This link has been bookmarked by 110 people . It was first bookmarked on 27 Mar 2009, by raman srinivasan.
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19 Oct 09
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17 Oct 09
Daniel MurrayAn interesting article about the financial crisis and influence.
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the IMF specializes in telling its clients what they don’t want to hear
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to IMF officials, all of these crises looked depressingly similar.
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countries in crisis need to learn to live within their means after a period of excess
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exports must be increased, and imports cut
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biggest obstacle to recovery, is almost invariably the politics of countries in crisis
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the oligarchs are usually among the first to get extra help from the government, such as preferential access to foreign currency, or maybe a nice tax break, or—here’s a classic Kremlin bailout technique—the assumption of private debt obligations by the government.
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So the IMF staff looks into the eyes of the minister of finance and decides whether the government is serious yet.
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only if at least some of the powerful oligarchs who did so much to create the underlying problems take a hit.
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depth and suddenness
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02 Oct 09
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14 Sep 09
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31 Aug 09
jordan gossthe finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform.
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18 Aug 09
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09 Aug 09
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23 Jul 09
Bob SteigerwaldThe crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
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07 Jul 09
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25 Jun 09
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Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too many risks. Emerging-market governments and their private-sector allies commonly form a tight-knit—and, most of the time, genteel—oligarchy, running the country rather like a profit-seeking company in which they are the controlling shareholders.
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04 Jun 09
Bruce MarksThe crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
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03 Jun 09
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30 May 09
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09 May 09
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02 May 09
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27 Apr 09
John DodsonThe crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
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Sean CarmodyThe crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
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24 Apr 09
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21 Apr 09
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Under duress, generosity toward old friends takes many innovative forms. Meanwhile, needing to squeeze someone, most emerging-market governments look first to ordinary working folk—at least until the riots grow too large.
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More alarming, they are now using their influence to prevent precisely the sorts of reforms that are needed, and fast, to pull the economy out of its nosedive. The government seems helpless, or unwilling, to act against them.
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From 1973 to 1985, the financial sector never earned more than 16 percent of domestic corporate profits.
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20 Apr 09
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Aviva GabrielThe finance industry has effectively captured the U.S. government-a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets...Recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that's blocking essential reform. ~ The Atlantic, May 2008
economics economy economic crisis kleptocracy financial finance politics democracy oligarchy plutocracy financial oligarchy economic gangsters finance industry financial industry banks U.S. USA american IMF
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18 Apr 09
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Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple
reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too
many risks. -
Emerging-market governments and their private-sector allies commonly form a
tight-knit—and, most of the time, genteel—oligarchy, running the country rather
like a profit-seeking company in which they are the controlling shareholders - 11 more annotations...
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Overborrowing always ends badly, whether for an individual, a company, or a
country. Sooner or later, credit conditions become tighter and no one will lend
you money on anything close to affordable terms -
“crony capitalism
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Squeezing the oligarchs, though, is seldom the strategy of choice among
emerging-market governments. Quite the contrary: at the outset of the crisis,
the oligarchs are usually among the first to get extra help from the government,
such as preferential access to foreign currency, or maybe a nice tax break,
or—here’s a classic Kremlin bailout technique—the assumption of private debt
obligations by the government. Under duress, generosity toward old friends takes
many innovative forms. Meanwhile, needing to squeeze someone, most
emerging-market governments look first to ordinary working folk—at least until
the riots grow too large. -
particularly with regard to wresting control of the banking system from the
hands of the most incompetent and avaricious “entrepreneurs.” -
From long years of experience, the IMF staff knows its program will
succeed—stabilizing the economy and enabling growth—only if at least some of the
powerful oligarchs who did so much to create the underlying problems take a hit.
