This link has been bookmarked by 4 people . It was first bookmarked on 11 Oct 2007, by someone privately.
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14 Oct 07
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12 Oct 07
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Stability is needed to scale up alternative sources of energy sufficiently to replace crude oil during a transition period of decades.
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11 Oct 07
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the way in which worldwide crude oil production is going to decline. If it goes rapidly, declining with a few percent each year or more, than it will be very difficult to complete the energy transition without severe economical consequences. If production stabilizes and plateaus for a decade or longer, after which the period of long decline begins, it would provide much greater means to sustain the present economy
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sharp “peakers” are mainly represented by the experts within the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas (ASPO). The best publication out there so far is that of the Uppsala Hydrocarbon Study Group (UHSG), which is led by ASPO President Kjell Aleklett.
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production will peak between 2008 and 2018, at approximately 90 to 95 million barrels per day. With the more likely scenario stating that the peak is in 2012 after which a sharp decline occurs. By 2030 he suggests production could have declined towards the low point of 50 million barrels per day.
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plateau” forecasters are widespread. Coming from a variety of organisations such as the BGR, the World Energy Council and energy consultancy PFC Energy. The analysis of the latter results in maximum production being reached around 2014, at nearly 100 million barrels per day, which would be maintained for a decade after which a slow decline occurs.
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not likely that it will lead to widespread liquid fuel shortages. Other liquid sources or equivalent energy sources can in that case fill a large part of the gap between supply and demand that is going to occur.
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present situation – a plateau that started in 2005 - is stable for now as long as no major factors are going to change.
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until 2010, continued by a down sloping plateau until 2013 after which the decline sets is. In total this scenario amounts to total present recoverable (proven + probable) reserves of 1220 billion barrels, which is in line with current estimates from the IHS Energy database.
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two questions. For how long will the oil industry be able to add such a large amount of new production each year? And the second being, is the decline rate of 4% to 5% stable or will it increase or decrease in the future?
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discoveries peaked in the 1960’s and have been declining ever since. Presently we are discovering on average one barrel for every three consumed. The continuation of this trend, which is very likely given the lack of new regions that have not yet been explored, would imply a remaining amount of oil yet to be found in the order of 100 to 250 billion barrels. The effect of 170 billion barrels of new discoveries in the coming 15 to 20 years is shown in figure 4 below. This would extend the present plateau until approximately 2017, under the assumption that the present decline rate of 4.5% will remain stable.
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nconventional crude oil is not likely to have such an influence. With unconventional in this article I mean oil sands, oil shale, polar oil and heavy and extra heavy oil. Present scenario’s for these sources of unconventional oil estimate a production level between 8 to 12 million barrels per day in 2030 (Campbell, 2006; IEA, 2006). This is too little and too late. The effect of approximately 12 million barrels per day by 2030 of unconventional production is shown in figure 5 below, which only slows the decline setting in 2017 slightly.
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a sum of 500 billion barrels does not lead to an extension of the plateau, but to a much slower decline rate after the slightly higher peak.
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A set of 507 giant and supergiant fields, contain around half of the words presently expected oil reserves that are going to be produced, according to the IHS Energy database. Their share of present total production is 48%, or in production terms, 40 million barrels per day. From his model, Robelius expects that these fields are the main driving force behind the shape of oil production yet to come. When this group of fields, that has been on a plateau since the ‘80s, starts to decline, world production will go with them.
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deepwater production will also have a significant influence. Deepwater fields have a rapid upslope, a short peak and a rapid downslope, because that is the most economical way to produce the oil from deepwater fields.
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Conclusions
1)If the global decline rate of existing production of 4.5% continues, oil production is likely to plateau at a level of 90 million barrels per day around 2010 until the end of the next decade, after which a moderate to sharp decline sets in.
2)If the global decline rate of existing production of 4.5% slows down to 2%, thanks to the addition of 500 billion barrels due to reserve growth, production will likely increase with some bumps towards 95 million barrels per day at the end of the next decade, after which a slow to moderate decline sets in.
3)If the global decline rate of existing production of 4.5% increases to 8%, due to the effect that the end of the era of giant oil fields and declining deepwater production has, production will likely peak around 2010 at 88 million barrels per day, declining slightly to 80 million barrels per day at the end of the next decade, after which a sharp decline sets in.
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converging agreement that we are going to enter a period in which supply can no longer meet demand, giving way to sustained high oil prices. Either because of the expectation of a long production plateau for one to several decades, or a peak after which a sharp decline sets in. My scenario exercise supports mainly the view of a peak with a sharp decline. The conditions in which a plateau can occur for more than a decade are an unlikely amount of reserve growth, significantly above 500 billion barrels, and/or much higher unconventional production increases.
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most likely scenario, I expect that the increase towards a higher decline rate, as shown in figure 8, is going to occur. The reasoning behind this is a combination of developments, 1) The end of the era of giant oil fields, where there was a sustained base of production of 40 million b/d, which is going to fall away, 2) The end of a sharp increase in production thanks to deepwater, which is going to go away with an equally sharp decrease, 3) The fact that the world has produced more reserves in the past three years than have been added from discoveries and reserve growth (Robelius, 2007; J.S. Herold, 2007), 4) The effect of above ground factors on production, which will lead to higher declines, because from 2009/2010 onwards there will be a significant gap between personnel supply and demand (CERA, 2007), there is a problem to scale up sufficient oil rigs for exploration and production (Simmons 2006), unrest and geopolitics are delaying new oil fields developments, and keeping production down in several countries such as Iraq, Venezuela and Nigeria, which is not likely to change for the better in the future.
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If the prices increase quickly in the northern hemiphere summer 2008 as market conditions suggest (oil prices tend to rise quickly and to higher than expected levels when supplies are tight due to demand elasicity problems in this market).
The real fear is that if a panic hits the market about "Peak Oil" and countries like The UK,Norway,Canada, Mexico and Iran and posssibly Russsia have to reduce exports because the voters in those countries want to preserve "domestic reserves" for their own citizens. This "hoarding behaviour" could become a major problem in world Oil Markets and just a small Peak Oil threat could quickly become a major shortage as producers with declining reserves withold from the market due to domestic pressures. -
As conventional oil production goes over the peak, unconventional oil, especially deep water, is going to dramatically effect the shape of the curve, as it already is. And here, the Hubbert method doesn't account for it well, so the "hard" way must be used to try to guage it. You make a good point in that the deep water production that is helping to prop up world supply is from ocean reservoirs that behave more like a gas field - sharp ramp to the high production level, a relatively brief production history, then a sharp collapse adding to the likelyhood of the sharp fall off scenario you describe. I don't know how anyone can determine just how much deep water oil there is. It seems like the biggest source of uncertainty in projecting the total liquids peak.
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