January 1, 2006, Southeast Asian Affairs, The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism, by Rommel C. Banlaoi, 

Since the Philippine government joined the global war on terrorism, it has been in hot pursuit of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Though government and media sources continue to describe the ASG as a mere bandit group because of the many kidnap-for-ransom activities (KRAs) it perpetrated in the past, the series of bombings that the ASG carried out in 2004 and 2005 were hallmarks of terrorism rather than banditry. Is the ASG mutating from a mere bandit group to a genuine terrorist organization?

Much has already been written about the ASG. But there is still little understanding of its exact origin, ideological inclination, organizational structure, leadership dynamics, operational capabilities, and recruitment strategies. This article aims to add value to the ongoing discussions on the ASG by focusing on such issues. It also aims to update the reader on the terrorist attacks conducted by the ASG in 2005 and to describe the Philippine government's counter-terrorism response.

The Genesis of the ASG

Though it is widely known that Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani founded the ASG, there is no uniform account of its exact origin.: According to media reports, the military allegedly formed the ASG in early 1990s to penetrate the ranks of Muslim radicals in Southern Philippines. The ASG reportedly acted as an agent provocateur of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).2 Edwin Angles (aka Ibrahim Yakub), who is believed to be Janjalani's co-founder of the ASG, was said to be the deep cover agent for the Defense Intelligence Group (DIG).3 Some sources even said that the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) facilitated the establishment of the ASG4 with the prodding of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).5 A Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) leader in Basilan even confessed that the ASG enjoyed the support of the military assigned to the area.6 The International Peace Mission that went to Basilan on 23-27 March 2002 found that there were "consistent credible reports that the military and the provincial government are coddling the Abu Sayyaf".7 But the AFP, the Department of National Defence (DND), and NICA have denied all these allegations. ASG leaders too have denied that the Group was a creation of the military. On 18 November 1994 Abu Abdu Said, then known as the ASG secretary-General, issued an important document entitled "A Voice of Truth" to describe the origin of the ASG. In this document, the ASG strongly denied that it was created by the military. It argued that the ASG was a radical movement aimed at pursuing the establishment of an Islamic State in Southern Philippines.

According to intelligence records, the ASG can be traced to disgruntled members of the MNLF who joined the International Islamic Brigade that fought the Soviet forces in Afghanistan from 1980 to 1988.8 After the Afghan war Janjalani and his followers formed a still unnamed group in 1988 to advance the idea of an Iranian-inspired Islamic State in Southern Philippines. In 1989 Janjalani called this group the Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF), which became the forerunner of the ASG. With the formation of the MCFF, Janjalani officially broke away from the MNLF in 1991. The MCFF was known in Mindanao as "Janjalani's group". Because the nom de guerre of Janjalani during the Afghan war was "Abu Sayyaf", in honour of Afghan resistance leader Professor Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the MCFF eventually became known as Abu Sayyaf s group. Some scholars and journalists mis-translated ASG to mean "bearer of the sword".9 But ASG really means in Arabic, "Father of the Swordsman".10

It was in August 1991 that Janjalani first publicly used the name ASG in connection with the bombing of MIV Doulos, a Christian missionary ship docked at the Zamboanga port in Southern Philippines.11 The bombing of MIV Doulos was a watershed event in the history of the ASG as it received international media attention for the death of two foreign missionaries and the wounding of 40 others. The ASG gained further international notoriety on 20 May 1992 when it assassinated Fr. Carzedda, a foreign Catholic missionary in Mindanao. Janjalani wrote an open letter claiming responsibility for the killing of the priest and warned of more violence to pursue its radical Islamist goals.

The ASG officially established its headquarters in Isabela, Basilan in 1992 and called it Camp Al-Madinah Mujahideen. The Philippine Marines captured this camp in May 1993, prompting the ASG to transfer its base to Patikul, Sulu. There, Janjalani closely cooperated with Ghalib Andang (aka Commander Robot), who headed the Sulu-based unit of the ASG. With the assistance of Commander Robot, the ASG embarked on vigorous manpower build-up, arms acquisition, and a series of fund-raising activities that involved primarily kidnapping for ransom.