This is the problem of all emerging markets. -
But there’s a deeper and more disturbing similarity: elite business
interests—financiers, in the case of the U.S.—played a central role in creating
the crisis, making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing of the
government, until the inevitable collapse. More alarming, they are now using
their influence to prevent precisely the sorts of reforms that are needed, and
fast, to pull the economy out of its nosedive. The government seems helpless, or
unwilling, to act against them. -
Top investment bankers and government officials like to lay the blame for the
current crisis on the lowering of U.S. interest rates after the dotcom bust or,
even better—in a “buck stops somewhere else” sort of way—on the flow of savings
out of China. Some on the right like to complain about Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac, or even about longer-standing efforts to promote broader homeownership.
And, of course, it is axiomatic to everyone that the regulators responsible for
“safety and soundness” were fast asleep at the whee -
But these various policies—lightweight regulation, cheap money, the unwritten
Chinese-American economic alliance, the promotion of homeownership—had something
in common. Even though some are traditionally associated with Democrats and some
with Republicans, they all benefited the financial sector -
The financial industry has not always enjoyed such favored treatment. But for
the past 25 years or so, finance has boomed, becoming ever more powerful. The
boom began with the Reagan years, and it only gained strength with the
deregulatory policies of the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. -
Not surprisingly, Wall Street ran with these opportunities. From 1973 to 1985,
the financial sector never earned more than 16 percent of domestic corporate
profits. In 1986, that figure reached 19 percent. In the 1990s, it oscillated
between 21 percent and 30 percent, higher than it had ever been in the postwar
period. This decade, it reached 41 percent. Pay rose just as dramatically. From
1948 to 1982, average compensation in the financial sector ranged between 99
percent and 108 percent of the average for all domestic private industries. From
1983, it shot upward, reaching 181 percent in 2007 -
. But that first age of banking oligarchs came to an end with the passage of
significant banking regulation in response to the Great Depression; the
reemergence of an American financial oligarchy is quite recent.
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17 Apr 09
william adiefinance industry captured the govt. sez former IMF chief economist
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15 Apr 09
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13 Apr 09
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10 Apr 09
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jjmerklerThe crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
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Jeehoon JeongThe crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
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09 Apr 09
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From long years of experience, the IMF staff knows its program will succeed—stabilizing the economy and enabling growth—only if at least some of the powerful oligarchs who did so much to create the underlying problems take a hit. This is the problem of all emerging markets.
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In each of those cases, global investors, afraid that the country or its financial sector wouldn’t be able to pay off mountainous debt, suddenly stopped lending. And in each case, that fear became self-fulfilling, as banks that couldn’t roll over their debt did, in fact, become unable to pay. This is precisely what drove Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy on September 15, causing all sources of funding to the U.S. financial sector to dry up overnight.
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disturbing similarity: elite business interests—financiers, in the case of the U.S.—played a central role in creating the crisis, making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing of the government, until the inevitable collapse. More alarming, they are now using their influence to prevent precisely the sorts of reforms that are needed, and fast, to pull the economy out of its nosedive.
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Even though some are traditionally associated with Democrats and some with Republicans, they all benefited the financial sector.
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From 1973 to 1985, the financial sector never earned more than 16 percent of domestic corporate profits. In 1986, that figure reached 19 percent. In the 1990s, it oscillated between 21 percent and 30 percent, higher than it had ever been in the postwar period. This decade, it reached 41 percent.
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Pay rose just as dramatically. From 1948 to 1982, average compensation in the financial sector ranged between 99 percent and 108 percent of the average for all domestic private industries. From 1983, it shot upward, reaching 181 percent in 2007.
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gave bankers enormous political weight—a weight not seen in the U.S. since the era of J.P. Morgan (the man)
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first age of banking oligarchs came to an end with the passage of significant banking regulation in response to the Great Depression
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08 Apr 09
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From long years of experience, the IMF staff knows its program will succeed—stabilizing the economy and enabling growth—only if at least some of the powerful oligarchs who did so much to create the underlying problems take a hit. This is the problem of all emerging markets.
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elite business interests—financiers, in the case of the U.S.—played a central role in creating the crisis, making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing of the government, until the inevitable collapse. More alarming, they are now using their influence to prevent precisely the sorts of reforms that are needed, and fast, to pull the economy out of its nosedive. The government seems helpless, or unwilling, to act against them.
