Further missile-launchers were destroyed on numerous occasions throughout the war, with much of this due to the use of reconnaissance drones.
They were used to detect the launches of medium-range missiles and the data could be processed and communicated to strike aircraft within a minute, making it possible to destroy the launchers and their crews before they could go back undercover.
The Hizbollah leadership did not anticipate the scale of the attack, nor did they expect the Israelis to strike at so many economic and logistical targets across Lebanon, many of them bearing little relationship to the capabilities or support networks of Hizbollah
The far more numerous short-range missiles could be brought from cover and fired from very simple launchers, with the launchers and their crews back under cover before there could be any retaliation. The Israelis had no realistic answer to this, which explains why they belatedly tried to move substantial ground forces into the main missile launch areas near the border.
stories now coming through to the defence media about Israeli technical advances probably has more to do with the air force seeking to guard its back
It is therefore useful to this wider community if the Israeli air force can convince that it secured many successes in southern Lebanon as a result of this "value-added capability", even if the achievement was minimal in the context of the overall war.
The end result, though, was that the Hizbollah forces were sufficiently robust and motivated to be able to respond in a manner that caused surprise verging on amazement among the more careful Israeli analysts.
Israel failed in its core war aim of defeating Hizbollah, despite the element of surprise and the long period of preparation.