To attract foreign funding, Janjalani renamed the ASG as Al-Harakatul AlIslamiya (AHAI), or Islamic Movement, in 1994. The ASG reportedly received financial and logistical support from like-minded organizations in Iran (Hezbollah), Pakistan (Jamaat-I-Islami and Hizbul-Mujahideen), Afghanistan (Hizb-Islami), Egypt (Al Gamaa-Al-Islamiya), Libya (International Harakatu'l Al-Islamia), and Algeria (Islamic Liberation Front). But the largest assistance allegedly came from the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) operated by Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law.

The ASG reportedly established links with Al Qaeda through Khalifa. But it was Ramzi Yousef who was said to have deepened the ASG's ties with Al Qaeda. The ASG's relationship with Al Qaeda was also facilitated by the personal friendship between Janjalani and bin Laden. Both stayed in Peshawar, Pakistan in the 1980s. Though Jason Burke argues that bin Laden did not directly provide funding support for Janjalani during the mid-80s,12 what is clear is that the ASG played a supporting role in Yousef s Bojinka Plot, which was foiled in 1995.13

From 1991 to 2000, the ASG reportedly engaged in 378 terrorist activities, which resulted in the death of 288 civilians.14 During the same period, the ASG ventured into 640 kidnapping activities involving a total of 2,076 victims. Because of its kidnappings the Philippine government preferred to describe the ASG as a mere bandit group. There was even a view that "the ASG is a mere homegrown criminal gang that employs terror tactics as its modus operandi".15 But the United States has listed the ASG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

Dr Samuel K. Tan of the University of the Philippines' Department of History provided a more scholarly discussion of the ASG' s origin. He said that the ASG started as a movement called Juma'a Abu Sayyaf.16 Dr Tan documented Janjalani's own account of the origin of ASG and wrote that Janjalani formed the ASG in 1991 as an alternative group of Filipino Muslim radicals who were disappointed with the secular leaderships of the MNLF and the moderate Islamist position of the MILF In fact, most of the original founders of the ASG were disgruntled members of the MNLF and the MILF In his undated public proclamation, presumably written between 1993 and 1994, Janjalani aptly stressed what he called the "Four Basic Truths" about the ASG, to wit:

1. It is not to create another faction in the Muslim struggle, which would be against the teaching of Islam, especially the Quran, but to serve as a bridge and balance between the MILF and MNLF, whose revolutionary roles and leadership cannot be ignored or usurped;

2. Its ultimate goal is the establishment of a purely Islamic government whose "nature, meaning, emblem and objective" are basic to peace;

3. Its advocacy of war is a necessity for as long as there exist oppression, injustice, capricious ambitions, and arbitrary claims imposed on the Muslims;

4. It believes that "war disturbs peace only for the attainment of the true and real objective of humanity - the establishment of justice and righteousness for all under the law of the noble Quran and the purified Sunnah".17

Zachary Abuza also provides his own historical account of the ASG. He divides the evolution of the ASG into the following periods: Founding Years (1988-91), Anti-Christian/Islamic State Terrorism including Deepening Ties with Al Qaeda (1991-95), Degeneration (1995-2001), Post-9/11 Global War on Terror (2001-2003), and Regeneration (2003 to the present).18 Though this periodization reveals Abuza's deep understanding of the ASG's history based on intelligence sources he consulted, his citation of police intelligence documents claiming that Ramzi Yousef encouraged the formation of the ASG did not stand unchallenged. There is a view that Janjalani formed the ASG not because of Yousef s prodding but as a result of the trend in political fundamentalist movements in the Philippines that began in the late 1980s.19 MILF founder Hashim Salamat commented that the emergence of the ASG "is caused by the oppression and the continuous usurpation of the powers within our homeland".20 Salamat also argued that "as long as the region and the Bangsamoro people are still under the control of the Philippine government, and oppression continues, we should expect more Abu Sayyaf style of groups to come to existence".

Ideological Inclination

The ASG's original ideology was anchored on Janjalani's religious and political thoughts. ASG followers recognized Janjalani not only as their leader but also as their ideological beacon.21 As an ideologue, Janjalani was well-informed of the historical, religious, economic, political, and social conditions in which Muslims in the Philippines found themselves.

At the early stage of world Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s and early 1980s,22 Janjalani travelled to different Muslim countries where he received training and education in radical Islamic thought. He received a very good Islamic education in Saudi Arabia in 1981 and went to Ummu I-Qura in Mecca where he studied Islamic jurisprudence for almost three years. There, Janjalani was deeply attracted to the concept of "jihad". Armed with radical Islamic ideology, Janjalani returned to his homeland in Basilan in 1984 to preach initially in various mosques before formally organizing the ASG. In 1988 Janjalani went to Peshawar, Pakistan, where he conscientiously studied the Islamic revolution in Iran. It was also in Peshawar that he reportedly met and befriended Osama bin Laden, who helped him organize the ASG.

