Schneier on Security: Last Week's Terrorism Arrests - The Diigo Meta page

• 24 Nov 06
  

  Todd Sayre

  imported:del.icio.us terrorism

• 19 Sep 06
  

  Adam Kazwell

  culture imported:del.icio.us politics travel

• 24 Aug 06
  

  Nathan M

  read BruceSchneier terrorism security

• 15 Aug 06
  

  Robert Dumas

  government privacy security technology politics

• 14 Aug 06
  

  Peter Klausner
  • Hours-long waits in the security line. Ridiculous prohibitions on what you can carry onboard. Last week's foiling of a major terrorist plot and the subsequent airport security graphically illustrates the difference between effective security and security theater.
• 

  Don Dahlmann

  Was die Anti-Terrorgesetze gebracht haben

• 

  ian connelly

  war

  • Banning box cutters since 9/11, or taking off our shoes since Richard Reid, has not made us any safer. And a long-term prohibition against liquid carry-ons won't make us safer, either. It's not just that there are ways around the rules, it's that focusing on tactics is a losing proposition.  It's easy to defend against what the terrorists planned last time, but it's shortsighted. If we spend billions fielding liquid-analysis machines in airports and the terrorists use solid explosives, we've wasted our money. If they target shopping malls, we've wasted our money. Focusing on tactics simply forces the terrorists to make a minor modification in their plans. There are too many targets -- stadiums, schools, theaters, churches, the long line of densely packed people before airport security -- and too many ways to kill people.  Security measures that require us to guess correctly don't work, because invariably we will guess wrong. It's not security, it's security theater: measures designed to make us feel safer but not actually safer.
• 

  krypton pc

  article business privacy security

• 13 Aug 06
  

  inigo ugarte

  terrorismo qaeda

• 

  mcurry
  • The new airplane security measures focus on that plot, because authorities believe they have not captured everyone involved. It's reasonable to assume that a few lone plotters, knowing their compatriots are in jail and fearing their own arrest, would try to finish the job on their own. The authorities are not being public with the details -- much of the "explosive liquid" story doesn't hang together -- but the excessive security measures seem prudent.  But only temporarily. Banning box cutters since 9/11, or taking off our shoes since Richard Reid, has not made us any safer. And a long-term prohibition against liquid carry-ons won't make us safer, either. It's not just that there are ways around the rules, it's that focusing on tactics is a losing proposition.
• 

  ken .

  "It's easy to defend against what the terrorists planned last time...", "If they target shopping malls, we've wasted our money...", "There are too many targets...", "Measures designed to make us feel safer but not actually safer", c.f Tainter

  business complexity fear money politics security social systems technology

• 

  Ian Delaney

  terrorism

  • Hours-long waits in the security line. Ridiculous prohibitions on what you can carry onboard. Last week's foiling of a major terrorist plot and the subsequent airport security graphically illustrates the difference between effective security and security theater.

Page Comments

• 
  Ian Delaney on 2006-08-13
  Hours-long waits in the security line. Ridiculous prohibitions on what you can carry onboard. Last week's foiling of a major terrorist plot and the subsequent airport security graphically illustrates the difference between effective security and security theater.
• 
  Adam Kazwell on 2006-09-19
  long-term prohibition against liquid carry-ons won't make us safer, either. It's not just that there are ways around the rules, it's that focusing on tactics is a losing proposition.

Would you like to comment?

Join Diigo for a free account, or sign in if you are already a member.