July 16, 2007, Inquirer, Difficult questions that should be asked, by Ramon J. Farolan,

July 16, 2007, Inquirer, Difficult questions that should be asked, by Ramon J. Farolan,

MANILA, Philippines -- The headline of yesterday's Inquirer is a bit puzzling - "Home are the heroes." Our Marines have always been home. They were killed in their homeland fighting for their homeland. Just because their bodies have been brought to Metro Manila does not mean that they have been away from the country. Perhaps the headline reflects the view of imperial Manila.

We join the nation in mourning the death of 14 Marines killed in the ambush in Basilan. Our hearts and prayers go out to their loved ones in this time of tragedy and sorrow.

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There are some difficult questions that have to be asked in the wake of what has been described as "the most shocking debacle in years" suffered by the Marines who, along with the Scout Rangers of the Philippine Army, have long been considered the elite fighting units of the AFP.

First, where was the air support during the 10-hour firefight which started at 10 in the morning?

For the information of our readers, the PAF has one Tactical Operations Wing (TOC) covering the whole of Mindanao. This wing, the 3rd TOC, is actually headquartered at the Edwin Andrews Air Base (EAAB) in Zamboanga City but its units are located in Cotabato, Davao and Cagayan de Oro covering Eastern Mindanao. Other units covering Western Mindanao are based in Jolo, Sanga-Sanga and Zamboanga City.

The aircraft that responded to the call for support when the ambush took place were those from the EAAB consisting of MG-520 Defenders, Huey choppers and OV-10 Bronco gunships. The helicopters reached the scene of the conflict but were unable to contact the ground elements because of poor communication facilities and therefore returned to base. According to reliable sources, this was the first instance of a failure of communications between air and ground units in the South. I was also informed that the ground fighting was so intense and at close range that even with functioning air-ground communications, it would have been dangerous to apply any firepower into the conflict for fear of hitting friendly elements. The OV-10s were not utilized for the same reason; by afternoon, bad weather made it impossible to carry out any kind of rescue mission.

As with the mortar duds that have been the subject of media reporting, the issue of malfunctioning air-ground communications should also be looked into closely to prevent a repetition of similar problems. Somehow, I am reminded of billions of AFP modernization funds that have never been accounted for properly.

Second, who was the commander of the unit involved in the movement to and from the objective? Were proper procedures for tactical movements observed throughout the deployment considering that the unit would be operating in so-called "MILF-controlled territory"? Was there a failure of intelligence?

Third, what reinforcements were available that could have responded to the calls for support by the beleaguered unit? Were the ambushed Marines the only military force on the island or were there other units in the vicinity? Considering that the firefight lasted 10 hours, responding units should have been able to reach the Marines and even give chase to the attackers.

Fourth, the issue of so-called "MILF-controlled areas" within Philippine territory must once and for all be settled.

Why should the Philippine government recognize MILF control and jurisdiction over certain portions of the national territory? One reason being given for the MILF attack on the Marines is that our troops entered "MILF territory" without proper coordination. Since when did the AFP have to coordinate with an illegal group in order to operate in the country?

The recent outbreak is a reminder that this long-playing conflict, like the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir, is not any closer to a solution regardless of how many peace talks are being conducted or how many peace documents have been signed. The last one was sealed and signed at Malaca¤ang a few years ago amid much pomp and publicity with the presence of foreign dignitaries led by the Organization of the Islamic Conference secretary general. Now, nobody remembers what it was all about. The MNLF leader then was Nur Misuari and he is now in jail facing all kinds of charges although the government appears to be treating him with kid gloves.

Yesterday it was the MNLF. Today it is the MILF. A few years from now, a different acronym will be used but the fight will continue over the same issues.

Our readers should be reminded of a few things concerning the MILF. The late Gen. Arturo Enrile, a former AFP chief of staff, once said: "The MILF has a one-track mind. It not only wants Mindanao for itself, it wants to turn the island into an Islamic state." This is true today as it was more than 10 years ago.

We should also remember the lesson of Camp Abubakar located in Maguindanao. For years, because of the desire to keep the MILF rebels at the peace table, the national leadership allowed them to maintain Camp Abubakar as an exclusive enclave for their forces. The camp was virtually untouchable with heavily armed checkpoints controlling entry and exit into Abubakar. It was off-limits to Philippine officialdom, both military and civilian.

When we allowed the MILF to run Abubakar, it was taken as a sign of weakness, as an indication that we were soft and would accept any arrangement for the sake of peace. In response, the MILF moved to strengthen its position while making a mockery of the peace process.

One of the sensible developments during former President Joseph Estrada's stay in office was the order to re-occupy and dismantle Camp Abubakar and restore government control over the area.

In the light of so-called MILF-controlled territories, I am reminded of the term "failed state." A state remains strong if it maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within its borders. When this is broken by the presence of warlords, militias or terrorists, the existence of the state becomes dubious and is in danger of becoming a failed state. One definition of a failed state is a weak state in which the central government has little practical control over portions of its territory. We are close to becoming such a state.


More Inquirer columns

Previous columns:
A victory for senior citizens – 7/09/07
GSIS arrogance and ineptitude – 7/02/07
Winston Garcia and the GSIS revisited – 6/24/07
Senator Trillanes IV: random thoughts – 6/18/07
Voice from the past – 6/11/07
Raising kids and teaching flying – 6/04/07