When Janjalani formed the ASG, his original intention was to create a group of Muslim Mujahideen committed to Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah, a "struggle in the cause of Allah" or "fighting and dying for the cause of Islam". Before Janjalani died in December 1998, he delivered eight radical ideological discourses called Khutbahs, which may be considered as primary sources of Janjalani's radical Islamic thought. These discourses explained Janjalani's Quranic perspective of Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah, which he lamented was misinterpreted by many Muslims. He even denounced the ulama (Muslim scholars) for their poor knowledge of the Quran and lamented that most Muslims in the Philippines calling themselves Moros were not really practising the true meaning of Islam compared with their counterparts in West Asia. These eight discourses also revealed Janjalani's deep grasp of Wahabi Islam. Indeed, the Islamic theology of Wahabism greatly informed Janjalani's radical ideology.

In his analysis of Philippine society, it is clear that Janjalani was aware of the injustices committed against Muslim communities. Thus he purportedly founded the ASG to vigorously seek kaadilan or justice for Muslims through jihad. For Janjalani, jihad was the highest form of struggle for justice or for a cause. He classified jihad into two forms: jihad al-akbar (greater jihad) and jihad al-asgar (lesser jihad), but did not elaborate. He only argued that they "are the same in Divine assessment but are merely differentiated in human terms and conditions".23 He contended that the "surest guarantee of justice and prosperity for Muslims" is the establishment of a purely Islamic state that can only be achieved through jihad. Janjalani even urged Muslims in the Philippines to pursue their jihad to the highest level in order to fulfil their paramount duty of martyrdom for the cause of Allah. His appeal for martyrdom also means endorsement of suicide terrorism. Though there had been no recorded incident of suicide terrorism in the country at the time, Janjalani was aware of the value of suicide terrorism as a favoured tactic of radical Muslims pursuing jihad. Some years later, the bombing of Superferry 14 on 28 February 2004 was originally planned by the ASG as a suicide mission.24

One of Janjalani's Khutbahs revealed his deep resentment against Christian missionaries in Mindanao, particularly those maligning Islam. Janjalani said that the aggressive preaching of Christian missionaries in Mindanao gravely insulted Islam and provoked Muslims to respond violently. The bombing of MIV Doulos in August 1991 was the ASG's retaliation against Christian missionaries who used derogatory words against Islam and called Allah a false God.

Organizational Structure and Leadership Dynamics

Janjalani's original plan when he established the ASG was to form a highly organized, systematic, and disciplined organization of fanatical secessionist Islamic fighters in Southern Philippines.25 Towards that end, he conceptualized the formation of the Islamic Executive Council (IEC) to serve as the main planning and execution body of the ASG. He chaired the IEC with 15 other Amirs supporting him. The IEC was intended to have two special committees: (a) the Jamiatul Al-Islamia Revolutionary Tabligh Group to pursue fund-raising and Islamic education; and (b) the Al-Misuaratt Khutbah Committee to pursue agitation and propaganda activities.26

Janjalani also planned for the ASG to have a military arm called Mujahidden Al-Sharifullah with three main units to carry out the terrorist activities of the group: (a) the Demolition Team, (b) the Mobile Force Team, and (c) the Campaign Propaganda Team.27 But Janjalani's organizational plan for the ASG did not fully materialize because of his untimely death in December 1998. His demise led to the disarray of the ASG and resulted in the creation of two major factions in Basilan and SuIu. Janjalani's younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani, headed the Basilan faction while Galib Andang (aka Commander Robot) headed the SuIu faction. Though intelligence sources identified another faction in Zamboanga City headed by Hadji Radzpal, other intelligence sources also said that Radzpal actually belonged to the SuIu faction. In July 1999 these two major factions agreed to appoint Khadaffy as their new Amir.