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Brooksley Born
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Not surprisingly, Wall Street ran with these opportunities. From 1973 to 1985, the financial sector never earned more than 16 percent of domestic corporate profits. In 1986, that figure reached 19 percent. In the 1990s, it oscillated between 21 percent and 30 percent, higher than it had ever been in the postwar period. This decade, it reached 41 percent.
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Pay rose just as dramatically. From 1948 to 1982, average compensation in the financial sector ranged between 99 percent and 108 percent of the average for all domestic private industries. From 1983, it shot upward, reaching 181 percent in 2007.
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06 Apr 09
Gary EdwardsThe crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
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1989, and with the private sector in Asia and Latin America during the crises of the late 1990s
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politics of countries in crisis.
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even if that backing gives off the faint whiff of corruption.
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sometimes pressured by the government,
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the oligarchs are usually among the first to get extra help from the government,
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at least until the riots grow too large.
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because the government can’t stay tough on erstwhile cronies, and the consequences are massive inflation or other disasters. A
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05 Apr 09
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04 Apr 09
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stevenson34Simon Johnson: formerly with IMF may have only viable solution to the world economic crisis.
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Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too many risks
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As masters of their mini-universe, these people make some investments that clearly benefit the broader economy, but they also start making bigger and riskier bets. They reckon—correctly, in most cases—that their political connections will allow them to push onto the government any substantial problems that arise.
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Eldritch CrankSqueezing the oligarchs, though, is seldom the strategy of choice among emerging-market governments. Quite the contrary: at the outset of the crisis, the oligarchs are usually among the first to get extra help from the government, such as preferential access to foreign currency, or maybe a nice tax break, or—here’s a classic Kremlin bailout technique—the assumption of private debt obligations by the government. Under duress, generosity toward old friends takes many innovative forms. Meanwhile, needing to squeeze someone, most emerging-market governments look first to ordinary working folk—at least until the riots grow too large.
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kndtc1The crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
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From 1973 to 1985, the financial sector never earned more than 16 percent of domestic corporate profits. In 1986, that figure reached 19 percent. In the 1990s, it oscillated between 21 percent and 30 percent, higher than it had ever been in the postwar period. This decade, it reached 41 percent.
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03 Apr 09
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Sharon BodeThe crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
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Gary Myersthe quiet coup
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Rushdy AhmadThe crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
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The crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
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Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too many risks.
- 11 more annotations...
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Emerging-market governments and their private-sector allies commonly form a tight-knit—and, most of the time, genteel—oligarchy, running the country rather like a profit-seeking company in which they are the controlling shareholders.
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In Russia, for instance, the private sector is now in serious trouble because, over the past five years or so, it borrowed at least $490 billion from global banks and investors on the assumption that the country’s energy sector could support a permanent increase in consumption throughout the economy. As Russia’s oligarchs spent this capital, acquiring other companies and embarking on ambitious investment plans that generated jobs, their importance to the political elite increased. Growing political support meant better access to lucrative contracts, tax breaks, and subsidies. And foreign investors could not have been more pleased; all other things being equal, they prefer to lend money to people who have the implicit backing of their national governments, even if that backing gives off the faint whiff of corruption.
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Yesterday’s “public-private partnerships” are relabeled “crony capitalism.” With credit unavailable, economic paralysis ensues, and conditions just get worse and worse.
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Squeezing the oligarchs, though, is seldom the strategy of choice
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It’s a game of musical chairs:
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Many IMF programs “go off track” (a euphemism) precisely because the government can’t stay tough on erstwhile cronies, and the consequences are massive inflation or other disasters. A program “goes back on track” once the government prevails or powerful oligarchs sort out among themselves who will govern—and thus win or lose—under the IMF-supported plan. The real fight in Thailand and Indonesia in 1997 was about which powerful families would lose their banks. In Thailand, it was handled relatively smoothly. In Indonesia, it led to the fall of President Suharto and economic chaos.
