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July 21, 2002, New York Times Magazine, It Only Looks Like Vietnam, by Donovan Webster,

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July 21, 2002, New York Times Magazine, It Only Looks Like Vietnam, by Donovan Webster,

Basilan Island should be a tourist paradise, one of the world's most visited beach destinations. Just a dot on the map -- 10 miles off the southernmost Philippine state of Mindanao -- Basilan has cathedral-like rain forests, volcanic highlands draped in misty waterfalls and white-sand beaches so clean they appear sifted from confectioners' sugar.

At the moment, though, the only foreigners here are 600 United States soldiers -- including 160 Green Berets -- billeted in 10 camps across Basilan's jungles. The reason for the scarcity of tourists is simple: a terrorist group called Abu Sayyaf, a loosely organized front of Islamic rebels with slack but well-documented ties to Al Qaeda. Its guerrillas regularly take -- and sometimes behead -- Christian and America-friendly hostages in the name of Allah, ransom, freedom from Filipino rule and whatever other useful excuses pop up.

As the leading edge of President Bush's spreading global war on terrorism, American troops have been on Basilan since late January. Their specific mission is to ''advise'' and train the Philippine Army, while also providing a stabilizing presence for the island's citizens.

Throughout the spring, the Green Berets have offered instruction in unit tactics, marksmanship, land navigation, communications and mission planning, all of which are yielding tangible upgrades to the quality of Philippine fighting. Filipino marksmanship greatly improved, too, after Special Forces trainers realized that many of the Filipino weapons were so old the rifling inside the barrels had worn away, causing bullets to veer unpredictably in flight. The Philippine military quickly released nearly 2,000 new and stockpiled M-16 A-2 rifles. The Americans also introduced encrypted radio transmitters (so the guerrillas could no longer listen in on army communications) and night-vision equipment.

Yet as these images vividly show, a specter beyond terrorism seems to hover over Basilan. This ghost is the American military experience in South Vietnam, where, beginning in 1961, U.S. ''advisers'' arrived for an open-ended stay in Southeast Asia. Fourteen years and 58,000 casualties later, American forces finally left South Vietnam, abandoning a mission that most Americans had concluded was misguided and unwinnable.

In the Philippines, the Pentagon has gone to great lengths to display its grasp of history. The American presence not only carries a specific end-date (perhaps as early as this month); it is bound by a number of severe restrictions. Under the Philippine Constitution, the active participation of foreign armies on Filipino soil has been banned since Washington decommissioned its last military bases there in 1992. Consequently, Special Forces were first allowed to conduct training purely on existing military posts. Only recently, during the last month of their mission on Basilan, have the Green Berets been granted approval to fine-tune smaller units in field maneuvers.

The Americans have also been confined by a second set of mandates. They may return fire only if fired upon, which so far has happened just once. Even more explicitly, the Americans cannot pursue Abu Sayyaf after engagement has been made.

The Pentagon, drawing another page from Vietnam history, is conducting a ''hearts and minds'' campaign designed to win over the local citizenry. A naval construction group is upgrading Basilan's infrastructure, improving roads, digging wells and erecting bridges to replace ones destroyed by Abu Sayyaf. It is also restoring the island's derelict airfield and upgrading a major harbor.

All of this carries with it the stated rationale of keeping the Special Forces efficiently supplied, though the Defense Department clearly understands the longer-term implications. ''If these improvements have secondary and tertiary benefits to the Filipino Army and the indigenous people of Basilan,'' says Brig. Gen. Donald Wurster, commander of American forces in the southern Philippines, ''that's O.K. with us.''

Five months into the mission, the combined Philippine-American push has shown signs of progress. Hundreds of families driven into Basilan's cities from their villages now feel secure enough to return home. And on June 7, on the Philippine mainland of Mindanao, a team of American-trained Filipino Rangers engaged an Abu Sayyaf cell that was holding three hostages. Two of them were the kidnapped American missionaries Martin and Gracia Burnham. In the ensuing firefight, Gracia Burnham raced to freedom while her husband and the other hostage were killed. Two weeks later, a smaller detachment of Abu Sayyaf was encountered in the waters off Mindanao by the Philippine Navy. Before this second engagement was through, an important Abu Sayyaf leader, Abu Sabaya, would be shot and killed while swimming from the scene, and four rebels would be taken into custody.These are undeniable successes, but limited. And still the shadow of Vietnam cannot be escaped. Abu Sayyaf guerrillas, like the Viet Cong decades ago, are melting into the local populace. ''They've left the jungle camps and gone back into the urban jungle,'' one local man told me during my recent visit there. ''Abu Sayyaf will disappear into the towns and cities until the heat is off. Then they'll reorganize and start their terrorism campaign again.''

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