Khadaffy, however, did not have the leadership quality of his elder brother to assert full control of the two factions. The Basilan group itself was factionalized, with ten armed groups in 2002 acting independently of each other. The Sulu faction, on the other hand, had 16 armed groups. All these groups carried the name of ASG. In Basilan, Khadaffy was not even in control of his own faction because he was overpowered by his deputy, Aldam Tilao (aka Abu Sabaya), who was then acting as the ASG spokesperson. There were also small bandit groups in Basilan and Sulu that wanted to be associated with the ASG for prestige. Thus the ASG became a very heterogeneous organization of factions and individuals with varying interests from radical Islamism to mere banditry.

Being heavily factionalized, the ASG quickly degenerated. The ASG went on a series of high-profile kidnapping sprees, prompting the Philippine government to label the group a "criminal gang". While there is no doubt that some ASG members continued to uphold the radical Islamist agenda, there are members, particularly in Sulu, who are just interested in KRAs. In 2000-2001 alone, the ASG was involved in 140 KRA incidents that resulted in the death of 16 victims.28 Some members see KRAs as a means of raising funds to finance their weapons purchase and ASG recruitment activities.

After 9/11, the ASG was very much on the run as a result of intensified military and police operations of the Philippine government. The conduct of the joint Philippine-American military exercise in 2002, dubbed "Balikatan 02-1", led to the neutralization of many ASG members, which included the death of Abu Sabaya in June 2002. The death of Abu Sabaya provided Khadaffy Janjalani the opportunity to take full control of the ASG, but only initially in the Basilan area. The SuIu faction continued under the control of Galib Andang. The capture of Galib Andang in December 2003 and his subsequent death in a bloody jail break attempt in March 2005 finally allowed Khadaffy to consolidate his leadership of the ASG and "bring the organization back to its roots".29

ASG Strength and Capabilities

The ASG started with no more than 1,000 members in 1991 and the number rose to almost 1,300 in 1998. According to the Philippines' Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF), ASG strength as of the last quarter of 2005 was no more than 350 members, very close to the figure of 380 during the second quarter of 2005 but well above its August 2005 figure of 250. An undersecretary of the DND estimated the current strength of the ASG to be around 500, close to the military intelligence figure of 409. Abuza has said that the current size of the ASG is around 250 to 300 "hard-core militants". In fact, there is no certainty about its current strength because some ASG members are also members of the MILF and the Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG) of the MNLF Other ASG members are even associated with the Rajah Sulaiman Movement (RSM), a group of Muslim converts in the Philippines believed to be funded by the ASG.30

While its exact strength is unclear, what is certain is that the ASG remains a very small but very lethal armed group of Muslims in the Philippines. Despite its small number, it draws its strength from a huge local support base. Most ASG members are relatives, friends, classmates, and neighbours of local folks. ASG members even buy their foodstuffs from local stores and get "early warning signals" from local communities during military offensives. The Philippine military has said that religious and political propaganda, financial compensation, and even coercion are the ASG's primary means of gaining local support in the form of manpower, intelligence, and sometimes logistics.31

Local support enhances the capability of the ASG. The AFP has reported that the ASG has the capability to stage "high impact terrorist attacks against civilian targets not only in Basilan and SuIu but also in other parts of the country".32 When ASG members fight, they "can pin-down up to a company size unit" and during military engagements, they are capable of "reinforcing beleaguered members in a short period of time", particularly in areas "near a Muslim village of an MNLF and MILF camp".33 There are even some "enterprising Muslims who join the fight purposely to acquire firearms and ammunitions left by government casualties".34

As of the last quarter of 2005, Philippine military intelligence estimated that around 480 weapons were in the ASG's possession. In previous encounters with the ASG, the military had seized night-vision devices, thermal imagers, sniper scopes, various types of commercial radios, satellite and cellular phones, and high-speed sea craft. Military intelligence assessments also indicate that some ASG members have enhanced their bomb-making capabilities as a result of joint training with JI members operating or hiding in the Philippines. Before his death in October 2003, Roman Al-Ghozi, known to be "the bomb maker" of the JI, admitted during interrogation that he shared his bomb-making expertise with ASG members. Rohmat Abdurrohim (aka Zaki), known as "the bomb trainer" of the ASG, confessed that he trained ASG members in bomb-making, including the use of mobile phones as detonating devices and the use of toothpaste tubes as among the bomb paraphernalia. Dulmatin and Umar Patek, wanted for the 2002 Bali bombing, reportedly trained some ASG members in bomb attacks. As stated earlier, Dulmatin and Umar Patek also prepared ASG members for future suicide missions. National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales was quoted as saying, "What we are looking for now is suicide terrorists, not (only) suicide bombers."35