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But there’s a deeper and more disturbing similarity: elite business interests—financiers, in the case of the U.S.—played a central role in creating the crisis, making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing of the government, until the inevitable collapse. More alarming, they are now using their influence to prevent precisely the sorts of reforms that are needed, and fast, to pull the economy out of its nosedive. The government seems helpless, or unwilling, to act against them.
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they all benefited the financial sector.
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The boom began with the Reagan years, and it only gained strength with the deregulatory policies of the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. Several other factors helped fuel the financial industry’s ascent.
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Paul Volcker’s monetary policy in the 1980s, and the increased volatility in interest rates that accompanied it, made bond trading much more lucrative. The invention of securitization, interest-rate swaps, and credit-default swaps greatly increased the volume of transactions that bankers could make money on. And an aging and increasingly wealthy population invested more and more money in securities, helped by the invention of the IRA and the 401(k) plan. Together, these developments vastly increased the profit opportunities in financial services.
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Not surprisingly, Wall Street ran with these opportunities. From 1973 to 1985, the financial sector never earned more than 16 percent of domestic corporate profits. In 1986, that figure reached 19 percent. In the 1990s, it oscillated between 21 percent and 30 percent, higher than it had ever been in the postwar period. This decade, it reached 41 percent. Pay rose just as dramatically. From 1948 to 1982, average compensation in the financial sector ranged between 99 percent and 108 percent of the average for all domestic private industries. From 1983, it shot upward, reaching 181 percent in 2007.
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Richard WanekEconomy
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02 Apr 09
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01 Apr 09
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31 Mar 09
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The crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
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ZebratailSimon Johnson on Oligarchs
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Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too many risks. Emerging-market governments and their private-sector allies commonly form a tight-knit—and, most of the time, genteel—oligarchy, running the country rather like a profit-seeking company in which they are the controlling shareholders. When a country like Indonesia or South Korea or Russia grows, so do the ambitions of its captains of industry. As masters of their mini-universe, these people make some investments that clearly benefit the broader economy, but they also start making bigger and riskier bets. They reckon—correctly, in most cases—that their political connections will allow them to push onto the government any substantial problems that arise.
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Michel Bauwensthe finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us wha
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30 Mar 09
superluminaOne thing you learn rather quickly when working at the International Monetary Fund is that no one is ever very happy to see you. Typically, your “clients” come in only after private capital has abandoned them, after regional trading-bloc partners have been unable to throw a strong enough lifeline, after last-ditch attempts to borrow from powerful friends like China or the European Union have fallen through. You’re never at the top of anyone’s dance card.
The reason, of course, is that the IMF specializes in telling its clients what they don’t want to hear. I should know; I pressed painful changes on many foreign officials during my time there as chief economist in 2007 and 2008. And I felt the effects of IMF pressure, at least indirectly, when I worked with governments in Eastern Europe as they struggled after 1989, and with the private sector in Asia and Latin America during the crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Over that time, from every vantage point, I saw firsthand the steady flow of officials—from Ukraine, Russia, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and elsewhere—trudging to the fund when circumstances were dire and all else had failed. -
Len RichardsonJoan Walsh refers to this article as possibly being correct assessment to recovery solutions.
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29 Mar 09
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28 Mar 09
Mike CaneOne thing you learn rather quickly when working at the International Monetary Fund is that no one is ever very happy to see you. Typically, your “clients” come in only after private capital has abandoned them, after regional trading-bloc partners have been unable to throw a strong enough lifeline, after last-ditch attempts to borrow from powerful friends like China or the European Union have fallen through. You’re never at the top of anyone’s dance card.
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kguestThe crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
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dj extracrispyThe crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government-a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF's staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we're running out of time.
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27 Mar 09
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rpwilsonThe crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.
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finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that
more typically describes emerging markets -
recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking
essential reform - 3 more annotations...
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Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple
reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too
many risks -
The downward spiral that follows is remarkably steep. Enormous companies teeter
on the brink of default, and the local banks that have lent to them collapse -
But there’s a deeper and more disturbing similarity: elite business
interests—financiers, in the case of the U.S.—played a central role in creating
the crisis, making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing of the
government, until the inevitable collapse
-
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