September 2, 2001, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Military suffers a serious credibility problem, by Carlos H. Conde,

September 2, 2001, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Military suffers a serious credibility problem, by Carlos H. Conde, 

IN THURSDAY'S House hearing on the alleged connivance between the Abu Sayyaf and some elements of the military, Reghis Romero II could not hide his frustration. The committee on national defense had summoned the millionaire contractor and he left Congress feeling a bit enraged. "It's so frustrating," Romero retorted when asked by reporters how it was to be subjected to more than six hours of intense questioning. 

"What we're fighting here is the Abu Sayyaf, not the hostages. But it seems we are the ones being investigated," he said. Days before Romero got exasperated, Brig. Gen. Romeo Dominguez, former commanding officer of the First Infantry Division, told reporters: "It is my word as a soldier against that of a priest." And in the Philippines, he added, "a priest would not tell a lie and a soldier would not tell the truth." 

Clearly, the military is suffering from a serious credibility problem. This, coupled with the sheer inability of the AFP to explain satisfactorily why the Abu Sayyaf bandits were able to "escape" the diocesan compound in Lamitan, Basilan, on June 2, is the reason why more and more people tend to believe the allegation of connivance leveled against Dominguez and other military officers by Lamitan parish priest Cirilo Nacorda and many of his parishioners. 

  
"I just couldn't believe how the Abu Sayyaf could have escaped. Either the military was so stupid or they were bought," says Nong Nani, a taxi driver in Davao City. Sen. Aquilino Pimentel Jr., a Mindanaoan, recently told a discussion group on the Internet: "I will take his (Father Nacorda's) word against any self-serving official of the government." 

Fr. Eliseo Mercado Jr., OMI, a leading Mindanao peace advocate based in Cotabato City, also said: "Father Nacorda's claim that there is collusion between the Abu Sayyaf and some elements of the AFP is also the claim of the many peoples in Mindanao." It did not help that, days before Father Nacorda came out with his allegation, two generals had asked him not to reveal what he knew. "Do not entertain the media. Do not talk to them. You are hurting us," Father Nacorda quoted one of the generals as telling him. 

The priest told the general: "I am a Christian. We are taught to speak the truth and to stand for the truth. I am a priest. I am supposed to be a model of the Christian community." To Prof. Benito Lim, who teaches East Asian studies at the University of the Philippines and an acknowledged expert on security concerns in Southeast Asia, nothing about the allegation is surprising. "I am not surprised," he says. Indeed, the public, least of all the military, should not be surprised that some people--credible people, may we point out--have come out to accuse some military officers of colluding with the Abu Sayyaf. It's not as though this is the first time something like this happened. 

Tales of Collusion 

In any of the several conflict areas in Mindanao, people tell tales of collusion. During the war between the Moro National Liberation Front and the government, reporters covering the conflict had told of instances when troops would "consult" with the rebels before firing away. But one of the most definitive accounts of this collusion between the military and the Abu Sayyaf was in the book "Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao" by veteran journalists Marites Danguilan-Vitug and Glenda Gloria. 

The Abu Sayyaf was founded by Abdurajak Janjalani, the brother of present leader Khaddafy Janjalani, as part of the revival of Islamic fundamentalism in Southern Philippines. But the book says its wave of terror, mainly through kidnapping and banditry, started when Edwin Angeles, one of Abdurajak's trusted men, betrayed the group. It turned out that Angeles was a police informant who, the book says, may have tipped off the authorities on Janjalani, who was killed by government men in 1998. Interestingly, Angeles had gotten very close to Khaddafy. 

"Many observed that it was only when Angeles came into the picture that the Abu Sayyaf turned to banditry and kidnapping," Vitug and Gloria wrote. They also quoted Melham Alam, a friend of Abdurajak's who led a group of MNLF renegades at that time, as saying, "I was advising him (Abdurajak) against Angeles. He never listened." After Abdurajak's death, the police and the Department of the Interior and Local Government under then Secretary Rafael Alunan III used Angeles more often in the government's anti-terrorist campaign. The PNP intelligence used Angeles throughout 1995. 