The ASG has also developed the capability to use car bombs. Khadaffy Janjalani has boasted that he allowed training in 2004 of a long line of bombers who could hit targets in major cities in the Philippines. The ASG reportedly formed an Urban Squad in 2005 to stage bombing operations in the cities. It has also developed the ability to wage maritime terrorist attacks. Almost all ASG members have deep familiarity with the maritime domain, having belonged to families of fisher folks with a long seafaring tradition.36 The Superferry 14 bombing in February 2004 was a clear demonstration of the ASG's maritime terrorist capability. The group also conducted some maritime training activities in Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in June 2005. In July 2005, ASG and JI fighters received underwater training in Sandakan, Malaysia to attack maritime targets such as ports and commercial vessels.37 In August 2005, military intelligence disclosed that ASG leaders and some foreign terrorists met in Patikul, Sulu, to plan an attack on some beaches in Palawan. This prompted the Philippine government to intensify the security of major ports and beaches in the country to prevent any planned maritime terrorist attacks.

Because of the small size of the ASG, the Office of the President has belittled its capability by describing the group as a spent force. This is strongly resented by the ASG leadership. In an official statement, ASG spokesperson Jainal SaIi (aka Abu Sulaiman) argued that government officials are "belittling us, but they are exaggerating the problem of terrorism in the country".38 In a telephone interview pertaining to the Superferry 14 bombing, Abu Sulaiman also taunted the Philippine government by saying, "Still doubtful about our capabilities? Good. Just wait and see. We will bring the war that you impose on us to your lands and seas, homes and streets. We will multiply the pain and suffering that you have inflicted on our people."39

Though the membership of the ASG continues to be small at present, it is embarking upon vigorous recruitment drives to recover from the loss of its members who were killed, neutralized, and arrested after 9/11. It has various techniques to recruit members. Apart from religious propaganda and agitation, the ASG motivates recruits through financial rewards. It also pays local recruits to serve as second and third security layers at their makeshift camps. Some members start their recruitment process by initially befriending potential recruits through ball games or pot (marijuana) sessions. The ASG also utilizes deception to recruit members. ASG leaders allow young Muslims to bring their firearms and take pictures of them and then use the pictures to blackmail them into joining the group.40 The ASG also uses marriages to expand its membership. At present, the ASG is paying attention to younger and more idealistic MILF members who regard the ongoing peace process with the Philippine government as a sham. ASG leaders think that if the MILF makes peace with the government, they will inherit some of the MILF firebrands in Southern Philippines. MILF leader Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim warned that a great deal is needed quickly "before younger Muslims in the region succumb to the greater radicalism of the Abu Sayyaf".41

Reviving Radical lslamism, Returning to Terrorism

From mere banditry, Khadaffy Janjalani has been reinvigorating the ASG to be a "genuine" Islamic Movement that resorts to terrorism as a political weapon. Abuza is correct when he says that since the capture and subsequent death of Galib Andang in 2004, the ASG has not conducted KRAs. Instead, the ASG has waged a series of high-profile terrorist attacks, the most lethal of which, so far, was the blasting of Superferry 14. The explosion on Superferry 14, which carried more than 899 passengers, resulted in the death of 116 persons and injury to 300 others.

On the eve of Valentine's Day in 2005, the ASG masterminded three simultaneous bombings in Makati City, Davao City, and General Santos City. The bombings resulted in the death of at least ten persons and the wounding of 136 others. Abu Sulaiman said that the three bombings were ASG's Valentine gift to President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and warned that "we will not stop until we get justice for the countless Muslim lives and properties that you people have destroyed". Shortly after the 2005 Valentine's Day terrorist attacks, detained ASG members at Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig City conducted a jail-break attempt in March 2005, which was foiled. The attempt resulted in the death of five ASG members, including Galib Andang. In August 2005 the ASG waged another terror attack when it bombed the Dona Ramona ferry in Lamitan, Basilan. At least 30 people, including several children, were injured. Two weeks before the bombing, the ASG staged small bombing attacks in Zamboanga City, Koronadal City, and Cotabato City in Mindanao.

All these bombing incidents in 2005 were hallmarks of terrorism rather than mere banditry. They show that the ASG has already transformed itself from a bandit group to a genuine terrorist organization. There are indications that Khadaffy Janjalani is reactivating the Islamic Executive Council (IEC) of the ASG to advance the original Islamist agenda of Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiya,42 centred on establishing an Islamic State in Mindanao.

