Clause which arises from their embodiment of questions that were thought 'political,' can have no bearing upon the justiciability of the equal protection claim presented in this case.
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Finally, we emphasize that it is the involvement in Guaranty Clause claims of the elements thought to define 'political questions,' and no other feature, which could render them nonjusticiable. Specifically, we have said that such claims are not held nonjusticiable because they touch matters of state governmental organization. [...]Brief examination of a few cases demonstrates this.
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We conclude that the complaint's allegations of a denial of equal protection present a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which appellants are entitled to a trial and a decision. The right asserted is within the reach of judicial protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) on 2008-09-01
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require manufacturers of prescription drugs to print the 'established name' of the drug 'prominently and in type at least half as large as that used thereon for any proprietary name or designation for such drug,' on labels and other printed material
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many of the drugs sold under familiar trade names are actually identical to drugs sold under their 'established' or less familiar trade names at significantly lower prices.
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If the label or labeling of a prescription drug bears a proprietary name or designation for the drug or any ingredient thereof, the established name, if such there be, corresponding to such proprietary name or designation, shall accompany each appearance of such proprietary name or designation.' 21 CFR § 1.104(g)(1).
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the Commissioner exceeded his authority under the statute by promulgating an order requiring labels, advertisements, and other printed matter relating to prescription drugs to designate the established name of the particular drug involved every time its trade name is used anywhere in such material.
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We conclude that nothing in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act itself precludes this action.
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its basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.
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whether the statute was properly construed by the Commissioner to require the established name of the drug to be used every time the proprietary name is employed.
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its promulgation puts petitioners in a dilemma that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to ameliorate.
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Where the legal issue presented is fit for judicial resolution, and where a regulation requires an immediate and significant change in the plaintiffs' conduct of their affairs with serious penalties attached to noncompliance, access to the courts under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act must be permitted, absent a statutory bar or some other unusual circumstance, neither of which appears here.
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Oyez: Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), U.S. Supreme Court Case Summary & Oral Argument on 2008-08-26
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Charles Dickerson made statements to authorities admitting that he was the getaway driver in a series of bank robberies.
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May Congress legislatively overrule Miranda v. Arizona and its warnings that govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation?
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No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Miranda governs the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.
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Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428 (2000) on 2008-08-25
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Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501 which in essence laid down a rule that the admissibility of such statements should turn only on whether or not they were voluntarily made. We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. We therefore hold that Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.
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While Bram was decided before Brown and its progeny, f[F]or the middle third of the 20th century our cases based the rule against admitting coerced confessions primarily, if not exclusively, on notions of due process.
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individual will not be "accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
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Given §3501's express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and the instruction for trial courts to consider a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to the circumstances of a confession, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress intended by its enactment to overrule Miranda.
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whether Congress has constitutional authority to thus supersede Miranda
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This Court has supervisory authority over the federal courts, and we may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are binding in those tribunals
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Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution
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But Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution
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whether the Miranda Court announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of congressional direction
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both Miranda and two of its companion cases applied the rule to proceedings in state courts-to wit,
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In fact, the majority opinion is replete with statements indicating that the majority thought it was announcing a constitutional rule.
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did not meet constitutional standards
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iranda Court's invitation for legislative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination
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Constitution would not preclude legislative solutions that differed from the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were "at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it
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In sum, we conclude that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. Following the rule of stare decisis, we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
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Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) on 2008-08-25
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no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court's considered interpretation of the United States Constitution.
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Specifically it involves actions by the Governor and Legislature of Arkansas upon the premise that they are not bound by our holding in Brown v. Board of Education
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First came, in November 1956, an amendment to the State Constitution flatly commanding the Arkansas General Assembly to oppose 'in every Constitutional manner the Un-constitutional desegregation decisions of May 17, 1954 and May 31, 1955 of the United States Supreme Court,' Ark.Const.Amend. 44, and, through the initiative, a pupil assignment law,
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law relieving school children from compulsory attendance at racially mixed schools, Ark.Stats. § 80-1525, and a law establishing a State Sovereignty Commission,
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Governor of Arkansas who dispatched units of the Arkansas National Guard to the Central High School grounds and placed the school 'off limits' to colored students.
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no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government, * * * denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State's power, his act is that of the State. This must be so, or the constitutional prohibition has no meaning
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the constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in school admission on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in the Brown case can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted 'ingeniously or ingenuously.'
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Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the 'supreme Law of the Land
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he fundamental and paramount law of the nation,'
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federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution
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No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.
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State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds, or property cannot be squared with the Amendment's command that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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