September 1, 2001, Bulatlat, Issue No. 28, House Hearing on AFP-Abu connivance elicits more questions than answers, by Carlos H. Conde, more questions than answers, by Carlos H. Conde

August 26-September 1, 2001, Bulatlat, Issue No. 28, House Hearing on AFP-Abu connivance elicits more questions than answers, by Carlos H. Conde,

Bulatlat.com

As the House committee on national defense wound down its second day of public hearing last Friday in Isabela, Basilan, on the alleged connivance of the Abu Sayyaf and the military, it was apparent that more questions rather than answers came up. Basilan Rep. Gerry Salapuddin declared exactly that observation and urged the committee to investigate further.

Friday’s public hearing in Isabela City, the capital of Basilan which can be reached from Zamboanga via a 30-minute ferry ride, featured the side of the military officials accused by Fr. Cirilo Nacorda of having connived with the Abu Sayyaf during the latter’s siege of Lamitan last June 2. The connivance, Fr. Nacordsa has alleged, paved the way for the “escape” of the Abu Sayyaf members who occupied a diocesan compound in Lamitan on that day. Lamitan is 40 minutes by land from Isabela City; Fr. Nacorda is the town’s parish priest.

The military officials questioned by the committee for almost five hours gave long rebuttals to Fr. Nacorda’s allegation. Brig. Gen. Romeo Dominguez, the commanding officer of group tasked to go after the bandits and whom Fr. Nacorda accused of distributing ransom money in the town’s district hospital, was more emphatic on Fr. Nacorda’s lack of personal knowledge about the alleged bribery than on his denial.

Fr. Nacorda, he told the committee, "has no personal knowledge of the malicious accusations he has hurled against me. He was one kilometer away hiding in his church. There are no witnesses who can collaborate his accusations."

In an emotional statement, Dominguez even hinted that it was Fr. Nacorda who was in cahoots with the Abu Sayyaf, using as an argument the fact that, while Fr. Rhoel Gallardo was brutally killed by the bandits in captivity last year, Fr. Nacorda, who was kidnapped in 1994, was released unharmed. (Surprisingly, not one member of the committee challenged Dominguez’s insinuation, if only to question the logic, or lack of it, behind it.)

Colonel Jovenal Narcise, the commanding officer of the 103rd Brigade in Basilan at the time, also denied Fr. Nacorda’s allegations and his account of what had transpired.

But despite the officials’ testimonies and the repeated, sometimes heated, questions coming from the congressmen, this question was never answered: Why did the troops pull out from around the diocesan compound that housed, among others, the St. Peter’s Church and the Jose Ma. Torres Hospital?

This question is crucial because the pullout at around 4:30 p.m. on June 2 preceded the Abu Sayyaf’s “escape” an hour and a half later. By pulling out, the soldiers practically cleared the way for the Abu Sayyaf to leave the place along with their hostages.

Dominguez, Narcise and Capt. Ruben Ginulbay, the commanding officer of the Scout Rangers class that was earlier ambushed and nearly decimated by the Abu Sayyaf, had affirmed in Friday’s hearing that there was no order to pull out. Narcise later said that only the platoon leaders were called to a briefing.

What they could not categorically answer, however, was whether the troops, in fact, pulled out. Repeated direct questions by the congressmen – “Did the troops pull out or not?” – elicited a non-answer from Dominguez, Narcise and Ginulbay: “There was no order to pull out.” Surprisingly, no one among the congressmen pointed out that, at that point in the questioning, the congressmen were not asking anymore if there was any order to pull out– they were asking if there was, in fact, a pullout.

According to the witnesses who submitted their affidavits and who testified to the committee during an executive session in Lamitan the day before the Isabela hearings, they saw the troops pull out of the perimeter of the compound. This is the reason why only the militiamen confronted the Abu Sayyaf as they moved out of the hospital through a small iron gate at the back of the compound.

The witnesses, some of whom talked to this reporter last week, reiterated that they saw the Abu Sayyaf in single file and that they were walking casually, not on alert, along Veterans Drive directly behind the hospital toward the residential area at the back of the compound. This suggests that the bandits were certain no one would accost them outside.

Eligio Cordero, a 50-year-old carpenter whose house is along Veteran’s Drive, told me that the bandits left “normally,” their guns slung on their shoulders “but not on alert.” He said he was about seven to 10 meters away from the bandits as they made their “escape.”

Bukidnon Rep. Nerius Acosta was visibly intrigued last Friday when he confronted Ginulbay. If, as Ginulbay said, there was no order to pull out, that means the troops were still around and could have confronted the bandits. That, of course, did not happen. “Why?” Acosta asked. Ginulbay could only smile faintly.

At the end of the hearing last Friday, not one of the AFP’s officers and men under question answered the one nagging question that hung over their head the whole time: Where were the troops when the Abu Sayyaf literally walked away?

Aside from that question, there are others that, if taken together, could imply connivance or, in the words of Dr. Daniel Cawley, the medical director of the Jose Ma. Torres Hospital, “at the very least gross incompetence on the part of the military.” (On Friday, Dominguez said they did not determine any lapses in their response to the siege.)

First, Lamitan town is generally an AFP-controlled area. There are checkpoints in every strategic point in the town. At around midnight of June 2, the fully armed bandits arrived in three jeepneys. Why were they not detected? Considering that, as Dominguez had testified too, there had been Abu Sayyaf sightings in nearby towns even a day earlier, it is reasonable to assume that the Army in Lamitan, which had a tactical post in Campo Uno, was in full alert. So why did the bandits waltz in that easily?

Second, the two 6x6 trucks that fetched Ginulbay’s troops from the wharf were ambushed. Because the trucks were on a mission, it is reasonable to believe that Campo Uno expected these to be back at around 2 a.m. the latest from the wharf. But because the trucks were ambushed, they did not reach their destination. The question is, How come Narcise only learned of the ambush at 5 in the morning and how come the reinforcements to Ginulbay’s troops arrived only after 6 a.m.? Didn’t Campo Uno wonder what happened to the trucks and Ginulbay’s troops and should have promptly checked?

Third, why wasn’t Ginulbay’s Scout Rangers, who had by then been badly decimated due to the ambush and who were dangerously ill-equipped, not relieved from their post around the compound? This doesn’t make sense because, as Ginulbay himself admitted, it was the first time he and his Luzon-based troops sat foot on Lamitan, ergo they are not familiar with the terrain. If the intention was to adequately handle the Abu Sayyaf inside the compound, why did the Army not assign somebody familiar with the terrain and the situation?

Fourth, how could Dos Palmas hostages Reghis Romero and two other victims have escaped from a compound surrounded by high concrete walls and filled with around 50 bandits?

Fifth, why did the military assault the compound at around 1 a.m. of June 3, when the bandits had already left the compound eight hours earlier?

Sixth, why were some of the houses outside the compound burned to the ground? Residents said the burning occurred after the bandits had left. The military blamed the burning on the Abu Sayyaf and later said that the bandits had planned to sack and burn the whole town.

These are just some of the questions confronting the House committee on national defense. Unless its members come up with satisfactory answers from the military, the suspicion that soldiers and officials connived with the bandits will not disappear. Bulatlat.com