The Philippine Government's Counter-Terrorism Response

On 12 October 2001 the Philippine government announced its 14-point approach to combat terrorism. It also formulated in November 2001 the National Plan to Address Terrorism and Its Consequences. To coordinate all efforts of the national and local government in the fight against terrorism, the government formed the Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF) on 24 March 2004. This was followed by the adoption of a 16-point counter-terrorism programme to operationalize its 14-point anti-terrorism policy.

The ATTF serves as the government's anti-terrorism super body that aims to establish an extensive anti-terrorism information system and accelerate intelligence exchange among all the intelligence units in the Philippines to identify terrorism personalities, cells, groups, and organizations in various local government units.43 The ATTF is strongly pushing for the passage of an Anti-Terrorism Law.44 In November 2005 the House of Representatives started plenary discussions on the anti-terrorism bill and approved it on 14 December 2005. According to Speaker De Venecia, "approval of the anti-terrorism bill reflects our resolve to fight headon the threats of terrorism".

But with the current political crisis facing the Arroyo administration and the call by some sectors for constitutional amendments, it is unlikely that an antiterrorism law would be passed soon. The Philippine Senate does not even regard such a bill as urgent. Moreover, opposition leaders and cause-oriented groups have expressed apprehensions that such a law might be used as a pretext to curtail human rights and civil liberties.

The absence of an anti-terrorism law, however, weakens the Philippine government's hand in its fight against terrorism. There have been several instances of suspected terrorists being arrested but only to be released on bail because of the absence of a law permitting continued detention. The Department of Justice (DOJ) reported in 2005 that it had filed 156 cases against suspected terrorists and named 867 for committing criminal acts related to terrorism. Ten have been sentenced to death. In November 2005, an Indonesian national (Zaki) believed to be a JI member, and two ASG members (Abu Khalil Trinidad and Gammal Baharan) were sentenced to death for multiple murder and multiple attempted murder in connection with the Superferry 14 bombing. But the DOJ admitted difficulties in prosecution because of the absence of an anti-terrorism law.

To add teeth to its anti-terrorist efforts, the government had passed the AntiMoney Laundering Act in 2001.45 In December 2005 the US Treasury Department was reported to have frozen the assets of three ASG leaders: Radullan Sahiron, Isnilon Totoni Hapilon, and Jainal Antel Sali. The Philippine government has also been intensifying military operations against the ASG. Combined military and the police raids led to the seizure of ten sacks of explosive devices in March 2005 in Quezon City. These explosives were intended to be used during the 2005 Lenten season to bomb soft targets in Metro Manila. The military and police establishments were also able to arrest, neutralize, or kill several ASG members during encounters. The efforts of the two services significantly reduced the strength of the ASG from its peak of 1,269 fighters in 2000 to approximately 250 fighters in 2005, though as stated earlier, the current strength of ASG remains disputed. As 2005 closed, the ASG was conducting a vigorous recruitment drive in Mindanao to recover from the losses it had suffered.

On 11 November 2005, the AFP began its offensive operations against the ASG in Sulu. Using Italian made S-211 jets and two US-made OV-10B ground assault planes, the military dropped bombs on suspected ASG lairs in Indanan and Maimbong towns of Sulu. The Philippine Marines and Scout Rangers were also deployed to hunt down ASG fighters in these towns. By 20 December, 25 ASG members had been killed. But according to some in the Muslim communities, the military had targeted MNLF rather than ASG camps in Sulu. The clashes also resulted in the death of six soldiers, while 33 were wounded. Hundreds of local residents caught in the crossfire were displaced. Though the AFP utilizes military action to fight terrorism, it recognizes that a military approach alone cannot defeat the ASG.46

Conclusion

Despite its nebulous beginning and small number, the ASG continues to be the most lethal armed Muslim group in the Philippines. From mere banditry, the ASG has rapidly mutated into a post-modern terrorist group that can operate militarily, politically, and ideologically.47 It is reorganizing itself to pursue its radical Islamist agenda. It has enhanced its capability to wage traditional bombing activities, and developed new capabilities to conduct maritime terrorist attacks and suicide terrorist missions. Only time will tell when the ASG will use these new capabilities.