Maj. Gen. Benjamin Libarnes, former chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Isafp) told the authors: "He's a crazy guy who deals only for the sake of money. I don't know why they (the PNP) used him." Vitug and Gloria provided an explanation for that puzzle: "The man knew the ins and outs of the Abu Sayyaf and the dynamics within the Muslim armed movement in general. Though dangerous, Angeles appeared to be of some use to the PNP at the time, so the gods played with him." 

In the book, Chief Supt. Rodolfo "Boogie" Mendoza of the PNP said that he received orders to handle Angeles. "I had the impression he was also being handled by somebody higher." "Under the Crescent Moon" also alleges that Angeles and the Abu Sayyaf were used by the Marines in Basilan. "A senior Army general assigned to Basilan says the Marines on the island used Angeles to the hilt, believing that propping up the Abu Sayyaf through him would neutralize the MNLF in the province and in the whole Western Mindanao," the book says. 

The MNLF was convinced, according to the book, that the Abu Sayyaf enjoyed the support of the military. An MNLF commander told the two authors that, at one time, his group called the Abu Sayyaf to help them repulse the Marines who had raided an MNLF camp in Kapawayan, Isabela. The Abu Sayyaf did respond but "they just made their presence felt and no single shot was fired from (the Abu Sayyaf)." 

The MNLF commander said he was shocked when Angeles radioed the Marines "to clarify to them that the encounter was not with the Abu Sayyaf but with the MNLF." The commander said he was so enraged he nearly shot Angeles right there and then. 

Hard to believe? 

According to the book, even AFP officials had grown suspicious of the military's involvement with the bandits, especially because of the Abu Sayyaf's successful evasion of troops during operations. "How can a band of criminals with no military training to speak of withstand the full might of the armed forces, slip through the troop cordon and conduct kidnapping right under the very noses of government troops?" asked Lt. Col. Ricardo Morales in a 1994 article for a journal. "Something is terribly wrong with our Armed Forces," he added. Army Capt. Rene Jarque, who has since retired from the service, was convinced that the Abu Sayyaf's ability to evade military operations "for too long on a tiny island lends credence to reports that military units have been ordered to halt operations when the Abu Sayyaf head, Janjalani, (was) already within reach." 

The book points out that, in 1995, military officers would wonder why the Abu Sayyaf "knew when they were going to be attacked, and Janjalani was always able to escape even a very tight dragnet." To National Security Adviser Roilo Golez, however, the charge that the military colluded with the Abu Sayyaf is simply too hard to believe. "These are very professional soldiers," he said. 

"It's hard to imagine how the soldiers could even have the time to collude. If there are lapses, that we can accept but to say that they were in cahoots is another thing," Golez says. Then he adds: "The Philippine military does not have a history of selling out. We have a long history of gallantry." 

But Joel Virador, secretary general of the human rights group Karapatan in Davao City, refutes Golez's assertion. He says the military is now reaping the fruits of its alleged collusion with the Abu Sayyaf. "It has a very serious credibility problem. No one believes the AFP and the police anymore. To make matters worse, our authorities are also being accused of involvement in drugs and other criminal activities. They should give us one reason why we should believe them in denying their involvement with the Abu Sayyaf," Virador said. 

It would take a long, long while for the AFP to regain its credibility, Virador said. "Bear in mind that the AFP never got out of the mold, out of the morass that Marcos created. It never recovered its dignity and credibility since martial law." Evelyn Carias, executive director of the Moro women's group Khadidja, likewise believes that the AFP has a serious credibility problem that is the product of its own abuses. "The human rights abuses in Moro areas, the intensified militarization of Moro communities, the all-out war by Estrada, these have tarnished the image and credibility of the AFP. The allegation of collusion, therefore, is not surprising," Carias said. 

Carias added that it should now be incumbent upon Congress to investigate the earlier activities of the Abu Sayyaf and their possible involvement with the military. "This collusion has apparently been going on for sometime. Nobody dared to check that abuse and now they have become so daring. Thankfully, there is a Father Nacorda who dared to speak out," she said.