Because of the virulence of the threat posed by the ASG, the AFP is intensifying its military operations against the group while being fully aware that the problem of terrorism cannot be solved by military means alone. There is no doubt that the problem of terrorism needs to be tackled through a comprehensive long-term approach that takes cognizance of the social, religious, ideological, political, and economic contexts in which ASG members operate. Unless the government recognizes the contexts that give rise to terrorism, the threat will continue to menace not only Philippine national security but also regional security.

Notes

This article does not represent the official position of the Department of National Defense, the National Defense College of the Philippines, or any agency of the Philippine government.

1 For earlier attempts, see Rohan Gunaratna, "The Evolution and Tactics of the Abu Sayyaf Group", Janes Intelligence Review, July 2001; Glenda Gloria, "Bearer of the Sword: The Abu Sayyaf Has Nebulous Beginnings and Incoherent Aims", Mindanao Updates, 6 June 2000; and Mark Turner, "Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines: The Rise of the Abu Sayyaf", Contemporary Southeast Asia 17, no. 1 (June 1995): pp. 1-19.

2 Eusaquito P Manalo, "Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group" (MA thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, December 2004), p. 3; Mark Turner, "The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf", Public Organization Review 3, no. 4 (December 2003): 394.

3 Dorian Zumel Sicat, "Transcript of Interview with Elmina Abdul, Widow to Edwin Angeles Taken at Basilan Community Hospital General Ward Isabela City, Province of Basilan Republic of the Philippines", 10 March 2002, http://www.okcbombing. org/News%20Articles/deathbed_confession.htm (accessed 14 November 2005).

4 Mirian Coronel Ferrer, ed., Peace Matters: A Philippine Peace Compendium (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 1997), p. 218.

5 Jose Maria Sison, US Terrorism and War in the Philippines (Manila: Aklat ng Bayan, 2003), p. 37.

6 Marites D. Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs, Institute for Popular Democracy and Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2000), p. 217.

7 For a complete copy of the report, see "Basilan: The Next Afghanistan?" (report of the International Peace Mission to Basilan, Philippines, 23-27 March 2002), http://www. bwf.org/pamayanan/peacemission.html (accessed 30 August 2004).

8 Department of National Defense, "Info Kit on the Abu Sayyaf Group" (presentation before the hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security at the Philippine Senate, Pasay City, 30 August 2001).

9 See, for example, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Bearer of the Sword", Military Review, March/April 2002, pp. 38-47.

10 Jose Torres, Jr., Into the Mountain: Hostages by the Abu Sayyaf (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 2001), p. 35.

11 "Special Report on the Abou Sayaff " (briefing of MIG9 during the Southern Command Conference, 19 January 1994).

12 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: LB. Tarus, 2003), p. 101.

13 For a detailed account of the Bojinka Plot, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, War on Terrorism In Southeast Asia (Quezon City: Rex Book Store International, 2004); Maria Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia (New York: Lree Press, 2003); Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam In Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

14 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Knowing the Terrorists: The Abu Sayyaf Study (Quezon City: General Headquarters of the Armed Lorces of the Philippines, 2002), p. 1.

15 Carlyle Thayer, "Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia", Pointer: Quarterly Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces 29, no. 4 (October-December 2003): 58.

16 Samuel K. Tan, "Beyond Lreedom: The Juma'a Abu Sayyaf (Assessment of Its Origins, Objectives, Ideology and Method of Struggle)", in Internationalisation of the Bangsamoro Struggle (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 2003), revised edition, p. 94.

17 Ibid., p. 96.

18 Zachary Abuza, Balik-Terrorlsm: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2005), pp. 2-11.

19 Julkipli M. Wadi, "Philippine Political Islam and the Lmerging Lundamentalist Strand", in Cooperation and Conflict In Global security, edited by Carmencita C. Aguilar (Quezon City: International Lederation of Social Sciences Organization, 1996), p. 210.

20 Salamat Hashim, The Bangsamoro People's Struggle Against Oppression and Colonialism (Camp Abubakre: Agency for Youth Affairs - MILL, 2001), p. 36.

21 Nathan G. Quimpo, "Dealing with the MILL and Abu Sayyaf: Who's Afraid of an Islamic State?" Public Policy III, no. 4 (October-December 1999): 50.

22 For a detailed discussion on the rise of Muslim radicalism in the Philippines, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Radical Muslim Terrorism in the Philippines", in Handbook on Terrorism and Insurgency In Southeast Asia, edited by Andrew Tan (London: Ldward Llgar Publishing, 2006).

23 Tan, Internatlonallzatlon of the Bangsamoro Struggle, p. 98.

24 Because of continuing radicalization of Muslim communities in the Philippines, the ASG may employ suicide terrorism in the near future. Dulmatin and Umar Patek, key suspects in the 2002 Bali bombings that killed more than 200 people, have reportedly established their base in the Philippines to prepare ASG members for future suicide missions. In his speech to the Loreign Correspondents Association of the Philippines in Manila on 11 August 2005, National security Adviser Norberto Gonzales warned that up to ten Indonesian militants, including Dulmatin and Umar Patek, were on the loose in the Philippines and plotting suicide attacks. see Joel Lrancis Guinto, "10 Indonesian suicide bombers hunted in RP", Philippine Dally Inquirer Breaking News, 11 August 2005, http://news.inq7.net/breaking/index.php?index=2&story_ id=46552 (accessed 26 December 2005).

25 This particular section is largely based on Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case" (paper presented at the international symposium "The Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia" organized by the Institute of Defense Analyses in cooperation with the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism and the US Pacific Command held at Palace of Golden Horses Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 18-20 April 2005). Also in Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia, edited by John T. Hanley, Kongdan Oh Hassig, and Caroline F. Ziemke (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2005).

26 To know more about the strategy of the ASG, see Office of the Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Field Handout: Doctrinal Extract for the Abu Sayyaf Group (Headquarters of the Philippine Marine Corps, 21 January 2002).

27 For detailed discussions, see Banlaoi, "Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case", p. 4.

28 Abuza, Ballk Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf, p. 8.

29 Ibid., p. viii.

30 For a detailed analysis of the RSM, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, Urban Terrorism In the Philippines: The Rajah Solalman Movement (forthcoming, 2006).

31 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Knowing the Terrorists: The Abu Sayyaf Study, p. 13.

32 Ibid., p. 14.

33 Ibid., p. 15.

34 Ibid.

35 Michael Punongbayan, "DOJ to Lxpose Terrorists' Financiers, Media Handlers", Philippine Star, 7 November 2005.

36 For more discussions on the maritime terrorist capability of the ASG, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat", Naval War College Review 58, no. 4 (Autumn 2005): 63-80. Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: Threat of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism", in Violence at Sea: Piracy at the Age of Terrorism, edited by Peter Lehr (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2006).

37 National Security Council Briefing, 7 September 2005. Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Is the Philippines the Next Target? The Second Bali Bombing Brings Terror Closer to Home", Newsbreak, 7 November 2005, p. 33.

38 Cited in Abuza, Ballk-Terrorlsm: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf, p. 11.

39 Marco Garrido, "After Madrid, Manila?" Asia Times, 24 April 2004, http://www. atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FD24Ae01.html (accessed 28 August 2004).

40 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Knowing the Terrorists: The Abu Sayyaf Study, p. 41.

41 Simon Elegant, "The Return of the Abu Sayyaf', Time Asia, 30 August 2004.

42 Angel M. Rabasa, "Southeast Asia: Moderate Tradition and Radical Challenge", in The Muslim World After 9/11, by Angel Rabasa et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), p. 402.

43 For a detailed analysis of local government response, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Local Government Response Against Terrorist Threats in the Philippines: Issues and Prospects", in security Managesment in Asian Cities, edited by C. Durkop (Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2005), pp. 29-54.

44 For an early interest on the subject, see Lauro Patiag, "Towards a National Legal Counter Measure to Combat Terrorism in the Philippines" (MA thesis, National Defense College of the Philippines, 2002).

45 Noel B. Mianos, An Assessment of Government Efforts at Dismantling Terrorist Financing (MA thesis, National Defense College of the Philippines, 2004).

46 ASG Combat Research and Study Group, "After Action Report" (submitted to the Commanding General of the Philippine Army on 19 September 2001 by the Training and Doctrine Command of the Philippine Army).

47 The case of ASG is not an isolated one. Terrorist groups elsewhere are also undergoing profound changes. See Rohan Gunaratna, ed., The Changing Face of Terrorism (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2004).

[Author Affiliation]

ROMMEL C. BANLAOI is a Professor of Political Science at the National Defense College of the Philippines, where he previously served as Vice President for Administrative Affairs and Assistant Vice-President for Research and Special Studies.